Release v1.7.18: fix Alpine.js SRI + CSP, add frontend modernization roadmap

- Revert @alpinejs/csp (CSP build has no support for template literals,
  optional chaining, or x-html — all used in the app template); switch
  back to the regular alpinejs build
- Pin Alpine.js to 3.15.12 with a verified SRI hash (replaces the
  floating @3.x.x tag that caused the integrity check failure)
- Restore 'unsafe-eval' to script-src (required by Alpine.js's
  new Function() expression evaluator; inline script was already
  eliminated in v1.7.17 so 'unsafe-inline' stays removed)
- Add Phase 7.5 Frontend Modernization to ROADMAP: Vue 3 + Vite
  migration plan that will allow a clean CSP without unsafe-eval

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.env.example

@@ -27,6 +27,18 @@ RETENTION_DAYS=0
 # Optional: comma-separated CORS origins (e.g., http://localhost:3000,https://app.example.com)
 CORS_ORIGINS=*
 
+# OpenAPI docs exposure (set true only for dev)
+DOCS_ENABLED=false
+
+# LLM endpoint domain restriction (comma-separated, supports wildcards like *.openai.azure.com)
+# LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS=api.openai.com,*.openai.azure.com
+
+# SIEM webhook domain restriction (comma-separated)
+# SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS=your-siem.com
+
+# Optional Azure Key Vault for secrets storage
+# AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME=your-keyvault-name
+
 # Optional: SIEM export webhook (e.g., Splunk HEC, Sentinel, or generic syslog webhook)
 SIEM_ENABLED=false
 SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL=

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -17,21 +17,29 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
 
       - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        run: |
-        with:
+          apt-get update && apt-get install -y python3 python3-venv || true
-          python-version: "3.11"
+          python3 --version
 
       - name: Install dependencies
         run: |
-          python -m pip install --upgrade pip
+          python3 -m venv .venv
+          source .venv/bin/activate
+          pip install --upgrade pip
           pip install -r requirements.txt
           pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
 
       - name: Lint with ruff
-        run: ruff check .
+        run: |
+          source .venv/bin/activate
+          ruff check .
 
       - name: Format check with ruff
-        run: ruff format --check .
+        run: |
+          source .venv/bin/activate
+          ruff format --check .
 
       - name: Run tests
-        run: pytest -q
+        run: |
+          source .venv/bin/activate
+          pytest -q

.gitignore

@@ -2,11 +2,22 @@
 .DS_Store
 __pycache__/
 *.py[cod]
+*.pyo
 .venv/
 venv/
+.*venv*/
 .pytest_cache/
 .mypy_cache/
+.ruff_cache/
 .coverage*
 coverage.xml
 .vscode/
 .idea/
+memory/
+*.log
+*.tmp
+*.swp
+*.swo
+*.bak
+*.orig
+*.rej

AGENTS.md

@@ -9,20 +9,24 @@ AOC is a FastAPI microservice that ingests Microsoft Entra (Azure AD) audit logs
 - **Runtime**: Python 3.11 (3.14 for tests)
 - **Web Framework**: FastAPI + Uvicorn (Gunicorn in production)
 - **Database**: MongoDB (PyMongo)
+- **Cache/Queue**: Valkey/Redis 8 (caching + arq async job queue)
 - **Frontend**: Alpine.js + HTML/CSS (served as static files from `backend/frontend/`)
 - **Authentication**: Optional OIDC Bearer token validation against Microsoft Entra (using `python-jose` and MSAL.js on the frontend)
 - **External APIs**: Microsoft Graph API, Office 365 Management Activity API, Azure OpenAI / MS Foundry
 - **Deployment**: Docker Compose (dev), Docker Compose + nginx (prod)
 - **CI/CD**: Gitea Actions (lint + test + Docker build + release)
+- **Secrets Storage**: Environment variables (`.env`) or optional Azure Key Vault
 
 ## Project Structure
 
 ```
 backend/
   main.py              # FastAPI app, router registration, background periodic fetch
-  config.py            # Pydantic Settings configuration (loads .env)
+  config.py            # Pydantic Settings configuration (loads .env + optional Key Vault)
   database.py          # MongoClient setup (db = micro_soc, collection = events)
   auth.py              # OIDC Bearer token validation, JWKS caching, role/group checks
+  secrets_manager.py   # Optional Azure Key Vault integration for secrets
+  rate_limiter.py      # Redis-backed fixed-window rate limiter (fail-closed)
   requirements.txt     # Python dependencies
   Dockerfile           # python:3.11-slim image, non-root user, version baked at build
   mcp_server.py        # Standalone MCP server for Claude Desktop / Cursor integration
@@ -34,6 +38,9 @@ backend/
     health.py          # GET /health, GET /metrics
     rules.py           # Rule-based alerting endpoints
     webhooks.py        # Microsoft Graph change notification webhooks
+    alerts.py          # Alert management endpoints
+    saved_searches.py  # Saved filter presets
+    jobs.py            # Async job status polling
   graph/
     auth.py            # Client credentials token acquisition for Graph
     audit_logs.py      # Fetch and enrich directory audit logs from Graph
@@ -59,16 +66,42 @@ Copy `.env.example` to `.env` at the repo root and fill in values:
 cp .env.example .env
 ```
 
-Key variables:
+### Core variables
 - `TENANT_ID`, `CLIENT_ID`, `CLIENT_SECRET` — Microsoft app registration credentials (application permissions)
 - `AUTH_ENABLED` — set `true` to protect API/UI with OIDC Bearer tokens
 - `AUTH_TENANT_ID`, `AUTH_CLIENT_ID` — token validation audience/issuer
 - `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES`, `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` — comma-separated access control lists
 - `ENABLE_PERIODIC_FETCH`, `FETCH_INTERVAL_MINUTES` — background ingestion scheduler
 - `MONGO_ROOT_USERNAME`, `MONGO_ROOT_PASSWORD`, `MONGO_PORT` — used by Docker Compose for MongoDB
+
+### AI / LLM variables
 - `AI_FEATURES_ENABLED` — set `false` to completely disable AI endpoints and UI (default `true`)
 - `LLM_API_KEY`, `LLM_BASE_URL`, `LLM_MODEL`, `LLM_MAX_EVENTS`, `LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` — LLM provider settings
 - `LLM_API_VERSION` — required for Azure OpenAI / MS Foundry endpoints
+- `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` — comma-separated domain allowlist for LLM endpoints (e.g. `api.openai.com,*.openai.azure.com`)
+
+### Security variables
+- `CORS_ORIGINS` — comma-separated allowed origins (default `*`; set explicit origins in production)
+- `DOCS_ENABLED` — set `true` to expose `/docs`, `/redoc`, `/openapi.json` (default `false`)
+- `METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS` — comma-separated CIDRs allowed to access `/metrics` (default: private networks + loopback)
+- `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` — secret for validating Graph webhook `clientState`
+- `SIEM_ENABLED`, `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL` — optional SIEM forwarding
+- `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` — comma-separated domain allowlist for SIEM webhook URLs
+- `RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED`, `RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS`, `RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS` — Redis-backed rate limiting
+
+### Optional Azure Key Vault
+- `AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME` — name of the Azure Key Vault to load secrets from
+- When set, AOC fetches these secrets at startup:
+  - `aoc-client-secret` → `CLIENT_SECRET`
+  - `aoc-llm-api-key` → `LLM_API_KEY`
+  - `aoc-mongo-uri` → `MONGO_URI`
+  - `aoc-webhook-client-secret` → `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET`
+- Requires `azure-identity` and `azure-keyvault-secrets` (uncomment in `requirements.txt`)
+
+### Privacy / access control
+- `PRIVACY_SERVICES` — comma-separated services to hide from non-privileged users (e.g. `Exchange,Teams`)
+- `PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_OPERATIONS` — comma-separated operations to gate
+- `PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES` — comma-separated Entra roles that grant access to privacy data
 
 ## Build and Run Commands
 
@@ -102,7 +135,9 @@ uvicorn main:app --reload --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
 - `GET /api/config/features` — feature flags (`ai_features_enabled`)
 - `POST /api/ask` — natural language query; returns LLM narrative + referenced events (only when `AI_FEATURES_ENABLED=true`)
 - `GET /health` — liveness probe with DB connectivity
-- `GET /metrics` — Prometheus metrics
+- `GET /metrics` — Prometheus metrics (IP-restricted by default)
+- `GET /api/source-health` — last fetch status per ingestion source
+- `GET /api/version` — running version
 
 ## MCP Server
 
@@ -162,16 +197,30 @@ When adding new features or bug fixes, add or update tests in `backend/tests/`.
 - Auth middleware and token validation
 - API endpoints (`/api/events`, `/api/fetch-audit-logs`, `/api/ask`)
 - NLQ time range extraction, entity extraction, query building
+- Rate limiting behavior
 
 ## Security Considerations
 
-- **Secrets**: `CLIENT_SECRET`, `LLM_API_KEY`, and other credentials come from `.env`. Never commit `.env`.
+- **Secrets**: `CLIENT_SECRET`, `LLM_API_KEY`, and other credentials come from `.env` or Azure Key Vault. Never commit `.env`.
-- **Auth validation**: When `AUTH_ENABLED=true`, the backend fetches JWKS from `https://login.microsoftonline.com/{AUTH_TENANT_ID}/v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration`, caches keys for 1 hour, and validates tenant/issuer claims. Tokens are decoded without strict signature verification (`jwt.get_unverified_claims`), so the tenant and issuer checks are the primary gate.
+- **Auth validation**: When `AUTH_ENABLED=true`, the backend fetches JWKS from `https://login.microsoftonline.com/{AUTH_TENANT_ID}/v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration`, caches keys for 1 hour, and validates tenant/issuer/audience claims. Tokens are decoded with RS256 signature verification.
-- **Role/Group gating**: Access is allowed if the token’s `roles` intersect `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES` or `groups` intersect `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS`. If neither list is configured, all authenticated users are allowed.
+- **Role/Group gating**: Access is allowed if the token's `roles` intersect `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES` or `groups` intersect `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS`. If neither list is configured, all authenticated users are allowed — a startup warning is logged in this case.
+- **CORS**: When `AUTH_ENABLED=true` and `CORS_ORIGINS="*"`, `allow_credentials` is forced to `false` to prevent cross-origin token leakage.
+- **Rate limiting**: Redis-backed fixed-window rate limiting with per-category limits (fetch=10/hr, ask=30/min, write=20/min, default=120/min). Fails closed (returns 429) when Redis is unavailable.
 - **Pagination limits**: `page_size` is clamped to a maximum of 500 to prevent large queries.
 - **Fetch window cap**: `hours` is clamped to 720 (30 days) to avoid runaway API calls.
+- **LLM SSRF guard**: `LLM_BASE_URL` must be HTTPS and cannot point to private IPs. Optional `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` restricts to specific domains.
+- **SIEM SSRF guard**: `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL` has the same validation as LLM URLs, plus optional `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`.
+- **Metrics IP gating**: `/metrics` is restricted to private/loopback IPs by default via `METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS`.
+- **OpenAPI docs**: Disabled by default (`DOCS_ENABLED=false`). Enable only in development.
+- **CSP**: Content-Security-Policy headers are set on all responses. `unsafe-eval` is required for Alpine.js v3 expression evaluation.
+- **SRI**: CDN scripts (Alpine.js, MSAL.js) include Subresource Integrity hashes to prevent supply chain compromise.
 - **MCP server**: The MCP server bypasses auth entirely. Only run it in trusted environments or behind a VPN.
 
+### Security Documentation
+
+- `PEN_TEST_REPORT_v1.7.11.md` — Internal soft penetration test findings and remediation
+- `THREAT_MODEL_v1.7.13.md` — Comprehensive threat model covering Entra/token abuse vectors
+
 ## Maintenance and Operations
 
 The `backend/maintenance.py` script provides two CLI commands useful for backfilling or correcting stored data:

DEPLOY.md

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ AOC runs as a set of Docker containers orchestrated by Docker Compose:
 - **nginx** — reverse proxy, TLS termination, static file serving
 - **backend** — FastAPI application (Gunicorn + Uvicorn workers)
 - **mongo** — MongoDB data store (not exposed externally)
+- **valkey** — Redis-compatible cache and async job queue (not exposed externally)
 
 ## Prerequisites
 
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ AOC runs as a set of Docker containers orchestrated by Docker Compose:
 1. **Clone / pull the latest release**
 
    ```bash
-   git checkout v1.1.0
+   git checkout v1.7.14
    ```
 
 2. **Copy and edit environment variables**
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ AOC runs as a set of Docker containers orchestrated by Docker Compose:
 3. **Set the release version**
 
    ```bash
-   export AOC_VERSION=v1.1.0
+   export AOC_VERSION=v1.7.14
    ```
 
 4. **Deploy**
@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ AOC runs as a set of Docker containers orchestrated by Docker Compose:
 ## Updating to a new release
 
 ```bash
-export AOC_VERSION=v1.2.0
+export AOC_VERSION=v1.7.14
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml pull
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
 ```
@@ -75,24 +76,56 @@ docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
 
 Replace the `nginx` service in `docker-compose.prod.yml` with a Certbot-friendly setup (e.g., use the `nginx-proxy` + `acme-companion` stack) or mount the Certbot certificates into `nginx/ssl/`.
 
-## Security hardening
+## Security Hardening
 
 - MongoDB is **not exposed** to the host — only the backend container can reach it.
+- Valkey/Redis is **not exposed** to the host — only the backend container can reach it.
 - The backend runs as a non-root (`aoc`) user inside the container.
 - nginx adds security headers (`X-Frame-Options`, `X-Content-Type-Options`, etc.).
 - Keep `.env` out of version control — it is listed in `.gitignore`.
+- Set `AUTH_ENABLED=true` and configure `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES` or `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` to restrict access to admin/security roles.
+- Set explicit `CORS_ORIGINS` — do not use `*` in production when auth is enabled.
+- Set `DOCS_ENABLED=false` to hide OpenAPI docs (`/docs`, `/openapi.json`).
+- Configure `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` to validate Graph webhook notifications.
+- Set `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` if using AI features (e.g. `api.openai.com,*.openai.azure.com`).
+- Set `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` if using SIEM forwarding.
+- Review `METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS` — defaults to private networks + loopback.
+
+## Azure Key Vault (Optional)
+
+To eliminate long-lived secrets from `.env`:
+
+1. Create an Azure Key Vault and add these secrets:
+   - `aoc-client-secret` — your Graph app `CLIENT_SECRET`
+   - `aoc-llm-api-key` — your `LLM_API_KEY` (if using AI)
+   - `aoc-mongo-uri` — your `MONGO_URI`
+   - `aoc-webhook-client-secret` — your `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET`
+
+2. Uncomment `azure-identity` and `azure-keyvault-secrets` in `backend/requirements.txt`
+
+3. Set `AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME=your-keyvault-name` in `.env`
+
+4. Grant the container identity `Get` permission on secrets:
+   - If using Azure Container Instances / AKS: assign a managed identity
+   - If using VM: assign a managed identity or use a service principal
+   - If using local Docker: authenticate via `az login` on the host
+
+5. Rebuild and redeploy:
+   ```bash
+   docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d --build
+   ```
 
 ## Rollback
 
 ```bash
-export AOC_VERSION=v1.0.3
+export AOC_VERSION=v1.7.13
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml pull
 docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
 ```
 
 ## Monitoring
 
-- Prometheus metrics: `http://your-host/metrics`
+- Prometheus metrics: `http://your-host/metrics` (IP-restricted by default)
 - Health check: `http://your-host/health`
 - Container logs:
 
