release: v4.1.0 — restructure entry points, add CIS baselines, reporting tools and fzf hints
- Restructure launchers: Start-IntuneToolkit.ps1 moves to repo root; Start-HeadlessIntune.ps1 moves to Scripts/; TUI helper moves to Scripts/Private/ - Add AGENTS.md with project architecture, entry points, and security notes - Add CIS M365 baseline assets (CISM365-v7, M365-CIS-Rapid) and reporting scripts - Add Python reporting utilities (Export-SettingsReport, Export-AssignmentReport, Export-ObjectInventoryReport) and CA wizard helpers - Update Deploy-IntuneBaseline.ps1 with Merge conflict resolution, ReportPath, and optimized group loading - Update Initialize-IntuneAuth.ps1 with -RotateSecret and configurable secret expiry - Update Extensions for Settings Catalog definition auto-export - Update README with v4.1.0, new entry points and script catalog - Bump VERSION to 4.1.0 - Harden .gitignore against .DS_Store, __pycache__, .venv-pdf/, local exports, Settings.json and IntuneManagement.log
This commit is contained in:
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# =====================================================================
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# CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v7.0.0 (Draft)
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# GENERATED from PDF — review before deploying
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# =====================================================================
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baseline:
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name: CIS-M365-v7-Generated
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conflictResolution: Skip
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whatIf: false
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tenantMutation:
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prefix: "CIS-v7-"
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groups:
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- displayName: "CIS-BreakGlass"
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mailNickname: "CISBreakGlass"
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securityEnabled: true
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- displayName: "CIS-Pilot-Users"
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mailNickname: "CISPilotUsers"
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securityEnabled: true
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tenantConfig:
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# ===============================================================
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# Section 1: adminCenter
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# ===============================================================
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adminCenter:
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# 1.1.2 (Manual): Ensure two emergency access accounts have been defined
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 1.1.3 (Automated): Ensure that between two and four global admins are designated
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# TODO: Map this control to YAML — see PDF for details
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# 1.1.4 (Automated): Ensure administrative accounts use licenses with a reduced application footprint
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# TODO: Map this control to YAML — see PDF for details
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# 1.2.1 (Automated): Ensure that only organizationally managed/approved public groups exist
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# TODO: Map this control to YAML — see PDF for details
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# 1.2.2: Ensure sign-in to shared mailboxes is blocked
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blockSharedMailboxSignIn: true
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# 1.3.1: Ensure the 'Password expiration policy' is set to 'Set passwords to never expire (recommended)'
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passwordExpiration: "NeverExpire"
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# 1.3.2: Ensure 'Idle session timeout' is set to '3 hours (or less)' for unmanaged devices
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idleSessionTimeoutHours: 3
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# 1.3.3: Ensure 'External sharing' of calendars is not available
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externalCalendarSharing: "Disabled"
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# 1.3.4: Ensure 'User owned apps and services' is restricted
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restrictUserOwnedApps: true
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# 1.3.5: Ensure internal phishing protection for Forms is enabled
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formsPhishingProtection: true
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# 1.3.6: Ensure the customer lockbox feature is enabled
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customerLockbox: true
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# 1.3.7: Ensure 'third-party storage services' are restricted in 'Microsoft 365 on the web'
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restrictThirdPartyStorage: true
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# 1.3.8 (Manual): Ensure that Sways cannot be shared with people outside of your organization
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 1.3.9: Ensure shared bookings pages are restricted to select users
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restrictSharedBookings: true
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# ===============================================================
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# Section 5: entraId
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# ===============================================================
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entraId:
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# 5.1.2.1 (Manual): Ensure 'Per-user MFA' is disabled
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 5.1.2.2: Ensure users cannot register applications
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blockUserConsent: true
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# 5.1.2.3: Ensure 'Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants' is set to 'Yes'
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blockTenantCreation: true
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# 5.1.2.4 (Manual): Ensure access to the Entra admin center is restricted
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 5.1.2.5 (Manual): Ensure the option to remain signed in is hidden
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 5.1.2.6 (Manual): Ensure 'LinkedIn account connections' is disabled
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 5.1.3.1: Ensure users cannot create security groups
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blockSecurityGroupCreation: true
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# 5.1.3.2 (Manual): Ensure that 'Restrict user ability to access groups features in My Groups' is set to 'Yes'
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 5.1.3.3 (Manual): Ensure that 'Owners can manage group membership requests in My Groups' is set to 'No'
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 5.1.3.4: Ensure that 'Users can create Microsoft 365 groups in Azure portals, API or PowerShell' is set to 'No'
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blockM365GroupCreation: true
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# 5.1.4.1: Ensure the ability to join devices to Entra is restricted
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restrictDeviceJoin: true
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# 5.1.4.2: Ensure the maximum number of devices per user is limited
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maxDevicesPerUser: 5
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# 5.1.4.3: Ensure the GA role is not added as a local administrator during Entra join
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gaLocalAdminDisabled: true
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# 5.1.4.4: Ensure local administrator assignment is limited during Entra join
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limitLocalAdminAssignment: true
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# 5.1.4.5: Ensure Local Administrator Password Solution is enabled
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enableLAPS: true
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# 5.1.4.6: Ensure users are restricted from recovering BitLocker keys
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restrictBitLockerRecovery: true
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# 5.1.5.1: Ensure user consent to apps accessing company data on their behalf is not allowed
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blockUserConsent: true
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# 5.1.5.2: Ensure the admin consent workflow is enabled
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enableAdminConsentWorkflow: true
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# 5.1.5.3: Ensure password addition is blocked for applications
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blockPasswordCredentials: true
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# 5.1.5.4: Ensure password lifetime for applications does not exceed 180 days
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maxPasswordLifetimeDays: 180
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# 5.1.5.5: Ensure new application passwords are system-generated
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systemGeneratedPasswords: true
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# 5.1.5.6: Ensure maximum certificate lifetime for applications does not exceed 180 days
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maxCertificateLifetimeDays: 180
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# 5.1.6.1: Ensure that collaboration invitations are sent to allowed domains only
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restrictCollaborationDomains: true
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# 5.1.6.2: Ensure that guest user access is restricted
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restrictGuestAccess: true
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# 5.1.6.3: Ensure guest user invitations are limited
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limitGuestInvitations: true
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# 5.1.8.1: Ensure that password hash sync is enabled for hybrid deployments
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enablePasswordHashSync: true
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# 5.2.3.1: Ensure Microsoft Authenticator is configured to protect against MFA fatigue
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authenticatorNumberMatching: true
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# 5.2.3.3 (Automated): Ensure password protection is enabled for on-prem Active Directory
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# NOTE: Hybrid-only control — requires on-premises Active Directory
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# 5.2.3.4: Ensure all member users are 'MFA capable'
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mfaCapableUsers: true
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# 5.2.3.5: Ensure weak authentication methods are disabled
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disableWeakAuthMethods: true
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# 5.2.3.6: Ensure system-preferred multifactor authentication is enabled
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systemPreferredMFA: true
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# 5.2.3.7: Ensure the email OTP authentication method is disabled
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disableEmailOTP: true
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# 5.2.3.8: Ensure that Account 'Lockout threshold' is '10' or less
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lockoutThreshold: 10
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# 5.2.3.9: Ensure that Account 'Lockout duration in seconds' is at least 60 seconds
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lockoutDurationSeconds: 60
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# 5.2.3.10: Ensure Microsoft Authenticator on companion applications is disabled
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disableAuthenticatorCompanionApps: true
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# 5.2.4.1 (Manual): Ensure 'Self service password reset enabled' is set to 'All'
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 5.2.4.2 (Manual): Ensure that 2 methods are required for password reset
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 5.2.4.3 (Manual): Ensure SSPR registration and authentication re- confirmation are required
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 5.2.4.4 (Manual): Ensure that users are notified on password resets
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 5.2.4.5 (Manual): Ensure all admins are notified when other admins reset their password
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 5.3.1: Ensure privileged role assignments are activated and not assigned
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pimRoleActivationRequired: true
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# 5.3.2: Ensure 'Access reviews' for guest users are configured
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accessReviewsForGuests: true
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# 5.3.3: Ensure 'Access reviews' for privileged roles are configured
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accessReviewsForPrivilegedRoles: true
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# 5.3.4: Ensure approval is required for Global Administrator role activation
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requireApprovalForGAActivation: true
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# 5.3.5: Ensure approval is required for Privileged Role Administrator activation
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requireApprovalForPRAActivation: true
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# ===============================================================
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# Section 6: exchange
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# ===============================================================
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exchange:
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# 6.1.1: Ensure 'AuditDisabled' organizationally is set to 'False'
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enableMailboxAuditOrgWide: true
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# 6.1.2: Ensure mailbox audit actions are configured
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configureMailboxAuditActions: true
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# 6.1.3: Ensure 'AuditBypassEnabled' is not enabled on mailboxes
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disableAuditBypass: true
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# 6.2.1: Ensure all forms of mail forwarding are blocked and/or disabled
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blockExternalForwarding: true
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# 6.2.2: Ensure mail transport rules do not whitelist specific domains
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noDomainWhitelistTransportRules: true
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# 6.2.3: Ensure email from external senders is identified
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enableExternalSenderBanner: true
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# 6.3.1: Ensure users installing Outlook add-ins is not allowed
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blockOutlookAddIns: true
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# 6.3.2: Ensure the ability to add personal email accounts and calendars is disabled
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disablePersonalEmailAccounts: true
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# 6.5.1: Ensure modern authentication for Exchange Online is enabled
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enableModernAuthExchange: true
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# 6.5.2: Ensure MailTips are enabled for end users
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enableMailTips: true
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# 6.5.3: Ensure additional storage providers are restricted in Outlook on the web
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restrictAdditionalStorageProviders: true
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# 6.5.4: Ensure SMTP AUTH is disabled
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disableSMTPAuth: true
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# 6.5.5: Ensure Direct Send submissions are rejected
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rejectDirectSend: true
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# ===============================================================
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# Section 7: sharePoint
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# ===============================================================
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sharePoint:
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# 7.2.1: Ensure modern authentication for SharePoint applications is required
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requireModernAuthSharePoint: true
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# 7.2.2: Ensure SharePoint and OneDrive integration with Azure AD B2B is enabled
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enableAADB2BIntegration: true
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# 7.2.3: Ensure external content sharing is restricted
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sharePointExternalSharing: "Disabled"
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# 7.2.4: Ensure OneDrive content sharing is restricted
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oneDriveExternalSharing: "Disabled"
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# 7.2.5: Ensure that SharePoint guest users cannot share items they don't own
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preventGuestResharing: true
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# 7.2.6: Ensure SharePoint external sharing is restricted
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restrictSharePointExternalSharing: true
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# 7.2.7: Ensure link sharing is restricted in SharePoint and OneDrive
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restrictLinkSharing: true
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# 7.2.8: Ensure external sharing is restricted by security group
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restrictSharingBySecurityGroup: true
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# 7.2.9: Ensure guest access to a site or OneDrive will expire automatically
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guestAccessExpirationDays: 30
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# 7.2.10: Ensure reauthentication with verification code is restricted
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restrictReauthenticationVerificationCode: true
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# 7.2.11: Ensure the SharePoint default sharing link permission is set
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defaultSharingLinkPermission: "View"
