Added authentication guidance and policy
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Security/authentication_guidance.md
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Security/authentication_guidance.md
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# Authentication Guidance & Hardening (Comprehensive, EU‑Aligned)
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**Document owner:** [Owner/Role]
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**Approved by:** [Steering Committee / CISO]
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**Effective date:** [YYYY-MM-DD]
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**Review cadence:** [Annually]
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---
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## 1. Purpose & Scope
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This document provides practical guidance and examples for implementing the Authentication Policy across [Organization] systems.
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It includes detailed examples for assurance levels, distinction of methods (passwords vs PINs vs biometrics), special cases (BitLocker, local admin accounts), out‑of‑band methods, central vs. local authentication, and reauthentication.
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---
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## 2. Method Identification Guide (What is it? Where does the secret live?)
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Use this section to classify any method you encounter.
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### 2.1 Memorized Secrets (Passwords)
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- **What it is:** A human‑chosen **password** sent to a **verifier** (server) that stores only a **hash**.
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- **Where the secret lives:** In the **user’s memory**; verifier stores a **hashed verifier**.
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- **Factor category:** **Something you know**.
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- **Typical AAL:** **AAL1** alone; **AAL2** when combined with another factor.
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- **Examples:** Account password for SSO, VPN, app logins.
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- **Notes:** Allow paste/managers; use passphrases; blocklist screening; no composition rules; no periodic expiry.
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### 2.2 Activation Secrets (PINs that unlock local authenticators)
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- **What it is:** A **PIN** used to unlock a **local cryptographic key** (TPM, smart card, FIDO2). The PIN itself is **never transmitted** to a server.
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- **Where the secret lives:** **On the device/token** only (e.g., TPM/smart‑card); verifier never sees it.
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- **Factor category:** **Something you know** (used locally), combined with **something you have** (device/token).
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- **Typical AAL:** Contributes to **AAL2** or **AAL3** depending on hardware and protocol.
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- **Examples and distinctions:**
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- **Windows Hello PIN** → unlocks TPM‑bound private key on **that device only**; **not** the same as the account password.
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- **Smart‑card PIN** → unlocks card’s private key; used with certificate‑based login.
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- **FIDO2 PIN** → unlocks the authenticator to perform WebAuthn challenges.
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- **Mobile device screen PIN** → unlocks the phone; when used with a bound authenticator app, it protects the **OOB** channel.
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- **BitLocker pre‑boot PIN** → unlocks the disk key (see BitLocker section).
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- **Minimums:** PIN **≥4**, **should be ≥6**; local throttling/lockout required.
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### 2.3 Biometrics (Local unlock only)
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- **What it is:** **Fingerprint/face/iris** used to unlock a **local key** (e.g., Windows Hello, phone biometric).
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- **Where the secret lives:** Biometric template stays on the device/TPM/secure enclave.
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- **Factor category:** **Something you are** (local unlock).
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- **Typical AAL:** Part of **AAL2/AAL3** when combined with hardware key; **never** as sole factor.
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### 2.4 Out‑of‑Band (OOB) Methods
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- **What it is:** A second, **separate channel** (e.g., mobile app) to approve login.
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- **Where the secret lives:** Bound to the **mobile device/app**; approvals sent over encrypted channel.
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- **Factor category:** Typically **something you have** (the device), sometimes plus its **PIN/biometric** (something you know/are).
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- **Typical AAL:** **AAL2** when **device‑bound and encrypted**.
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- **Examples:** Push approvals; **QR‑code sign‑in** with Microsoft Authenticator.
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- **Not permitted as primary:** SMS/voice/email (recovery only).
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---
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## 3. Assurance Levels – Examples & Guidance
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### 🔹 AAL1 (Single Factor)
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- **Examples:**
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- Password‑only login to low‑risk intranet site
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- Local Linux/Windows account with password
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- BitLocker with **PIN only** (no TPM)
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- Local admin password **without LAPS**
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- **Risks:** Phishable/replayable; brute‑forceable.
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- **Guidance:** Use only for low‑sensitivity or offline recovery; **not** for remote/external access; plan deprecation.