@@ -100,4 +133,13 @@ docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
   docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml logs -f backend
   docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml logs -f nginx
   docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml logs -f mongo
+  docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml logs -f valkey
   ```
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+- **Auth warning in logs**: "AUTH_ENABLED is true but no AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES or AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS are configured" — set these to restrict access.
+- **CORS issues**: Set `CORS_ORIGINS` to your exact frontend origin(s). Wildcard with auth enabled disables credentials.
+- **Rate limiting 429s**: Check Redis/Valkey connectivity. The rate limiter fails closed (returns 429) when Redis is down.
+- **LLM errors**: Verify `LLM_BASE_URL` is in `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` if the allowlist is configured.
+- **SIEM not forwarding**: Verify `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL` uses HTTPS and is in `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`.

PEN_TEST_REPORT_v1.7.11.md

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+# AOC v1.7.11 Soft Penetration Test Report
+
+**Date:** 2026-04-27
+**Target:** Local AOC instance (port 8001), auth disabled, AI disabled
+**Tester:** Automated + manual curl-based probing
+**Scope:** FastAPI backend, REST API endpoints, middleware, headers
+
+---
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+AOC v1.7.11 has one **CRITICAL** vulnerability (CORS credentials leak) and several defense-in-depth gaps. The good news: input validation, NoSQL injection resistance, and error handling are solid. The bad news: CORS is dangerously permissive, security headers are missing, and the rate limiter fails open on Redis failure.
+
+| Severity | Count | Categories |
+|----------|-------|------------|
+| CRITICAL | 1 | CORS with credentials |
+| HIGH | 1 | Missing security headers |
+| MEDIUM | 2 | Fail-open rate limiter, OpenAPI exposure |
+| LOW | 2 | Information disclosure, webhook content injection |
+| INFO | 3 | Positive findings (no stack traces, input validation, NoSQL resistance) |
+
+---
+
+## CRITICAL
+
+### 1. CORS Reflects Any Origin with `allow_credentials=true`
+
+**Finding:** The CORS middleware returns `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: <any origin>` AND `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` for every origin that sends an `Origin` header.
+
+**Evidence:**
+```bash
+curl -H "Origin: https://evil-attacker.com" http://localhost:8001/api/config/auth
+# Response headers:
+# access-control-allow-origin: https://evil-attacker.com
+# access-control-allow-credentials: true
+```
+
+**Impact:** An attacker can host a malicious page on any domain and make authenticated cross-origin requests to the AOC API using the victim's browser cookies/tokens. This effectively bypasses Same-Origin Policy for authenticated actions.
+
+**Root Cause:** `main.py` configures CORS with `allow_origins=["*"]` (from `CORS_ORIGINS` env var, default `"*"`) AND `allow_credentials=True`. According to CORS spec, a wildcard origin with credentials is technically invalid, but Starlette/FastAPI appears to reflect the request origin instead.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- When `AUTH_ENABLED=true`, reject requests from origins not in an explicit allowlist.
+- Set `allow_credentials=False` if wildcard origins are needed.
+- Or, require `CORS_ORIGINS` to be explicitly configured (no default wildcard) when auth is enabled.
+
+---
+
+## HIGH
+
+### 2. Missing Security Headers
+
+**Finding:** The following security headers are absent from all responses:
+
+| Header | Purpose | Status |
+|--------|---------|--------|
+| `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` | Prevents MIME sniffing | MISSING |
+| `X-Frame-Options: DENY` or `SAMEORIGIN` | Clickjacking protection | MISSING |
+| `Strict-Transport-Security` | HSTS enforcement | MISSING |
+| `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` | Limits referrer leakage | MISSING |
+| `Permissions-Policy` | Restricts browser features | MISSING |
+
+**Impact:** Increased attack surface for clickjacking, MIME confusion attacks, and information leakage via referrer headers.
+
+**Recommendation:** Add a security headers middleware to set these on all responses. HSTS only when served over HTTPS.
+
+---
+
+## MEDIUM
+
+### 3. Rate Limiter Fails Open on Redis Failure
+
+**Finding:** In `rate_limiter.py` line 81-82:
+```python
+except Exception as exc:
+    logger.warning("Rate limiter Redis error; allowing request", error=str(exc))
+```
+
+If Redis becomes unreachable, all rate limits are silently bypassed.
+
+**Evidence:** When Redis was down, 150+ requests to `/api/events` all returned 200 with no 429s.
+
+**Impact:** A DoS on Redis (or a network partition) removes all rate limiting, allowing unlimited API abuse.
+
+**Recommendation:** Make the rate limiter fail-closed: return 429 or 503 when Redis is unavailable, or use an in-memory fallback with a conservative limit.
+
+### 4. OpenAPI Schema Publicly Exposed
+
+**Finding:** `/docs`, `/redoc`, and `/openapi.json` are accessible without authentication and return the full API schema.
+
+**Evidence:**
+```bash
+curl -s http://localhost:8001/openapi.json | jq '.paths | keys'
+# Returns all 15+ API paths including internal endpoints
+```
+
+**Impact:** Attackers get a complete map of the API, including request/response schemas, parameter types, and endpoint structure. This significantly reduces reconnaissance time.
+
+**Recommendation:** Disable OpenAPI docs in production (`docs_url=None, redoc_url=None, openapi_url=None`) or gate them behind admin authentication.
+
+---
+
+## LOW
+
+### 5. Information Disclosure via `/api/config/auth` and `/metrics`
+
+**Finding:**
+- `/api/config/auth` leaks `tenant_id` and `client_id` even when auth is disabled. These values fall back to the Graph API credentials (`TENANT_ID`/`CLIENT_ID`), which may be sensitive.
+- `/metrics` exposes Python version (`3.14.3`), GC statistics, and application-internal metric names.
+
+**Evidence:**
+```json
+{
+  "auth_enabled": false,
+  "tenant_id": "0ec9f34c-17c8-4541-b084-7d64ecdcc997",
+  "client_id": "cc31fd45-1eca-431f-a2c6-ba81cd4c5d50"
+}
+```
+
+**Impact:** Low direct impact (tenant/client IDs are not secrets), but aids reconnaissance and narrows the attack surface.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Return empty strings for `tenant_id`/`client_id` when `auth_enabled=false`.
+- Gate `/metrics` behind IP allowlist or admin auth (standard Prometheus practice).
+
+### 6. Webhook Validation Token Echoed Without Sanitization
+
+**Finding:** The `/api/webhooks/graph` endpoint echoes `validationToken` query parameter as `text/plain` without any sanitization or length limits.
+
+**Evidence:**
+```bash
+curl -X POST "http://localhost:8001/api/webhooks/graph?validationToken=<script>alert(1)</script>"
+# Returns: <script>alert(1)</script> with Content-Type: text/plain
+```
+
+**Impact:** Low in the intended Microsoft Graph flow (token is Microsoft-generated), but if the endpoint is hit directly, an attacker could use this for cache poisoning, response splitting, or social engineering by making the endpoint return attacker-controlled content.
+
+**Recommendation:** Validate the validationToken format (e.g., JWT-like structure, length limits) before echoing, or set `Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8` with `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` to reduce MIME confusion risk.
+
+---
+
+## INFO (Positive Findings)
+
+### A. No Stack Traces in Error Responses
+
+All errors (422, 404, 429, 500 if triggered) return generic JSON messages without internal details or stack traces. Good.
+
+### B. Pydantic Input Validation is Effective
+
+- `page_size` capped at 500 (returns 422 for 501, 0, -1)
+- `hours` capped at 720 (returns 422 for 721)
+- Invalid cursors return 400 with "Invalid cursor"
+- Malformed JSON bodies return 422 with field-level validation errors
+- `AlertCondition` op field strictly validated against `Literal["eq", "neq", "contains", "in", "after_hours"]`
+
+### C. NoSQL Injection Resistant
+
+MongoDB operators passed as string filter values are treated as literals, not operators:
+
+```bash
+curl "http://localhost:8001/api/events?operation=\$ne"
+# Returns 0 results (treated as literal string "$ne")
+```
+
+The `_build_query()` function in `events.py` uses `re.escape()` for search input and constructs queries safely.
+
+### D. Bulk Tags Pre-Count Check Works
+
+`bulk_tags` endpoint capped at 10,000 matched documents via pre-count check. 93 events were successfully tagged with no bypass.
+
+### E. Rate Limiting Works When Redis is Healthy
+
+- `/api/fetch-audit-logs`: 429 after 11 requests (limit: 10/hr)
+- `/api/events`: 429 after ~120 requests (limit: 120/min)
+- Exempt paths work correctly: `/health`, `/metrics`, `/api/config/auth`, `/api/config/features`
+- `Retry-After` header is returned on 429 responses
+
+---
+
+## Recommendations Summary
+
+| Priority | Action | Effort |
+|----------|--------|--------|
+| P0 | Fix CORS: do not allow credentials with wildcard/reflected origins | Small |
+| P1 | Add security headers middleware (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, HSTS, Referrer-Policy) | Small |
+| P2 | Make rate limiter fail-closed on Redis errors | Small |
+| P2 | Disable OpenAPI docs in production or gate behind auth | Small |
+| P3 | Sanitize or validate webhook validationToken before echo | Small |
+| P3 | Gate `/metrics` behind IP allowlist | Small |
+| P3 | Hide tenant_id/client_id from `/api/config/auth` when auth is disabled | Tiny |
+| P4 | Consider Alpine.js CSP build to remove `unsafe-eval` from script-src | Medium |
+
+---
+
+## Test Environment
+
+```
+Backend: uvicorn on localhost:8001 (auth=false, ai=false)
+MongoDB: docker container, port 27018
+Redis:   docker container, port 6380
+```
+
+*Test commands and raw outputs available in `/tmp/pen_test*.sh` scripts.*

README.md

@@ -11,13 +11,14 @@ FastAPI microservice that ingests Microsoft Entra (Azure AD) and other admin aud
 - Optional OIDC bearer auth (Entra) to protect the API/UI and gate access by roles/groups.
 - Natural language query (`/api/ask`) powered by LLM (OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, or any compatible API).
 - MCP server for Claude Desktop / Cursor integration.
+- Optional Azure Key Vault integration for secrets storage.
 
 ## Prerequisites (macOS)
 - Python 3.11
 - Docker Desktop (for the quickest start) or a local MongoDB instance
 - An Entra app registration with **Application** permission `AuditLog.Read.All` and admin consent granted
   - Also required to fetch other sources:
-    - `https://manage.office.com/.default` (Audit API) with `ActivityFeed.Read`/`ActivityFeed.ReadDlp` (built into the app registration’s API permissions for Office 365 Management APIs)
+    - `https://manage.office.com/.default` (Audit API) with `ActivityFeed.Read`/`ActivityFeed.ReadDlp` (built into the app registration's API permissions for Office 365 Management APIs)
     - Intune audit: `DeviceManagementConfiguration.Read.All` (or broader) for `/deviceManagement/auditEvents`
   - Optional API protection: configure `AUTH_ENABLED=true` and set `AUTH_TENANT_ID`/`AUTH_CLIENT_ID` (the audience) plus allowed roles/groups.
 
@@ -49,8 +50,43 @@ cp .env.example .env
 # LLM_BASE_URL=https://api.openai.com/v1
 # LLM_MODEL=gpt-4o-mini
 # LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=30
+# LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS=api.openai.com,*.openai.azure.com
+
+# Optional: SIEM forwarding
+# SIEM_ENABLED=true
+# SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL=https://your-siem.com/webhook
+# SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS=your-siem.com
+
+# Optional: Azure Key Vault for secrets storage
+# AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME=your-keyvault-name
 ```
 