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# 7.3.1: Ensure Office 365 SharePoint infected files are disallowed for download
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disallowInfectedFileDownload: true
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# ===============================================================
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# Section 8: teams
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# ===============================================================
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teams:
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# 8.1.1: Ensure external file sharing in Teams is enabled for only approved cloud storage services
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restrictExternalFileSharing: true
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# 8.1.2: Ensure users can't send emails to a channel email address
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blockChannelEmail: true
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# 8.2.1: Ensure external domains are restricted in the Teams admin center
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restrictExternalDomains: true
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# 8.2.2: Ensure communication with unmanaged Teams users is disabled
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disableUnmanagedUserCommunication: true
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# 8.2.3: Ensure external Teams users cannot initiate conversations
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blockExternalUserInitiation: true
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# 8.2.4: Ensure the organization cannot communicate with accounts in trial Teams tenants
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blockTrialTenantCommunication: true
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# 8.4.1 (Manual): Ensure app permission policies are configured
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# TODO: Implement manually per PDF instructions
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# 8.5.1: Ensure anonymous users can't join a meeting
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allowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting: false
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# 8.5.2: Ensure anonymous users and dial-in callers can't start a meeting
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allowAnonymousUsersToStartMeeting: false
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# 8.5.3: Ensure only people in my org can bypass the lobby
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orgOnlyBypassLobby: true
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# 8.5.4: Ensure users dialing in can't bypass the lobby
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dialInCantBypassLobby: true
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# 8.5.5: Ensure meeting chat does not allow anonymous users
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noAnonymousMeetingChat: true
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# 8.5.6: Ensure only organizers and co-organizers can present
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onlyOrganizersCanPresent: true
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# 8.5.7: Ensure external participants can't give or request control
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noExternalControl: true
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# 8.5.8: Ensure external meeting chat is off
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externalMeetingChatOff: true
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# 8.5.9: Ensure meeting recording is off by default
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meetingRecordingOffByDefault: true
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# 8.6.1: Ensure users can report security concerns in Teams
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enableSecurityConcernsReporting: true
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# ===============================================================
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# Section 9: powerBI
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# ===============================================================
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powerBI:
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# 9.1.1: Ensure guest user access is restricted
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restrictGuestAccess: true
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# 9.1.2: Ensure external user invitations are restricted
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restrictExternalInvitations: true
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# 9.1.3: Ensure guest access to content is restricted
|
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restrictGuestContentAccess: true
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# 9.1.4: Ensure 'Publish to web' is restricted
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restrictPublishToWeb: true
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# 9.1.5: Ensure 'Interact with and share R and Python' visuals is 'Disabled'
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disableRPythonVisuals: true
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# 9.1.6: Ensure 'Allow users to apply sensitivity labels for content' is 'Enabled'
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enableSensitivityLabels: true
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# 9.1.7: Ensure shareable links are restricted
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restrictShareableLinks: true
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# 9.1.8: Ensure enabling of external data sharing is restricted
|
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restrictExternalDataSharing: true
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# 9.1.9: Ensure 'Block ResourceKey Authentication' is 'Enabled'
|
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blockResourceKeyAuth: true
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# 9.1.10: Ensure access to APIs by service principals is restricted
|
||||
restrictServicePrincipalAPIAccess: true
|
||||
# 9.1.11: Ensure service principals cannot create and use profiles
|
||||
blockServicePrincipalProfiles: true
|
||||
# 9.1.12: Ensure service principals ability to create workspaces, connections and deployment pipelines is restricted
|
||||
restrictServicePrincipalWorkspaceCreation: true
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# Section 3: purview
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
purview:
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||||
# 3.1.1: Ensure Microsoft 365 audit log search is Enabled
|
||||
enableAuditLogSearch: true
|
||||
# 3.2.1 (Automated): Ensure DLP policies are enabled
|
||||
# TODO: Map this control to YAML — see PDF for details
|
||||
# 3.2.2 (Automated): Ensure DLP policies are enabled for Microsoft Teams
|
||||
# TODO: Map this control to YAML — see PDF for details
|
||||
# 3.2.3 (Automated): Ensure DLP policies are published for Copilot users
|
||||
# TODO: Map this control to YAML — see PDF for details
|
||||
# 3.3.1 (Automated): Ensure Information Protection sensitivity label policies are published
|
||||
# TODO: Map this control to YAML — see PDF for details
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# Section 2: Defender for Office 365
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
defender:
|
||||
# 2.1.1: Ensure Safe Links for Office Applications is Enabled
|
||||
safeLinks:
|
||||
name: "SafeLinks-Default"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
trackClicks: true
|
||||
allowClickThrough: false
|
||||
scanUrls: true
|
||||
enableForInternalSenders: true
|
||||
# 2.1.2: Ensure the Common Attachment Types Filter is enabled
|
||||
antiMalware:
|
||||
name: "AntiMalware-Default"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
enableInternalNotifications: true
|
||||
fileTypes: ["ace", "ani", "app", "docm", "exe", "jar", "jnlp", "msi", "ps1", "scr", "vbs", "wsf"]
|
||||
# 2.1.3: Ensure notifications for internal users sending malware is Enabled
|
||||
antiMalware:
|
||||
name: "AntiMalware-InternalNotify"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
enableInternalNotifications: true
|
||||
# 2.1.4: Ensure Safe Attachments policy is enabled
|
||||
safeAttachments:
|
||||
name: "SafeAttachments-Default"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
action: "Block"
|
||||
quarantineMessages: true
|
||||
# 2.1.5: Ensure Safe Attachments for SharePoint, OneDrive, and Microsoft Teams is Enabled
|
||||
safeAttachments:
|
||||
name: "SafeAttachments-SPO-Teams"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
action: "Block"
|
||||
enableForSharePoint: true
|
||||
enableForTeams: true
|
||||
# 2.1.6: Ensure Exchange Online Spam Policies are set to notify administrators
|
||||
antiSpam:
|
||||
name: "AntiSpam-Notify-Admins"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
notifyAdmins: true
|
||||
# 2.1.7: Ensure that an anti-phishing policy has been created
|
||||
antiPhish:
|
||||
name: "AntiPhish-Default"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
enableMailboxIntelligence: true
|
||||
enableSpoofIntelligence: true
|
||||
mailboxIntelligenceProtectionAction: "Quarantine"
|
||||
# 2.1.8 (Automated): Ensure that SPF records are published for all Exchange Domains
|
||||
# NOTE: DNS-level control — configure via DNS provider, not M365 tenant
|
||||
# 2.1.9 (Automated): Ensure that DKIM is enabled for all Exchange Online Domains
|
||||
# NOTE: DNS-level control — configure via DNS provider, not M365 tenant
|
||||
# 2.1.10 (Automated): Ensure DMARC records for all Exchange Online domains are published
|
||||
# NOTE: DNS-level control — configure via DNS provider, not M365 tenant
|
||||
# 2.1.11: Ensure comprehensive attachment filtering is applied
|
||||
antiMalware:
|
||||
name: "AntiMalware-Comprehensive"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
enableFileFilter: true
|
||||
# 2.1.12: Ensure the connection filter IP allow list is not used
|
||||
connectionFilterIPAllowListEmpty: true
|
||||
# 2.1.13: Ensure the connection filter safe list is off
|
||||
connectionFilterSafeListOff: true
|
||||
# 2.1.14: Ensure inbound anti-spam policies do not contain allowed domains
|
||||
inboundAntiSpamNoAllowedDomains: true
|
||||
# 2.1.15: Ensure outbound anti-spam message limits are in place
|
||||
outboundAntiSpamLimits: true
|
||||
# 2.2.1 (Manual): Ensure emergency access account activity is monitored
|
||||
# 2.4.1: Ensure Priority account protection is enabled and configured
|
||||
priorityAccount:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
# 2.4.2: Ensure Priority accounts have 'Strict protection' presets applied
|
||||
priorityAccount:
|
||||
strictProtection: true
|
||||
# 2.4.3 (Manual): Ensure Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps is enabled and configured
|
||||
# 2.4.4: Ensure Zero-hour auto purge for Microsoft Teams is on
|
||||
zap:
|
||||
enabledForTeams: true
|
||||
# 2.4.5 (Manual): Ensure 'AIR' remediation is enabled
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# Section 5.2.2: Conditional Access
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
conditionalAccess:
|
||||
reportOnly: true
|
||||
breakGlassGroup: "CIS-BreakGlass"
|
||||
policies:
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-multifactor-authentication-is-enabled-for-all-us"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.1"
|
||||
description: "Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users in administrative roles"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeRoles:
|
||||
- "Global Administrator"
|
||||
- "Privileged Role Administrator"
|
||||
- "Security Administrator"
|
||||
- "Exchange Administrator"
|
||||
- "SharePoint Administrator"
|
||||
- "Conditional Access Administrator"
|
||||
- "Application Administrator"
|
||||
- "Cloud Application Administrator"
|
||||
- "User Administrator"
|
||||
- "Helpdesk Administrator"
|
||||
- "Billing Administrator"
|
||||
- "Authentication Administrator"
|
||||
- "Password Administrator"
|
||||
- "Global Reader"
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-multifactor-authentication-is-enabled-for-all-us"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.2"
|
||||
description: "Ensure multifactor authentication is enabled for all users"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Enable-Conditional-Access-policies-to-block-legacy-auth"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.3"
|
||||
description: "Enable Conditional Access policies to block legacy authentication"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
clientAppTypes: ["exchangeActiveSync", "other"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["block"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-Signin-frequency-is-enabled-and-browser-sessions"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.4"
|
||||
description: "Ensure Sign-in frequency is enabled and browser sessions are not persistent for Administrative users"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeRoles:
|
||||
- "Global Administrator"
|
||||
- "Privileged Role Administrator"
|
||||
- "Security Administrator"
|
||||
- "Exchange Administrator"
|
||||
- "SharePoint Administrator"
|
||||
- "Conditional Access Administrator"
|
||||
- "Application Administrator"
|
||||
- "Cloud Application Administrator"
|
||||
- "User Administrator"
|
||||
- "Helpdesk Administrator"
|
||||
- "Billing Administrator"
|
||||
- "Authentication Administrator"
|
||||
- "Password Administrator"
|
||||
- "Global Reader"
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
sessionControls:
|
||||
signInFrequency:
|
||||
value: 12
|
||||
type: hours
|
||||
isEnabled: true
|
||||
persistentBrowser:
|
||||
mode: never
|
||||
isEnabled: true
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-Phishingresistant-MFA-strength-is-required-for-A"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.5"
|
||||
description: "Ensure 'Phishing-resistant MFA strength' is required for Administrators"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeRoles:
|
||||
- "Global Administrator"
|
||||
- "Privileged Role Administrator"
|
||||
- "Security Administrator"
|
||||
- "Exchange Administrator"
|
||||
- "SharePoint Administrator"
|
||||
- "Conditional Access Administrator"
|
||||
- "Application Administrator"
|
||||
- "Cloud Application Administrator"
|
||||
- "User Administrator"
|
||||
- "Helpdesk Administrator"
|
||||
- "Billing Administrator"
|
||||
- "Authentication Administrator"
|
||||
- "Password Administrator"
|
||||
- "Global Reader"
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["authenticationStrength"]
|
||||
authenticationStrength:
|
||||
id: "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000004"
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Enable-Identity-Protection-user-risk-policies"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.6"
|
||||
description: "Enable Identity Protection user risk policies"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
signInRiskLevels: ["medium", "high"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Enable-Identity-Protection-signin-risk-policies"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.7"
|
||||
description: "Enable Identity Protection sign-in risk policies"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
signInRiskLevels: ["medium", "high"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-signin-risk-is-blocked-for-medium-and-high-risk"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.8"
|
||||
description: "Ensure 'sign-in risk' is blocked for medium and high risk"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
signInRiskLevels: ["medium", "high"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["block"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-a-managed-device-is-required-for-authentication"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.9"
|
||||
description: "Ensure a managed device is required for authentication"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["compliantDevice", "domainJoinedDevice"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-a-managed-device-is-required-to-register-securit"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.10"
|
||||
description: "Ensure a managed device is required to register security information"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeUserActions: ["urn:user:registersecurityinfo"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["compliantDevice", "domainJoinedDevice"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-signin-frequency-for-Intune-Enrollment-is-set-to"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.11"
|
||||
description: "Ensure sign-in frequency for Intune Enrollment is set to 'Every time'"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["0000000a-0000-0000-c000-000000000000"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
sessionControls:
|
||||
signInFrequency:
|
||||
value: 12
|
||||
type: hours
|
||||
isEnabled: true
|
||||
persistentBrowser:
|
||||
mode: never
|
||||
isEnabled: true
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-the-device-code-signin-flow-is-blocked"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.12"
|
||||
description: "Ensure the device code sign-in flow is blocked"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
authenticationFlows:
|
||||
deviceCodeFlow:
|
||||
isEnabled: true
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["block"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-that-periodic-reauthentication-is-required-for-a"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.13"
|
||||
description: "Ensure that periodic reauthentication is required for all users"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-trusted-named-locations-are-defined"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.14"
|
||||
description: "Ensure trusted 'named locations' are defined"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
# TODO: Define named locations in Entra admin center
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-exclusionary-geographic-access-controls-are-util"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.15"
|
||||
description: "Ensure exclusionary geographic access controls are utilized"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
# TODO: Define named locations in Entra admin center
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-Token-Protection-is-enforced-for-session-tokens"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.16"
|
||||
description: "Ensure Token Protection is enforced for session tokens"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
# TODO: Enable Token Protection via Authentication Strength policy
|
||||
- name: "Ensure-authentication-transfer-is-blocked"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.17"
|
||||
description: "Ensure authentication transfer is blocked"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["block"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
# CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v7.0.0 (Draft)
|
||||
# Tenant-Level Baseline Manifest
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
# This YAML extends the OpenIntuneBaseline format to cover M365 tenant
|
||||
# configuration: Entra ID, Conditional Access, Defender, Exchange,
|
||||
# SharePoint, and Teams.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# HOW TO USE WITH A DRAFT PDF:
|
||||
# 1. Copy this file to your own baseline (e.g., mytenant-cisv7.yaml)
|
||||
# 2. As you read the CIS v7.0.0 PDF, transcribe controls into the
|
||||
# appropriate sections below. Each control has a 'cisControl' field
|
||||
# for traceability.
|
||||
# 3. Customize names, exclusions, and groups for your tenant.
|
||||
# 4. Run: ./Scripts/Deploy-CISM365Baseline.ps1 -BaselinePath ./Baselines/mytenant-cisv7.yaml
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SAFETY:
