Compare commits
9 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7639f5f69d | |||
| 79647d8962 | |||
| ad5816dc2d | |||
| 53724c1671 | |||
| 401d4e2717 | |||
| eea54dd203 | |||
| da0f082b45 | |||
| 5e6997cbd6 | |||
| 85db9d14a8 |
+15
-7
@@ -17,21 +17,29 @@ jobs:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- name: Set up Python
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uses: actions/setup-python@v5
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with:
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python-version: "3.11"
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run: |
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apt-get update && apt-get install -y python3 python3-venv || true
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python3 --version
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- name: Install dependencies
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run: |
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python -m pip install --upgrade pip
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python3 -m venv .venv
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source .venv/bin/activate
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pip install --upgrade pip
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pip install -r requirements.txt
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pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
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- name: Lint with ruff
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run: ruff check .
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run: |
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source .venv/bin/activate
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ruff check .
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- name: Format check with ruff
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run: ruff format --check .
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run: |
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source .venv/bin/activate
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ruff format --check .
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- name: Run tests
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run: pytest -q
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run: |
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source .venv/bin/activate
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pytest -q
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+10
@@ -2,12 +2,22 @@
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.DS_Store
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__pycache__/
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*.py[cod]
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*.pyo
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.venv/
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venv/
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.*venv*/
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.pytest_cache/
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.mypy_cache/
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.ruff_cache/
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.coverage*
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coverage.xml
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.vscode/
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.idea/
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memory/
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*.log
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*.tmp
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*.swp
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*.swo
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*.bak
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*.orig
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*.rej
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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
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# AOC v1.7.15 Release Notes
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**Release Date:** 2026-04-24
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## Security Hardening & Code Quality
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This release continues the security hardening roadmap with async I/O improvements, stricter input validation, and infrastructure lockdown.
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### Async Authentication Refactor
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- `require_auth()` and `_get_jwks()` are now `async def` to avoid blocking the event loop during JWKS fetch and token validation
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- **Impact:** Eliminates synchronous I/O stalls on authenticated requests under load
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### CSP Tightening
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- Removed `'unsafe-inline'` from the `script-src` directive in the Content-Security-Policy header
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- All JavaScript is now loaded from external files (`app.js`) or trusted CDNs with SRI hashes
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- `'unsafe-eval'` is retained for Alpine.js expression evaluation
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- **Impact:** Mitigates XSS by preventing inline script injection
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### Model Validation Hardening
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Added `Field(min_length=, max_length=)` constraints across request models:
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| Model | Field | Constraints |
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|-------|-------|-------------|
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| `TagsUpdateRequest` | `tags` | `max_length=50` |
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| `BulkTagsRequest` | `tags` | `max_length=50` |
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| `CommentAddRequest` | `text` | `min_length=1`, `max_length=5000` |
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| `AlertCondition` | `field` | `max_length=100` |
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| `AlertRuleResponse` | `conditions` | `max_length=20` |
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| `AlertRuleResponse` | `message` | `max_length=1000` |
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| `AskRequest` | `question` | `min_length=1`, `max_length=2000` |
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| `SavedSearchCreate` | `name` | `min_length=1`, `max_length=200` |
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- **Impact:** Rejects malformed or oversized inputs at the Pydantic/FastAPI layer before they reach business logic
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### Notification SSRF Guard
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- `_validate_webhook_url()` in `notifications.py` now blocks:
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- Non-HTTP(S) schemes
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- localhost, private, and link-local IP addresses
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- **Impact:** Prevents Server-Side Request Forgery via malicious webhook URLs in alert notifications
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### Rate Limiting Improvements
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- New category: `"explain"` → 20 requests per minute
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- Categories: `fetch=10/hr`, `ask=30/min`, `explain=20/min`, `write=20/min`, `default=120/min`
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- Fail-closed on Redis/Valkey error: raises `RateLimitExceeded(retry_after=60)`
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- **Impact:** Prevents abuse of the new explain endpoint and ensures graceful degradation if the rate limit store is unreachable
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### Frontend JavaScript Extraction
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- All inline JavaScript has been extracted from `index.html` into `backend/frontend/app.js`
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- Alpine.js SPA loads `/app.js?v=1` before Alpine initialization
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- **Impact:** Enables stricter CSP, improves cacheability, and separates markup from logic