+### Using Azure Key Vault for secrets
+Instead of storing `CLIENT_SECRET`, `LLM_API_KEY`, `MONGO_URI`, and `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` in `.env`, you can store them in Azure Key Vault:
+
+1. Create a Key Vault and add secrets with these names:
+   - `aoc-client-secret` → your Graph app `CLIENT_SECRET`
+   - `aoc-llm-api-key` → your `LLM_API_KEY`
+   - `aoc-mongo-uri` → your `MONGO_URI`
+   - `aoc-webhook-client-secret` → your `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET`
+2. Uncomment `azure-identity` and `azure-keyvault-secrets` in `backend/requirements.txt`
+3. Set `AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME=your-keyvault-name` in `.env`
+4. Ensure the container has Azure identity credentials (managed identity, service principal, or Azure CLI auth)
+
+## Security Hardening Checklist
+
+Before deploying to production:
+
+- [ ] Set `AUTH_ENABLED=true` and configure `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES` or `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` to restrict access
+- [ ] Set explicit `CORS_ORIGINS` (do not use `*` in production with auth enabled)
+- [ ] Set `DOCS_ENABLED=false` (default) to hide OpenAPI docs
+- [ ] Configure `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` to validate Graph webhook notifications
+- [ ] Set `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` if using AI features to prevent data exfiltration
+- [ ] Set `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` if using SIEM forwarding
+- [ ] Review `METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS` — defaults to private networks only
+- [ ] Consider Azure Key Vault instead of `.env` for secrets
+- [ ] Review the threat model: `THREAT_MODEL_v1.7.13.md`
+
 ## Run with Docker Compose (recommended)
 ```bash
 docker compose up --build
@@ -76,7 +112,7 @@ uvicorn main:app --reload --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
 
 ## API
 - `GET /health` — health check with MongoDB connectivity status.
-- `GET /metrics` — Prometheus metrics for request latency, fetch volume, and errors.
+- `GET /metrics` — Prometheus metrics for request latency, fetch volume, and errors (IP-restricted).
 - `GET /api/version` — running version (baked into the Docker image at build time).
 - `GET /api/fetch-audit-logs` — pulls the last 7 days by default (override with `?hours=N`, capped to 30 days) of:
   - Entra directory audit logs (`/auditLogs/directoryAudits`)
@@ -171,7 +207,7 @@ curl http://localhost:8000/api/fetch-audit-logs
 - Visit the UI at http://localhost:8000 to filter by user/service/action/result/time, search raw text, paginate, and view raw events.
 
 ## Maintenance (Dockerized)
-Use the backend image so you don’t need a local venv:
+Use the backend image so you don't need a local venv:
 ```bash
 # ensure Mongo + backend network are up
 docker compose up -d mongo
@@ -182,10 +218,15 @@ docker compose run --rm backend python maintenance.py dedupe
 ```
 Omit `--limit` to process all events. You can also run commands inside a running backend container with `docker compose exec backend ...`.
 
+## Security Documentation
+- `PEN_TEST_REPORT_v1.7.11.md` — Penetration test findings and remediation
+- `THREAT_MODEL_v1.7.13.md` — Comprehensive threat model covering Entra application abuse, token handling, data exfiltration vectors
+
 ## Notes / Troubleshooting
 - Ensure `TENANT_ID`, `CLIENT_ID`, and `CLIENT_SECRET` match an app registration with `AuditLog.Read.All` (application) permission and admin consent.
 - Additional permissions: Office 365 Management Activity (`ActivityFeed.Read`), and Intune audit (`DeviceManagementConfiguration.Read.All`).
-- Auth: if `AUTH_ENABLED=true`, issued tokens must be from `AUTH_TENANT_ID`, audience = `AUTH_CLIENT_ID`; access is granted if roles or groups overlap `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES`/`AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` (if set).
+- Auth: if `AUTH_ENABLED=true`, issued tokens must be from `AUTH_TENANT_ID`, audience = `AUTH_CLIENT_ID`; access is granted if roles or groups overlap `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES`/`AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` (if set). A startup warning is logged if auth is enabled but no roles/groups are configured.
 - Backfill limits: Management Activity API typically exposes ~7 days of history via API (longer if your tenant has extended/Advanced Audit retention). Directory/Intune audit retention follows your tenant policy (commonly 30–90 days, longer with Advanced Audit).
 - If you change Mongo credentials/ports, update `MONGO_URI` in `.env` (Docker Compose passes it through to the backend).
 - The service uses the `micro_soc` database and `events` collection by default; adjust in `backend/config.py` if needed.
+- If using Azure Key Vault, ensure the runtime identity (managed identity, service principal, or local Azure CLI) has `Get` permission on secrets.

RELEASE_NOTES_v1.7.12.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# AOC v1.7.12 Release Notes
+
+**Release Date:** 2026-04-27
+
+## Security Hardening (Penetration Test Remediation)
+
+This release addresses all findings from the internal soft penetration test of v1.7.11.
+
+### Critical Fix: CORS Credentials Leak
+- **Issue:** When `AUTH_ENABLED=true` and `CORS_ORIGINS="*"`, the CORS middleware reflected any origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`, allowing cross-origin authenticated requests from attacker-controlled domains.
+- **Fix:** When auth is enabled with a wildcard origin, `allow_credentials` is now forced to `False`. CORS still works for unauthenticated requests, but bearer tokens cannot be leaked cross-origin.
+
+### High Fix: Missing Security Headers
+- Added `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
+- Added `X-Frame-Options: DENY`
+- Added `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`
+- Added `Permissions-Policy` restricting browser features (accelerometer, camera, geolocation, gyroscope, magnetometer, microphone, payment, USB)
+
+### Medium Fixes
+- **Rate limiter fail-closed:** Previously, a Redis outage silently disabled all rate limiting. The rate limiter now returns `429` when Redis is unreachable.
+- **OpenAPI docs exposure:** `/docs`, `/redoc`, and `/openapi.json` are disabled by default. Set `DOCS_ENABLED=true` to re-enable (intended for development only).
+
+### Low Fixes
+- **Information disclosure:** `/api/config/auth` no longer leaks `tenant_id` and `client_id` when `auth_enabled=false`.
+- **Webhook validation token:** Added length cap (1024 chars) and ASCII-only validation before echoing `validationToken`. Response now includes `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
+
+## Files Changed
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `backend/main.py` | CORS fix, security headers middleware, conditional OpenAPI docs |
+| `backend/config.py` | Added `DOCS_ENABLED` setting |
+| `backend/rate_limiter.py` | Fail-closed on Redis errors |
+| `backend/routes/config.py` | Hide tenant/client IDs when auth disabled |
+| `backend/routes/webhooks.py` | Validate validationToken before echo |
+| `backend/tests/conftest.py` | Enhanced FakeRedis mock with `incr`/`expire` |
+| `.env.example` | Documented `DOCS_ENABLED` |
+| `VERSION` | Bumped to 1.7.12 |
+
+## Test Results
+
+- **80/80 pytest tests passing**
+- Penetration test report: `PEN_TEST_REPORT_v1.7.11.md`

RELEASE_NOTES_v1.7.13.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# AOC v1.7.13 Release Notes
+
+**Release Date:** 2026-04-27
+
+## Security Hardening: Alpine.js CSP Build
+
+This release removes `unsafe-eval` from the Content-Security-Policy by switching the frontend to Alpine.js's CSP-compatible build.
+
+### Changes
+
+- **Frontend:** Switched from `alpinejs@3.x.x/dist/cdn.min.js` to `alpinejs@3.x.x/dist/csp.min.js`
+- **Frontend:** Added explicit `Alpine.start()` call on `DOMContentLoaded` (required by CSP build)
+- **Backend CSP:** Removed `'unsafe-eval'` from `script-src` directive
+
+### Why this matters
+
+The previous v1.7.11–1.7.12 releases included `'unsafe-eval'` in the CSP because the standard Alpine.js CDN build uses `new Function()` internally for reactive expression evaluation. The CSP build eliminates this requirement, further hardening the application against XSS and injection attacks.
+
+### Compatibility
+
+All existing Alpine.js directives (`x-data`, `x-init`, `x-show`, `x-text`, `x-for`, `x-if`, `x-model`, event handlers) continue to work unchanged. The CSP build uses a safe expression evaluator that produces identical behavior without `eval`/`new Function`.
+
+## Files Changed
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `backend/frontend/index.html` | Alpine.js src → `csp.min.js`; added `Alpine.start()` |
+| `backend/main.py` | Removed `'unsafe-eval'` from `script-src` CSP |
+| `VERSION` | Bumped to 1.7.13 |
+
+## Test Results
+
+- **80/80 pytest tests passing**
+- Ruff lint/format clean

RELEASE_NOTES_v1.7.14.md

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# AOC v1.7.14 Release Notes
+
+**Release Date:** 2026-04-27
+
+## Security Hardening: Threat Model Remediation
+
+This release addresses the high-severity findings from the v1.7.13 threat model review.
+
+### LLM Endpoint Domain Allowlist
+
+- **New config:** `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` (comma-separated, supports wildcards like `*.openai.azure.com`)
+- **Behavior:** When configured, the `/api/ask` endpoint rejects `LLM_BASE_URL` domains not in the allowlist
+- **Impact:** Prevents audit data exfiltration via a compromised or attacker-controlled LLM endpoint
+
+### SIEM Webhook SSRF Guard
+
+- **New config:** `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` (comma-separated)
+- **Behavior:** The SIEM forwarder now validates `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL` with the same SSRF checks as the LLM endpoint (HTTPS-only, blocks private IPs, enforces domain allowlist)
+- **Impact:** Prevents real-time audit data exfiltration via a malicious SIEM webhook URL
+
+### CDN Subresource Integrity (SRI)
+
+- Added `integrity` hashes to both CDN scripts in the frontend:
+  - Alpine.js 3.15.11: `sha384-WPtu0YHhJ3arcykfnv1JgUffWDSKRnqnDeTpJUbOc2os2moEmLkIdaeR0trPN4be`
+  - MSAL.js 2.37.0: `sha384-DUSOaqAzlZRiZxkDi8hL7hXJDZ+X39ZOAYV9ZDx44gUv9pozmcunJH02tjSFLPnW`
+- **Impact:** Browser refuses to execute CDN scripts if the content doesn't match the hash, preventing supply chain compromise
+
+### Auth Misconfiguration Warning
+
+- At startup, AOC now logs a `WARNING` if `AUTH_ENABLED=true` but neither `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES` nor `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` is configured
+- **Impact:** Operators are alerted when the app is accidentally left open to all Entra users
+
+### Azure Key Vault Integration (Optional)
+
+- **New module:** `backend/secrets_manager.py`
+- **New config:** `AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME`
+- **Behavior:** If `AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME` is set, AOC fetches these secrets from Key Vault at startup:
+  - `aoc-client-secret` → `CLIENT_SECRET`
+  - `aoc-llm-api-key` → `LLM_API_KEY`
+  - `aoc-mongo-uri` → `MONGO_URI`
+  - `aoc-webhook-client-secret` → `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET`
+- Falls back silently to `.env` / environment variables when Key Vault is not configured
+- **Dependencies:** `azure-identity` and `azure-keyvault-secrets` (commented out in `requirements.txt` — uncomment when using Key Vault)
+- **Impact:** Eliminates long-lived secrets from `.env` files and Docker images
+
+## Files Changed
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `backend/config.py` | Added `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`, `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`, `AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME` |
+| `backend/routes/ask.py` | Domain allowlist enforcement for LLM URL |
+| `backend/siem.py` | SSRF guard + domain allowlist for SIEM webhook |
+| `backend/frontend/index.html` | SRI hashes for Alpine.js and MSAL.js |
+| `backend/main.py` | Startup warning for auth misconfiguration |
+| `backend/secrets_manager.py` | New — Azure Key Vault integration |
+| `backend/requirements.txt` | Added optional Azure Key Vault packages |
+| `.env.example` | Documented new settings |
+| `VERSION` | Bumped to 1.7.14 |
+| `THREAT_MODEL_v1.7.13.md` | Threat model documentation |
+
+## Test Results
+
+- **80/80 pytest tests passing**
+- Ruff lint/format clean

RELEASE_NOTES_v1.7.15.md

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# AOC v1.7.15 Release Notes
+
+**Release Date:** 2026-04-24
+
+## Security Hardening & Code Quality
+
+This release continues the security hardening roadmap with async I/O improvements, stricter input validation, and infrastructure lockdown.
+
+### Async Authentication Refactor
+
+- `require_auth()` and `_get_jwks()` are now `async def` to avoid blocking the event loop during JWKS fetch and token validation
+- **Impact:** Eliminates synchronous I/O stalls on authenticated requests under load
+
+### CSP Tightening
+
+- Removed `'unsafe-inline'` from the `script-src` directive in the Content-Security-Policy header
+- All JavaScript is now loaded from external files (`app.js`) or trusted CDNs with SRI hashes
+- `'unsafe-eval'` is retained for Alpine.js expression evaluation
+- **Impact:** Mitigates XSS by preventing inline script injection
+
+### Model Validation Hardening
+
+Added `Field(min_length=, max_length=)` constraints across request models:
+
+| Model | Field | Constraints |
+|-------|-------|-------------|
+| `TagsUpdateRequest` | `tags` | `max_length=50` |
+| `BulkTagsRequest` | `tags` | `max_length=50` |
+| `CommentAddRequest` | `text` | `min_length=1`, `max_length=5000` |
+| `AlertCondition` | `field` | `max_length=100` |
+| `AlertRuleResponse` | `conditions` | `max_length=20` |
+| `AlertRuleResponse` | `message` | `max_length=1000` |
+| `AskRequest` | `question` | `min_length=1`, `max_length=2000` |
+| `SavedSearchCreate` | `name` | `min_length=1`, `max_length=200` |
+
+- **Impact:** Rejects malformed or oversized inputs at the Pydantic/FastAPI layer before they reach business logic
+
+### Notification SSRF Guard
+
+- `_validate_webhook_url()` in `notifications.py` now blocks:
+  - Non-HTTP(S) schemes
+  - localhost, private, and link-local IP addresses
+- **Impact:** Prevents Server-Side Request Forgery via malicious webhook URLs in alert notifications
+
+### Rate Limiting Improvements
+
+- New category: `"explain"` → 20 requests per minute
+- Categories: `fetch=10/hr`, `ask=30/min`, `explain=20/min`, `write=20/min`, `default=120/min`
+- Fail-closed on Redis/Valkey error: raises `RateLimitExceeded(retry_after=60)`
+- **Impact:** Prevents abuse of the new explain endpoint and ensures graceful degradation if the rate limit store is unreachable
+
+### Frontend JavaScript Extraction
+
+- All inline JavaScript has been extracted from `index.html` into `backend/frontend/app.js`
+- Alpine.js SPA loads `/app.js?v=1` before Alpine initialization
+- **Impact:** Enables stricter CSP, improves cacheability, and separates markup from logic
+
+### Docker Compose Security
+
+- Backend port binding changed from `"8000:8000"` to `"127.0.0.1:8000:8000"`
+- **Impact:** Prevents direct external access to the backend when nginx is the intended reverse proxy
+
+## Files Changed
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `backend/auth.py` | `require_auth()` and `_get_jwks()` made async |
+| `backend/main.py` | CSP tightened; startup warnings |
+| `backend/models/api.py` | Added `Field` validation constraints |
+| `backend/notifications.py` | SSRF guard for webhook URLs |
+| `backend/rate_limiter.py` | Added `"explain"` rate limit category |
+| `backend/routes/saved_searches.py` | `SavedSearchCreate` Pydantic model with validation |
+| `backend/frontend/index.html` | Extracted inline JS to `app.js` |
+| `backend/frontend/app.js` | New — extracted frontend JavaScript |
+| `docker-compose.yml` | Backend port bound to `127.0.0.1` only |
+| `nginx/nginx.conf` | Security headers alignment |
+| `backend/tests/test_auth.py` | Updated for async `require_auth()` |
+| `backend/tests/test_api.py` | Updated saved searches validation test |
+| `backend/tests/test_ask.py` | Updated empty question test for 422 |
+| `.gitignore` | Added `memory/` |
+| `VERSION` | Bumped to 1.7.15 |
+
+## Test Results
+
+- **80/80 pytest tests passing**
+- Ruff lint/format clean
+
+## Docker Image
+
+```
+git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:v1.7.15
+```

RELEASE_NOTES_v1.7.16.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# AOC v1.7.16 Release Notes
+
+**Release Date:** 2026-04-24
+
+## Infrastructure & Maintenance
+
+### Gitea Actions CI Fix
+
+The CI workflow (`.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`) has been reworked for compatibility with Gitea Actions (`act_runner`):
+
+- **Removed** `actions/setup-python@v5` — incompatible with self-hosted Gitea (relies on GitHub's tool cache API)
+- **Added** system Python installation via `apt-get install python3 python3-venv`
+- **Uses a virtual environment** inside the job to avoid PEP 668 `externally-managed-environment` errors
+- All steps (`pip install`, `ruff check`, `ruff format`, `pytest`) now activate the venv explicitly
+
+### Repository Cleanup
+
+- **Expanded `.gitignore`** to cover all venv variants (`.*venv*/`), `.ruff_cache/`, and common temp/backup files
+- **Removed** temporary working directories (`backend/.venv_ci/`, `__pycache__/`)
+
+## Files Changed
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` | Complete rewrite for Gitea Actions compatibility |
+| `.gitignore` | Expanded patterns for venvs, caches, temp files |
+| `VERSION` | Bumped to 1.7.16 |
+
+## Test Results
+
+- **80/80 pytest tests passing**
+- Ruff lint/format clean
+- CI green on Gitea Actions
+
+## Docker Image
+
+```
+git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:v1.7.16
+```

RELEASE_NOTES_v1.7.17.md

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# AOC v1.7.17 Release Notes
+
+**Release Date:** 2026-05-29
+
+## Security & Hardening
+
+### Alpine.js CSP Build
+
+The frontend now loads the **Alpine.js CSP build** (`@alpinejs/csp@3.15.12`) instead of the standard distribution. This aligns the runtime with the existing Content-Security-Policy and removes reliance on `unsafe-eval` for Alpine's expression evaluation.
+
+- **File:** `backend/frontend/index.html`
+- **Integrity hash:** `sha384-MKLWq9B+VC0W3U8kDIBEsSu8uCnQ1B0UQpRaB+F7uR5ocXFbymMUKuLRntu5LLdu`
+
+## Ingestion Reliability
+
+### Office 365 Management Activity API Window Clamping
+
+The unified audit log fetcher now respects the API's hard limits to prevent rejected requests during catch-up scenarios or stale watermarks:
+
+- **Maximum query window:** 24 hours (`_API_MAX_WINDOW_HOURS`)
+- **Maximum lookback:** 7 days (`_API_MAX_LOOKBACK_DAYS`)
+- When a persisted `since` watermark is older than either limit, the start time is clamped to the most recent allowable window. Subsequent fetches continue catching up normally.
+
+This prevents ingestion stalls after extended outages without dropping events permanently.
+
+## Files Changed
+
+| File | Change |
+|------|--------|
+| `backend/frontend/index.html` | Switched Alpine.js to CSP build with updated SRI hash |
+| `backend/sources/unified_audit.py` | Added API window/lookback clamping for O365 Management Activity API |
+| `VERSION` | Bumped to 1.7.17 |
+
+## Docker Image
+
+```
+git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:v1.7.17
+```

ROADMAP.md

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Goal: evolve from a polling dashboard into a full security operations tool.
 
 ---
 
-## Phase 5: Intelligence
+## Phase 5: Intelligence ✅
 Goal: add AI-powered analysis and external tool integration.
 
 - [x] AI feature flag (`AI_FEATURES_ENABLED`) to gate LLM-dependent features
@@ -76,7 +76,56 @@ UI polish (topbar, footer, clickable pills) in v1.6.1–v1.6.4.
 
 ---
 
-## Phase 6: Multi-Tenancy (Premium) ⏸️
+## Phase 6: Security Hardening ✅
+Goal: address penetration test findings and threat model gaps.
+
+- [x] Fix CORS credentials leak (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Add security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy) (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Make rate limiter fail-closed on Redis failure (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Disable OpenAPI docs by default (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Hide tenant_id/client_id from config endpoint when auth disabled (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Validate webhook validationToken before echo (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Gate `/metrics` behind IP allowlist (v1.7.12)
+- [x] Add LLM domain allowlist (`LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`) (v1.7.14)
+- [x] Add SIEM webhook SSRF guard + domain allowlist (v1.7.14)
+- [x] Add SRI hashes to CDN scripts (v1.7.14)
+- [x] Add startup warning for auth misconfiguration (v1.7.14)
+- [x] Add Azure Key Vault integration for secrets storage (v1.7.14)
+- [x] Internal penetration test + threat model documentation
+
+---
+
+## Phase 7.5: Frontend Modernization 📋
+Goal: eliminate `unsafe-eval` from the Content Security Policy by migrating from Alpine.js to a compiled frontend framework.
+
+Status: **Planned**. Current Alpine.js requires `unsafe-eval` because it uses `new Function()` to evaluate attribute expressions at runtime. A compiled framework evaluates all expressions at build time — the browser only receives static JS, making a fully clean CSP (`script-src 'self'`) possible.
+
+### Recommended approach: Vue 3 + Vite
+Alpine.js was inspired by Vue, so the migration is largely mechanical:
+
+| Alpine.js | Vue 3 |
+|-----------|-------|
+| `x-data="aocApp()"` | `<script setup>` or `createApp(aocApp)` |
+| `x-text`, `x-show`, `x-if`, `x-for` | `v-text`, `v-show`, `v-if`, `v-for` |
+| `x-model`, `x-html` | `v-model`, `v-html` |
+| `@click="method()"` | `@click="method()"` (identical) |
+
+The `app.js` logic (`aocApp()` function body, ~820 lines) translates almost directly.
+The CDN dependencies on `cdn.jsdelivr.net` and `alcdn.msauth.net` can be dropped:
+MSAL can be bundled via npm, and the final CSP becomes `script-src 'self'` only.
+
+### Effort estimate
+- Vite + Vue 3 project setup: ~2–3 hours
+- Template migration (HTML directives): ~4–6 hours
+- `app.js` → Vue component: ~2–3 hours
+- MSAL integration via npm: ~1 hour
+- Testing + polish: ~2–4 hours
+
+**Total: ~1–2 days**
+
+---
+
+## Phase 7: Multi-Tenancy (Premium) ⏸️
 Goal: allow MSPs to manage multiple client tenants from a single deployment.
 
 Status: **Planned — not started**. Architecture designed, pending validation of core features (SIEM export, alerting) in production first.
@@ -88,10 +137,10 @@ Status: **Planned — not started**. Architecture designed, pending validation o
 - Super-admin role for MSP staff to access all tenants
 
 ### Implementation phases
-- **Phase 6.1** (2–3 days): Tenant model & registry, tenant-aware data layer, per-tenant Graph API auth
+- **Phase 7.1** (2–3 days): Tenant model & registry, tenant-aware data layer, per-tenant Graph API auth
-- **Phase 6.2** (1 day): Tenant-scoped API routes, tenant-specific config endpoints
+- **Phase 7.2** (1 day): Tenant-scoped API routes, tenant-specific config endpoints
-- **Phase 6.3** (2 days): Frontend tenant switcher, tenant name display, admin page
+- **Phase 7.3** (2 days): Frontend tenant switcher, tenant name display, admin page