|
||||
# - Conditional Access policies default to 'reportOnly: true' (globally)
|
||||
# and 'state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced' (per-policy).
|
||||
# - The script also supports -WhatIf.
|
||||
# - Break-glass accounts/groups are automatically excluded from CA.
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
baseline:
|
||||
name: CIS-M365-v7-Example
|
||||
conflictResolution: Skip # Skip | Update | Error
|
||||
whatIf: false
|
||||
|
||||
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Global name mutation applied to every policy / CA rule (optional)
|
||||
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
tenantMutation:
|
||||
search: "CIS-v7-"
|
||||
replace: "ACME-CIS-"
|
||||
# Alternatively use prefix instead of search/replace:
|
||||
# prefix: "ACME-CIS-"
|
||||
|
||||
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Cloud-only security groups (mirrors Intune baseline format)
|
||||
# These are created if they do not exist and can be referenced
|
||||
# in CA policy assignments by displayName.
|
||||
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
groups:
|
||||
- displayName: "CIS-BreakGlass"
|
||||
mailNickname: "CISBreakGlass"
|
||||
securityEnabled: true
|
||||
|
||||
- displayName: "CIS-Pilot-Users"
|
||||
mailNickname: "CISPilotUsers"
|
||||
securityEnabled: true
|
||||
|
||||
- displayName: "CIS-All-Company"
|
||||
mailNickname: "CISAllCompany"
|
||||
securityEnabled: true
|
||||
|
||||
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Intune policies (optional — reuses the exact same schema as
|
||||
# OpenIntuneBaseline.example.yaml). Keep them here if you want a
|
||||
# single manifest for the whole tenant.
|
||||
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
policies:
|
||||
# Example: reuse your existing Intune exports
|
||||
# - sourcePath: ./policies/CIS-Windows-Compliance.json
|
||||
# type: CompliancePolicies
|
||||
# assignments:
|
||||
# - targetType: Group
|
||||
# groupName: "CIS-All-Company"
|
||||
|
||||
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# TENANT-LEVEL CONFIGURATION (new section)
|
||||
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
tenantConfig:
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# 1. M365 Admin Center (CIS Section 1)
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
adminCenter:
|
||||
# 1.3.1 (L1) Password expiration
|
||||
passwordExpiration: NeverExpire # NeverExpire | 90Days | 180Days
|
||||
|
||||
# 1.3.2 (L2) Idle session timeout (hours)
|
||||
idleSessionTimeoutHours: 3
|
||||
|
||||
# 1.3.4 (L1) Restrict user owned apps and services
|
||||
restrictUserOwnedApps: true
|
||||
|
||||
# 1.3.5 (L1) Internal phishing protection for Forms
|
||||
formsPhishingProtection: true
|
||||
|
||||
# 1.3.6 (L2) Customer Lockbox
|
||||
customerLockbox: true
|
||||
|
||||
# 1.3.7 (L2) Restrict third-party storage services
|
||||
restrictThirdPartyStorage: true
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# 5. Entra ID (CIS Section 5)
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
entraId:
|
||||
# 5.1.1.1 (L1) Cloud-only administrative accounts
|
||||
# NOTE: Manual — script can only validate, not create accounts.
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.1.3 (L1) Global admin count (2-4)
|
||||
# NOTE: Manual — script assesses only.
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.2.2 (L2) Disallow third-party integrated applications
|
||||
blockUserConsent: true
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.2.3 (L1) Restrict non-admin tenant creation
|
||||
blockTenantCreation: true
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.2.4 (L1) Restrict access to Entra admin center
|
||||
restrictAdminCenterAccess: true
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.2.6 (L2) Disable LinkedIn account connections
|
||||
disableLinkedIn: true
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.3.1 (L1) Dynamic group for guest users
|
||||
# NOTE: Manual — requires tenant-specific query.
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.4.2 (L1) Maximum devices per user
|
||||
maxDevicesPerUser: 5
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.4.3 (L1) GA not added as local admin during Entra join
|
||||
gaLocalAdminDisabled: true
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.2.3.2 (L1) Custom banned password list
|
||||
bannedPasswords:
|
||||
- "Contoso"
|
||||
- "Password"
|
||||
- "Welcome"
|
||||
- "Admin"
|
||||
- "Login"
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.2.3.4 (L1) Ensure all member users are MFA capable
|
||||
# NOTE: Enforced via Conditional Access below.
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# 5.2.2 Conditional Access (CIS Section 5.2.2)
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# CRITICAL: All CA policies are created in REPORT-ONLY mode by
|
||||
# default. Flip 'reportOnly: false' after you have validated
|
||||
# traffic in the Entra admin center.
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
conditionalAccess:
|
||||
reportOnly: true # Global switch for all CA policies
|
||||
breakGlassGroup: "CIS-BreakGlass" # Auto-excluded from every CA policy
|
||||
|
||||
policies:
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# CIS 5.2.2.3 (L1) Block legacy authentication
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: "Block-Legacy-Auth"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.3"
|
||||
description: "Block all legacy authentication protocols (EAS, basic auth)"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced # enabled | enabledForReportingButNotEnforced | disabled
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
# breakGlassGroup is injected automatically by the script
|
||||
clientAppTypes: ["exchangeActiveSync", "other"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["block"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# CIS 5.2.2.1 (L1) Require MFA for administrative roles
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: "Require-MFA-Admins"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.1"
|
||||
description: "Require MFA for all users assigned to administrative roles"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeRoles:
|
||||
- "Global Administrator"
|
||||
- "Privileged Role Administrator"
|
||||
- "Security Administrator"
|
||||
- "Exchange Administrator"
|
||||
- "SharePoint Administrator"
|
||||
- "Conditional Access Administrator"
|
||||
- "Application Administrator"
|
||||
- "Cloud Application Administrator"
|
||||
- "User Administrator"
|
||||
- "Helpdesk Administrator"
|
||||
- "Billing Administrator"
|
||||
- "Authentication Administrator"
|
||||
- "Password Administrator"
|
||||
- "Global Reader"
|
||||
excludeUsers: [] # Add break-glass UPNs here if not using breakGlassGroup
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# CIS 5.2.2.2 (L1) Require MFA for all users
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: "Require-MFA-All-Users"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.2"
|
||||
description: "Require MFA for all user sign-ins"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
excludeGroups: [] # e.g., ["CIS-Pilot-Users"] for staged rollout
|
||||
locations:
|
||||
includeLocations: ["AllTrusted"] # Requires named locations; use "All" if none defined
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# CIS 5.2.2.4 (L1) Sign-in frequency for admins
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: "Admin-SignIn-Frequency"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.4"
|
||||
description: "Require re-authentication every 12h for admins; no persistent browser"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeRoles:
|
||||
- "Global Administrator"
|
||||
- "Privileged Role Administrator"
|
||||
- "Security Administrator"
|
||||
sessionControls:
|
||||
signInFrequency:
|
||||
value: 12
|
||||
type: hours
|
||||
isEnabled: true
|
||||
persistentBrowser:
|
||||
mode: never
|
||||
isEnabled: true
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["mfa"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# CIS 5.2.2.5 (L2) Phishing-resistant MFA for admins
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: "Require-PhishingResistant-MFA-Admins"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.5"
|
||||
description: "Require phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2, certificate) for admins"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeRoles:
|
||||
- "Global Administrator"
|
||||
- "Privileged Role Administrator"
|
||||
- "Security Administrator"
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["authenticationStrength"]
|
||||
authenticationStrength:
|
||||
id: "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000004" # Phishing-resistant MFA
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# CIS 5.2.2.12 (L1) Block device code flow
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: "Block-Device-Code-Flow"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.12"
|
||||
description: "Block sign-ins using the device code authentication flow"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
authenticationFlows:
|
||||
deviceCodeFlow:
|
||||
isEnabled: true
|
||||
ruleType: "include"
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["block"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# CIS 5.2.2.8 (L2) Block medium/high risk sign-ins
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: "Block-HighRisk-SignIns"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.8"
|
||||
description: "Block sign-ins with medium or high risk score (requires Entra ID P2)"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
signInRiskLevels: ["medium", "high"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["block"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# CIS 5.2.2.9 (L1) Require managed device
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: "Require-Managed-Device"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.9"
|
||||
description: "Require device to be compliant or hybrid Entra joined"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["compliantDevice", "domainJoinedDevice"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# CIS 5.2.2.10 (L1) Require managed device to register security info
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
- name: "Require-Managed-Device-Security-Info"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.10"
|
||||
description: "Require managed device when registering security information"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeUserActions: ["urn:user:registersecurityinfo"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["compliantDevice", "domainJoinedDevice"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# 2. Microsoft Defender for Office 365 (CIS Section 2)
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
defender:
|
||||
# 2.1.1 (L2) Safe Links for Office Applications
|
||||
safeLinks:
|
||||
- name: "SafeLinks-Default"
|
||||
cisControl: "2.1.1"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
trackClicks: true
|
||||
allowClickThrough: false
|
||||
scanUrls: true
|
||||
enableForInternalSenders: true
|
||||
# The script auto-creates a rule applying this to all accepted domains
|
||||
|
||||
# 2.1.4 (L2) Safe Attachments
|
||||
safeAttachments:
|
||||
- name: "SafeAttachments-Default"
|
||||
cisControl: "2.1.4"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
action: Block # Block | DynamicDelivery | Monitor
|
||||
quarantineMessages: true
|
||||
|
||||
# 2.1.2 (L1) Common Attachment Types Filter
|
||||
antiMalware:
|
||||
- name: "AntiMalware-Default"
|
||||
cisControl: "2.1.2"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
enableInternalNotifications: true
|
||||
fileTypes:
|
||||
- ace
|
||||
- ani
|
||||
- app
|
||||
- docm
|
||||
- exe
|
||||
- jar
|
||||
- jnlp
|
||||
- msi
|
||||
- ps1
|
||||
- scr
|
||||
- vbs
|
||||
- wsf
|
||||
|
||||
# 2.1.3 (L1) Internal malware notifications
|
||||
# 2.4.4 (L1) Zero-hour auto purge for Teams
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# 6. Exchange Online (CIS Section 6)
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
exchange:
|
||||
# 6.1.1 (L1) AuditDisabled organizationally set to False
|
||||
enableMailboxAuditOrgWide: true
|
||||
|
||||
# 6.1.2 (L1) Mailbox audit actions configured
|
||||
# NOTE: Enabled automatically when org-wide auditing is on (above).
|
||||
|
||||
# 6.2.1 (L1) Block all forms of external forwarding
|
||||
blockExternalForwarding: true
|
||||
|
||||
# 6.2.2 (L1) Transport rules do not whitelist domains
|
||||
# NOTE: Manual review required.
|
||||
|
||||
# 6.2.3 (L1) Identify email from external senders
|
||||
enableExternalSenderBanner: true
|
||||
|
||||
# Transport rule: prepend external email warning
|
||||
externalEmailWarningRule: true
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# 7. SharePoint / OneDrive (CIS Section 7)
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
sharePoint:
|
||||
# Default sharing link type
|
||||
defaultSharingLinkType: Direct # Direct | Internal | AnonymousAccess
|
||||
|
||||
# External sharing for SharePoint
|
||||
sharePointExternalSharing: Disabled
|
||||
# Options: Disabled | ExistingExternalUserSharingOnly | ExternalUserSharingOnly | Anyone
|
||||
|
||||
# External sharing for OneDrive
|
||||
oneDriveExternalSharing: Disabled
|
||||
|
||||
# Guest access expiration (days)
|
||||
guestAccessExpirationDays: 30
|
||||
|
||||
# 7.x (L1) Prevent custom script execution
|
||||
# NOTE: Set via Set-PnPTenant -DenyAddAndCustomizePages 1
|
||||
denyCustomScripts: true
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# 8. Microsoft Teams (CIS Section 8)
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
teams:
|
||||
# 8.x Anonymous meeting join
|
||||
allowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting: false
|
||||
|
||||
# 8.x Anonymous meeting start
|
||||
allowAnonymousUsersToStartMeeting: false
|
||||
|
||||
# 8.x Teams email integration
|
||||
enableEmailIntegration: false
|
||||
|
||||
# 8.x Federation / external access
|
||||
allowFederatedUsers: false
|
||||
allowTeamsConsumer: false
|
||||
|
||||
# 8.x Restrict unmanaged user access
|
||||
# NOTE: Controlled via Teams meeting policy; script sets Global.
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# 3. Microsoft Purview (CIS Section 3)
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# NOTE: DLP, sensitivity labels, and retention policies are
|
||||
# highly business-specific. Add them here as needed:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# purview:
|
||||
# dlpPolicies:
|
||||
# - name: "CIS-DLP-Default"
|
||||
# ...
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# 9. Power BI (CIS Section 9)
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# NOTE: Power BI tenant settings are best managed via
|
||||
# Microsoft365DSC or direct Admin API calls. Add here if needed.
|
||||
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# NEW in v7.0.0 (expected)
|
||||
# ===============================================================
|
||||
# As you read the draft PDF, transcribe new controls into the
|
||||
# appropriate sections above. Use the 'cisControl' field to
|
||||
# preserve traceability (e.g., cisControl: "5.2.3.7").
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
|
||||
# CIS M365 v7.0.0 YAML Baseline Format
|
||||
|
||||
This document describes the YAML schema for `CISM365-v7.example.yaml`, which extends the existing `OpenIntuneBaseline.example.yaml` format to cover **tenant-level** M365 configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why This Format?
|
||||
|
||||
The existing Intune baseline YAML works great for device policies. For CIS M365 compliance, you need the same declarative approach but for:
|
||||
- Entra ID settings (password policies, device quotas, consent)
|
||||
- Conditional Access policies
|
||||
- Defender for Office 365 policies
|
||||
- Exchange Online transport rules
|
||||
- SharePoint / OneDrive sharing
|
||||
- Microsoft Teams policies
|
||||
|
||||
This YAML keeps the **same root structure** as the Intune baseline so you can optionally include Intune policies in the same manifest, or keep them separate.
|
||||
|
||||
## Root Structure
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
baseline:
|
||||
name: string
|
||||
conflictResolution: Skip | Update | Error
|
||||
whatIf: false
|
||||
|
||||
tenantMutation:
|
||||
search: string # optional
|
||||
replace: string # optional
|
||||
prefix: string # optional (alternative to search/replace)
|
||||
|
||||
groups: [] # Cloud-only security groups (same as Intune baseline)
|
||||
policies: [] # Intune policies (optional, same schema as Intune baseline)
|
||||
tenantConfig: # NEW: M365 tenant-level configuration
|
||||
adminCenter: {}
|
||||
entraId: {}
|
||||
conditionalAccess: {}
|
||||
defender: {}
|
||||
exchange: {}
|
||||
sharePoint: {}
|
||||
teams: {}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## tenantConfig Sections
|
||||
|
||||
### adminCenter
|
||||
|
||||
M365 Admin Center settings.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
adminCenter:
|
||||
passwordExpiration: NeverExpire # NeverExpire | 90Days | 180Days
|
||||
idleSessionTimeoutHours: 3
|
||||
restrictUserOwnedApps: true
|
||||
formsPhishingProtection: true
|
||||
customerLockbox: true
|
||||
restrictThirdPartyStorage: true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### entraId
|
||||
|
||||
Entra ID directory settings.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
entraId:
|
||||
blockUserConsent: true
|
||||
blockTenantCreation: true
|
||||
restrictAdminCenterAccess: true
|
||||
disableLinkedIn: true
|
||||
maxDevicesPerUser: 5
|
||||
gaLocalAdminDisabled: true
|
||||
bannedPasswords:
|
||||
- "Contoso"
|
||||
- "Password"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### conditionalAccess
|
||||
|
||||
The most powerful section. Supports **automatic CA policy creation** with:
|
||||
- **Global `reportOnly` switch** — all policies default to report-only
|
||||
- **Automatic break-glass exclusion** — specify one group, it's excluded from every policy
|
||||
- **Custom naming** via `tenantMutation`
|
||||
- **Role name resolution** — use friendly names like "Global Administrator", script maps to template IDs
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
conditionalAccess:
|
||||
reportOnly: true # Global switch
|
||||
breakGlassGroup: "CIS-BreakGlass" # Auto-excluded from all policies
|
||||
policies:
|
||||
- name: "Block-Legacy-Auth"
|
||||
cisControl: "5.2.2.3"
|
||||
description: "Block legacy authentication"
|
||||
state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
applications:
|
||||
includeApplications: ["All"]
|
||||
users:
|
||||
includeUsers: ["All"]
|
||||
excludeGroups: ["CIS-Pilot-Users"]
|
||||
clientAppTypes: ["exchangeActiveSync", "other"]
|
||||
grantControls:
|
||||
builtInControls: ["block"]
|
||||
operator: "OR"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**CA Policy Conditions Supported:**
|
||||
|
||||
| Condition | YAML Key | Example |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|---------|
|
||||
| Apps | `applications.includeApplications` | `["All"]` or `["Office365"]` |
|
||||
| User actions | `applications.includeUserActions` | `["urn:user:registersecurityinfo"]` |
|
||||
| Users | `users.includeUsers` | `["All"]` or specific UPNs |
|
||||
| Groups | `users.includeGroups` / `excludeGroups` | `["CIS-Pilot-Users"]` — resolved by displayName |
|
||||
| Roles | `users.includeRoles` / `excludeRoles` | `["Global Administrator"]` — friendly names mapped to template IDs |
|
||||
| Client apps | `clientAppTypes` | `["exchangeActiveSync", "other"]` |
|
||||
| Sign-in risk | `signInRiskLevels` | `["medium", "high"]` |
|
||||
| Locations | `locations.includeLocations` | `["AllTrusted"]` or `["All"]` |
|
||||
| Auth flows | `authenticationFlows.deviceCodeFlow` | `{ isEnabled: true }` |
|
||||
|
||||
**Grant Controls Supported:**
|
||||
|
||||
| Control | YAML Key |
|
||||
|---------|----------|
|
||||
| Block | `grantControls.builtInControls: ["block"]` |
|
||||
| Require MFA | `grantControls.builtInControls: ["mfa"]` |
|
||||
| Compliant device | `grantControls.builtInControls: ["compliantDevice", "domainJoinedDevice"]` |
|
||||
| Phishing-resistant MFA | `grantControls.builtInControls: ["authenticationStrength"]` + `grantControls.authenticationStrength.id` |
|
||||
|
||||
**Session Controls Supported:**
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
sessionControls:
|
||||
signInFrequency:
|
||||
value: 12
|
||||
type: hours
|
||||
isEnabled: true
|
||||
persistentBrowser:
|
||||
mode: never # never | always
|
||||
isEnabled: true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### defender
|
||||
|
||||
Defender for Office 365 policies.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
defender:
|
||||
safeLinks:
|
||||
- name: "SafeLinks-Default"
|
||||
cisControl: "2.1.1"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
trackClicks: true
|
||||
allowClickThrough: false
|
||||
scanUrls: true
|
||||
enableForInternalSenders: true
|
||||
safeAttachments:
|
||||
- name: "SafeAttachments-Default"
|
||||
cisControl: "2.1.4"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
action: Block
|
||||
quarantineMessages: true
|
||||
antiMalware:
|
||||
- name: "AntiMalware-Default"
|
||||
cisControl: "2.1.2"
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
enableInternalNotifications: true
|
||||
fileTypes: ["ace", "exe", "jar", "vbs"]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### exchange
|
||||
|
||||
Exchange Online settings.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
exchange:
|
||||
enableMailboxAuditOrgWide: true
|
||||
blockExternalForwarding: true
|
||||
enableExternalSenderBanner: true
|
||||
externalEmailWarningRule: true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### sharePoint
|
||||
|
||||
SharePoint / OneDrive sharing settings.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
sharePoint:
|
||||
adminUrl: "https://contoso-admin.sharepoint.com"
|
||||
defaultSharingLinkType: Direct
|
||||
sharePointExternalSharing: Disabled
|
||||
oneDriveExternalSharing: Disabled
|
||||
guestAccessExpirationDays: 30
|
||||
denyCustomScripts: true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### teams
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft Teams policies.
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
teams:
|
||||
allowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting: false
|
||||
allowAnonymousUsersToStartMeeting: false
|
||||
enableEmailIntegration: false
|
||||
allowFederatedUsers: false
|
||||
allowTeamsConsumer: false
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Using the Draft PDF
|
||||
|
||||
Since CIS does not publish XLS for draft benchmarks:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Open the PDF and work through each section
|
||||
2. For **automated** controls, add them to the appropriate `tenantConfig` section with the `cisControl` field
|
||||
3. For **manual** controls, skip them or add a comment
|
||||
4. The `cisControl` field preserves traceability (e.g., `cisControl: "5.2.2.3"`)
|
||||
|
||||
## Deployment
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Assess (read-only)
|
||||
./Scripts/Deploy-CISM365Baseline.ps1 -BaselinePath ./Baselines/mytenant-cisv7.yaml
|
||||
|
||||
# Deploy (applies changes)
|
||||
./Scripts/Deploy-CISM365Baseline.ps1 -BaselinePath ./Baselines/mytenant-cisv7.yaml -Mode Deploy -Apply -Verbose
|
||||
|
||||
# Deploy only specific workloads
|
||||
./Scripts/Deploy-CISM365Baseline.ps1 -BaselinePath ./Baselines/mytenant-cisv7.yaml -Mode Deploy -Apply -Workloads ConditionalAccess,EntraID
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Safety Defaults
|
||||
|
||||
| Feature | Default | Why |
|
||||
|---------|---------|-----|
|
||||
| `Mode` | `Assess` | Must explicitly opt in to changes |
|
||||
| `conditionalAccess.reportOnly` | `true` | All CA policies created in report-only mode |
|
||||
| `breakGlassGroup` | Auto-excluded | Prevents lockout |
|
||||
| `Apply` switch | Required for Deploy | Double-confirmation pattern |
|
||||
| `-WhatIf` | Supported | Native PowerShell WhatIf |
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
|
||||
@{
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
# CIS M365 Rapid Baseline Configuration
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
# This file defines the desired state for a new/greenfield tenant.
|
||||
# Edit values before running Deploy-CISM365RapidBaseline.ps1.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# IMPORTANT: This baseline is designed for NEW or NEWLY-ACQUIRED tenants.