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### 🔹 AAL2 (Standard MFA)
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- **Examples:**
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- Password + **TOTP** authenticator app
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- Password + **push** approval on a bound device
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- Password + **QR‑code** sign‑in with Microsoft Authenticator
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- **Smart‑card + PIN**
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- **Windows Hello** (TPM‑backed key) + PIN/biometric
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- **BitLocker: TPM + PIN**
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- Local admin password **with LAPS** (unique per device, rotated) for offline recovery scenarios
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- **Risks:** Still phishable (push/QR can be proxied).
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- **Guidance:** Default for SaaS, VPN, employee desktops; allow push/QR only when **device‑bound** and **rate‑limited**; enroll **≥2 MFA methods** per user.
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### 🔹 AAL3 (High Assurance)
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- **Examples:**
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- **FIDO2/WebAuthn hardware** security key
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- **PIV/smart‑card** login with crypto challenge + PIN
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- **Windows Hello** with biometric unlocking a **TPM‑bound** key used for hardware‑backed auth
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- **BitLocker: TPM + PIN + post‑boot FIDO2** login
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- **Risks:** Strong phishing and verifier‑impersonation resistance.
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- **Guidance:** Required for admins, production, regulated systems; **no OOB**; keys must be **non‑exportable** and hardware‑protected; biometrics only unlock keys.
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---
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## 4. Central vs. Local Authentication
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- **Central (preferred):** IdP/SSO (SAML/OIDC/RADIUS) with consistent policy, logging, and conditional access.
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- **Local (supporting/offline):** BitLocker pre‑boot PIN, Windows Hello PIN, Linux root password.
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- **Guidance:** Local methods **must** follow length/blocklist rules for memorized secrets and enforce local throttling; prefer TPM/smart‑card integration for higher assurance.
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---
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## 5. BitLocker Pre‑Boot Authentication (Deep‑dive)
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- **TPM only:** Disk key released automatically → **AAL1**. Not acceptable for sensitive data.
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- **PIN only (no TPM):** PIN protects disk key → **AAL1**. Use only with compensating **post‑boot MFA** and limited roles.
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- **TPM + PIN:** PIN unlocks TPM which releases disk key → **AAL2**. Enterprise baseline for laptops.
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- **TPM + PIN + post‑boot FIDO2/smart‑card:** Meets **AAL3** for privileged/regulated systems.
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- **Operational requirements:** PIN length **≥6** recommended; enforce lockout/anti‑hammering; maintain recovery key hygiene; test pre‑boot accessibility for users with assistive tech.
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---
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## 6. Local Administrator Accounts
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- **Without LAPS:** Shared/static password → **AAL1 (high risk)**; prohibited except as break‑glass in a vault with approvals and audit.
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- **With LAPS:** Unique random password per device, rotated automatically → **AAL1 (mitigated)**; acceptable for offline recovery; retrieval must be logged.
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- **Preferred daily admin:** Central privileged accounts with **MFA** (**AAL2/AAL3**).
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---
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## 7. Reauthentication & Session Management
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- **AAL1:** Reauth **≤ 30 days**.
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- **AAL2:** Reauth **≤ 24 hours**, inactivity **≤ 1 hour**.
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- **AAL3:** Reauth **≤ 12 hours**, inactivity **≤ 15 minutes**.
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- **Tips:** Warn prior to expiry; support seamless reauth with device‑bound authenticators.
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---
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## 8. Password Creation & User Education (Quick Guide)
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- Prefer **passphrases** (multiple unrelated words with spaces).
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- Avoid personal info, service names, or keyboard patterns.
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- Use a **password manager**; unique secret per site/system.
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- Expect **blocklist rejection** for weak/compromised choices.
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- Do **not** write down passwords in plain sight; if written, store securely.