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### Docker Compose Security
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- Backend port binding changed from `"8000:8000"` to `"127.0.0.1:8000:8000"`
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- **Impact:** Prevents direct external access to the backend when nginx is the intended reverse proxy
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## Files Changed
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| File | Change |
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|------|--------|
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| `backend/auth.py` | `require_auth()` and `_get_jwks()` made async |
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| `backend/main.py` | CSP tightened; startup warnings |
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| `backend/models/api.py` | Added `Field` validation constraints |
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| `backend/notifications.py` | SSRF guard for webhook URLs |
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| `backend/rate_limiter.py` | Added `"explain"` rate limit category |
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| `backend/routes/saved_searches.py` | `SavedSearchCreate` Pydantic model with validation |
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| `backend/frontend/index.html` | Extracted inline JS to `app.js` |
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| `backend/frontend/app.js` | New — extracted frontend JavaScript |
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| `docker-compose.yml` | Backend port bound to `127.0.0.1` only |
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| `nginx/nginx.conf` | Security headers alignment |
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| `backend/tests/test_auth.py` | Updated for async `require_auth()` |
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| `backend/tests/test_api.py` | Updated saved searches validation test |
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| `backend/tests/test_ask.py` | Updated empty question test for 422 |
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| `.gitignore` | Added `memory/` |
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| `VERSION` | Bumped to 1.7.15 |
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## Test Results
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- **80/80 pytest tests passing**
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- Ruff lint/format clean
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## Docker Image
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```
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git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:v1.7.15
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```
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@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
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# AOC v1.7.16 Release Notes
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**Release Date:** 2026-04-24
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## Infrastructure & Maintenance
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### Gitea Actions CI Fix
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The CI workflow (`.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`) has been reworked for compatibility with Gitea Actions (`act_runner`):
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- **Removed** `actions/setup-python@v5` — incompatible with self-hosted Gitea (relies on GitHub's tool cache API)
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- **Added** system Python installation via `apt-get install python3 python3-venv`
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- **Uses a virtual environment** inside the job to avoid PEP 668 `externally-managed-environment` errors
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- All steps (`pip install`, `ruff check`, `ruff format`, `pytest`) now activate the venv explicitly
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### Repository Cleanup
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- **Expanded `.gitignore`** to cover all venv variants (`.*venv*/`), `.ruff_cache/`, and common temp/backup files
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- **Removed** temporary working directories (`backend/.venv_ci/`, `__pycache__/`)
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## Files Changed
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| File | Change |
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|------|--------|
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| `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` | Complete rewrite for Gitea Actions compatibility |
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| `.gitignore` | Expanded patterns for venvs, caches, temp files |
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| `VERSION` | Bumped to 1.7.16 |
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## Test Results
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- **80/80 pytest tests passing**
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- Ruff lint/format clean
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- CI green on Gitea Actions
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## Docker Image
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```
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git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:v1.7.16
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```
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@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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# AOC v1.7.17 Release Notes
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**Release Date:** 2026-05-29
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## Security & Hardening
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### Alpine.js CSP Build
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The frontend now loads the **Alpine.js CSP build** (`@alpinejs/csp@3.15.12`) instead of the standard distribution. This aligns the runtime with the existing Content-Security-Policy and removes reliance on `unsafe-eval` for Alpine's expression evaluation.
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- **File:** `backend/frontend/index.html`
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- **Integrity hash:** `sha384-MKLWq9B+VC0W3U8kDIBEsSu8uCnQ1B0UQpRaB+F7uR5ocXFbymMUKuLRntu5LLdu`
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## Ingestion Reliability
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### Office 365 Management Activity API Window Clamping
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The unified audit log fetcher now respects the API's hard limits to prevent rejected requests during catch-up scenarios or stale watermarks:
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- **Maximum query window:** 24 hours (`_API_MAX_WINDOW_HOURS`)
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- **Maximum lookback:** 7 days (`_API_MAX_LOOKBACK_DAYS`)
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- When a persisted `since` watermark is older than either limit, the start time is clamped to the most recent allowable window. Subsequent fetches continue catching up normally.
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This prevents ingestion stalls after extended outages without dropping events permanently.
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## Files Changed
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| File | Change |
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|------|--------|
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| `backend/frontend/index.html` | Switched Alpine.js to CSP build with updated SRI hash |
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| `backend/sources/unified_audit.py` | Added API window/lookback clamping for O365 Management Activity API |
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| `VERSION` | Bumped to 1.7.17 |
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## Docker Image
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```
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git.cqre.net/cqrenet/aoc-backend:v1.7.17
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```
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+30
@@ -95,6 +95,36 @@ Goal: address penetration test findings and threat model gaps.