|
||||
# On an established tenant, some changes may impact users.
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
Tenant = @{
|
||||
# Your tenant's initial .onmicrosoft.com domain
|
||||
TenantDomain = 'contoso.onmicrosoft.com'
|
||||
|
||||
# SharePoint admin center URL
|
||||
SharePointAdminUrl = 'https://contoso-admin.sharepoint.com'
|
||||
|
||||
# License profile: E3 | E5 | E3+P2
|
||||
# Determines whether P2-only features (Identity Protection, PIM) are configured
|
||||
LicenseProfile = 'E3'
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
# Section 5: Entra ID (Identity)
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
EntraID = @{
|
||||
# 1.3.1 - Password expiration policy
|
||||
PasswordExpiration = 'NeverExpire' # NeverExpire | 90Days | 180Days
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.2.3.2 - Custom banned password list
|
||||
BannedPasswords = @('Contoso', 'Contoso1', 'Password', 'Welcome')
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.2.3 - Restrict non-admin users from creating tenants
|
||||
BlockTenantCreation = $true
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.2.6 - Disable LinkedIn account connections
|
||||
DisableLinkedIn = $true
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.2.2 - Disallow third-party integrated applications (user consent)
|
||||
# Note: Set to $true for strict CIS compliance. May break some SaaS integrations.
|
||||
BlockUserConsent = $true
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.4.2 - Maximum devices per user
|
||||
MaxDevicesPerUser = 5
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.4.3 - Do not add GA role as local admin during Entra join
|
||||
GALocalAdminDisabled = $true
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.2.3.1 - Microsoft Authenticator: protect against MFA fatigue
|
||||
MFAFatigueProtection = $true
|
||||
|
||||
# Emergency access accounts (break-glass) - used for CA policy exclusions
|
||||
BreakGlassAccounts = @(
|
||||
'breakglass1@contoso.onmicrosoft.com'
|
||||
'breakglass2@contoso.onmicrosoft.com'
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
# Section 5.2.2: Conditional Access Policies
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
ConditionalAccess = @(
|
||||
@{
|
||||
Name = 'CIS-Block-Legacy-Auth'
|
||||
Description = 'CIS 5.2.2.3 - Block legacy authentication protocols'
|
||||
Enabled = $true
|
||||
State = 'enabled'
|
||||
Conditions = @{
|
||||
Applications = @{ IncludeApplications = @('All') }
|
||||
Users = @{ IncludeUsers = @('All'); ExcludeUsers = @() }
|
||||
ClientAppTypes = @('exchangeActiveSync', 'other')
|
||||
}
|
||||
GrantControls = @{
|
||||
BuiltInControls = @('block')
|
||||
Operator = 'OR'
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@{
|
||||
Name = 'CIS-Require-MFA-Admins'
|
||||
Description = 'CIS 5.2.2.1 - Require MFA for all users in administrative roles'
|
||||
Enabled = $true
|
||||
State = 'enabled'
|
||||
Conditions = @{
|
||||
Applications = @{ IncludeApplications = @('All') }
|
||||
Users = @{ IncludeUsers = @('All'); ExcludeRoles = @('62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10') } # Exclude Global Admin if using PIM
|
||||
}
|
||||
GrantControls = @{
|
||||
BuiltInControls = @('mfa')
|
||||
Operator = 'OR'
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@{
|
||||
Name = 'CIS-Require-MFA-All-Users'
|
||||
Description = 'CIS 5.2.2.2 - Require MFA for all users'
|
||||
Enabled = $true
|
||||
State = 'enabled'
|
||||
Conditions = @{
|
||||
Applications = @{ IncludeApplications = @('All') }
|
||||
Users = @{ IncludeUsers = @('All'); ExcludeUsers = @() }
|
||||
Locations = @{ IncludeLocations = @('AllTrusted') } # Requires named locations
|
||||
}
|
||||
GrantControls = @{
|
||||
BuiltInControls = @('mfa')
|
||||
Operator = 'OR'
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@{
|
||||
Name = 'CIS-Block-Device-Code-Flow'
|
||||
Description = 'CIS 5.2.2.12 - Block device code sign-in flow'
|
||||
Enabled = $true
|
||||
State = 'enabled'
|
||||
Conditions = @{
|
||||
Applications = @{ IncludeApplications = @('All') }
|
||||
Users = @{ IncludeUsers = @('All'); ExcludeUsers = @() }
|
||||
AuthenticationFlows = @{ IncludeAuthenticationFlows = @('deviceCode') }
|
||||
}
|
||||
GrantControls = @{
|
||||
BuiltInControls = @('block')
|
||||
Operator = 'OR'
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@{
|
||||
Name = 'CIS-Block-High-Risk-SignIns'
|
||||
Description = 'CIS 5.2.2.8 - Block sign-ins with medium/high risk (requires P2)'
|
||||
Enabled = $true
|
||||
State = 'enabledForReportingButNotEnforced' # Set to 'enabled' after validation
|
||||
Conditions = @{
|
||||
Applications = @{ IncludeApplications = @('All') }
|
||||
Users = @{ IncludeUsers = @('All'); ExcludeUsers = @() }
|
||||
SignInRiskLevels = @('high', 'medium')
|
||||
}
|
||||
GrantControls = @{
|
||||
BuiltInControls = @('block')
|
||||
Operator = 'OR'
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
# Section 2: Microsoft Defender for Office 365
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
Defender = @{
|
||||
# 2.1.1 - Safe Links for Office Applications
|
||||
SafeLinks = @{
|
||||
Name = 'CIS-SafeLinks-Default'
|
||||
Enabled = $true
|
||||
TrackClicks = $true
|
||||
AllowClickThrough = $false
|
||||
ScanUrls = $true
|
||||
EnableForInternalSenders = $true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# 2.1.4 - Safe Attachments
|
||||
SafeAttachments = @{
|
||||
Name = 'CIS-SafeAttachments-Default'
|
||||
Enabled = $true
|
||||
Action = 'Block' # Block | DynamicDelivery | Monitor
|
||||
QuarantineMessages = $true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# 2.1.2 - Common Attachment Types Filter (built into anti-malware)
|
||||
AntiMalware = @{
|
||||
Name = 'CIS-AntiMalware-Default'
|
||||
Enabled = $true
|
||||
EnableInternalSenderNotifications = $true
|
||||
FileTypes = @('ace', 'ani', 'app', 'docm', 'exe', 'iso', 'jar', 'jnlp', 'msi', 'php', 'ps1', 'scr', 'vbs', 'wsf')
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Anti-Phish baseline
|
||||
AntiPhish = @{
|
||||
Name = 'CIS-AntiPhish-Default'
|
||||
Enabled = $true
|
||||
EnableMailboxIntelligence = $true
|
||||
EnableSpoofIntelligence = $true
|
||||
MailboxIntelligenceProtectionAction = 'Quarantine'
|
||||
TargetedUserProtectionAction = 'Quarantine'
|
||||
TargetedDomainProtectionAction = 'Quarantine'
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
# Section 6: Exchange Online
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
Exchange = @{
|
||||
# 6.2.1 - Block all forms of external mail forwarding
|
||||
BlockExternalForwarding = $true
|
||||
|
||||
# 6.1.2 - Enable mailbox auditing organization-wide
|
||||
EnableMailboxAudit = $true
|
||||
|
||||
# 6.2.3 - Identify email from external senders (external sender banner)
|
||||
EnableExternalSenderBanner = $true
|
||||
|
||||
# Transport rule: prepend external email warning
|
||||
ExternalEmailWarning = $true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
# Section 7: SharePoint / OneDrive
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
SharePoint = @{
|
||||
# 7.x - Default sharing link type
|
||||
# Options: Direct, Internal, AnonymousAccess
|
||||
DefaultSharingLinkType = 'Direct' # Most restrictive = Direct (specific people only)
|
||||
|
||||
# 7.x - External sharing for SharePoint
|
||||
SharePointExternalSharing = 'Disabled' # Disabled | ExistingExternalUserSharingOnly | ExternalUserSharingOnly | Anyone
|
||||
|
||||
# 7.x - External sharing for OneDrive
|
||||
OneDriveExternalSharing = 'Disabled' # Disabled | ExistingExternalUserSharingOnly | ExternalUserSharingOnly | Anyone
|
||||
|
||||
# Guest access expiration (days)
|
||||
GuestAccessExpirationDays = 30
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
# Section 8: Microsoft Teams
|
||||
# =====================================================================
|
||||
Teams = @{
|
||||
# 8.x - Allow anonymous users to join meetings
|
||||
AllowAnonymousMeetingJoin = $false
|
||||
|
||||
# 8.x - Allow anonymous users to start meetings
|
||||
AllowAnonymousMeetingStart = $false
|
||||
|
||||
# 8.x - Teams email integration
|
||||
EnableEmailIntegration = $false
|
||||
|
||||
# Federation / external access
|
||||
AllowFederatedUsers = $false
|
||||
AllowTeamsConsumer = $false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,699 @@
|
||||
<#PSScriptInfo
|
||||
.VERSION 1.0.0
|
||||
.GUID 9f3c2a8b-7e1d-4f5a-9b2c-8d3e4f5a6b7c
|
||||
.AUTHOR IntuneManagement Toolkit
|
||||
.COMPANYNAME
|
||||
.COPYRIGHT
|
||||
.TAGS CIS,M365,Security,Baseline,EntraID,Defender,Exchange,SharePoint,Teams
|
||||
.LICENSEURI
|
||||
.PROJECTURI
|
||||
.ICONURI
|
||||
.EXTERNALMODULEDEPENDENCIES Microsoft.Graph,ExchangeOnlineManagement,PnP.PowerShell,MicrosoftTeams
|
||||
.REQUIREDSCRIPTS
|
||||
.EXTERNALSCRIPTDEPENDENCIES
|
||||
.RELEASENOTES
|
||||
v1.0.0 - Initial rapid baseline for CIS M365 Foundations alignment on greenfield/newly-acquired tenants.
|
||||
#>
|
||||
|
||||
<#
|
||||
.SYNOPSIS
|
||||
Rapidly deploys (or assesses) a high-impact CIS M365-aligned baseline to a new or newly-acquired tenant.
|
||||
|
||||
.DESCRIPTION
|
||||
This script targets the ~40 highest-impact, easily-automated CIS M365 controls across:
|
||||
- Entra ID (password policies, auth methods, Conditional Access)
|
||||
- Microsoft Defender for Office 365 (Safe Links, Safe Attachments, Anti-Phish)
|
||||
- Exchange Online (external forwarding block, mailbox auditing)
|
||||
- SharePoint Online / OneDrive (external sharing restrictions)
|
||||
- Microsoft Teams (anonymous meeting restrictions, federation)
|
||||
|
||||
It is designed for NEW or NEWLY-ACQUIRED tenants where disruption risk is low.
|
||||
On established tenants, run in -Mode Assess first and review every change.
|
||||
|
||||
DEFAULT BEHAVIOUR IS READ-ONLY (-Mode Assess). You must specify -Mode Deploy -Apply to make changes.
|
||||
|
||||
.PARAMETER Mode
|
||||
Assess = Read-only audit against the baseline (default)
|
||||
Deploy = Apply the baseline configuration
|
||||
|
||||
.PARAMETER ConfigPath
|
||||
Path to the .psd1 configuration file. Defaults to .\CISM365-RapidBaseline.psd1
|
||||
|
||||
.PARAMETER Apply
|
||||
Required switch when Mode is 'Deploy'. Prevents accidental execution.
|
||||
|
||||
.PARAMETER TenantId
|
||||
Optional tenant ID for Graph authentication.
|
||||
|
||||
.PARAMETER SharePointAdminUrl
|
||||
Optional SharePoint admin URL (e.g., https://contoso-admin.sharepoint.com).
|
||||
If omitted, uses the value from the config file.
|
||||
|
||||
.PARAMETER Workloads
|
||||
Array of workloads to process. Default is all.
