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policies/Security/secure_sdlc_policy.md

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Secure Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) Policy

Document owner: [Owner/Role]
Approved by: [Steering Committee / CISO]
Effective date: [YYYY-MM-DD]
Review cadence: [Annually]


1. Purpose & Scope

This policy establishes mandatory secure development requirements for software built or materially customized by [Organization]. It applies to all engineering teams and to third-party developers per the Vendor & Third-Party Risk Management Policy.


2. Policy Statements

2.1 Secure Design & Threat Modeling

  • New systems handling TLP:AMBER+STRICT/RED data or touching kill-chain infrastructure (per Authentication Policy §2.1) must undergo threat modeling before implementation begins.

2.2 Secure Coding Standards

2.3 Dependency & Supply Chain Security

  • A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) must be generated for production applications.
  • Dependencies must be scanned for known vulnerabilities on every build; findings follow the SLA in Vulnerability & Patch Management Policy §2.2.
  • Dependency pinning must be used; automatic unpinned upgrades to production are prohibited.

2.4 Code Review & Analysis

  • All production code changes must be peer reviewed before merge.
  • Static analysis (SAST) must run on every build; dynamic analysis (DAST) must run at least before each production release for externally exposed applications.

2.5 Secrets in Code

2.6 Penetration Testing

  • Kill-chain-adjacent and externally exposed production applications must undergo penetration testing at least annually and after material architecture change.

2.7 Enforcement

  • Production deployment must not proceed without passing SAST and dependency scanning gates, absent a documented, time-bound CISO exception.

3. Antifragility Alignment

This policy is built to the five pillars of the organization's internal Antifragile Enterprise Manifest.

Pillar Applied In How
1. Structural Decoupling §2.3 SBOM and pinned dependencies make the hidden coupling graph of third-party code visible and controllable
2. Optionality Preservation §2.2 Following an open standard (ASVS) rather than a single vendor's proprietary security checklist keeps the standard portable
3. Stress-to-Signal Conversion §2.4 SAST/DAST findings and pen test results feed the same structural-fix process as any other incident
4. Sovereign Intelligence §2.1 Threat models are documented artifacts, not a conversation that evaporates after the design meeting
5. Asymmetric Payoff Design (Barbell) §2.2, §2.6 ASVS Level 2 and mandatory pen testing concentrated on kill-chain-adjacent/external apps; internal low-risk tools stay at Level 1

4. References