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---
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## 9. Quick Comparison Tables
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### 9.1 Method Classification
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| Method | What it is | Secret location | Factor(s) | Typical AAL | Notes |
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| Account **password** | Memorized secret sent to verifier | User memory / verifier stores hash | Know | AAL1 (alone) | Needs blocklist; no composition; no expiry |
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| **Windows Hello PIN** | Local PIN to unlock TPM key | Device TPM | Know + Have (device) | AAL2–AAL3* | Device‑specific; not account password |
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| **Smart‑card PIN** | Local PIN to unlock card key | Smart‑card | Know + Have | AAL2–AAL3 | Cert‑based login |
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| **FIDO2 PIN** | Local PIN to unlock FIDO key | Hardware key | Know + Have | AAL3 | Phishing‑resistant |
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| **Biometric** | Local unlock (face/fingerprint) | Device enclave | Are (+ Have) | AAL2–AAL3 | Unlock only; not sole factor |
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| **TOTP app** | One‑time code generator | Mobile device | Have (+ Know if app PIN) | AAL2 | Bind device; protect seed |
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| **Push/QR OOB** | Encrypted approval channel | Mobile device | Have (+ Know/Are) | AAL2 | Device‑bound & rate‑limited |
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| **SMS/voice/email OTP** | Code over PSTN/email | Network/mail | Have? (weak) | Recovery only | Not primary MFA |
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\*Depends on deployment: with hardware‑bound non‑exportable keys and phishing‑resistant protocol usage, Windows Hello deployments can reach AAL3.
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### 9.2 BitLocker Summary
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| Mode | AAL | Use Case | Notes |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| TPM only | AAL1 | Low‑risk fleets | Not for sensitive data |
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| PIN only (no TPM) | AAL1 | Legacy/no‑TPM | Must pair with post‑boot MFA |
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| TPM + PIN | AAL2 | Enterprise baseline | Enforce ≥6 PIN, anti‑hammering |
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| TPM + PIN + post‑boot FIDO2 | AAL3 | Admin/regulated | Strongest posture |
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---
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## 10. Hardening Checklist
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✅ Map systems to **AAL1–AAL3**
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✅ Enforce **password** rules (length, 64‑char support, Unicode, blocklist, no composition)
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✅ Enroll **≥2 MFA methods** per user (primary + backup)
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✅ Prefer **FIDO2/smart‑card** for AAL3; ban **OOB** at AAL3
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✅ Permit only **device‑bound encrypted** push/QR; **ban SMS/email/voice** as primary
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✅ Enforce **LAPS** on all Windows endpoints; ban shared local admin passwords
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✅ Configure **rate‑limiting** for online guesses; local anti‑hammering for PINs
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✅ Implement **session timeouts** per AAL; warn users pre‑expiry
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✅ Audit **MFA resets**, **local admin retrievals**, and **failed logins**
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---
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## 11. References
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- NIST SP 800‑63B (Digital Identity Guidelines, 2023 update)
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- CIS Controls v8.1 (Controls 5 & 6)
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- ENISA Guidelines on Identity and Access Management
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- OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet
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Security/authentication_policy.md
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Security/authentication_policy.md
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# Authentication Policy (Comprehensive, EU‑Aligned)
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**Document owner:** [Owner/Role]
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**Approved by:** [Steering Committee / CISO]
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**Effective date:** [YYYY-MM-DD]
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**Review cadence:** [Annually]
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---
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## 1. Purpose & Scope
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This policy establishes mandatory requirements for authentication across [Organization] systems, including:
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- Passwords and memorized secrets
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- Multi‑factor authentication (MFA)
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- Authenticator Assurance Levels (AALs)
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- Out‑of‑band (OOB) authentication
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- Central vs. local authentication
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- Special cases (BitLocker, local admin accounts, device/smart‑card/mobile PINs)
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- Session management and reauthentication
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It is aligned with **NIST SP 800‑63B** (as best practice), **CIS Controls v8.1**, and **ENISA guidance**.
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It applies to all employees, contractors, vendors, and service accounts.
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This policy supports GDPR principles of **data protection by design** and **accountability**.
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---
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## 2. Policy Statements
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### 2.1 Assurance Levels
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- [Organization] **shall** align with Authenticator Assurance Levels (AALs):
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- **AAL1:** Single‑factor authentication. Permitted only for low‑sensitivity internal apps or offline scenarios.
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- **AAL2:** Multi‑factor authentication combining two categories (e.g., password + OTP app, push, QR code OOB). Required for employee logins, SaaS, and external‑facing systems.
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- **AAL3:** High‑assurance, hardware‑backed MFA (e.g., FIDO2, smartcards). Required for privileged/admin access, production, and regulated data systems.
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### 2.2 Memorized Secrets (Passwords)
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- **Length:**
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- **15+ characters** when used as a single factor.
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- **8+ characters** when used only in combination with MFA.