|
||||
Options: EntraID, ConditionalAccess, Defender, Exchange, SharePoint, Teams
|
||||
|
||||
.EXAMPLE
|
||||
# Assess your tenant without making any changes
|
||||
.\Deploy-CISM365RapidBaseline.ps1
|
||||
|
||||
.EXAMPLE
|
||||
# Deploy the baseline after review
|
||||
.\Deploy-CISM365RapidBaseline.ps1 -Mode Deploy -Apply -Verbose
|
||||
|
||||
.EXAMPLE
|
||||
# Assess only Entra ID and Conditional Access
|
||||
.\Deploy-CISM365RapidBaseline.ps1 -Workloads @('EntraID','ConditionalAccess')
|
||||
#>
|
||||
[CmdletBinding(SupportsShouldProcess)]
|
||||
param(
|
||||
[Parameter()]
|
||||
[ValidateSet('Assess','Deploy')]
|
||||
[string]$Mode = 'Assess',
|
||||
|
||||
[Parameter()]
|
||||
[string]$ConfigPath = "$PSScriptRoot\CISM365-RapidBaseline.psd1",
|
||||
|
||||
[Parameter()]
|
||||
[switch]$Apply,
|
||||
|
||||
[Parameter()]
|
||||
[string]$TenantId,
|
||||
|
||||
[Parameter()]
|
||||
[string]$SharePointAdminUrl,
|
||||
|
||||
[Parameter()]
|
||||
[ValidateSet('EntraID','ConditionalAccess','Defender','Exchange','SharePoint','Teams')]
|
||||
[string[]]$Workloads = @('EntraID','ConditionalAccess','Defender','Exchange','SharePoint','Teams')
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
#region Initialization
|
||||
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
|
||||
$script:Results = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new()
|
||||
$script:ChangesMade = 0
|
||||
$script:ChangesSkipped = 0
|
||||
$script:Errors = 0
|
||||
|
||||
function Write-SectionHeader {
|
||||
param([string]$Title)
|
||||
Write-Host "`n========================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
|
||||
Write-Host " $Title" -ForegroundColor Cyan
|
||||
Write-Host "========================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function Add-Result {
|
||||
param(
|
||||
[string]$Workload,
|
||||
[string]$Control,
|
||||
[string]$Status, # Pass, Fail, Fixed, Skipped, Error
|
||||
[string]$Message,
|
||||
[string]$Remediation = ''
|
||||
)
|
||||
$script:Results.Add([PSCustomObject]@{
|
||||
Workload = $Workload
|
||||
Control = $Control
|
||||
Status = $Status
|
||||
Message = $Message
|
||||
Remediation = $Remediation
|
||||
})
|
||||
switch ($Status) {
|
||||
'Fixed' { $script:ChangesMade++ }
|
||||
'Skipped' { $script:ChangesSkipped++ }
|
||||
'Error' { $script:Errors++ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Load configuration
|
||||
if (-not (Test-Path $ConfigPath)) {
|
||||
throw "Configuration file not found: $ConfigPath"
|
||||
}
|
||||
$Config = Import-PowerShellDataFile -Path $ConfigPath
|
||||
$TenantDomain = $Config.Tenant.TenantDomain
|
||||
if (-not $SharePointAdminUrl) { $SharePointAdminUrl = $Config.Tenant.SharePointAdminUrl }
|
||||
$LicenseProfile = $Config.Tenant.LicenseProfile
|
||||
#endregion
|
||||
|
||||
#region Authentication
|
||||
Write-SectionHeader "Authentication"
|
||||
|
||||
# Microsoft Graph
|
||||
Write-Host "Connecting to Microsoft Graph..." -NoNewline
|
||||
$GraphScopes = @(
|
||||
'Directory.Read.All','Directory.ReadWrite.All','Policy.Read.All','Policy.ReadWrite.ConditionalAccess',
|
||||
'Organization.Read.All','Organization.ReadWrite.All','RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory',
|
||||
'IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All','IdentityRiskEvent.Read.All'
|
||||
)
|
||||
if ($TenantId) {
|
||||
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes ($GraphScopes -join ',') -TenantId $TenantId -NoWelcome
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes ($GraphScopes -join ',') -NoWelcome
|
||||
}
|
||||
Write-Host " OK" -ForegroundColor Green
|
||||
|
||||
# Exchange Online (includes Defender)
|
||||
if ($Workloads -contains 'Defender' -or $Workloads -contains 'Exchange') {
|
||||
Write-Host "Connecting to Exchange Online..." -NoNewline
|
||||
Connect-ExchangeOnline -ShowBanner:$false
|
||||
Write-Host " OK" -ForegroundColor Green
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# SharePoint
|
||||
if ($Workloads -contains 'SharePoint') {
|
||||
Write-Host "Connecting to SharePoint Online..." -NoNewline
|
||||
Connect-PnPOnline -Url $SharePointAdminUrl -Interactive
|
||||
Write-Host " OK" -ForegroundColor Green
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Teams
|
||||
if ($Workloads -contains 'Teams') {
|
||||
Write-Host "Connecting to Microsoft Teams..." -NoNewline
|
||||
Connect-MicrosoftTeams
|
||||
Write-Host " OK" -ForegroundColor Green
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endregion
|
||||
|
||||
#region Helper Functions
|
||||
function Test-IsGlobalAdmin {
|
||||
$context = Get-MgContext
|
||||
$myRoles = Get-MgRoleManagementDirectoryRoleAssignment -Filter "principalId eq '$($context.Account)'" -ExpandProperty RoleDefinition
|
||||
return ($myRoles.RoleDefinition.DisplayName -contains 'Global Administrator')
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function Invoke-WithErrorHandling {
|
||||
param(
|
||||
[string]$Workload,
|
||||
[string]$Control,
|
||||
[scriptblock]$Action,
|
||||
[string]$Remediation = ''
|
||||
)
|
||||
try {
|
||||
& $Action
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload $Workload -Control $Control -Status 'Error' -Message $_.Exception.Message -Remediation $Remediation
|
||||
Write-Warning "[$Workload/$Control] ERROR: $_"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endregion
|
||||
|
||||
#region Entra ID
|
||||
if ($Workloads -contains 'EntraID') {
|
||||
Write-SectionHeader "Entra ID / Identity"
|
||||
|
||||
# 1.3.1 - Password expiration
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '1.3.1-PasswordExpiration' -Action {
|
||||
$org = Get-MgOrganization
|
||||
$currentPolicy = $org.PasswordPolicies
|
||||
$desired = if ($Config.EntraID.PasswordExpiration -eq 'NeverExpire') { 'None' } else { 'PasswordExpiration' }
|
||||
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
$pass = ($desired -eq 'None' -and $currentPolicy -contains 'DisablePasswordExpiration')
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '1.3.1-PasswordExpiration' `
|
||||
-Status $(if ($pass) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "Current policy: $currentPolicy | Desired: $($Config.EntraID.PasswordExpiration)" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Set-MgOrganization -PasswordPolicies 'DisablePasswordExpiration'"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($TenantDomain, "Set password expiration to $($Config.EntraID.PasswordExpiration)")) {
|
||||
Update-MgOrganization -OrganizationId $org.Id -PasswordPolicies 'DisablePasswordExpiration'
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '1.3.1-PasswordExpiration' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Set to NeverExpire"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '1.3.1-PasswordExpiration' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.2.3.2 - Banned passwords
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.2.3.2-BannedPasswords' -Action {
|
||||
$policy = Get-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicy | Select-Object -ExpandProperty AuthenticationMethodConfigurations | Where-Object { $_.Id -eq 'MicrosoftAuthenticator' }
|
||||
# Banned password list is actually in directory settings
|
||||
$settings = Get-MgDirectorySetting | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -eq 'Password Rule Settings' }
|
||||
if (-not $settings) {
|
||||
$template = Get-MgDirectorySettingTemplate | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -eq 'Password Rule Settings' }
|
||||
$settings = New-MgDirectorySetting -TemplateId $template.Id
|
||||
}
|
||||
$currentList = ($settings.Values | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'BannedPasswordList' }).Value
|
||||
$desiredList = $Config.EntraID.BannedPasswords -join ', '
|
||||
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
$hasAll = ($Config.EntraID.BannedPasswords | ForEach-Object { $currentList -contains $_ }) -notcontains $false
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.2.3.2-BannedPasswords' `
|
||||
-Status $(if ($hasAll) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "Current: $currentList | Desired: $desiredList" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Update-MgDirectorySetting -BannedPasswordList '$desiredList'"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($TenantDomain, "Update banned password list")) {
|
||||
$params = @{ BannedPasswordList = $desiredList; EnableBannedPasswordCheck = $true }
|
||||
Update-MgDirectorySetting -DirectorySettingId $settings.Id -Values $params
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.2.3.2-BannedPasswords' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Updated banned password list"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.2.3.2-BannedPasswords' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.2.3 - Block tenant creation by non-admins
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.2.3-BlockTenantCreation' -Action {
|
||||
$setting = Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy
|
||||
$current = $setting.DefaultUserRolePermissions.AllowedToCreateTenants
|
||||
$desired = -not $Config.EntraID.BlockTenantCreation
|
||||
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.2.3-BlockTenantCreation' `
|
||||
-Status $(if ($current -eq $desired) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "AllowedToCreateTenants = $current | Desired = $desired" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{AllowedToCreateTenants=`$false}"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($TenantDomain, "Set AllowedToCreateTenants = $desired")) {
|
||||
Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{ AllowedToCreateTenants = $desired }
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.2.3-BlockTenantCreation' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Set to $desired"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.2.3-BlockTenantCreation' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.2.6 - Disable LinkedIn
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.2.6-DisableLinkedIn' -Action {
|
||||
$org = Get-MgOrganization
|
||||
$current = $org.MarketingNotificationEmails -contains 'LinkedIn'
|
||||
# LinkedIn setting is in directory settings
|
||||
$setting = Get-MgDirectorySetting | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -eq 'Consent Policy Settings' }
|
||||
# Simplified check - actual LinkedIn config varies by tenant region
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.2.6-DisableLinkedIn' -Status 'Skipped' `
|
||||
-Message "LinkedIn integration check requires UI validation or tenant-specific Graph path." `
|
||||
-Remediation "Navigate to Entra admin center > Users > User settings > LinkedIn account connections"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.4.2 - Max devices per user
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.4.2-MaxDevicesPerUser' -Action {
|
||||
$setting = Get-MgPolicyDeviceRegistrationPolicy
|
||||
$current = $setting.UserDeviceQuota
|
||||
$desired = $Config.EntraID.MaxDevicesPerUser
|
||||
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.4.2-MaxDevicesPerUser' `
|
||||
-Status $(if ($current -le $desired) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "Current quota: $current | Desired max: $desired" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Update-MgPolicyDeviceRegistrationPolicy -UserDeviceQuota $desired"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($TenantDomain, "Set max devices per user to $desired")) {
|
||||
Update-MgPolicyDeviceRegistrationPolicy -UserDeviceQuota $desired
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.4.2-MaxDevicesPerUser' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Set to $desired"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.4.2-MaxDevicesPerUser' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.1.2.2 - Block user consent
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.2.2-BlockUserConsent' -Action {
|
||||
$policy = Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy
|
||||
$current = $policy.DefaultUserRolePermissions.AllowedToCreateApps
|
||||
$desired = -not $Config.EntraID.BlockUserConsent
|
||||
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.2.2-BlockUserConsent' `
|
||||
-Status $(if ($current -eq $desired) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "AllowedToCreateApps = $current | Desired = $desired" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{AllowedToCreateApps=`$false}"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($TenantDomain, "Set AllowedToCreateApps = $desired")) {
|
||||
Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{ AllowedToCreateApps = $desired }
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.2.2-BlockUserConsent' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Set to $desired"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'EntraID' -Control '5.1.2.2-BlockUserConsent' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endregion
|
||||
|
||||
#region Conditional Access
|
||||
if ($Workloads -contains 'ConditionalAccess') {
|
||||
Write-SectionHeader "Conditional Access"
|
||||
|
||||
foreach ($caPolicy in $Config.ConditionalAccess) {
|
||||
$policyName = $caPolicy.Name
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'ConditionalAccess' -Control $policyName -Action {
|
||||
$existing = Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy -Filter "displayName eq '$policyName'" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
|
||||
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
if ($existing) {
|
||||
$stateMatch = ($existing.State -eq $caPolicy.State)
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'ConditionalAccess' -Control $policyName `
|
||||
-Status $(if ($stateMatch) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "Policy exists. State: $($existing.State) | Desired: $($caPolicy.State)" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Review policy in Entra admin center > Protection > Conditional Access"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'ConditionalAccess' -Control $policyName -Status 'Fail' `
|
||||
-Message "Policy does not exist." `
|
||||
-Remediation "Create policy '$policyName' via Entra admin center or Graph API"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($existing) {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($policyName, "Update Conditional Access policy state to $($caPolicy.State)")) {
|
||||
Update-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy -ConditionalAccessPolicyId $existing.Id -State $caPolicy.State
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'ConditionalAccess' -Control $policyName -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Updated state to $($caPolicy.State)"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'ConditionalAccess' -Control $policyName -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
# For Deploy mode without existing policy, we provide guidance rather than auto-creating
|
||||
# because CA policies are complex and tenant-specific (groups, apps, exclusions)
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'ConditionalAccess' -Control $policyName -Status 'Skipped' `
|
||||
-Message "Policy does not exist. Auto-creation of CA policies is intentionally manual to avoid lockouts." `
|
||||
-Remediation "Use the sample JSON in this script's comments or build via Entra admin center, then re-run Assess."