-- **Phase 6.4** (1 day): License gating — signed JWT `LICENSE_KEY` gates multi-tenant mode
+- **Phase 7.4** (1 day): License gating — signed JWT `LICENSE_KEY` gates multi-tenant mode
 
 ### Licensing model
 - Single-tenant: remains MIT/free

THREAT_MODEL_v1.7.13.md

@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+# AOC Threat Model — v1.7.13
+
+**Date:** 2026-04-27
+**Scope:** Entra ID / Microsoft Graph integration, token handling, data flows, external dependencies
+**Assumptions:** Deployment is Docker Compose behind nginx reverse proxy; `AUTH_ENABLED=true`; `AI_FEATURES_ENABLED` may be true or false.
+
+---
+
+## Attack Surface Map
+
+```
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│                              ATTACKER                                        │
+│         │                    │                    │                          │
+│         ▼                    ▼                    ▼                          │
+│  ┌─────────────┐    ┌──────────────┐    ┌─────────────────┐                 │
+│  │  Frontend   │    │   API        │    │  Webhook        │                 │
+│  │  (CDN JS)   │    │  (/api/*)    │    │  (/api/webhooks)│                 │
+│  └──────┬──────┘    └──────┬───────┘    └────────┬────────┘                 │
+│         │                  │                      │                          │
+│         ▼                  ▼                      ▼                          │
+│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐            │
+│  │                    AOC BACKEND                               │            │
+│  │  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐    │            │
+│  │  │  Auth    │  │  Events  │  │  Fetch   │  │  Ask/LLM │    │            │
+│  │  │  (JWT)   │  │  (Mongo) │  │  (Graph) │  │  (HTTP)  │    │            │
+│  │  └────┬─────┘  └────┬─────┘  └────┬─────┘  └────┬─────┘    │            │
+│  │       │             │             │             │           │            │
+│  │       ▼             ▼             ▼             ▼           │            │
+│  │  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐    │            │
+│  │  │              SECRETS / CREDENTIALS                   │    │            │
+│  │  │  CLIENT_SECRET  │  LLM_API_KEY  │  MONGO_PASSWORD   │    │            │
+│  │  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘    │            │
+│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘            │
+│         │                  │                      │                          │
+│         ▼                  ▼                      ▼                          │
+│  ┌─────────────┐    ┌──────────────┐    ┌─────────────────┐                 │
+│  │ Microsoft   │    │  LLM API     │    │  SIEM Webhook   │                 │
+│  │  Graph API  │    │  (OpenAI/    │    │  (optional)     │                 │
+│  │             │    │   Azure)     │    │                 │                 │
+│  └─────────────┘    └──────────────┘    └─────────────────┘                 │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+---
+
+## 1. Entra App Registration Abuse — HIGH
+
+### 1.1 Client Credentials Leak = Full Tenant Read
+
+**How it works:**
+- AOC uses `client_credentials` flow (`graph/auth.py`)
+- `CLIENT_ID` + `CLIENT_SECRET` are exchanged for an access token at `login.microsoftonline.com`
+- The token has `https://graph.microsoft.com/.default` scope
+- This grants **all application permissions** configured in the Entra app registration
+
+**Typical permissions:**
+- `Directory.Read.All` — read all users, groups, devices, roles
+- `AuditLog.Read.All` — read all audit logs
+- `DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All` — read all Intune devices
+
+**Attack scenario:**
+1. Attacker gains read access to `.env` or the Docker container filesystem
+2. Attacker calls the token endpoint directly with the leaked `CLIENT_ID`/`CLIENT_SECRET`
+3. Attacker receives a Graph API access token valid for ~1 hour
+4. Attacker can query ALL tenant data independently of AOC
+
+**Impact:** Complete tenant data exfiltration — users, groups, devices, audit logs, mailboxes (if `Exchange.Read` granted).
+
+**Mitigation in place:** None. The backend needs these permissions to function.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Store `CLIENT_SECRET` in a secret manager (Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault) rather than `.env`
+- Use short-lived certificates instead of long-lived secrets for app authentication
+- Monitor Entra sign-in logs for anomalous `client_credentials` token requests
+- Restrict app registration permissions to the absolute minimum (e.g., `AuditLog.Read.All` + `Directory.Read.All` only)
+
+---
+
+### 1.2 No Scope Restriction on Graph Token
+
+**Finding:** `get_access_token()` always requests `https://graph.microsoft.com/.default` — the full permission set. There's no mechanism to request narrower scopes for specific operations.
+
+**Impact:** If the app registration has 10 permissions, every token has all 10. A bug in one code path could expose data from all 10 permission areas.
+
+**Recommendation:** Not easily fixable without splitting into multiple app registrations. Document as accepted risk.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Authentication & Token Validation — MEDIUM
+
+### 2.1 JWKS Fetch Without TLS Certificate Validation Hardening
+
+**Finding:** `_get_jwks()` fetches OIDC configuration and JWKS from `login.microsoftonline.com` using standard `requests` TLS validation. No certificate pinning or CA bundle restriction.
+
+**Attack scenario (advanced):**
+1. Attacker compromises DNS or a network hop between AOC and Microsoft
+2. Attacker serves a fake JWKS endpoint with their own public key
+3. Attacker issues a forged JWT signed with their private key
+4. AOC validates the forged JWT against the attacker's public key
+5. Attacker gains authenticated access
+
+**Likelihood:** Very low (requires DNS compromise or nation-state-level interception).
+
+**Mitigation:** Standard TLS validation is in place. For high-security environments, consider pinning the `login.microsoftonline.com` certificate thumbprint.
+
+---
+
+### 2.2 Missing `nbf` / `iat` Claim Verification
+
+**Finding:** `_decode_token()` verifies `exp`, `tid`, `iss`, and `aud` but does not check `nbf` (not before) or `iat` (issued at) claims.
+
+**Impact:** A token used before its validity period (`nbf`) or with a suspicious future `iat` would be accepted. Minor issue — MSAL tokens are well-formed in practice.
+
+---
+
+### 2.3 Role/Group Gating Defaults to "Allow All"
+
+**Finding:** In `auth.py`:
+```python
+def _allowed(claims, allowed_roles, allowed_groups):
+    if not allowed_roles and not allowed_groups:
+        return True
+```
+
+**Impact:** If `AUTH_ENABLED=true` but `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES` and `AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` are left empty (the default), **every Entra user in the tenant** can authenticate and use AOC. This is a common misconfiguration.
+
+**Recommendation:** Add a startup warning when auth is enabled but no roles/groups are configured. Consider changing the default to deny-all.
+
+---
+
+### 2.4 Privacy Service Role Gating Also Defaults to "Allow All"
+
+**Finding:** `user_can_access_privacy_services()` returns `True` if `PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES` is empty. If an admin configures `PRIVACY_SERVICES` (e.g., `Exchange`) but forgets to set `PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES`, all users see all privacy data.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Data Exfiltration Paths — HIGH
+
+### 3.1 LLM Endpoint as Data Exfiltration Channel
+
+**Finding:** When `AI_FEATURES_ENABLED=true` and `LLM_API_KEY` is set:
+- The `/api/ask` endpoint sends audit event data (actors, targets, operations, summaries) to the configured LLM API
+- `_validate_llm_url()` blocks private IPs but does NOT restrict the domain to an allowlist
+- Any HTTPS URL is accepted
+
+**Attack scenario:**
+1. Attacker gains `.env` write access (or container filesystem access)
+2. Attacker changes `LLM_BASE_URL` to `https://attacker.com/fake-llm`
+3. Attacker sends an `/api/ask` request like "show me all events"
+4. AOC queries MongoDB and sends up to `LLM_MAX_EVENTS` (default 200) events to the attacker's URL
+5. Attacker receives structured audit data including actor names, UPNs, device names, operation details
+
+**Impact:** Up to 200 audit events exfiltrated per API call. With pagination, an attacker could exfiltrate the entire database.
+
+**Mitigation in place:** SSRF guard blocks private IPs and localhost.
+
+**Gap:** No domain allowlist. An attacker-controlled public HTTPS endpoint is accepted.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Add `LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` config (e.g., `api.openai.com,*.openai.azure.com`)
+- Validate `LLM_BASE_URL` against this allowlist at startup and on every request
+- Log all LLM requests with event counts sent
+
+---
+
+### 3.2 SIEM Webhook as Real-Time Exfiltration Channel
+
+**Finding:** `siem.py` forwards every normalized event to `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL` during ingestion:
+```python
+def forward_event(event):
+    if not SIEM_ENABLED or not SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL:
+        return
+    requests.post(SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL, json=event, timeout=10)
+```
+
+**Gap:** No URL validation at all. Unlike the LLM endpoint, the SIEM webhook has NO SSRF guard.
+
+**Attack scenario:**
+1. Attacker sets `SIEM_ENABLED=true` and `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL=https://attacker.com/collect`
+2. Every new audit event fetched from Graph is immediately POSTed to the attacker's URL
+3. Attacker receives real-time stream of all tenant audit events
+
+**Impact:** Real-time, continuous data exfiltration of all audit events.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Add the same SSRF validation to `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL` that exists for `LLM_BASE_URL`
+- Add `SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS` config
+- Log SIEM forwarding failures prominently
+
+---
+
+### 3.3 Export Features (JSON/CSV)
+
+**Finding:** The frontend has `exportJSON()` and `exportCSV()` functions that download all currently filtered events. These are authenticated but not rate-limited separately from `/api/events`.
+
+**Impact:** A compromised account can export large batches of events. However, this requires authentication and is bounded by the 500-event page size limit.
+
+**Risk level:** LOW — requires valid auth and is noisy.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Webhook Abuse — MEDIUM
+
+### 4.1 Graph Change Notification Webhook
+
+**Finding:** `/api/webhooks/graph` receives Microsoft Graph change notifications:
+- Echoes `validationToken` for subscription handshake
+- Accepts notifications with optional `clientState` validation
+- `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` is empty by default
+
+**Attack scenario 1 — Subscription hijacking:**
+1. Attacker discovers the webhook URL (via API enumeration or guess)
+2. Attacker creates a Graph subscription pointing to the AOC webhook URL
+3. Attacker receives change notifications for the subscribed resource
+
+**Mitigation:** Notifications without matching `clientState` are rejected when `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` is configured. But it's empty by default.
+
+**Attack scenario 2 — Validation token abuse:**
+1. Attacker sends a POST to `/api/webhooks/graph?validationToken=<arbitrary content>`
+2. AOC echoes the token back as `text/plain`
+3. Could be used for cache poisoning or response splitting
+
+**Mitigation:** Length and ASCII validation added in v1.7.12.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Require `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` to be set in production
+- Document that the webhook endpoint should NOT be exposed to the public internet
+
+---
+
+## 5. Supply Chain — MEDIUM
+
+### 5.1 CDN Scripts Without Subresource Integrity (SRI)
+
+**Finding:** The frontend loads two external scripts without SRI hashes:
+```html
+<script defer src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/alpinejs@3.x.x/dist/cdn.min.js"></script>
+<script src="https://alcdn.msauth.net/browser/2.37.0/js/msal-browser.min.js" crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
+```
+
+**Attack scenario:**
+1. `cdn.jsdelivr.net` or `alcdn.msauth.net` is compromised (supply chain attack)
+2. Malicious JavaScript is served instead of the legitimate library
+3. Malicious script can steal MSAL tokens, modify API requests, or exfiltrate data
+
+**Impact:** Complete frontend compromise — token theft, data exfiltration, UI spoofing.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Add SRI hashes to both script tags:
+  ```html
+  <script defer src="..." integrity="sha384-..." crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
+  ```
+- Or vendor the JS files and serve them from the same origin
+
+---
+
+## 6. Privilege Escalation — MEDIUM
+
+### 6.1 Application Permissions Bypass User Boundaries
+
+**Finding:** Because AOC uses application permissions (not delegated permissions), the backend can read audit logs for ALL users, not just the authenticated user. The privacy service filtering (`PRIVACY_SERVICES`) is the only boundary — and it's opt-in.
+
+**Impact:** A user with minimal Entra permissions (e.g., a regular user who can authenticate) can view audit logs for the entire tenant if:
+- `PRIVACY_SERVICES` is not configured, OR
+- `PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES` is not configured
+
+**Recommendation:**
+- Document that AOC should be restricted to admin/security roles via `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES`
+- Consider adding per-user event filtering (only show events where the authenticated user is the actor or target)
+
+---
+
+## 7. Miscellaneous Vectors — LOW
+
+### 7.1 Token Cache in Memory
+
+**Finding:** `_TOKEN_CACHE` in `graph/auth.py` is an in-memory dictionary. If an attacker gains code execution in the Python process, they can read the cache or call `get_access_token()` directly.
+
+**Impact:** Attacker with code execution can get Graph API tokens. But if they have code execution, they already have `CLIENT_SECRET` from memory or `.env`.
+
+### 7.2 MongoDB Connection String
+
+**Finding:** `MONGO_URI` contains credentials. If an attacker gains filesystem access, they can connect directly to MongoDB and bypass all AOC auth/privacy controls.
+
+**Mitigation:** MongoDB is internal to Docker network (not exposed to host in production compose file).
+
+### 7.3 Audit Trail Log Injection
+
+**Finding:** `audit_trail.log_action()` stores actions in MongoDB. The `details` dict could contain user-controlled data (e.g., filter values). If the audit log is ever rendered without escaping, this could lead to XSS.
+
+**Risk level:** LOW — audit logs are not currently rendered in the UI.
+
+---
+
+## Risk Summary
+
+| Vector | Severity | Likelihood | Requires |
+|--------|----------|------------|----------|
+| Client secret leak → full tenant read | **HIGH** | Medium | `.env` or container access |
+| LLM endpoint hijacking → data exfil | **HIGH** | Low | `.env` write access |
+| SIEM webhook hijacking → real-time exfil | **HIGH** | Low | `.env` write access |
+| CDN compromise → frontend token theft | **MEDIUM** | Low | Supply chain attack |
+| Role gating misconfig → all users access | **MEDIUM** | High | Misconfiguration |
+| Webhook subscription hijacking | **MEDIUM** | Low | URL discovery |
+| DNS compromise → fake JWKS | **MEDIUM** | Very low | Network compromise |
+| Application permissions bypass boundaries | **MEDIUM** | High | Default config |
+| Token replay | LOW | Low | Token theft |
+| Audit log injection | LOW | Low | Filter manipulation |
+
+---
+
+## Immediate Recommendations
+
+1. **Add LLM domain allowlist** (`LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`) and validate at startup
+2. **Add SIEM SSRF guard** — reuse `_validate_llm_url()` for `SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL`
+3. **Add SRI hashes** to CDN script tags, or vendor the libraries
+4. **Add startup warning** when auth is enabled but no `AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES`/`AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS` configured
+5. **Document webhook security** — require `WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET` in production
+6. **Consider Key Vault integration** for `CLIENT_SECRET` and `LLM_API_KEY`
+7. **Add per-user filtering option** — restrict events to those involving the authenticated user

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-1.7.11
+1.7.18

backend/auth.py

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
+import asyncio
 import contextvars
+import threading
 import time
 
 import requests
@@ -20,23 +22,37 @@ from jwt.algorithms import RSAAlgorithm
 _auth_context: contextvars.ContextVar[dict | None] = contextvars.ContextVar("auth_context", default=None)
 
 JWKS_CACHE = {"exp": 0, "keys": []}
+_jwks_lock = threading.Lock()
 logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.auth")
 
 
-def _get_jwks():
+def _fetch_jwks_blocking() -> list:
-    now = time.time()
+    """Fetch JWKS from Microsoft — runs in a thread, never in the event loop."""
-    if JWKS_CACHE["keys"] and JWKS_CACHE["exp"] > now:
-        return JWKS_CACHE["keys"]
-
     oidc = requests.get(
         f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{AUTH_TENANT_ID}/v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration",
         timeout=10,
     ).json()
     jwks_uri = oidc["jwks_uri"]
-    keys = requests.get(jwks_uri, timeout=10).json()["keys"]
+    return requests.get(jwks_uri, timeout=10).json()["keys"]
-    JWKS_CACHE["keys"] = keys
+
-    JWKS_CACHE["exp"] = now + 60 * 60  # cache 1h
+
-    return keys
+def _get_jwks():
+    now = time.time()
+    with _jwks_lock:
+        if JWKS_CACHE["keys"] and JWKS_CACHE["exp"] > now:
+            return JWKS_CACHE["keys"]
+        keys = _fetch_jwks_blocking()
+        JWKS_CACHE["keys"] = keys
+        JWKS_CACHE["exp"] = now + 60 * 60  # cache 1h
+        return keys
+
+
+async def _get_jwks_async() -> list:
+    """Non-blocking JWKS fetch: return from cache or refresh in a thread pool."""
+    now = time.time()
+    if JWKS_CACHE["keys"] and JWKS_CACHE["exp"] > now:
+        return JWKS_CACHE["keys"]
+    return await asyncio.to_thread(_get_jwks)
 
 
 def _allowed(claims: dict, allowed_roles: set[str], allowed_groups: set[str]) -> bool:
@@ -96,7 +112,7 @@ def user_can_access_privacy_services(claims: dict) -> bool:
     return bool(user_roles.intersection(PRIVACY_SERVICE_ROLES))
 
 
-def require_auth(authorization: str | None = Header(None)):
+async def require_auth(authorization: str | None = Header(None)):
     if not AUTH_ENABLED:
         user = {"sub": "anonymous"}
         _auth_context.set(user)
@@ -106,7 +122,7 @@ def require_auth(authorization: str | None = Header(None)):
         raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Missing bearer token")
 
     token = authorization.split(" ", 1)[1]
-    jwks = _get_jwks()
+    jwks = await _get_jwks_async()
     claims = _decode_token(token, jwks)
 
     if not _allowed(claims, AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES, AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS):

backend/config.py

@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
-from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
+from secrets_manager import load_key_vault_secrets
+
+# Pre-load Azure Key Vault secrets into os.environ before pydantic-settings reads them.
+# This is a no-op if AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME is not set.
+load_key_vault_secrets()
+
+from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict  # noqa: E402
 
 
 class Settings(BaseSettings):
@@ -76,6 +82,19 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS: int = 120
     RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS: int = 60
 
+    # Security / docs exposure
+    DOCS_ENABLED: bool = False
+    METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS: str = "127.0.0.1,::1,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
+
+    # LLM endpoint restriction (comma-separated domains, e.g. "api.openai.com,*.openai.azure.com")
+    LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS: str = ""
+
+    # SIEM webhook restriction (comma-separated domains)
+    SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS: str = ""
+
+    # Optional Azure Key Vault integration for secrets
+    AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME: str = ""
+
 
 _settings = Settings()
 
@@ -127,3 +146,11 @@ WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET = _settings.WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET
 RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED = _settings.RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED
 RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS = _settings.RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS
 RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS = _settings.RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS
+
+DOCS_ENABLED = _settings.DOCS_ENABLED
+METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS = _settings.METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS
+
+LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS = [d.strip().lower() for d in _settings.LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS.split(",") if d.strip()]
+SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS = [d.strip().lower() for d in _settings.SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS.split(",") if d.strip()]
+
+AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME = _settings.AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME

backend/frontend/app.js

@@ -0,0 +1,820 @@
+function aocApp() {
+  return {
+    events: [],
+    sourceHealth: [],
+    statusText: '',
+    countText: '',
+    cursorStack: [],
+    nextCursor: null,
+    currentCursor: null,
+    modalOpen: false,
+    modalBody: '',
+    modalEventId: '',
+    modalExplanation: '',
+    modalExplainLoading: false,
+    modalExplainError: '',
+    authBtnText: 'Login',
+    authConfig: null,
+    msalInstance: null,
+    account: null,
+    accessToken: null,
+    authScopes: [],
+    filters: {
+      actor: '', selectedServices: [], search: '', operation: '', result: '', start: '', end: '', limit: 24, includeTags: '', excludeTags: '',
+    },
+    panelState: { sourceHealth: true, alerts: true, rules: true, filters: true, ask: true, events: true },
+    options: { actors: [], services: [], operations: [], results: [] },
+    savedSearches: [],
+    appVersion: '',
+    repoUrl: 'https://git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc',
+    docsUrl: 'https://git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc/src/branch/main/README.md',
+    aiFeaturesEnabled: true,
+    alertSummary: { total_open: 0, high: 0, medium: 0, low: 0 },
+    alerts: [],
+    alertsTotal: 0,
+    alertsPage: 1,
+    alertsFilter: { status: 'open', severity: '' },
+    rules: [],
+    ruleModalOpen: false,
+    ruleEditId: null,
+    ruleEdit: { name: '', enabled: true, severity: 'medium', message: '', conditions: [] },
+    askQuestionText: '',
+    askLoading: false,
+    askAnswer: '',
+    askAnswerHtml: '',
+    askEvents: [],
+    askLlmUsed: false,
+    askLlmError: '',
+
+    async initApp() {
+      await this.loadVersion();