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- Systems **must** allow at least **64 characters**, accept **spaces/Unicode**, and **must not truncate** entered secrets.
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- **Composition:** No mandatory composition rules (no required mixes of upper/lower/digit/symbol).
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- **Screening:** New/changed passwords **must** be screened against **blocklists** of commonly used, expected, or **compromised** passwords (including organization‑specific terms).
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- **Expiration:** **No periodic expiration**. Change **only** upon suspected compromise or policy breach.
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- **Usability:** **Allow paste/autofill** and provide a **“show password”** option. **No password hints** and **no knowledge‑based questions (KBA)**.
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- **Reuse:** Password **must not** match the user’s current or any **of the last 5** passwords (where technically supported).
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- **Rate limiting:** Verifiers **must** throttle online guessing (progressive delays; avoid permanent lockout DoS).
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- **Storage:** Store only **salted, hashed** verifiers using **Argon2id (preferred)**, **bcrypt**, or **PBKDF2** with strong parameters; per‑credential unique salt; optional server‑side **pepper** protected separately.
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- **Transport:** Collect and transmit passwords only over **authenticated, encrypted channels** (TLS 1.2+).
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- **Managers:** Users **should** use an approved **password manager** to generate/store unique passwords.
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### 2.3 Activation Secrets (Local Unlock PINs/Biometrics)
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- **Definition:** An **activation secret** (e.g., device PIN, Windows Hello PIN, smart‑card PIN, FIDO2 PIN) is used **only to unlock a local authenticator/TPM/smart‑card**. It is **not transmitted** to a server and is **not** a password.
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- **Requirements:** Activation secrets **shall** remain on the device/token; **shall be ≥4 characters** and **should be ≥6**; online guesses **shall** be throttled/limited locally.
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- **Biometrics:** May be used **only** to unlock a device‑bound key and **must not** be the sole authenticator.
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### 2.4 Acceptable Authenticators
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- **Allowed:** FIDO2/WebAuthn keys; smartcards with PIN; authenticator apps (TOTP, push, **QR‑code sign‑in**); device‑bound biometrics (unlock only).
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- **Fallback only:** SMS/voice OTPs.
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- **Prohibited:** Email OTP; KBA/security questions.
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### 2.5 Out‑of‑Band (OOB) Methods
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- OOB authenticators **must** use **encrypted, device‑bound** channels (e.g., push or QR‑code flows) and **must** implement rate‑limiting.
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- **SMS/voice/email** **must not** be used as **primary** MFA. SMS/voice may be used **only** as recovery with risk acceptance.
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### 2.6 Central vs. Local Authentication
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- **Central IdP/SSO** **must** be the default for enterprise access.
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- **Local authentication** (device‑only) may be used for **pre‑boot**, **offline**, or **recovery**, but **must** meet the applicable AAL and other requirements in this policy.
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### 2.7 BitLocker Pre‑Boot Authentication
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- **TPM only:** AAL1; not acceptable for sensitive systems.
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- **PIN only (no TPM):** AAL1; acceptable only with compensating controls.
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- **TPM + PIN:** AAL2; recommended baseline for enterprise laptops.
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- **TPM + PIN + post‑boot FIDO2/smart‑card MFA:** Meets AAL3 for administrative systems.
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### 2.8 Local Administrator Accounts
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- Local admin accounts **must not** share passwords across devices.
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- **LAPS or equivalent** **must** randomize and rotate local admin passwords.
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- Local admin accounts **must not** be used for daily administration; use **central privileged accounts with MFA** (AAL2/AAL3).
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### 2.9 Reauthentication & Session Management
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- **AAL1:** Reauthentication **≤ 30 days**.
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- **AAL2:** Reauthentication **≤ 24 hours**, inactivity timeout **≤ 1 hour**.
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- **AAL3:** Reauthentication **≤ 12 hours**, inactivity timeout **≤ 15 minutes**.
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### 2.10 Enforcement
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- Violations **may** result in disciplinary action or revocation of access.
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- Non‑compliant systems **must** be remediated or formally excepted with CISO approval.
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---
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## 3. References
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- NIST SP 800‑63B (Digital Identity Guidelines, 2023 update)
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- CIS Controls v8.1 (Controls 5 & 6)
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- ENISA Guidelines on Identity and Access Management
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- OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet
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