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endregion
|
||||
|
||||
#region Defender / Exchange
|
||||
if ($Workloads -contains 'Defender') {
|
||||
Write-SectionHeader "Defender for Office 365"
|
||||
|
||||
# Safe Links
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.1-SafeLinks' -Action {
|
||||
$policy = Get-SafeLinksPolicy -Identity $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.Name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
if ($policy) {
|
||||
$pass = $policy.EnableSafeLinksForEmail -and $policy.TrackClicks -and -not $policy.AllowClickThrough
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.1-SafeLinks' -Status $(if ($pass) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "Safe Links policy exists. EmailProtection=$($policy.EnableSafeLinksForEmail) TrackClicks=$($policy.TrackClicks) AllowClickThrough=$($policy.AllowClickThrough)" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Set-SafeLinksPolicy -Identity '$($Config.Defender.SafeLinks.Name)' -EnableSafeLinksForEmail `$true -TrackClicks `$true -AllowClickThrough `$false"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.1-SafeLinks' -Status 'Fail' `
|
||||
-Message "Safe Links policy '$($Config.Defender.SafeLinks.Name)' not found." `
|
||||
-Remediation "New-SafeLinksPolicy (see script comments for full syntax)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($policy) {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($Config.Defender.SafeLinks.Name, 'Update Safe Links policy')) {
|
||||
Set-SafeLinksPolicy -Identity $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.Name `
|
||||
-EnableSafeLinksForEmail $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.Enabled `
|
||||
-TrackClicks $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.TrackClicks `
|
||||
-AllowClickThrough $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.AllowClickThrough `
|
||||
-ScanUrls $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.ScanUrls `
|
||||
-EnableForInternalSenders $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.EnableForInternalSenders
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.1-SafeLinks' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Updated Safe Links policy"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.1-SafeLinks' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($Config.Defender.SafeLinks.Name, 'Create Safe Links policy')) {
|
||||
New-SafeLinksPolicy -Name $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.Name `
|
||||
-EnableSafeLinksForEmail $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.Enabled `
|
||||
-TrackClicks $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.TrackClicks `
|
||||
-AllowClickThrough $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.AllowClickThrough `
|
||||
-ScanUrls $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.ScanUrls `
|
||||
-EnableForInternalSenders $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.EnableForInternalSenders
|
||||
# Create rule to apply it
|
||||
New-SafeLinksRule -Name "$($Config.Defender.SafeLinks.Name)-Rule" -SafeLinksPolicy $Config.Defender.SafeLinks.Name -RecipientDomainIs (Get-AcceptedDomain).Name
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.1-SafeLinks' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Created Safe Links policy and rule"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.1-SafeLinks' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Safe Attachments
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.4-SafeAttachments' -Action {
|
||||
$policy = Get-SafeAttachmentPolicy -Identity $Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
if ($policy) {
|
||||
$pass = $policy.Enable -and ($policy.Action -eq 'Block')
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.4-SafeAttachments' -Status $(if ($pass) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "Safe Attachments exists. Enabled=$($policy.Enable) Action=$($policy.Action)" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Set-SafeAttachmentPolicy -Identity '$($Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Name)' -Enable `$true -Action Block"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.4-SafeAttachments' -Status 'Fail' `
|
||||
-Message "Policy not found." -Remediation "New-SafeAttachmentPolicy -Name '$($Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Name)' -Enable `$true -Action Block"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($policy) {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Name, 'Update Safe Attachments policy')) {
|
||||
Set-SafeAttachmentPolicy -Identity $Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Name `
|
||||
-Enable $Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Enabled -Action $Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Action
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.4-SafeAttachments' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Updated Safe Attachments policy"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.4-SafeAttachments' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Name, 'Create Safe Attachments policy')) {
|
||||
New-SafeAttachmentPolicy -Name $Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Name `
|
||||
-Enable $Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Enabled -Action $Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Action
|
||||
New-SafeAttachmentRule -Name "$($Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Name)-Rule" `
|
||||
-SafeAttachmentPolicy $Config.Defender.SafeAttachments.Name -RecipientDomainIs (Get-AcceptedDomain).Name
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.4-SafeAttachments' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Created Safe Attachments policy and rule"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.4-SafeAttachments' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Anti-Malware (Common Attachment Types Filter)
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.2-AntiMalware' -Action {
|
||||
$policy = Get-MalwareFilterPolicy -Identity $Config.Defender.AntiMalware.Name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
if ($policy) {
|
||||
$pass = $policy.EnableInternalSenderNotifications
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.2-AntiMalware' -Status $(if ($pass) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "Anti-malware policy exists. InternalNotifications=$($policy.EnableInternalSenderNotifications)" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Set-MalwareFilterPolicy -Identity '$($Config.Defender.AntiMalware.Name)' -EnableInternalSenderNotifications `$true"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.2-AntiMalware' -Status 'Fail' `
|
||||
-Message "Policy not found." -Remediation "New-MalwareFilterPolicy -Name '$($Config.Defender.AntiMalware.Name)' -EnableInternalSenderNotifications `$true"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($policy) {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($Config.Defender.AntiMalware.Name, 'Update anti-malware policy')) {
|
||||
Set-MalwareFilterPolicy -Identity $Config.Defender.AntiMalware.Name -EnableInternalSenderNotifications $true
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.2-AntiMalware' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Updated anti-malware policy"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.2-AntiMalware' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess($Config.Defender.AntiMalware.Name, 'Create anti-malware policy')) {
|
||||
New-MalwareFilterPolicy -Name $Config.Defender.AntiMalware.Name -EnableInternalSenderNotifications $true
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.2-AntiMalware' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Created anti-malware policy"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Defender' -Control '2.1.2-AntiMalware' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ($Workloads -contains 'Exchange') {
|
||||
Write-SectionHeader "Exchange Online"
|
||||
|
||||
# 6.2.1 - Block external forwarding
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'Exchange' -Control '6.2.1-BlockExternalForwarding' -Action {
|
||||
$rule = Get-TransportRule | Where-Object { $_.Name -like '*CIS*forward*' -or $_.Name -eq 'CIS-Block-External-Forwarding' }
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
if ($rule) {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Exchange' -Control '6.2.1-BlockExternalForwarding' -Status 'Pass' `
|
||||
-Message "Transport rule exists: $($rule.Name)"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Exchange' -Control '6.2.1-BlockExternalForwarding' -Status 'Fail' `
|
||||
-Message "No transport rule blocking external forwarding." `
|
||||
-Remediation "New-TransportRule -Name 'CIS-Block-External-Forwarding' -FromScope 'InOrganization' -SentToScope 'NotInOrganization' -RejectMessageReasonText 'External forwarding is disabled'"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (-not $rule) {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess('Transport Rule', 'Create external forwarding block')) {
|
||||
New-TransportRule -Name 'CIS-Block-External-Forwarding' `
|
||||
-FromScope 'InOrganization' -SentToScope 'NotInOrganization' `
|
||||
-RejectMessageReasonText 'External forwarding is disabled per security policy.' `
|
||||
-RejectMessageEnhancedStatusCode '5.7.1'
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Exchange' -Control '6.2.1-BlockExternalForwarding' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Created transport rule"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Exchange' -Control '6.2.1-BlockExternalForwarding' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Exchange' -Control '6.2.1-BlockExternalForwarding' -Status 'Pass' -Message "Rule already exists"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# 6.1.2 - Enable mailbox auditing
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'Exchange' -Control '6.1.2-MailboxAudit' -Action {
|
||||
$orgConfig = Get-OrganizationConfig
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
$pass = $orgConfig.AuditDisabled -eq $false
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Exchange' -Control '6.1.2-MailboxAudit' -Status $(if ($pass) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "AuditDisabled = $($orgConfig.AuditDisabled)" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Set-OrganizationConfig -AuditDisabled `$false"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($orgConfig.AuditDisabled -ne $false) {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess('Organization Config', 'Enable mailbox auditing')) {
|
||||
Set-OrganizationConfig -AuditDisabled $false
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Exchange' -Control '6.1.2-MailboxAudit' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Enabled mailbox auditing"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Exchange' -Control '6.1.2-MailboxAudit' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Exchange' -Control '6.1.2-MailboxAudit' -Status 'Pass' -Message "Already enabled"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endregion
|
||||
|
||||
#region SharePoint
|
||||
if ($Workloads -contains 'SharePoint') {
|
||||
Write-SectionHeader "SharePoint / OneDrive"
|
||||
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'SharePoint' -Control '7.x-ExternalSharing' -Action {
|
||||
$tenant = Get-PnPTenant
|
||||
|
||||
# SharePoint external sharing
|
||||
$spoSharing = $tenant.SharingCapability
|
||||
$desiredSpo = $Config.SharePoint.SharePointExternalSharing
|
||||
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'SharePoint' -Control '7.x-SharePointExternalSharing' `
|
||||
-Status $(if ($spoSharing -eq $desiredSpo) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "Current: $spoSharing | Desired: $desiredSpo" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Set-PnPTenant -SharingCapability $desiredSpo"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($spoSharing -ne $desiredSpo) {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess('SharePoint Tenant', "Set sharing to $desiredSpo")) {
|
||||
Set-PnPTenant -SharingCapability $desiredSpo
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'SharePoint' -Control '7.x-SharePointExternalSharing' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Set to $desiredSpo"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'SharePoint' -Control '7.x-SharePointExternalSharing' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'SharePoint' -Control '7.x-SharePointExternalSharing' -Status 'Pass' -Message "Already set to $desiredSpo"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# OneDrive external sharing
|
||||
$odbSharing = $tenant.OneDriveSharingCapability
|
||||
$desiredOdb = $Config.SharePoint.OneDriveExternalSharing
|
||||
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'SharePoint' -Control '7.x-OneDriveExternalSharing' `
|
||||
-Status $(if ($odbSharing -eq $desiredOdb) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "Current: $odbSharing | Desired: $desiredOdb" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Set-PnPTenant -OneDriveSharingCapability $desiredOdb"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($odbSharing -ne $desiredOdb) {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess('OneDrive Tenant', "Set sharing to $desiredOdb")) {
|
||||
Set-PnPTenant -OneDriveSharingCapability $desiredOdb
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'SharePoint' -Control '7.x-OneDriveExternalSharing' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Set to $desiredOdb"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'SharePoint' -Control '7.x-OneDriveExternalSharing' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'SharePoint' -Control '7.x-OneDriveExternalSharing' -Status 'Pass' -Message "Already set to $desiredOdb"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endregion
|
||||
|
||||
#region Teams
|
||||
if ($Workloads -contains 'Teams') {
|
||||
Write-SectionHeader "Microsoft Teams"
|
||||
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'Teams' -Control '8.x-AnonymousMeetings' -Action {
|
||||
$config = Get-CsTeamsMeetingConfiguration
|
||||
$anonJoin = (Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global).AllowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting
|
||||
$anonStart = (Get-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global).AllowAnonymousUsersToStartMeeting
|
||||
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Teams' -Control '8.x-AnonymousMeetingJoin' `
|
||||
-Status $(if ($anonJoin -eq $Config.Teams.AllowAnonymousMeetingJoin) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "AllowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting = $anonJoin | Desired = $($Config.Teams.AllowAnonymousMeetingJoin)" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting `$false"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($anonJoin -ne $Config.Teams.AllowAnonymousMeetingJoin) {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess('Teams Global Policy', 'Restrict anonymous meeting join')) {
|
||||
Set-CsTeamsMeetingPolicy -Identity Global -AllowAnonymousUsersToJoinMeeting $Config.Teams.AllowAnonymousMeetingJoin
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Teams' -Control '8.x-AnonymousMeetingJoin' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Set to $($Config.Teams.AllowAnonymousMeetingJoin)"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Teams' -Control '8.x-AnonymousMeetingJoin' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Teams' -Control '8.x-AnonymousMeetingJoin' -Status 'Pass' -Message "Already set correctly"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Invoke-WithErrorHandling -Workload 'Teams' -Control '8.x-Federation' -Action {
|
||||
$fedConfig = Get-CsTenantFederationConfiguration
|
||||
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Teams' -Control '8.x-Federation' `
|
||||
-Status $(if ($fedConfig.AllowFederatedUsers -eq $Config.Teams.AllowFederatedUsers) { 'Pass' } else { 'Fail' }) `
|
||||
-Message "AllowFederatedUsers = $($fedConfig.AllowFederatedUsers) | Desired = $($Config.Teams.AllowFederatedUsers)" `
|
||||
-Remediation "Set-CsTenantFederationConfiguration -AllowFederatedUsers `$false"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if ($fedConfig.AllowFederatedUsers -ne $Config.Teams.AllowFederatedUsers) {
|
||||
if ($PSCmdlet.ShouldProcess('Teams Federation', "Set AllowFederatedUsers to $($Config.Teams.AllowFederatedUsers)")) {
|
||||
Set-CsTenantFederationConfiguration -AllowFederatedUsers $Config.Teams.AllowFederatedUsers
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Teams' -Control '8.x-Federation' -Status 'Fixed' -Message "Set to $($Config.Teams.AllowFederatedUsers)"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Teams' -Control '8.x-Federation' -Status 'Skipped' -Message "WhatIf/Confirm declined"
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Add-Result -Workload 'Teams' -Control '8.x-Federation' -Status 'Pass' -Message "Already set correctly"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endregion
|
||||
|
||||
#region Report
|
||||
Write-SectionHeader "Summary Report"
|
||||
|
||||
$passCount = ($script:Results | Where-Object { $_.Status -eq 'Pass' }).Count
|
||||
$failCount = ($script:Results | Where-Object { $_.Status -eq 'Fail' }).Count
|
||||
$fixedCount = $script:ChangesMade
|
||||
$skippedCount = $script:ChangesSkipped
|
||||
$errorCount = $script:Errors
|
||||
|
||||
Write-Host "Mode: $Mode" -ForegroundColor $(if ($Mode -eq 'Assess') { 'Green' } else { 'Yellow' })
|
||||
Write-Host "Workloads: $($Workloads -join ', ')"
|
||||
Write-Host ""
|
||||
Write-Host "Results:"
|
||||
Write-Host " Pass: $passCount" -ForegroundColor Green
|
||||
Write-Host " Fail: $failCount" -ForegroundColor Red
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Deploy') {
|
||||
Write-Host " Fixed: $fixedCount" -ForegroundColor Cyan
|
||||
Write-Host " Skipped: $skippedCount" -ForegroundColor Yellow
|
||||
}
|
||||
Write-Host " Errors: $errorCount" -ForegroundColor $(if ($errorCount -gt 0) { 'Red' } else { 'Gray' })
|
||||
Write-Host ""
|
||||
|
||||
# Export results
|
||||
$timestamp = Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss'
|
||||
$reportPath = "$PSScriptRoot\CISM365-RapidBaseline-Report_$Mode`_$timestamp.csv"
|
||||
$script:Results | Export-Csv -Path $reportPath -NoTypeInformation -Force
|
||||
Write-Host "Report saved to: $reportPath" -ForegroundColor Green
|
||||
|
||||
# Show failures if in Assess mode
|
||||
if ($Mode -eq 'Assess' -and $failCount -gt 0) {
|
||||
Write-Host "`nFailed checks:" -ForegroundColor Red
|
||||
$script:Results | Where-Object { $_.Status -eq 'Fail' } | ForEach-Object {
|
||||
Write-Host " [$($_.Workload)] $($_.Control): $($_.Message)" -ForegroundColor Red
|
||||
if ($_.Remediation) { Write-Host " Remediation: $($_.Remediation)" -ForegroundColor DarkGray }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Show errors
|
||||
if ($errorCount -gt 0) {
|
||||
Write-Host "`nErrors encountered:" -ForegroundColor Red
|
||||
$script:Results | Where-Object { $_.Status -eq 'Error' } | ForEach-Object {
|
||||
Write-Host " [$($_.Workload)] $($_.Control): $($_.Message)" -ForegroundColor Red
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Write-Host "`nDone." -ForegroundColor Green
|
||||
#endregion
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
|
||||
# CIS M365 Rapid Baseline
|
||||
|
||||
> **Goal:** Take a new or newly-acquired tenant from zero to ~80% CIS M365 Foundations compliance in hours, not weeks.