+      await this.initAuth();
+      this.loadSavedFilters();
+      this.loadPanelState();
+      if (!this.authConfig?.auth_enabled || this.accessToken) {
+        await this.loadFilterOptions();
+        await this.loadSavedSearches();
+        await this.loadSourceHealth();
+        await this.loadAlertSummary();
+        await this.loadAlerts();
+        await this.loadRules();
+        await this.loadEvents();
+      }
+    },
+
+    loadSavedFilters() {
+      try {
+        const saved = localStorage.getItem('aoc_filters');
+        if (!saved) return;
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(saved);
+        const fields = ['actor', 'selectedServices', 'search', 'operation', 'result', 'start', 'end', 'limit', 'includeTags', 'excludeTags'];
+        fields.forEach((f) => {
+          if (parsed[f] !== undefined) this.filters[f] = parsed[f];
+        });
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    saveFilters() {
+      try {
+        localStorage.setItem('aoc_filters', JSON.stringify(this.filters));
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    loadPanelState() {
+      try {
+        const saved = localStorage.getItem('aoc_panels');
+        if (saved) {
+          const parsed = JSON.parse(saved);
+          Object.keys(parsed).forEach((k) => { if (this.panelState[k] !== undefined) this.panelState[k] = parsed[k]; });
+        }
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    savePanelState() {
+      try {
+        localStorage.setItem('aoc_panels', JSON.stringify(this.panelState));
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    togglePanel(key) {
+      this.panelState[key] = !this.panelState[key];
+      this.savePanelState();
+    },
+
+    async loadVersion() {
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch('/api/version');
+        if (res.ok) {
+          const body = await res.json();
+          this.appVersion = (body.version || '').replace(/^v/, '');
+        }
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    authHeader() {
+      return this.accessToken ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${this.accessToken}` } : {};
+    },
+
+    pickToken(res) {
+      if (!res) return null;
+      const clientId = this.authConfig?.client_id;
+      // If accessToken is present and its audience matches our API, use it.
+      if (res.accessToken && clientId) {
+        try {
+          const base64 = res.accessToken.split('.')[1].replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');
+          const padded = base64.padEnd(base64.length + (4 - base64.length % 4) % 4, '=');
+          const payload = JSON.parse(atob(padded));
+          if (payload.aud === clientId) {
+            return res.accessToken;
+          }
+        } catch {}
+      }
+      // Fall back to idToken (always aud=clientId) or accessToken
+      return res.idToken || res.accessToken || null;
+    },
+
+    async initAuth() {
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch('/api/config/auth');
+        if (!res.ok) {
+          console.error('Auth config fetch failed:', res.status, res.statusText);
+          this.authConfig = { auth_enabled: false, _error: res.status };
+        } else {
+          this.authConfig = await res.json();
+        }
+      } catch (err) {
+        console.error('Auth config fetch error:', err);
+        this.authConfig = { auth_enabled: false, _error: 'network' };
+      }
+
+      try {
+        const featRes = await fetch('/api/config/features');
+        if (featRes.ok) {
+          const featBody = await featRes.json();
+          this.aiFeaturesEnabled = featBody.ai_features_enabled !== false;
+          if (featBody.default_page_size) {
+            this.filters.limit = featBody.default_page_size;
+          } else {
+            this.filters.limit = 24;
+          }
+        } else {
+          this.aiFeaturesEnabled = true;
+        }
+      } catch {
+        this.aiFeaturesEnabled = true;
+      }
+
+      if (!this.authConfig?.auth_enabled) {
+        this.authBtnText = 'Auth: OFF';
+        console.warn('AOC auth is disabled. Set AUTH_ENABLED=true in .env to enable login.');
+        return;
+      }
+
+      const tenantId = this.authConfig.tenant_id;
+      const clientId = this.authConfig.client_id;
+      if (!clientId || !tenantId) {
+        this.authBtnText = 'Auth: misconfigured';
+        this.statusText = 'Auth is enabled but client_id or tenant_id is missing. Check .env configuration.';
+        console.error('AOC auth misconfigured: missing client_id or tenant_id in /api/config/auth');
+        return;
+      }
+
+      if (typeof msal === 'undefined' || !msal.PublicClientApplication) {
+        this.statusText = 'Login library failed to load. Please check network or CDN.';
+        return;
+      }
+
+      const baseScope = this.authConfig.scope || "";
+      this.authScopes = Array.from(new Set(['openid', 'profile', 'email', ...baseScope.split(/[ ,]+/).filter(Boolean)]));
+      const authority = `https://login.microsoftonline.com/${tenantId}`;
+      const redirectUri = window.location.origin;
+
+      this.msalInstance = new msal.PublicClientApplication({
+        auth: { clientId, authority, redirectUri },
+        cache: { cacheLocation: 'sessionStorage' },
+      });
+
+      const redirectResult = await this.msalInstance.handleRedirectPromise().catch(() => null);
+      if (redirectResult) {
+        this.account = redirectResult.account;
+        this.msalInstance.setActiveAccount(this.account);
+        this.accessToken = this.pickToken(redirectResult);
+      } else {
+        const accounts = this.msalInstance.getAllAccounts();
+        if (accounts.length) {
+          this.account = accounts[0];
+          this.msalInstance.setActiveAccount(this.account);
+          this.accessToken = await this.acquireToken(this.authScopes);
+        }
+      }
+
+      this.updateAuthButtons();
+    },
+
+    async acquireToken(scopes) {
+      if (!this.msalInstance || !this.account) return null;
+      const request = { scopes: scopes && scopes.length ? scopes : ['openid', 'profile', 'email'], account: this.account };
+      try {
+        const res = await this.msalInstance.acquireTokenSilent(request);
+        return this.pickToken(res);
+      } catch {
+        const res = await this.msalInstance.acquireTokenPopup(request);
+        return this.pickToken(res);
+      }
+    },
+
+    updateAuthButtons() {
+      const loggedIn = !!this.account;
+      if (this.authConfig?.auth_enabled) {
+        this.authBtnText = loggedIn ? 'Logout' : 'Login';
+      }
+      if (loggedIn) {
+        this.acquireToken(this.authScopes).then((t) => { if (t) this.accessToken = t; }).catch(() => {});
+        this.statusText = '';
+      } else if (this.authConfig?.auth_enabled) {
+        this.statusText = 'Please log in to view events.';
+      }
+    },
+
+    async toggleAuth() {
+      if (!this.authConfig?.auth_enabled || !this.msalInstance) return;
+      if (this.account) {
+        const acc = this.msalInstance.getActiveAccount();
+        this.accessToken = null;
+        this.account = null;
+        this.updateAuthButtons();
+        if (acc) await this.msalInstance.logoutPopup({ account: acc });
+        return;
+      }
+      const scopes = this.authScopes && this.authScopes.length ? this.authScopes : ['openid', 'profile', 'email'];
+      this.statusText = 'Redirecting to sign in...';
+      this.msalInstance.loginRedirect({ scopes });
+    },
+
+    async loadEvents(cursor) {
+      this.currentCursor = cursor || null;
+      const params = new URLSearchParams();
+      ['actor', 'operation', 'result', 'search'].forEach((key) => {
+        const val = this.filters[key];
+        if (val) params.append(key, val);
+      });
+      if (this.filters.selectedServices && this.filters.selectedServices.length) {
+        this.filters.selectedServices.forEach((s) => params.append('services', s));
+      }
+      if (this.filters.includeTags) {
+        this.filters.includeTags.split(/[,;]+/).map((t) => t.trim()).filter(Boolean).forEach((t) => params.append('include_tags', t));
+      }
+      if (this.filters.excludeTags) {
+        this.filters.excludeTags.split(/[,;]+/).map((t) => t.trim()).filter(Boolean).forEach((t) => params.append('exclude_tags', t));
+      }
+      if (this.filters.start) {
+        const d = new Date(this.filters.start);
+        if (!isNaN(d.getTime())) params.append('start', d.toISOString());
+      }
+      if (this.filters.end) {
+        const d = new Date(this.filters.end);
+        if (!isNaN(d.getTime())) params.append('end', d.toISOString());
+      }
+      params.append('page_size', String(this.filters.limit || 50));
+      if (cursor) params.append('cursor', cursor);
+
+      this.statusText = 'Loading events…';
+      this.countText = '';
+
+      if (this.authConfig?.auth_enabled && !this.accessToken) {
+        this.statusText = 'Please sign in to load events.';
+        return;
+      }
+
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch(`/api/events?${params.toString()}`, { headers: { Accept: 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() } });
+        if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Request failed: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
+        const body = await res.json();
+        this.events = body.items || [];
+        this.nextCursor = body.next_cursor || null;
+        this.countText = body.total >= 0 ? `${body.total} event${body.total === 1 ? '' : 's'}` : '';
+        this.statusText = this.events.length ? '' : 'No events found for these filters.';
+        this.saveFilters();
+      } catch (err) {
+        this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to load events.';
+      }
+    },
+
+    async fetchLogs() {
+      this.statusText = 'Fetching latest audit logs…';
+      if (this.authConfig?.auth_enabled && !this.accessToken) {
+        this.statusText = 'Please sign in first.';
+        return;
+      }
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch('/api/fetch-audit-logs', { headers: this.authHeader() });
+        if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Fetch failed: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
+        const body = await res.json();
+        const errs = Array.isArray(body.errors) && body.errors.length ? `Warnings: ${body.errors.join(' | ')}` : '';
+        this.statusText = `Fetched and stored ${body.stored_events || 0} events.${errs ? ' ' + errs : ''} Refreshing list…`;
+        this.resetPagination();
+        await this.loadEvents();
+        await this.loadSourceHealth();
+      } catch (err) {
+        this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to fetch audit logs.';
+      }
+    },
+
+    async loadFilterOptions() {
+      if (this.authConfig?.auth_enabled && !this.accessToken) return;
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch('/api/filter-options', { headers: this.authHeader() });
+        if (!res.ok) return;
+        const opts = await res.json();
+        this.options.actors = (opts.actors || []).slice(0, 200);
+        this.options.services = (opts.services || []).slice(0, 200);
+        this.options.operations = (opts.operations || []).slice(0, 200);
+        this.options.results = (opts.results || []).slice(0, 200);
+
+        const saved = localStorage.getItem('aoc_filters');
+        if (!saved && this.options.services.length) {
+          // Default: show all services (privacy controls handle exclusions server-side)
+          this.filters.selectedServices = [...this.options.services];
+        } else if (saved) {
+          try {
+            const parsed = JSON.parse(saved);
+            if (parsed.selectedServices) {
+              this.filters.selectedServices = parsed.selectedServices.filter((s) => this.options.services.includes(s));
+            }
+          } catch {}
+        }
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    async loadSourceHealth() {
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch('/api/source-health', { headers: this.authHeader() });
+        if (!res.ok) return;
+        this.sourceHealth = await res.json();
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    async loadSavedSearches() {
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch('/api/saved-searches', { headers: this.authHeader() });
+        if (!res.ok) return;
+        this.savedSearches = await res.json();
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    async saveCurrentFilters() {
+      const name = prompt('Name this saved filter:');
+      if (!name || !name.trim()) return;
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch('/api/saved-searches', {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ name: name.trim(), filters: { ...this.filters } }),
+        });
+        if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
+        const created = await res.json();
+        this.savedSearches.unshift(created);
+        this.statusText = 'Filters saved.';
+        setTimeout(() => { if (this.statusText === 'Filters saved.') this.statusText = ''; }, 2000);
+      } catch (err) {
+        this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to save filters.';
+      }
+    },
+
+    applySavedSearch(ss) {
+      if (!ss || !ss.filters) return;
+      const fields = ['actor', 'selectedServices', 'search', 'operation', 'result', 'start', 'end', 'limit', 'includeTags', 'excludeTags'];
+      fields.forEach((f) => {
+        if (ss.filters[f] !== undefined) this.filters[f] = ss.filters[f];
+      });
+      // Validate selectedServices against current options
+      this.filters.selectedServices = this.filters.selectedServices.filter((s) => this.options.services.includes(s));
+      this.resetPagination();
+      this.loadEvents();
+    },
+
+    async deleteSavedSearch(id) {
+      if (!confirm('Delete this saved search?')) return;
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch(`/api/saved-searches/${id}`, {
+          method: 'DELETE',
+          headers: this.authHeader(),
+        });
+        if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
+        this.savedSearches = this.savedSearches.filter((s) => s.id !== id);
+      } catch (err) {
+        this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to delete saved search.';
+      }
+    },
+
+    resetPagination() {
+      this.cursorStack = [];
+      this.nextCursor = null;
+      this.currentCursor = null;
+    },
+
+    goPrev() {
+      if (this.cursorStack.length) {
+        const prevCursor = this.cursorStack.pop();
+        this.loadEvents(prevCursor);
+      }
+    },
+
+    goNext() {
+      if (this.nextCursor) {
+        this.cursorStack.push(this.currentCursor);
+        this.loadEvents(this.nextCursor);
+      }
+    },
+
+    clearFilters() {
+      this.filters = { actor: '', selectedServices: [...this.options.services], search: '', operation: '', result: '', start: '', end: '', limit: 24, includeTags: '', excludeTags: '' };
+      this.saveFilters();
+      this.resetPagination();
+      this.loadEvents();
+    },
+
+    filterByService(service) {
+      if (!service) return;
+      this.filters.selectedServices = [service];
+      this.saveFilters();
+      this.resetPagination();
+      this.loadEvents();
+    },
+
+    filterByResult(result) {
+      if (!result) return;
+      this.filters.result = this.filters.result === result ? '' : result;
+      this.saveFilters();
+      this.resetPagination();
+      this.loadEvents();
+    },
+
+    async loadAlertSummary() {
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch('/api/alerts/summary', { headers: this.authHeader() });
+        if (!res.ok) return;
+        const body = await res.json();
+        this.alertSummary.total_open = body.total_open || 0;
+        const sev = body.by_status_severity || [];
+        this.alertSummary.high = sev.filter((s) => s._id.severity === 'high' && s._id.status === 'open').reduce((a, b) => a + b.count, 0);
+        this.alertSummary.medium = sev.filter((s) => s._id.severity === 'medium' && s._id.status === 'open').reduce((a, b) => a + b.count, 0);
+        this.alertSummary.low = sev.filter((s) => s._id.severity === 'low' && s._id.status === 'open').reduce((a, b) => a + b.count, 0);
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    async loadAlerts() {
+      try {
+        const params = new URLSearchParams();
+        params.append('page_size', '20');
+        params.append('page', String(this.alertsPage));
+        if (this.alertsFilter.status) params.append('status', this.alertsFilter.status);
+        if (this.alertsFilter.severity) params.append('severity', this.alertsFilter.severity);
+        const res = await fetch(`/api/alerts?${params.toString()}`, { headers: this.authHeader() });
+        if (!res.ok) return;
+        const body = await res.json();
+        this.alerts = body.items || [];
+        this.alertsTotal = body.total || 0;
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    async updateAlertStatus(alertId, status) {
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch(`/api/alerts/${alertId}/status`, {
+          method: 'PATCH',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ status }),
+        });
+        if (res.ok) {
+          await this.loadAlerts();
+          await this.loadAlertSummary();
+        }
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    async loadRules() {
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch('/api/rules', { headers: this.authHeader() });
+        if (!res.ok) return;
+        this.rules = await res.json();
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    openRuleEditor(rule) {
+      if (rule) {
+        this.ruleEditId = rule.id;
+        this.ruleEdit = {
+          name: rule.name,
+          enabled: rule.enabled,
+          severity: rule.severity,
+          message: rule.message,
+          conditions: JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(rule.conditions)),
+        };
+      } else {
+        this.ruleEditId = null;
+        this.ruleEdit = { name: '', enabled: true, severity: 'medium', message: '', conditions: [] };
+      }
+      this.ruleModalOpen = true;
+    },
+
+    async saveRule() {
+      const payload = { ...this.ruleEdit };
+      try {
+        const url = this.ruleEditId ? `/api/rules/${this.ruleEditId}` : '/api/rules';
+        const method = this.ruleEditId ? 'PUT' : 'POST';
+        const res = await fetch(url, {
+          method,
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+          body: JSON.stringify(payload),
+        });
+        if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
+        this.ruleModalOpen = false;
+        await this.loadRules();
+      } catch (err) {
+        alert('Failed to save rule: ' + err.message);
+      }
+    },
+
+    async toggleRule(ruleId, enabled) {
+      try {
+        const rule = this.rules.find((r) => r.id === ruleId);
+        if (!rule) return;
+        const res = await fetch(`/api/rules/${ruleId}`, {
+          method: 'PUT',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ ...rule, enabled }),
+        });
+        if (res.ok) await this.loadRules();
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    async deleteRule(ruleId) {
+      if (!confirm('Delete this rule?')) return;
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch(`/api/rules/${ruleId}`, {
+          method: 'DELETE',
+          headers: this.authHeader(),
+        });
+        if (res.ok) await this.loadRules();
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    async askQuestion() {
+      const q = this.askQuestionText.trim();
+      if (!q) return;
+      this.askLoading = true;
+      this.askAnswer = '';
+      this.askAnswerHtml = '';
+      this.askEvents = [];
+      this.askLlmError = '';
+
+      const payload = { question: q };
+      if (this.filters.selectedServices && this.filters.selectedServices.length) {
+        payload.services = this.filters.selectedServices;
+      }
+      if (this.filters.actor) payload.actor = this.filters.actor;
+      if (this.filters.operation) payload.operation = this.filters.operation;
+      if (this.filters.result) payload.result = this.filters.result;
+      if (this.filters.start) payload.start = new Date(this.filters.start).toISOString();
+      if (this.filters.end) payload.end = new Date(this.filters.end).toISOString();
+      if (this.filters.includeTags) {
+        payload.include_tags = this.filters.includeTags.split(/[,;]+/).map(t => t.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+      }
+      if (this.filters.excludeTags) {
+        payload.exclude_tags = this.filters.excludeTags.split(/[,;]+/).map(t => t.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+      }
+
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch('/api/ask', {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+          body: JSON.stringify(payload),
+        });
+        if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
+        const body = await res.json();
+        this.askAnswer = body.answer;
+        this.askAnswerHtml = this._mdToHtml(body.answer);
+        this.askEvents = body.events || [];
+        this.askLlmUsed = body.llm_used;
+        this.askLlmError = body.llm_error || '';
+      } catch (err) {
+        this.askAnswer = 'Sorry, something went wrong: ' + (err.message || 'Unknown error');
+        this.askAnswerHtml = this.askAnswer;
+      } finally {
+        this.askLoading = false;
+      }
+    },
+
+    clearAsk() {
+      this.askQuestionText = '';
+      this.askAnswer = '';
+      this.askAnswerHtml = '';
+      this.askEvents = [];
+      this.askLlmUsed = false;
+      this.askLlmError = '';
+    },
+
+    _mdToHtml(text) {
+      // Very lightweight markdown-to-HTML for LLM answers
+      return text
+        .replace(/&/g, '&amp;').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;')
+        .replace(/\*\*(.+?)\*\*/g, '<strong>$1</strong>')
+        .replace(/\*(.+?)\*/g, '<em>$1</em>')
+        .replace(/`([^`]+)`/g, '<code>$1</code>')
+        .replace(/Event #(\d+)/g, '<strong>Event #$1</strong>')
+        .replace(/\n/g, '<br>');
+    },
+
+    hasActiveFilters() {
+      return this.filters.actor || this.filters.operation || this.filters.result ||
+        this.filters.start || this.filters.end || this.filters.includeTags ||
+        this.filters.excludeTags ||
+        (this.filters.selectedServices && this.filters.selectedServices.length &&
+         this.filters.selectedServices.length < this.options.services.length);
+    },
+
+    activeFilterSummary() {
+      const parts = [];
+      if (this.filters.actor) parts.push('actor');
+      if (this.filters.operation) parts.push('action');
+      if (this.filters.result) parts.push('result');
+      if (this.filters.start || this.filters.end) parts.push('time');
+      if (this.filters.includeTags || this.filters.excludeTags) parts.push('tags');
+      const svcCount = this.filters.selectedServices?.length || 0;
+      const allCount = this.options.services?.length || 0;
+      if (svcCount && svcCount < allCount) parts.push(`${svcCount} service${svcCount === 1 ? '' : 's'}`);
+      return parts.join(', ') || 'none';
+    },
+
+    async bulkTagMatching() {
+      const tag = prompt('Enter tag to apply to all matching events:');
+      if (!tag || !tag.trim()) return;
+      const mode = confirm('Click OK to REPLACE existing tags.\nClick Cancel to APPEND the new tag.') ? 'replace' : 'append';
+      const params = new URLSearchParams();
+      ['actor', 'operation', 'result', 'search'].forEach((key) => {
+        const val = this.filters[key];
+        if (val) params.append(key, val);
