Release v2.4.5: detect explicit Deny ACEs in replication permission check

Test-ReplicationPermissions previously only scanned Allow ACEs, so an
explicit Deny on the DCSync extended rights (common in hardening
baselines that Deny a broad group and Allow only named service
accounts) was invisible to the pre-flight check: it reported
"verified" while Get-ADReplAccount still failed with "Replication
access was denied". The check now flags exactly which right is
blocked and by which identity's Deny ACE.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-29 11:49:14 +02:00
parent 1d98b908c6
commit 65e451413e
10 changed files with 52 additions and 15 deletions
+25 -6
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
$script:ElysiumVersion = '2.4.4'
$script:ElysiumVersion = '2.4.5'
function Invoke-RestartWithExecutable {
param(
@@ -403,8 +403,8 @@ function Test-ReplicationPermissions {
$guid = $rightsToCheck[$rightName]
$granted = $false
$aceExistsForGuid = $false
$denyIdentity = $null
foreach ($ace in $acl) {
if ($ace.AccessControlType -ne [System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]::Allow) { continue }
# InheritOnly ACEs apply to child objects only - the NC root itself is not covered
if ([bool]($ace.PropagationFlags -band [System.Security.AccessControl.PropagationFlags]::InheritOnly)) { continue }
$rights = $ace.ActiveDirectoryRights
@@ -415,10 +415,22 @@ function Test-ReplicationPermissions {
-or ($hasExtended -and $ace.ObjectType -eq [guid]::Empty) `
-or ($hasExtended -and $ace.ObjectType -eq $guid)
if (-not $isMatch) { continue }
if (-not $callerSids.Contains($ace.IdentityReference.Value)) { continue }
if ($ace.AccessControlType -eq [System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]::Deny) {
# Explicit Deny ACEs are evaluated before Allow ACEs in a canonical ACL and win
# regardless of any Allow found elsewhere. A check that only scans Allow ACEs would
# falsely report the right as granted while the actual DRS call is still denied.
$denyIdentity = $ace.IdentityReference.Value
continue
}
if ($ace.ObjectType -eq $guid) { $aceExistsForGuid = $true }
if ($callerSids.Contains($ace.IdentityReference.Value)) { $granted = $true; break }
$granted = $true
}
if (-not $granted) {
if ($denyIdentity) {
$allMissingLines += "[on $ncDN] $rightName (DENIED by explicit Deny ACE for '$denyIdentity' - this overrides any Allow grant)"
} elseif (-not $granted) {
$hint = if ($aceExistsForGuid) {
' (ACE exists but not assigned to this account or any of its groups)'
} else {
@@ -436,8 +448,15 @@ function Test-ReplicationPermissions {
" Grant 'Replicating Directory Changes' on CN=Configuration,$DomainDN" +
" (covers Schema NC via inheritance) in addition to the domain NC rights.")
}
throw ("Account '{0}' failed replication permission check:`n - {1}{2}" -f `
$Credential.UserName, ($allMissingLines -join "`n - "), $schemaNote)
$denyNote = ''
if ($allMissingLines | Where-Object { $_ -match 'DENIED by explicit Deny ACE' }) {
$denyNote = ("`n`nNOTE: at least one right is blocked by an explicit Deny ACE, not a missing grant." +
" Find and remove/scope it: Advanced Security on the NC object > look for a Deny entry" +
" covering 'Replicating Directory Changes*' that matches this account or one of its groups" +
" (common with hardening baselines that Deny a broad group like Everyone/Domain Users).")
}
throw ("Account '{0}' failed replication permission check:`n - {1}{2}{3}" -f `
$Credential.UserName, ($allMissingLines -join "`n - "), $schemaNote, $denyNote)
}
Write-Host ("[+] Replication permissions verified for '{0}' on domain NC and schema NC." -f $Credential.UserName)