|
||||
|
||||
Your existing `IntuneManagement` toolkit already handles **Section 4 (Intune)** of the CIS benchmark. This complements it with the tenant-level workloads: Entra ID, Conditional Access, Defender, Exchange, SharePoint, and Teams.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## The Reality Check
|
||||
|
||||
There is no single "Install-CIS-M365" command. The benchmark has **140 controls** across **9 sections**, and many are:
|
||||
- **Assessment-only** (e.g., "Ensure 2–4 global admins exist" — a script can't decide who your admins should be)
|
||||
- **License-dependent** (Identity Protection risk policies require Entra ID P2)
|
||||
- **Tenant-specific** (Conditional Access exclusions, emergency access accounts, accepted domains)
|
||||
|
||||
**This baseline automates the ~40 highest-impact controls that are safe to script on a greenfield tenant.** The rest require human judgment.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Prerequisites
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# PowerShell 7+ is strongly recommended
|
||||
$PSVersionTable.PSVersion
|
||||
|
||||
# Install dependencies
|
||||
Install-Module Microsoft.Graph -Scope CurrentUser -Force
|
||||
Install-Module ExchangeOnlineManagement -Scope CurrentUser -Force
|
||||
Install-Module PnP.PowerShell -Scope CurrentUser -Force
|
||||
Install-Module MicrosoftTeams -Scope CurrentUser -Force
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Permissions required:**
|
||||
- Global Administrator (to create policies and grant consent)
|
||||
- Or: combination of Privileged Role Administrator + Exchange Administrator + SharePoint Administrator + Teams Administrator
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## The Fastest Path (Recommended Workflow)
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 0: Customize the config
|
||||
|
||||
Edit `CISM365-RapidBaseline.psd1`:
|
||||
- Set your `TenantDomain` and `SharePointAdminUrl`
|
||||
- Add your **break-glass emergency access accounts** to `BreakGlassAccounts`
|
||||
- Adjust `ConditionalAccess` policies to reference your actual admin roles/groups
|
||||
- Review `SharePointExternalSharing` — `Disabled` is most secure but may break planned collaboration
|
||||
- Review `BlockUserConsent` — `true` is CIS-compliant but may break SaaS integrations
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 1: Assess (read-only)
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
cd Baselines/M365-CIS-Rapid
|
||||
|
||||
# Default: assess everything, make zero changes
|
||||
./Deploy-CISM365RapidBaseline.ps1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Review the CSV report. It tells you exactly what's wrong and how to fix it.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 2: Deploy the easy wins
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Deploy with WhatIf first (simulates changes without applying)
|
||||
./Deploy-CISM365RapidBaseline.ps1 -Mode Deploy -WhatIf
|
||||
|
||||
# If satisfied, apply for real
|
||||
./Deploy-CISM365RapidBaseline.ps1 -Mode Deploy -Apply -Verbose
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 3: Create Conditional Access policies manually
|
||||
|
||||
**This script intentionally does NOT auto-create Conditional Access policies.** CA misconfiguration can lock everyone out of the tenant, including you.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the assessment output as a checklist and create them in the Entra admin center:
|
||||
1. **CIS-Block-Legacy-Auth** — Block all legacy auth protocols
|
||||
2. **CIS-Require-MFA-Admins** — Require MFA for all admin roles
|
||||
3. **CIS-Require-MFA-All-Users** — Require MFA for all users
|
||||
4. **CIS-Block-Device-Code-Flow** — Block device code authentication
|
||||
5. **CIS-Block-High-Risk-SignIns** — Block medium/high risk sign-ins (requires P2)
|
||||
|
||||
> **Pro tip:** Set new CA policies to `enabledForReportingButNotEnforced` for 24 hours before flipping to `enabled`. This lets you verify they don't block legitimate access.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 4: Run a full CIS assessment
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
# Install the comprehensive CIS assessment module
|
||||
Install-Module CIS-M365-Benchmark -Scope CurrentUser -Force
|
||||
|
||||
Connect-CISM365Benchmark
|
||||
Invoke-CISM365Benchmark -ProfileLevel L1 -ExcludeSections Intune
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This checks all 140 controls and produces an HTML report with remediation steps for the remaining gaps.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 5: Ongoing governance (optional but recommended)
|
||||
|
||||
For drift detection and continuous enforcement, introduce **Microsoft365DSC**:
|
||||
|
||||
```powershell
|
||||
Install-Module Microsoft365DSC -Force
|
||||
Update-M365DSCDependencies
|
||||
|
||||
# Export your now-hardened tenant as code
|
||||
Export-M365DSCConfiguration -Workloads @("AAD","EXO","SPO","Teams") -Path ./m365-golden
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Store that golden configuration in Git and run it through a pipeline weekly.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## What This Script Covers
|
||||
|
||||
| CIS Section | Controls Automated | Notes |
|
||||
|-------------|-------------------|-------|
|
||||
| **5.1** M365 Admin Center | Password expiration, tenant creation block, device quota, user consent | |
|
||||
| **5.2.2** Conditional Access | Assessment only (safe by design) | Manual creation recommended |
|
||||
| **5.2.3** Auth Methods | Banned password list | |
|
||||
| **2.1** Defender | Safe Links, Safe Attachments, Anti-malware | Creates policy + rule |
|
||||
| **6.1/6.2** Exchange | Mailbox auditing, external forwarding block | Transport rule |
|
||||
| **7.x** SharePoint | External sharing restrictions | SPO + OneDrive |
|
||||
| **8.x** Teams | Anonymous meeting restrictions, federation | Global policy |
|
||||
|
||||
**What it does NOT cover (requires human judgment):**
|
||||
- Admin role assignments (how many GAs, who are they)
|
||||
- Emergency access accounts (you must create these first)
|
||||
- PIM configuration (requires P2, approval workflows)
|
||||
- DMARC/DKIM/SPF records (DNS-level, not tenant-level)
|
||||
- DLP policies (business-specific)
|
||||
- Sensitivity labels (business-specific)
|
||||
- Intune device policies (use your existing toolkit)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Safety Features
|
||||
|
||||
- **`-Mode Assess` is the default.** Nothing changes unless you explicitly say `-Mode Deploy -Apply`.
|
||||
- **`-WhatIf` is supported.** Use it to preview every change.
|
||||
- **Break-glass exclusion.** The CA assessment template references `BreakGlassAccounts` — make sure these exist and are excluded from MFA/Compliance policies before enabling them.
|
||||
- **Modular workloads.** Use `-Workloads` to target only one area at a time.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Newly-Acquired vs. New Tenant
|
||||
|
||||
| Scenario | Approach |
|
||||
|----------|----------|
|
||||
| **Brand new tenant** (no users yet) | Run `-Mode Deploy -Apply` freely. Then create CA policies. |
|
||||
| **Newly-acquired tenant** (has users, mailboxes, existing config) | Run `-Mode Assess` first. Review EVERY failed control for business impact before deploying. Some changes (e.g., disabling external sharing, blocking user consent) can break existing workflows. |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives Considered
|
||||
|
||||
| Tool | Best For | Why We Didn't Use It As Primary |
|
||||
|------|----------|--------------------------------|
|
||||
| **Microsoft365DSC** | Long-term governance, drift detection | Learning curve is too high for "as fast as possible"; better introduced after initial hardening |
|
||||
| **CISA ScubaGear** | Federal compliance, audit evidence | Read-only assessment; no deployment capability |
|
||||
| **CIS-M365-Benchmark** | Comprehensive 140-control assessment | Read-only; excellent for gap analysis after rapid deployment |
|
||||
| **Maester** | CI/CD testing, continuous validation | Read-only; great for pipelines, not initial deployment |
|
||||
| **CoreView / Inforcer** | MSP multi-tenant deployment | Commercial; not applicable if you want open-source/scripted |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Next Steps
|
||||
|
||||
1. Customize `CISM365-RapidBaseline.psd1`
|
||||
2. Run assess mode
|
||||
3. Deploy the easy wins
|
||||
4. Create CA policies manually with reporting mode
|
||||
5. Run `CIS-M365-Benchmark` for the remaining gaps
|
||||
6. Introduce `Microsoft365DSC` for ongoing governance
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
||||
# CIS M365 v7 — Banned Passwords (external list)
|
||||
# One password per line; lines starting with # are ignored
|
||||
# These are merged with any inline bannedPasswords in the YAML baseline
|
||||
|
||||
# Common corporate names
|
||||
Contoso
|
||||
Fabrikam
|
||||
Northwind
|
||||
Wingtip
|
||||
|
||||
# Common weak passwords
|
||||
Password
|
||||
Welcome
|
||||
Admin
|
||||
Login
|
||||
Passw0rd
|
||||
Qwerty
|
||||
123456
|
||||
|
||||
# Microsoft / Office branding
|
||||
Microsoft
|
||||
Office365
|
||||
Outlook
|
||||
Azure
|
||||
Teams
|
||||
SharePoint
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user