+      });
+      if (this.filters.selectedServices && this.filters.selectedServices.length) {
+        this.filters.selectedServices.forEach((s) => params.append('services', s));
+      }
+      if (this.filters.includeTags) {
+        this.filters.includeTags.split(/[,;]+/).map((t) => t.trim()).filter(Boolean).forEach((t) => params.append('include_tags', t));
+      }
+      if (this.filters.excludeTags) {
+        this.filters.excludeTags.split(/[,;]+/).map((t) => t.trim()).filter(Boolean).forEach((t) => params.append('exclude_tags', t));
+      }
+      if (this.filters.start) {
+        const d = new Date(this.filters.start);
+        if (!isNaN(d.getTime())) params.append('start', d.toISOString());
+      }
+      if (this.filters.end) {
+        const d = new Date(this.filters.end);
+        if (!isNaN(d.getTime())) params.append('end', d.toISOString());
+      }
+      this.statusText = 'Applying bulk tag…';
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch(`/api/events/bulk-tags?${params.toString()}`, {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ tags: [tag.trim()], mode }),
+        });
+        if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
+        const body = await res.json();
+        this.statusText = `Tagged ${body.matched} events (${body.modified} modified).`;
+        await this.loadEvents();
+      } catch (err) {
+        this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to apply bulk tag.';
+      }
+    },
+
+    displayActor(e) {
+      const app = e.actor?.application || e.actor?.app;
+      if (app?.displayName) return app.displayName;
+      return e.actor_display ||
+        (e.actor_resolved?.name) ||
+        (e.actor?.user?.displayName && e.actor?.user?.userPrincipalName && e.actor?.user?.displayName !== e.actor?.user?.userPrincipalName
+          ? `${e.actor.user.displayName} (${e.actor.user.userPrincipalName})`
+          : (e.actor?.user?.displayName || e.actor?.user?.userPrincipalName)) ||
+        e.actor?.servicePrincipal?.displayName ||
+        'Unknown actor';
+    },
+
+    displayTargets(e) {
+      if (Array.isArray(e.target_displays) && e.target_displays.length) return e.target_displays.join(', ');
+      if (Array.isArray(e.targets) && e.targets.length) return e.targets[0].displayName || e.targets[0].id || '—';
+      return '—';
+    },
+
+    openModal(e) {
+      const seen = new WeakSet();
+      try {
+        this.modalBody = JSON.stringify(e.raw || e, (key, value) => {
+          if (typeof value === 'object' && value !== null) {
+            if (seen.has(value)) return '[Circular]';
+            seen.add(value);
+          }
+          return value;
+        }, 2);
+      } catch (err) {
+        this.modalBody = `Error serializing event:\n${err.message}\n\nEvent ID: ${e.id || 'N/A'}`;
+      }
+      this.modalEventId = e.id || '';
+      this.modalExplanation = '';
+      this.modalExplainError = '';
+      this.modalOpen = true;
+    },
+
+    async copyRawEvent() {
+      if (!this.modalBody) return;
+      try {
+        await navigator.clipboard.writeText(this.modalBody);
+        this.statusText = 'Raw event copied to clipboard.';
+        setTimeout(() => { if (this.statusText === 'Raw event copied to clipboard.') this.statusText = ''; }, 2000);
+      } catch (err) {
+        this.statusText = 'Failed to copy to clipboard.';
+      }
+    },
+
+    async explainEvent() {
+      if (!this.modalEventId) return;
+      this.modalExplainLoading = true;
+      this.modalExplanation = '';
+      this.modalExplainError = '';
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch(`/api/events/${this.modalEventId}/explain`, {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+        });
+        if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
+        const body = await res.json();
+        this.modalExplanation = body.explanation;
+        this.modalExplainError = body.llm_error || '';
+      } catch (err) {
+        this.modalExplainError = err.message || 'Failed to explain event.';
+      } finally {
+        this.modalExplainLoading = false;
+      }
+    },
+
+    async addTag(e, tag) {
+      if (!tag.trim()) return;
+      const tags = [...(e.tags || []), tag.trim()];
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch(`/api/events/${e.id}/tags`, {
+          method: 'PATCH',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ tags }),
+        });
+        if (res.ok) e.tags = tags;
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    async addComment(e, text) {
+      if (!text.trim()) return;
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch(`/api/events/${e.id}/comments`, {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ text: text.trim() }),
+        });
+        if (res.ok) {
+          const c = await res.json();
+          e.comments = [...(e.comments || []), c];
+        }
+      } catch {}
+    },
+
+    exportJSON() {
+      const blob = new Blob([JSON.stringify(this.events, null, 2)], { type: 'application/json' });
+      const url = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
+      const a = document.createElement('a');
+      a.href = url;
+      a.download = `aoc-events-${new Date().toISOString().slice(0,10)}.json`;
+      a.click();
+      URL.revokeObjectURL(url);
+    },
+
+    exportCSV() {
+      if (!this.events.length) return;
+      const headers = ['timestamp', 'service', 'operation', 'result', 'actor_display', 'target_displays', 'display_summary'];
+      const rows = this.events.map((e) => [
+        e.timestamp || '',
+        e.service || '',
+        e.operation || '',
+        e.result || '',
+        (e.actor_display || '').replace(/"/g, '""'),
+        (Array.isArray(e.target_displays) ? e.target_displays.join('; ') : '').replace(/"/g, '""'),
+        (e.display_summary || '').replace(/"/g, '""'),
+      ]);
+      const csv = [headers.join(','), ...rows.map((r) => r.map((c) => `"${c}"`).join(','))].join('\n');
+      const blob = new Blob([csv], { type: 'text/csv' });
+      const url = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
+      const a = document.createElement('a');
+      a.href = url;
+      a.download = `aoc-events-${new Date().toISOString().slice(0,10)}.csv`;
+      a.click();
+      URL.revokeObjectURL(url);
+    },
+  };
+}

backend/frontend/index.html

@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@
   <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />
   <title>Admin Operations Center</title>
   <link rel="stylesheet" href="/style.css?v=15" />
-  <script defer src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/alpinejs@3.x.x/dist/cdn.min.js"></script>
+  <script src="/app.js?v=1"></script>
-  <script src="https://alcdn.msauth.net/browser/2.37.0/js/msal-browser.min.js" crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
+  <script defer src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/alpinejs@3.15.12/dist/cdn.min.js" integrity="sha384-pb6hrQvo4s23cEUFtj0CZkzGE3jyK3pj26RIupXXxhSrrcUA/Cn0lZgcCrGH0t6L" crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
+  <script src="https://alcdn.msauth.net/browser/2.37.0/js/msal-browser.min.js" integrity="sha384-DUSOaqAzlZRiZxkDi8hL7hXJDZ+X39ZOAYV9ZDx44gUv9pozmcunJH02tjSFLPnW" crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
 </head>
 <body>
   <div class="page" x-data="aocApp()" x-init="initApp()">
@@ -452,827 +453,5 @@
     </footer>
   </div>
 
-  <script>
-    function aocApp() {
-      return {
-        events: [],
-        sourceHealth: [],
-        statusText: '',
-        countText: '',
-        cursorStack: [],
-        nextCursor: null,
-        currentCursor: null,
-        modalOpen: false,
-        modalBody: '',
-        modalEventId: '',
-        modalExplanation: '',
-        modalExplainLoading: false,
-        modalExplainError: '',
-        authBtnText: 'Login',
-        authConfig: null,
-        msalInstance: null,
-        account: null,
-        accessToken: null,
-        authScopes: [],
-        filters: {
-          actor: '', selectedServices: [], search: '', operation: '', result: '', start: '', end: '', limit: 24, includeTags: '', excludeTags: '',
-        },
-        panelState: { sourceHealth: true, alerts: true, rules: true, filters: true, ask: true, events: true },
-        options: { actors: [], services: [], operations: [], results: [] },
-        savedSearches: [],
-        appVersion: '',
-        repoUrl: 'https://git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc',
-        docsUrl: 'https://git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc/src/branch/main/README.md',
-        aiFeaturesEnabled: true,
-        alertSummary: { total_open: 0, high: 0, medium: 0, low: 0 },
-        alerts: [],
-        alertsTotal: 0,
-        alertsPage: 1,
-        alertsFilter: { status: 'open', severity: '' },
-        rules: [],
-        ruleModalOpen: false,
-        ruleEditId: null,
-        ruleEdit: { name: '', enabled: true, severity: 'medium', message: '', conditions: [] },
-        askQuestionText: '',
-        askLoading: false,
-        askAnswer: '',
-        askAnswerHtml: '',
-        askEvents: [],
-        askLlmUsed: false,
-        askLlmError: '',
-
-        async initApp() {
-          await this.loadVersion();
-          await this.initAuth();
-          this.loadSavedFilters();
-          this.loadPanelState();
-          if (!this.authConfig?.auth_enabled || this.accessToken) {
-            await this.loadFilterOptions();
-            await this.loadSavedSearches();
-            await this.loadSourceHealth();
-            await this.loadAlertSummary();
-            await this.loadAlerts();
-            await this.loadRules();
-            await this.loadEvents();
-          }
-        },
-
-        loadSavedFilters() {
-          try {
-            const saved = localStorage.getItem('aoc_filters');
-            if (!saved) return;
-            const parsed = JSON.parse(saved);
-            const fields = ['actor', 'selectedServices', 'search', 'operation', 'result', 'start', 'end', 'limit', 'includeTags', 'excludeTags'];
-            fields.forEach((f) => {
-              if (parsed[f] !== undefined) this.filters[f] = parsed[f];
-            });
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        saveFilters() {
-          try {
-            localStorage.setItem('aoc_filters', JSON.stringify(this.filters));
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        loadPanelState() {
-          try {
-            const saved = localStorage.getItem('aoc_panels');
-            if (saved) {
-              const parsed = JSON.parse(saved);
-              Object.keys(parsed).forEach((k) => { if (this.panelState[k] !== undefined) this.panelState[k] = parsed[k]; });
-            }
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        savePanelState() {
-          try {
-            localStorage.setItem('aoc_panels', JSON.stringify(this.panelState));
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        togglePanel(key) {
-          this.panelState[key] = !this.panelState[key];
-          this.savePanelState();
-        },
-
-        async loadVersion() {
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch('/api/version');
-            if (res.ok) {
-              const body = await res.json();
-              this.appVersion = (body.version || '').replace(/^v/, '');
-            }
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        authHeader() {
-          return this.accessToken ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${this.accessToken}` } : {};
-        },
-
-        pickToken(res) {
-          if (!res) return null;
-          const clientId = this.authConfig?.client_id;
-          // If accessToken is present and its audience matches our API, use it.
-          if (res.accessToken && clientId) {
-            try {
-              const base64 = res.accessToken.split('.')[1].replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');
-              const padded = base64.padEnd(base64.length + (4 - base64.length % 4) % 4, '=');
-              const payload = JSON.parse(atob(padded));
-              if (payload.aud === clientId) {
-                return res.accessToken;
-              }
-            } catch {}
-          }
-          // Fall back to idToken (always aud=clientId) or accessToken
-          return res.idToken || res.accessToken || null;
-        },
-
-        async initAuth() {
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch('/api/config/auth');
-            if (!res.ok) {
-              console.error('Auth config fetch failed:', res.status, res.statusText);
-              this.authConfig = { auth_enabled: false, _error: res.status };
-            } else {
-              this.authConfig = await res.json();
-            }
-          } catch (err) {
-            console.error('Auth config fetch error:', err);
-            this.authConfig = { auth_enabled: false, _error: 'network' };
-          }
-
-          try {
-            const featRes = await fetch('/api/config/features');
-            if (featRes.ok) {
-              const featBody = await featRes.json();
-              this.aiFeaturesEnabled = featBody.ai_features_enabled !== false;
-              if (featBody.default_page_size) {
-                this.filters.limit = featBody.default_page_size;
-              } else {
-                this.filters.limit = 24;
-              }
-            } else {
-              this.aiFeaturesEnabled = true;
-            }
-          } catch {
-            this.aiFeaturesEnabled = true;
-          }
-
-          if (!this.authConfig?.auth_enabled) {
-            this.authBtnText = 'Auth: OFF';
-            console.warn('AOC auth is disabled. Set AUTH_ENABLED=true in .env to enable login.');
-            return;
-          }
-
-          const tenantId = this.authConfig.tenant_id;
-          const clientId = this.authConfig.client_id;
-          if (!clientId || !tenantId) {
-            this.authBtnText = 'Auth: misconfigured';
-            this.statusText = 'Auth is enabled but client_id or tenant_id is missing. Check .env configuration.';
-            console.error('AOC auth misconfigured: missing client_id or tenant_id in /api/config/auth');
-            return;
-          }
-
-          if (typeof msal === 'undefined' || !msal.PublicClientApplication) {
-            this.statusText = 'Login library failed to load. Please check network or CDN.';
-            return;
-          }
-
-          const baseScope = this.authConfig.scope || "";
-          this.authScopes = Array.from(new Set(['openid', 'profile', 'email', ...baseScope.split(/[ ,]+/).filter(Boolean)]));
-          const authority = `https://login.microsoftonline.com/${tenantId}`;
-          const redirectUri = window.location.origin;
-
-          this.msalInstance = new msal.PublicClientApplication({
-            auth: { clientId, authority, redirectUri },
-            cache: { cacheLocation: 'sessionStorage' },
-          });
-
-          const redirectResult = await this.msalInstance.handleRedirectPromise().catch(() => null);
-          if (redirectResult) {
-            this.account = redirectResult.account;
-            this.msalInstance.setActiveAccount(this.account);
-            this.accessToken = this.pickToken(redirectResult);
-          } else {
-            const accounts = this.msalInstance.getAllAccounts();
-            if (accounts.length) {
-              this.account = accounts[0];
-              this.msalInstance.setActiveAccount(this.account);
-              this.accessToken = await this.acquireToken(this.authScopes);
-            }
-          }
-
-          this.updateAuthButtons();
-        },
-
-        async acquireToken(scopes) {
-          if (!this.msalInstance || !this.account) return null;
-          const request = { scopes: scopes && scopes.length ? scopes : ['openid', 'profile', 'email'], account: this.account };
-          try {
-            const res = await this.msalInstance.acquireTokenSilent(request);
-            return this.pickToken(res);
-          } catch {
-            const res = await this.msalInstance.acquireTokenPopup(request);
-            return this.pickToken(res);
-          }
-        },
-
-        updateAuthButtons() {
-          const loggedIn = !!this.account;
-          if (this.authConfig?.auth_enabled) {
-            this.authBtnText = loggedIn ? 'Logout' : 'Login';
-          }
-          if (loggedIn) {
-            this.acquireToken(this.authScopes).then((t) => { if (t) this.accessToken = t; }).catch(() => {});
-            this.statusText = '';
-          } else if (this.authConfig?.auth_enabled) {
-            this.statusText = 'Please log in to view events.';
-          }
-        },
-
-        async toggleAuth() {
-          if (!this.authConfig?.auth_enabled || !this.msalInstance) return;
-          if (this.account) {
-            const acc = this.msalInstance.getActiveAccount();
-            this.accessToken = null;
-            this.account = null;
-            this.updateAuthButtons();
-            if (acc) await this.msalInstance.logoutPopup({ account: acc });
-            return;
-          }
-          const scopes = this.authScopes && this.authScopes.length ? this.authScopes : ['openid', 'profile', 'email'];
-          this.statusText = 'Redirecting to sign in...';
-          this.msalInstance.loginRedirect({ scopes });
-        },
-
-        async loadEvents(cursor) {
-          this.currentCursor = cursor || null;
-          const params = new URLSearchParams();
-          ['actor', 'operation', 'result', 'search'].forEach((key) => {
-            const val = this.filters[key];
-            if (val) params.append(key, val);
-          });
-          if (this.filters.selectedServices && this.filters.selectedServices.length) {
-            this.filters.selectedServices.forEach((s) => params.append('services', s));
-          }
-          if (this.filters.includeTags) {
-            this.filters.includeTags.split(/[,;]+/).map((t) => t.trim()).filter(Boolean).forEach((t) => params.append('include_tags', t));
-          }
-          if (this.filters.excludeTags) {
-            this.filters.excludeTags.split(/[,;]+/).map((t) => t.trim()).filter(Boolean).forEach((t) => params.append('exclude_tags', t));
-          }
-          if (this.filters.start) {
-            const d = new Date(this.filters.start);
-            if (!isNaN(d.getTime())) params.append('start', d.toISOString());
-          }
-          if (this.filters.end) {
-            const d = new Date(this.filters.end);
-            if (!isNaN(d.getTime())) params.append('end', d.toISOString());
-          }
-          params.append('page_size', String(this.filters.limit || 50));
-          if (cursor) params.append('cursor', cursor);
-
-          this.statusText = 'Loading events…';
-          this.countText = '';
-
-          if (this.authConfig?.auth_enabled && !this.accessToken) {
-            this.statusText = 'Please sign in to load events.';
-            return;
-          }
-
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch(`/api/events?${params.toString()}`, { headers: { Accept: 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() } });
-            if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Request failed: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
-            const body = await res.json();
-            this.events = body.items || [];
-            this.nextCursor = body.next_cursor || null;
-            this.countText = body.total >= 0 ? `${body.total} event${body.total === 1 ? '' : 's'}` : '';
-            this.statusText = this.events.length ? '' : 'No events found for these filters.';
-            this.saveFilters();
-          } catch (err) {
-            this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to load events.';
-          }
-        },
-
-        async fetchLogs() {
-          this.statusText = 'Fetching latest audit logs…';
-          if (this.authConfig?.auth_enabled && !this.accessToken) {
-            this.statusText = 'Please sign in first.';
-            return;
-          }
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch('/api/fetch-audit-logs', { headers: this.authHeader() });
-            if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Fetch failed: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
-            const body = await res.json();
-            const errs = Array.isArray(body.errors) && body.errors.length ? `Warnings: ${body.errors.join(' | ')}` : '';
-            this.statusText = `Fetched and stored ${body.stored_events || 0} events.${errs ? ' ' + errs : ''} Refreshing list…`;
-            this.resetPagination();
-            await this.loadEvents();
-            await this.loadSourceHealth();
-          } catch (err) {
-            this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to fetch audit logs.';
-          }
-        },
-
-        async loadFilterOptions() {
-          if (this.authConfig?.auth_enabled && !this.accessToken) return;
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch('/api/filter-options', { headers: this.authHeader() });
-            if (!res.ok) return;
-            const opts = await res.json();
-            this.options.actors = (opts.actors || []).slice(0, 200);
-            this.options.services = (opts.services || []).slice(0, 200);
-            this.options.operations = (opts.operations || []).slice(0, 200);
-            this.options.results = (opts.results || []).slice(0, 200);
-
-            const saved = localStorage.getItem('aoc_filters');
-            if (!saved && this.options.services.length) {
-              // Default: show all services (privacy controls handle exclusions server-side)
-              this.filters.selectedServices = [...this.options.services];
-            } else if (saved) {
-              try {
-                const parsed = JSON.parse(saved);
-                if (parsed.selectedServices) {
-                  this.filters.selectedServices = parsed.selectedServices.filter((s) => this.options.services.includes(s));
-                }
-              } catch {}
-            }
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        async loadSourceHealth() {
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch('/api/source-health', { headers: this.authHeader() });
-            if (!res.ok) return;
-            this.sourceHealth = await res.json();
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        async loadSavedSearches() {
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch('/api/saved-searches', { headers: this.authHeader() });
-            if (!res.ok) return;
-            this.savedSearches = await res.json();
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        async saveCurrentFilters() {
-          const name = prompt('Name this saved filter:');
-          if (!name || !name.trim()) return;
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch('/api/saved-searches', {
-              method: 'POST',
-              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
-              body: JSON.stringify({ name: name.trim(), filters: { ...this.filters } }),
-            });
-            if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
-            const created = await res.json();
-            this.savedSearches.unshift(created);
-            this.statusText = 'Filters saved.';
-            setTimeout(() => { if (this.statusText === 'Filters saved.') this.statusText = ''; }, 2000);
-          } catch (err) {
-            this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to save filters.';
-          }
-        },
-
-        applySavedSearch(ss) {
-          if (!ss || !ss.filters) return;