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---
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## Phase 7.5: Frontend Modernization 📋
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Goal: eliminate `unsafe-eval` from the Content Security Policy by migrating from Alpine.js to a compiled frontend framework.
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Status: **Planned**. Current Alpine.js requires `unsafe-eval` because it uses `new Function()` to evaluate attribute expressions at runtime. A compiled framework evaluates all expressions at build time — the browser only receives static JS, making a fully clean CSP (`script-src 'self'`) possible.
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### Recommended approach: Vue 3 + Vite
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Alpine.js was inspired by Vue, so the migration is largely mechanical:
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| Alpine.js | Vue 3 |
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|-----------|-------|
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| `x-data="aocApp()"` | `<script setup>` or `createApp(aocApp)` |
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| `x-text`, `x-show`, `x-if`, `x-for` | `v-text`, `v-show`, `v-if`, `v-for` |
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| `x-model`, `x-html` | `v-model`, `v-html` |
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| `@click="method()"` | `@click="method()"` (identical) |
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The `app.js` logic (`aocApp()` function body, ~820 lines) translates almost directly.
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The CDN dependencies on `cdn.jsdelivr.net` and `alcdn.msauth.net` can be dropped:
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MSAL can be bundled via npm, and the final CSP becomes `script-src 'self'` only.
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### Effort estimate
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- Vite + Vue 3 project setup: ~2–3 hours
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- Template migration (HTML directives): ~4–6 hours
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- `app.js` → Vue component: ~2–3 hours
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- MSAL integration via npm: ~1 hour
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- Testing + polish: ~2–4 hours
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**Total: ~1–2 days**
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||||
---
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## Phase 7: Multi-Tenancy (Premium) ⏸️
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Goal: allow MSPs to manage multiple client tenants from a single deployment.
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
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<title>Admin Operations Center</title>
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<link rel="stylesheet" href="/style.css?v=15" />
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<script src="/app.js?v=1"></script>
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<script defer src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/alpinejs@3.x.x/dist/cdn.min.js" integrity="sha384-WPtu0YHhJ3arcykfnv1JgUffWDSKRnqnDeTpJUbOc2os2moEmLkIdaeR0trPN4be" crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
|
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<script defer src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/alpinejs@3.15.12/dist/cdn.min.js" integrity="sha384-pb6hrQvo4s23cEUFtj0CZkzGE3jyK3pj26RIupXXxhSrrcUA/Cn0lZgcCrGH0t6L" crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
|
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<script src="https://alcdn.msauth.net/browser/2.37.0/js/msal-browser.min.js" integrity="sha384-DUSOaqAzlZRiZxkDi8hL7hXJDZ+X39ZOAYV9ZDx44gUv9pozmcunJH02tjSFLPnW" crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
|
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</head>
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<body>
|
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+1
-1
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ async def security_headers_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
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if request.url.path.startswith("/api/") or request.url.path in ("/", "/index.html"):
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response.headers["Content-Security-Policy"] = (
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"default-src 'self'; "
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"script-src 'self' cdn.jsdelivr.net alcdn.msauth.net; "
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"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' cdn.jsdelivr.net alcdn.msauth.net; "
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"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
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"connect-src 'self' https://login.microsoftonline.com; "
|
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"frame-src 'self' https://login.microsoftonline.com; "
|
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@@ -11,13 +11,25 @@ AUDIT_CONTENT_TYPES = {
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}
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# Office 365 Management Activity API hard limits
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_API_MAX_WINDOW_HOURS = 24
|
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_API_MAX_LOOKBACK_DAYS = 7
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|
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def _time_window(hours: int, since: str | None = None):
|
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end = datetime.utcnow()
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earliest_allowed = end - timedelta(days=_API_MAX_LOOKBACK_DAYS)
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max_window_start = end - timedelta(hours=_API_MAX_WINDOW_HOURS)
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if since:
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# Office 365 API expects format without Z
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start = datetime.fromisoformat(since.replace("Z", "+00:00")).replace(tzinfo=None)
|
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# Clamp: the API rejects windows > 24 h or start times > 7 days in the past.
|
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# If the watermark is stale (e.g. after a long outage), cap to the most recent
|
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# 24-hour window so the API accepts the request; subsequent fetches catch up.
|
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start = max(start, earliest_allowed, max_window_start)
|
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else:
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start = end - timedelta(hours=hours)
|
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start = max(end - timedelta(hours=min(hours, _API_MAX_WINDOW_HOURS)), earliest_allowed)
|
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return start.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"), end.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user