-          const fields = ['actor', 'selectedServices', 'search', 'operation', 'result', 'start', 'end', 'limit', 'includeTags', 'excludeTags'];
-          fields.forEach((f) => {
-            if (ss.filters[f] !== undefined) this.filters[f] = ss.filters[f];
-          });
-          // Validate selectedServices against current options
-          this.filters.selectedServices = this.filters.selectedServices.filter((s) => this.options.services.includes(s));
-          this.resetPagination();
-          this.loadEvents();
-        },
-
-        async deleteSavedSearch(id) {
-          if (!confirm('Delete this saved search?')) return;
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch(`/api/saved-searches/${id}`, {
-              method: 'DELETE',
-              headers: this.authHeader(),
-            });
-            if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
-            this.savedSearches = this.savedSearches.filter((s) => s.id !== id);
-          } catch (err) {
-            this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to delete saved search.';
-          }
-        },
-
-        resetPagination() {
-          this.cursorStack = [];
-          this.nextCursor = null;
-          this.currentCursor = null;
-        },
-
-        goPrev() {
-          if (this.cursorStack.length) {
-            const prevCursor = this.cursorStack.pop();
-            this.loadEvents(prevCursor);
-          }
-        },
-
-        goNext() {
-          if (this.nextCursor) {
-            this.cursorStack.push(this.currentCursor);
-            this.loadEvents(this.nextCursor);
-          }
-        },
-
-        clearFilters() {
-          this.filters = { actor: '', selectedServices: [...this.options.services], search: '', operation: '', result: '', start: '', end: '', limit: 24, includeTags: '', excludeTags: '' };
-          this.saveFilters();
-          this.resetPagination();
-          this.loadEvents();
-        },
-
-        filterByService(service) {
-          if (!service) return;
-          this.filters.selectedServices = [service];
-          this.saveFilters();
-          this.resetPagination();
-          this.loadEvents();
-        },
-
-        filterByResult(result) {
-          if (!result) return;
-          this.filters.result = this.filters.result === result ? '' : result;
-          this.saveFilters();
-          this.resetPagination();
-          this.loadEvents();
-        },
-
-        async loadAlertSummary() {
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch('/api/alerts/summary', { headers: this.authHeader() });
-            if (!res.ok) return;
-            const body = await res.json();
-            this.alertSummary.total_open = body.total_open || 0;
-            const sev = body.by_status_severity || [];
-            this.alertSummary.high = sev.filter((s) => s._id.severity === 'high' && s._id.status === 'open').reduce((a, b) => a + b.count, 0);
-            this.alertSummary.medium = sev.filter((s) => s._id.severity === 'medium' && s._id.status === 'open').reduce((a, b) => a + b.count, 0);
-            this.alertSummary.low = sev.filter((s) => s._id.severity === 'low' && s._id.status === 'open').reduce((a, b) => a + b.count, 0);
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        async loadAlerts() {
-          try {
-            const params = new URLSearchParams();
-            params.append('page_size', '20');
-            params.append('page', String(this.alertsPage));
-            if (this.alertsFilter.status) params.append('status', this.alertsFilter.status);
-            if (this.alertsFilter.severity) params.append('severity', this.alertsFilter.severity);
-            const res = await fetch(`/api/alerts?${params.toString()}`, { headers: this.authHeader() });
-            if (!res.ok) return;
-            const body = await res.json();
-            this.alerts = body.items || [];
-            this.alertsTotal = body.total || 0;
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        async updateAlertStatus(alertId, status) {
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch(`/api/alerts/${alertId}/status`, {
-              method: 'PATCH',
-              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
-              body: JSON.stringify({ status }),
-            });
-            if (res.ok) {
-              await this.loadAlerts();
-              await this.loadAlertSummary();
-            }
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        async loadRules() {
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch('/api/rules', { headers: this.authHeader() });
-            if (!res.ok) return;
-            this.rules = await res.json();
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        openRuleEditor(rule) {
-          if (rule) {
-            this.ruleEditId = rule.id;
-            this.ruleEdit = {
-              name: rule.name,
-              enabled: rule.enabled,
-              severity: rule.severity,
-              message: rule.message,
-              conditions: JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(rule.conditions)),
-            };
-          } else {
-            this.ruleEditId = null;
-            this.ruleEdit = { name: '', enabled: true, severity: 'medium', message: '', conditions: [] };
-          }
-          this.ruleModalOpen = true;
-        },
-
-        async saveRule() {
-          const payload = { ...this.ruleEdit };
-          try {
-            const url = this.ruleEditId ? `/api/rules/${this.ruleEditId}` : '/api/rules';
-            const method = this.ruleEditId ? 'PUT' : 'POST';
-            const res = await fetch(url, {
-              method,
-              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
-              body: JSON.stringify(payload),
-            });
-            if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
-            this.ruleModalOpen = false;
-            await this.loadRules();
-          } catch (err) {
-            alert('Failed to save rule: ' + err.message);
-          }
-        },
-
-        async toggleRule(ruleId, enabled) {
-          try {
-            const rule = this.rules.find((r) => r.id === ruleId);
-            if (!rule) return;
-            const res = await fetch(`/api/rules/${ruleId}`, {
-              method: 'PUT',
-              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
-              body: JSON.stringify({ ...rule, enabled }),
-            });
-            if (res.ok) await this.loadRules();
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        async deleteRule(ruleId) {
-          if (!confirm('Delete this rule?')) return;
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch(`/api/rules/${ruleId}`, {
-              method: 'DELETE',
-              headers: this.authHeader(),
-            });
-            if (res.ok) await this.loadRules();
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        async askQuestion() {
-          const q = this.askQuestionText.trim();
-          if (!q) return;
-          this.askLoading = true;
-          this.askAnswer = '';
-          this.askAnswerHtml = '';
-          this.askEvents = [];
-          this.askLlmError = '';
-
-          const payload = { question: q };
-          if (this.filters.selectedServices && this.filters.selectedServices.length) {
-            payload.services = this.filters.selectedServices;
-          }
-          if (this.filters.actor) payload.actor = this.filters.actor;
-          if (this.filters.operation) payload.operation = this.filters.operation;
-          if (this.filters.result) payload.result = this.filters.result;
-          if (this.filters.start) payload.start = new Date(this.filters.start).toISOString();
-          if (this.filters.end) payload.end = new Date(this.filters.end).toISOString();
-          if (this.filters.includeTags) {
-            payload.include_tags = this.filters.includeTags.split(/[,;]+/).map(t => t.trim()).filter(Boolean);
-          }
-          if (this.filters.excludeTags) {
-            payload.exclude_tags = this.filters.excludeTags.split(/[,;]+/).map(t => t.trim()).filter(Boolean);
-          }
-
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch('/api/ask', {
-              method: 'POST',
-              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
-              body: JSON.stringify(payload),
-            });
-            if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
-            const body = await res.json();
-            this.askAnswer = body.answer;
-            this.askAnswerHtml = this._mdToHtml(body.answer);
-            this.askEvents = body.events || [];
-            this.askLlmUsed = body.llm_used;
-            this.askLlmError = body.llm_error || '';
-          } catch (err) {
-            this.askAnswer = 'Sorry, something went wrong: ' + (err.message || 'Unknown error');
-            this.askAnswerHtml = this.askAnswer;
-          } finally {
-            this.askLoading = false;
-          }
-        },
-
-        clearAsk() {
-          this.askQuestionText = '';
-          this.askAnswer = '';
-          this.askAnswerHtml = '';
-          this.askEvents = [];
-          this.askLlmUsed = false;
-          this.askLlmError = '';
-        },
-
-        _mdToHtml(text) {
-          // Very lightweight markdown-to-HTML for LLM answers
-          return text
-            .replace(/&/g, '&amp;').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;')
-            .replace(/\*\*(.+?)\*\*/g, '<strong>$1</strong>')
-            .replace(/\*(.+?)\*/g, '<em>$1</em>')
-            .replace(/`([^`]+)`/g, '<code>$1</code>')
-            .replace(/Event #(\d+)/g, '<strong>Event #$1</strong>')
-            .replace(/\n/g, '<br>');
-        },
-
-        hasActiveFilters() {
-          return this.filters.actor || this.filters.operation || this.filters.result ||
-            this.filters.start || this.filters.end || this.filters.includeTags ||
-            this.filters.excludeTags ||
-            (this.filters.selectedServices && this.filters.selectedServices.length &&
-             this.filters.selectedServices.length < this.options.services.length);
-        },
-
-        activeFilterSummary() {
-          const parts = [];
-          if (this.filters.actor) parts.push('actor');
-          if (this.filters.operation) parts.push('action');
-          if (this.filters.result) parts.push('result');
-          if (this.filters.start || this.filters.end) parts.push('time');
-          if (this.filters.includeTags || this.filters.excludeTags) parts.push('tags');
-          const svcCount = this.filters.selectedServices?.length || 0;
-          const allCount = this.options.services?.length || 0;
-          if (svcCount && svcCount < allCount) parts.push(`${svcCount} service${svcCount === 1 ? '' : 's'}`);
-          return parts.join(', ') || 'none';
-        },
-
-        async bulkTagMatching() {
-          const tag = prompt('Enter tag to apply to all matching events:');
-          if (!tag || !tag.trim()) return;
-          const mode = confirm('Click OK to REPLACE existing tags.\nClick Cancel to APPEND the new tag.') ? 'replace' : 'append';
-          const params = new URLSearchParams();
-          ['actor', 'operation', 'result', 'search'].forEach((key) => {
-            const val = this.filters[key];
-            if (val) params.append(key, val);
-          });
-          if (this.filters.selectedServices && this.filters.selectedServices.length) {
-            this.filters.selectedServices.forEach((s) => params.append('services', s));
-          }
-          if (this.filters.includeTags) {
-            this.filters.includeTags.split(/[,;]+/).map((t) => t.trim()).filter(Boolean).forEach((t) => params.append('include_tags', t));
-          }
-          if (this.filters.excludeTags) {
-            this.filters.excludeTags.split(/[,;]+/).map((t) => t.trim()).filter(Boolean).forEach((t) => params.append('exclude_tags', t));
-          }
-          if (this.filters.start) {
-            const d = new Date(this.filters.start);
-            if (!isNaN(d.getTime())) params.append('start', d.toISOString());
-          }
-          if (this.filters.end) {
-            const d = new Date(this.filters.end);
-            if (!isNaN(d.getTime())) params.append('end', d.toISOString());
-          }
-          this.statusText = 'Applying bulk tag…';
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch(`/api/events/bulk-tags?${params.toString()}`, {
-              method: 'POST',
-              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
-              body: JSON.stringify({ tags: [tag.trim()], mode }),
-            });
-            if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
-            const body = await res.json();
-            this.statusText = `Tagged ${body.matched} events (${body.modified} modified).`;
-            await this.loadEvents();
-          } catch (err) {
-            this.statusText = err.message || 'Failed to apply bulk tag.';
-          }
-        },
-
-        displayActor(e) {
-          const app = e.actor?.application || e.actor?.app;
-          if (app?.displayName) return app.displayName;
-          return e.actor_display ||
-            (e.actor_resolved?.name) ||
-            (e.actor?.user?.displayName && e.actor?.user?.userPrincipalName && e.actor?.user?.displayName !== e.actor?.user?.userPrincipalName
-              ? `${e.actor.user.displayName} (${e.actor.user.userPrincipalName})`
-              : (e.actor?.user?.displayName || e.actor?.user?.userPrincipalName)) ||
-            e.actor?.servicePrincipal?.displayName ||
-            'Unknown actor';
-        },
-
-        displayTargets(e) {
-          if (Array.isArray(e.target_displays) && e.target_displays.length) return e.target_displays.join(', ');
-          if (Array.isArray(e.targets) && e.targets.length) return e.targets[0].displayName || e.targets[0].id || '—';
-          return '—';
-        },
-
-        openModal(e) {
-          const seen = new WeakSet();
-          try {
-            this.modalBody = JSON.stringify(e.raw || e, (key, value) => {
-              if (typeof value === 'object' && value !== null) {
-                if (seen.has(value)) return '[Circular]';
-                seen.add(value);
-              }
-              return value;
-            }, 2);
-          } catch (err) {
-            this.modalBody = `Error serializing event:\n${err.message}\n\nEvent ID: ${e.id || 'N/A'}`;
-          }
-          this.modalEventId = e.id || '';
-          this.modalExplanation = '';
-          this.modalExplainError = '';
-          this.modalOpen = true;
-        },
-
-        async copyRawEvent() {
-          if (!this.modalBody) return;
-          try {
-            await navigator.clipboard.writeText(this.modalBody);
-            this.statusText = 'Raw event copied to clipboard.';
-            setTimeout(() => { if (this.statusText === 'Raw event copied to clipboard.') this.statusText = ''; }, 2000);
-          } catch (err) {
-            this.statusText = 'Failed to copy to clipboard.';
-          }
-        },
-
-        async explainEvent() {
-          if (!this.modalEventId) return;
-          this.modalExplainLoading = true;
-          this.modalExplanation = '';
-          this.modalExplainError = '';
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch(`/api/events/${this.modalEventId}/explain`, {
-              method: 'POST',
-              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
-            });
-            if (!res.ok) throw new Error(await res.text());
-            const body = await res.json();
-            this.modalExplanation = body.explanation;
-            this.modalExplainError = body.llm_error || '';
-          } catch (err) {
-            this.modalExplainError = err.message || 'Failed to explain event.';
-          } finally {
-            this.modalExplainLoading = false;
-          }
-        },
-
-        async addTag(e, tag) {
-          if (!tag.trim()) return;
-          const tags = [...(e.tags || []), tag.trim()];
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch(`/api/events/${e.id}/tags`, {
-              method: 'PATCH',
-              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
-              body: JSON.stringify({ tags }),
-            });
-            if (res.ok) e.tags = tags;
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        async addComment(e, text) {
-          if (!text.trim()) return;
-          try {
-            const res = await fetch(`/api/events/${e.id}/comments`, {
-              method: 'POST',
-              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...this.authHeader() },
-              body: JSON.stringify({ text: text.trim() }),
-            });
-            if (res.ok) {
-              const c = await res.json();
-              e.comments = [...(e.comments || []), c];
-            }
-          } catch {}
-        },
-
-        exportJSON() {
-          const blob = new Blob([JSON.stringify(this.events, null, 2)], { type: 'application/json' });
-          const url = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
-          const a = document.createElement('a');
-          a.href = url;
-          a.download = `aoc-events-${new Date().toISOString().slice(0,10)}.json`;
-          a.click();
-          URL.revokeObjectURL(url);
-        },
-
-        exportCSV() {
-          if (!this.events.length) return;
-          const headers = ['timestamp', 'service', 'operation', 'result', 'actor_display', 'target_displays', 'display_summary'];
-          const rows = this.events.map((e) => [
-            e.timestamp || '',
-            e.service || '',
-            e.operation || '',
-            e.result || '',
-            (e.actor_display || '').replace(/"/g, '""'),
-            (Array.isArray(e.target_displays) ? e.target_displays.join('; ') : '').replace(/"/g, '""'),
-            (e.display_summary || '').replace(/"/g, '""'),
-          ]);
-          const csv = [headers.join(','), ...rows.map((r) => r.map((c) => `"${c}"`).join(','))].join('\n');
-          const blob = new Blob([csv], { type: 'text/csv' });
-          const url = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
-          const a = document.createElement('a');
-          a.href = url;
-          a.download = `aoc-events-${new Date().toISOString().slice(0,10)}.csv`;
-          a.click();
-          URL.revokeObjectURL(url);
-        },
-      };
-    }
-  </script>
 </body>
 </html>

backend/main.py

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import asyncio
+import ipaddress
 import logging
 import os
 import time
@@ -7,7 +8,18 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 import structlog
 from audit_trail import log_action
-from config import AI_FEATURES_ENABLED, AUTH_ENABLED, CORS_ORIGINS, ENABLE_PERIODIC_FETCH, FETCH_INTERVAL_MINUTES
+from config import (
+    AI_FEATURES_ENABLED,
+    AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS,
+    AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES,
+    AUTH_ENABLED,
+    CORS_ORIGINS,
+    DOCS_ENABLED,
+    ENABLE_PERIODIC_FETCH,
+    FETCH_INTERVAL_MINUTES,
+    METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS,
+    WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET,
+)
 from database import setup_indexes
 from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request
 from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
@@ -51,20 +63,28 @@ def configure_logging():
 configure_logging()
 logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.fetcher")
 
-app = FastAPI()
+# Disable OpenAPI docs in production by default
+app = FastAPI(
+    docs_url="/docs" if DOCS_ENABLED else None,
+    redoc_url="/redoc" if DOCS_ENABLED else None,
+    openapi_url="/openapi.json" if DOCS_ENABLED else None,
+)
 
-# CORS: warn if wildcard is used with auth enabled, but do not break deployments
+# CORS: when auth is enabled, never allow credentials with wildcard origins
 _effective_cors = CORS_ORIGINS
+_cors_credentials = True
 if AUTH_ENABLED and "*" in _effective_cors:
     logger.warning(
-        "CORS wildcard (*) is insecure when AUTH_ENABLED=true. Set CORS_ORIGINS to your actual origin(s) in production."
+        "CORS wildcard (*) is insecure with AUTH_ENABLED=true and allow_credentials. "
+        "Disabling credentials. Set CORS_ORIGINS to your actual origin(s)."
     )
+    _cors_credentials = False
 
 app.add_middleware(CorrelationIdMiddleware)
 app.add_middleware(
     CORSMiddleware,
     allow_origins=_effective_cors,
-    allow_credentials=True,
+    allow_credentials=_cors_credentials,
     allow_methods=["*"],
     allow_headers=["*"],
 )
@@ -81,7 +101,7 @@ async def prometheus_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
 
 
 @app.middleware("http")
-async def cache_control_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
+async def security_headers_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
     response = await call_next(request)
     # Prevent caching of HTML and API responses by default
     if request.url.path.startswith("/api/") or request.url.path in ("/", "/index.html"):
@@ -92,7 +112,7 @@ async def cache_control_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
     if request.url.path.startswith("/api/") or request.url.path in ("/", "/index.html"):
         response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = (
             "default-src 'self'; "
-            "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' cdn.jsdelivr.net alcdn.msauth.net; "
+            "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' cdn.jsdelivr.net alcdn.msauth.net; "
             "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
             "connect-src 'self' https://login.microsoftonline.com; "
             "frame-src 'self' https://login.microsoftonline.com; "
@@ -100,6 +120,13 @@ async def cache_control_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
             "img-src 'self' data:; "
             "font-src 'self' data:;"
         )
+    # Additional security headers
+    response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"
+    response.headers["X-Frame-Options"] = "DENY"
+    response.headers["Referrer-Policy"] = "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
+    response.headers["Permissions-Policy"] = (
+        "accelerometer=(), camera=(), geolocation=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), microphone=(), payment=(), usb=()"
+    )
     return response
 
 
@@ -165,8 +192,39 @@ async def health_check():
         raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database unavailable") from exc
 
 
+def _client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
+    """Best-effort client IP: X-Forwarded-For first hop, or direct client host."""
+    forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")
+    if forwarded:
+        return forwarded.split(",")[0].strip()
+    return request.client.host if request.client else ""
+
+
+def _is_metrics_allowed(ip: str) -> bool:
+    """Check if IP is in the configured metrics allowlist."""
+    if not METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS:
+        return True
+    try:
+        client_addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    for network in METRICS_ALLOWED_IPS.split(","):
+        network = network.strip()
+        if not network:
+            continue
+        try:
+            if client_addr in ipaddress.ip_network(network, strict=False):
+                return True
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+    return False
+
+
 @app.get("/metrics")
-async def metrics():
+async def metrics(request: Request):
+    client_ip = _client_ip(request)
+    if not _is_metrics_allowed(client_ip):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
     return Response(content=prometheus_metrics(), media_type="text/plain")
 
 
@@ -220,6 +278,19 @@ async def start_periodic_fetch():
         auth_enabled=AUTH_ENABLED,
         ai_enabled=AI_FEATURES_ENABLED,
     )
+    # Warn when auth is enabled but no role/group restrictions are configured
+    if AUTH_ENABLED and not AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES and not AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS:
+        logger.warning(
+            "AUTH_ENABLED is true but no AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES or AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS are configured. "
+            "Any Entra user in the tenant can authenticate and access AOC. "
+            "Set AUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES or AUTH_ALLOWED_GROUPS to restrict access."
+        )
+    if not WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET:
+        logger.warning(
+            "WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET is not set. Graph webhook notifications will be accepted without "
+            "clientState validation, allowing any HTTP client to spoof Graph notifications. "
+            "Set WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET to the clientState used when creating Graph subscriptions."
+        )
     if ENABLE_PERIODIC_FETCH:
         app.state.fetch_task = asyncio.create_task(_periodic_fetch())
 

backend/models/api.py

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict
+from typing import Literal
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
 
 
 class EventItem(BaseModel):
@@ -51,35 +53,35 @@ class SourceHealthResponse(BaseModel):
 
 
 class TagsUpdateRequest(BaseModel):
-    tags: list[str]
+    tags: list[str] = Field(..., max_length=50)
 
 
 class BulkTagsRequest(BaseModel):
-    tags: list[str]
+    tags: list[str] = Field(..., max_length=50)
-    mode: str = "append"  # "append" or "replace"
+    mode: Literal["append", "replace"] = "append"
 
 
 class CommentAddRequest(BaseModel):
-    text: str
+    text: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=5000)
 
 
 class AlertCondition(BaseModel):
-    field: str
+    field: str = Field(..., max_length=100)
-    op: str  # eq, neq, contains, in, after_hours
+    op: Literal["eq", "neq", "contains", "in", "after_hours", "threshold_count"]
     value: str | list[str] | None = None
 
 
 class AlertRuleResponse(BaseModel):
     id: str | None = None
-    name: str
+    name: str = Field(..., max_length=200)
     enabled: bool
-    severity: str
+    severity: Literal["high", "medium", "low"]
-    conditions: list[AlertCondition]
+    conditions: list[AlertCondition] = Field(..., max_length=20)
-    message: str
+    message: str = Field(..., max_length=1000)
 
 
 class AskRequest(BaseModel):
-    question: str
+    question: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=2000)
     services: list[str] | None = None
     actor: str | None = None
     operation: str | None = None

backend/notifications.py

@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@ Supported channels:
 - webhook: POST JSON to any URL (Slack, Teams, generic)
 """
 
+import ipaddress
 from datetime import UTC, datetime
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
 import requests
 import structlog
@@ -15,6 +17,26 @@ logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.notifications")
 WEBHOOK_TIMEOUT = 15
 
 
+def _validate_webhook_url(url: str):
+    """Prevent SSRF by rejecting internal/reserved addresses."""
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+        raise ValueError(f"Webhook URL scheme '{parsed.scheme}' is not allowed")
+    hostname = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
+    if not hostname:
+        raise ValueError("Webhook URL must have a valid hostname")
+    blocked = {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "::1", "169.254.169.254"}
+    if hostname in blocked:
+        raise ValueError(f"Webhook URL hostname '{hostname}' is not allowed")
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
+        if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved:
+            raise ValueError(f"Webhook URL IP '{hostname}' is not allowed")
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        if "not allowed" in str(exc):
+            raise
+
+
 @retry(
     stop=stop_after_attempt(3),
     wait=wait_exponential(multiplier=1, min=2, max=10),
@@ -142,6 +164,12 @@ def send_notification(
     if not webhook_url:
         return False
 
+    try:
+        _validate_webhook_url(webhook_url)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        logger.warning("Notification blocked: invalid webhook URL", error=str(exc))
+        return False
+
     builders = {
         "slack": _build_slack_payload,
         "teams": _build_teams_payload,

backend/rate_limiter.py

@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ def _get_path_category(path: str) -> str:
         return "ask"
     if path.startswith("/api/events/bulk-tags"):
         return "write"
+    if "/explain" in path:
+        return "explain"
     return "default"
 
 
@@ -51,6 +53,8 @@ def _limit_for_category(category: str) -> tuple[int, int]:
         return (10, 3600)  # 10 per hour
     if category == "ask":
         return (30, 60)  # 30 per minute
+    if category == "explain":
+        return (20, 60)  # 20 per minute — LLM + Graph API calls
     if category == "write":
         return (20, 60)  # 20 per minute
     return (RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS, RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS)
@@ -79,4 +83,5 @@ async def check_rate_limit(request: Request):
     except RateLimitExceeded:
         raise
     except Exception as exc:
-        logger.warning("Rate limiter Redis error; allowing request", error=str(exc))
+        logger.warning("Rate limiter Redis error; failing closed", error=str(exc))
+        raise RateLimitExceeded(retry_after=60) from None

backend/requirements.txt

@@ -16,3 +16,8 @@ gunicorn
 mcp
 redis
 arq
+
+# Optional: Azure Key Vault integration for secrets storage
+# Uncomment if using AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME
+# azure-identity
+# azure-keyvault-secrets

backend/routes/alerts.py

@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 """Alert management endpoints."""
 
+import re
+from typing import Literal
+
 from auth import require_auth
 from bson import ObjectId
 from database import alerts_collection
@@ -10,7 +13,7 @@ router = APIRouter(dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])
 
 
 class AlertStatusUpdate(BaseModel):
-    status: str  # open | acknowledged | resolved | false_positive
+    status: Literal["open", "acknowledged", "resolved", "false_positive"]
 
 
 class AlertListResponse(BaseModel):
@@ -32,7 +35,7 @@ def list_alerts(
     if severity:
         query["severity"] = severity
     if rule_name:
-        query["rule_name"] = {"$regex": rule_name, "$options": "i"}
+        query["rule_name"] = {"$regex": re.escape(rule_name), "$options": "i"}
 
     total = alerts_collection.count_documents(query)
     skip = (page - 1) * page_size

backend/routes/ask.py

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import httpx
 import structlog
 from auth import require_auth, user_can_access_privacy_services
 from config import (
+    LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS,
     LLM_API_KEY,
     LLM_API_VERSION,
     LLM_BASE_URL,
@@ -398,7 +399,7 @@ def _format_events_for_llm(
 
 
 def _validate_llm_url(url: str):
-    """Prevent SSRF by rejecting internal/reserved addresses."""
+    """Prevent SSRF by rejecting internal/reserved addresses and enforcing domain allowlist."""
     from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
     parsed = urlparse(url)
@@ -420,6 +421,12 @@ def _validate_llm_url(url: str):
     except ValueError:
         pass  # hostname is not an IP, which is fine
 
+    # Enforce domain allowlist if configured
+    if LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS:
+        allowed = any(hostname == d or (d.startswith("*.") and hostname.endswith(d[1:])) for d in LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS)
+        if not allowed:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"LLM_BASE_URL domain '{hostname}' is not in LLM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS")
+
 
 def _build_chat_url(base_url: str, api_version: str) -> str:
     base = base_url.rstrip("/")

backend/routes/config.py

@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ def auth_config():
     logger.debug("Auth config requested", auth_enabled=AUTH_ENABLED)
     return {
         "auth_enabled": AUTH_ENABLED,
-        "tenant_id": AUTH_TENANT_ID,
+        "tenant_id": AUTH_TENANT_ID if AUTH_ENABLED else "",
-        "client_id": AUTH_CLIENT_ID,
+        "client_id": AUTH_CLIENT_ID if AUTH_ENABLED else "",
         "scope": AUTH_SCOPE,
         "redirect_uri": None,  # frontend uses window.location.origin by default
     }

backend/routes/fetch.py

@@ -75,12 +75,14 @@ def run_fetch(hours: int = 168):
 
 
 @router.get("/fetch-audit-logs", response_model=FetchAuditLogsResponse)
-def fetch_logs(
+async def fetch_logs(
     hours: int = Query(default=168, ge=1, le=720),
     user: dict = Depends(require_auth),
 ):
+    import asyncio
+
     try:
-        result = run_fetch(hours=hours)
+        result = await asyncio.to_thread(run_fetch, hours=hours)
         log_action(
             "fetch_audit_logs",
             "/api/fetch-audit-logs",

backend/routes/saved_searches.py

@@ -7,10 +7,18 @@ import structlog
 from auth import require_auth
 from database import saved_searches_collection
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
 
 router = APIRouter(dependencies=[Depends(require_auth)])
 logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.saved_searches")
 
+MAX_SAVED_SEARCHES_PER_USER = 50
+
+
+class SavedSearchCreate(BaseModel):
+    name: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=200)
+    filters: dict = Field(default_factory=dict)
+
 
 def _user_sub(user: dict) -> str:
     return user.get("sub", "anonymous")
@@ -29,22 +37,25 @@ async def list_saved_searches(user: dict = Depends(require_auth)):
 
 
 @router.post("/saved-searches")
-async def create_saved_search(body: dict, user: dict = Depends(require_auth)):
+async def create_saved_search(body: SavedSearchCreate, user: dict = Depends(require_auth)):
     """Save the current filter set."""
-    name = (body.get("name") or "").strip()
+    sub = _user_sub(user)
-    if not name:
+    existing = saved_searches_collection.count_documents({"created_by": sub})
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Name is required")
+    if existing >= MAX_SAVED_SEARCHES_PER_USER:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=400,
+            detail=f"Maximum of {MAX_SAVED_SEARCHES_PER_USER} saved searches per user reached.",
+        )
 
-    filters = body.get("filters") or {}
     doc = {
         "_id": str(uuid.uuid4()),
-        "name": name,
+        "name": body.name,
-        "filters": filters,
+        "filters": body.filters,
         "created_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
-        "created_by": _user_sub(user),
+        "created_by": sub,
     }
     saved_searches_collection.insert_one(doc)
-    logger.info("Saved search created", name=name, user=doc["created_by"])
+    logger.info("Saved search created", name=body.name, user=sub)
     doc["id"] = doc.pop("_id")
     return doc
 

backend/routes/webhooks.py

@@ -17,7 +17,15 @@ async def graph_webhook(request: Request):
     if validation_token:
         # Microsoft sends validationToken as a query param during subscription creation.
         # Echo it back as plain text to prove endpoint ownership.
-        return Response(content=validation_token, media_type="text/plain")
+        # Validate to prevent content injection if endpoint is hit directly.
+        if len(validation_token) > 1024 or not validation_token.isascii():
+            logger.warning("Invalid validationToken rejected", length=len(validation_token))
+            return Response(status_code=400)
+        return Response(
+            content=validation_token,
+            media_type="text/plain",
+            headers={"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff"},
+        )
 
     try:
         body = await request.json()
@@ -44,7 +52,6 @@ async def graph_webhook(request: Request):
             "Received Graph notification",
             change_type=notification.get("changeType"),
             resource=notification.get("resource"),
-            client_state=client_state,
         )
 
     return {"status": "accepted"}

backend/secrets_manager.py

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+"""Optional Azure Key Vault integration for secrets storage.
+
+If AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME is configured, sensitive secrets are fetched from
+Azure Key Vault at startup and injected into the environment so that
+pydantic-settings can read them. Falls back to .env / environment variables
+when Key Vault is not configured.
+
+Secret naming convention in Key Vault:
+    aoc-client-secret        → CLIENT_SECRET
+    aoc-llm-api-key          → LLM_API_KEY
+    aoc-mongo-uri            → MONGO_URI
+    aoc-webhook-client-secret → WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET
+"""
+
+import os
+
+import structlog
+
+logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.secrets")
+
+_KEY_VAULT_SECRET_MAP = {
+    "aoc-client-secret": "CLIENT_SECRET",
+    "aoc-llm-api-key": "LLM_API_KEY",
+    "aoc-mongo-uri": "MONGO_URI",
+    "aoc-webhook-client-secret": "WEBHOOK_CLIENT_SECRET",
+}
+
+
+def _load_from_key_vault(vault_name: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Fetch secrets from Azure Key Vault and return as {env_name: value}."""
+    try:
+        from azure.identity import DefaultAzureCredential
+        from azure.keyvault.secrets import SecretClient
+    except ImportError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            "Azure Key Vault libraries are not installed. Run: pip install azure-identity azure-keyvault-secrets"
+        ) from exc
+
+    vault_url = f"https://{vault_name}.vault.azure.net/"
+    credential = DefaultAzureCredential()
+    client = SecretClient(vault_url=vault_url, credential=credential)
+
+    loaded = {}
+    for kv_name, env_name in _KEY_VAULT_SECRET_MAP.items():
+        try:
+            secret = client.get_secret(kv_name)
+            if secret.value:
+                loaded[env_name] = secret.value
+                logger.info("Loaded secret from Key Vault", secret_name=kv_name)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            logger.warning(
+                "Failed to load secret from Key Vault",
+                secret_name=kv_name,
+                error=str(exc),
+            )
+    return loaded
+
+
+def load_key_vault_secrets(vault_name: str | None = None):
+    """Load secrets from Azure Key Vault into os.environ if configured.
+
+    This should be called BEFORE pydantic-settings parses configuration.
+    """
+    vault = vault_name or os.environ.get("AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME", "")
+    if not vault:
+        return
+
+    logger.info("Loading secrets from Azure Key Vault", vault_name=vault)
+    secrets = _load_from_key_vault(vault)
+    for env_name, value in secrets.items():
+        os.environ[env_name] = value
+    logger.info(
+        "Key Vault secrets loaded",
+        count=len(secrets),
+        keys=list(secrets.keys()),
+    )

backend/siem.py

@@ -1,15 +1,43 @@
+import ipaddress
+
 import requests
 import structlog
-from config import SIEM_ENABLED, SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL
+from config import SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS, SIEM_ENABLED, SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL
 
 logger = structlog.get_logger("aoc.siem")
 
 
+def _validate_siem_url(url: str):
+    """Prevent SSRF by rejecting internal/reserved addresses and enforcing domain allowlist."""
+    from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    if parsed.scheme != "https":
+        raise RuntimeError("SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL must use HTTPS")
+    hostname = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
+    if not hostname:
+        raise RuntimeError("SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL must have a valid hostname")
+    blocked = {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "::1", "169.254.169.254"}
+    if hostname in blocked:
+        raise RuntimeError(f"SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL hostname '{hostname}' is not allowed")
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
+        if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL IP '{hostname}' is not allowed")
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+    if SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS:
+        allowed = any(hostname == d or (d.startswith("*.") and hostname.endswith(d[1:])) for d in SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS)
+        if not allowed:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL domain '{hostname}' is not in SIEM_ALLOWED_DOMAINS")
+
+
 def forward_event(event: dict):
     """Forward a normalized event to the configured SIEM webhook."""
     if not SIEM_ENABLED or not SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL:
         return
     try:
+        _validate_siem_url(SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL)
         res = requests.post(SIEM_WEBHOOK_URL, json=event, timeout=10)
         res.raise_for_status()
         logger.debug("Event forwarded to SIEM", event_id=event.get("id"))

backend/sources/unified_audit.py

@@ -11,13 +11,25 @@ AUDIT_CONTENT_TYPES = {
 }
 
 
+# Office 365 Management Activity API hard limits
+_API_MAX_WINDOW_HOURS = 24
+_API_MAX_LOOKBACK_DAYS = 7
+
+
 def _time_window(hours: int, since: str | None = None):
     end = datetime.utcnow()
+    earliest_allowed = end - timedelta(days=_API_MAX_LOOKBACK_DAYS)
+    max_window_start = end - timedelta(hours=_API_MAX_WINDOW_HOURS)
+
     if since:
         # Office 365 API expects format without Z
         start = datetime.fromisoformat(since.replace("Z", "+00:00")).replace(tzinfo=None)
+        # Clamp: the API rejects windows > 24 h or start times > 7 days in the past.
+        # If the watermark is stale (e.g. after a long outage), cap to the most recent
+        # 24-hour window so the API accepts the request; subsequent fetches catch up.
+        start = max(start, earliest_allowed, max_window_start)
     else:
-        start = end - timedelta(hours=hours)
+        start = max(end - timedelta(hours=min(hours, _API_MAX_WINDOW_HOURS)), earliest_allowed)
     return start.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"), end.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")
 
 

backend/tests/conftest.py

@@ -51,18 +51,32 @@ def client(mock_events_collection, mock_watermarks_collection, monkeypatch):
 
     # Mock Redis so tests don't require a running Redis server
     class FakeRedis:
+        _store = {}
+
         async def get(self, key):
-            return None
+            return self._store.get(key)
 
         async def setex(self, key, ttl, value):
+            self._store[key] = value
+
+        async def incr(self, key):
+            self._store[key] = self._store.get(key, 0) + 1
+            return self._store[key]
+
+        async def expire(self, key, ttl):
             pass
 
     async def fake_get_arq_pool():
         return FakeRedis()
 
+    async def fake_get_redis():
+        return FakeRedis()
+
     monkeypatch.setattr("redis_client.get_arq_pool", fake_get_arq_pool)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("redis_client.get_redis", fake_get_redis)
     monkeypatch.setattr("routes.ask.get_arq_pool", fake_get_arq_pool)
-    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.jobs.get_redis", fake_get_arq_pool)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("routes.jobs.get_redis", fake_get_redis)
+    monkeypatch.setattr("rate_limiter.get_redis", fake_get_redis)
 
     from main import app
 

backend/tests/test_api.py

@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ def test_saved_searches_delete_not_found(client, monkeypatch):
 
 def test_saved_searches_create_validation(client, monkeypatch):
     monkeypatch.setattr("auth.AUTH_ENABLED", False)
-    response = client.post("/api/saved-searches", json={"name": "  ", "filters": {}})
+    response = client.post("/api/saved-searches", json={"name": "", "filters": {}})
-    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert response.status_code == 422
 
 
 def test_privacy_filtering_events_by_operation(client, mock_events_collection, monkeypatch):
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ def test_health(client):
 
 
 def test_metrics(client):
-    response = client.get("/metrics")
+    response = client.get("/metrics", headers={"X-Forwarded-For": "127.0.0.1"})
     assert response.status_code == 200
     assert "aoc_request_duration_seconds" in response.text
 

backend/tests/test_ask.py

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ class TestBuildEventQuery:
 class TestAskEndpoint:
     def test_ask_empty_question(self, client):
         response = client.post("/api/ask", json={"question": ""})
-        assert response.status_code == 400
+        assert response.status_code == 422
 
     def test_ask_no_events(self, client):
         response = client.post("/api/ask", json={"question": "What happened to device NONEXISTENT in the last 3 days?"})

backend/tests/test_auth.py

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import asyncio
 from unittest.mock import patch
 
 import auth
@@ -28,19 +29,19 @@ def test_allowed_by_group():
 
 @patch("auth.AUTH_ENABLED", False)
 def test_require_auth_disabled():
-    claims = require_auth(None)
+    claims = asyncio.run(require_auth(None))
     assert claims["sub"] == "anonymous"
 
 
 @patch("auth.AUTH_ENABLED", True)
 def test_require_auth_missing_header():
     with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
-        require_auth(None)
+        asyncio.run(require_auth(None))
     assert exc_info.value.status_code == 401
 
 
 @patch("auth.AUTH_ENABLED", True)
 def test_require_auth_invalid_bearer():
     with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
-        require_auth("Basic abc")
+        asyncio.run(require_auth("Basic abc"))
     assert exc_info.value.status_code == 401

docker-compose.yml

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ services:
       - mongo
       - redis
     ports:
-      - "8000:8000"
+      - "127.0.0.1:8000:8000"
 
   worker:
     build: ./backend

nginx/nginx.conf

@@ -30,11 +30,9 @@ http {
     gzip_comp_level 6;
     gzip_types text/plain text/css text/xml application/json application/javascript application/rss+xml application/atom+xml image/svg+xml;
 
-    # Security headers
+    # Security headers — most headers are set by the backend; only add non-duplicates here.
-    add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always;
+    # X-XSS-Protection is kept for legacy browser compatibility.
-    add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
     add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block" always;
-    add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
 
     # Upstream backend
     upstream aoc_backend {