Updated README for detailed report explanation.
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README.md
94
README.md
@@ -63,3 +63,97 @@ They are paired online while running the script. KHDB does not contain usernames
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It should! If you have EDR installed on the host machine, this tool should be exceptioned.
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### Would our monitoring tool detect this activity?
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It should, as it is extremely sensitive operation that should never happen outside of this (or similar) procedure. Running this tool should be cleared with your SOC beforehand (or used as a test case).
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---
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## Weak password report
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1. Reversible Encryption:
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* ****Explanation:**** Accounts have passwords stored in a reversible format that can be decrypted.
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* **Risk Assessment:** High. Decrypted passwords can be misused easily.
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* **Possible Cause:** Legacy applications requiring plaintext password equivalents.
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* **Use:** Compatibility with older applications.
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* **Remediation:** Disable reversible encryption through Group Policy ("Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Account Policies > Password Policy > Store passwords using reversible encryption").
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2. LM Hashes Present:
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* **Explanation:** Use of outdated LAN Manager (LM) hashes for storing passwords.
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* **Risk Assessment:** Very High. LM hashes are easily cracked.
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* **Possible Cause:** Historical default settings for older Windows systems.
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* **Use:** Compatibility with legacy clients or systems.
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* **Remediation:** Disable LM hash storage via Group Policy ("Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > Network security: Do not store LAN Manager hash value on next password change").
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3. Accounts with No Password:
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* **Explanation:** Accounts are configured without a password.
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* **Risk Assessment:** Extremely High. Accounts are accessible without authentication.
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* **Possible Cause:** Oversight or initial setup convenience.
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* **Use:** Automated scripts or systems needing easy access.
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* **Remediation:** Ensure all accounts have strong passwords. Disable unnecessary accounts.
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4. Passwords Found in Dictionary:
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* **Explanation:** Accounts use weak passwords found in common dictionaries.
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* **Risk Assessment:** High. Dictionary attacks can easily guess these passwords.
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* **Possible Cause:** Lack of strong password policies.
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* **Use:** User convenience and easy recall.
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* **Remediation:** Implement and enforce strong password policies, use password filter DLLs.
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5. Same Passwords for Multiple Accounts:
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* **Explanation:** Multiple accounts share the same password.
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* **Risk Assessment:** High. Compromise of one account leads to multiple breaches.
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* **Possible Cause:** Administrative convenience.
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* **Use:** Simplified management across services.
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* **Remediation:** Establish unique passwords for each account, audit for password uniqueness.
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6. SamAccountName as Password:
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* **Explanation:** Usernames are used as passwords.
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* **Risk Assessment:** High. Easy to guess and compromise.
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* **Possible Cause:** Rudimentary security setup.
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* **Use:** Lowering barriers for user access.
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* **Remediation:** Prohibit this practice through user education and strict password policies.
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7. Computer Accounts with Default Passwords:
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* **Explanation:** Computer accounts use default passwords.
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* **Risk Assessment:** High. Default passwords are widely known.
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* **Possible Cause:** Incomplete setup or bulk deployments.
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* **Use:** Streamlined initial setup.
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* **Remediation:** Reset all default passwords to strong, unique ones.
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8. Missing Kerberos AES Keys:
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* **Explanation:** Accounts lack AES keys for Kerberos, falling back to weaker encryption.
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* **Risk Assessment:** Moderate to High. Weakens Kerberos authentication.
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* **Possible Cause:** Incomplete updates or migrations.
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* **Use:** Compatibility with older systems.
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* **Remediation:** Enable AES encryption for Kerberos in account properties and domain policies.
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9. No Kerberos Pre-Authentication Required:
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* **Explanation:** Accounts can request authentication data without pre-authentication.
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* **Risk Assessment:** High. Facilitates offline brute-force attacks.
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* **Possible Cause:** Troubleshooting or legacy system compatibility.
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* **Use:** Avoiding issues with older clients.
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* **Remediation:** Enable Kerberos pre-authentication for all accounts via account properties.
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10. Only DES Encryption Allowed:
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* **Explanation:** Accounts are restricted to using DES encryption.
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* **Risk Assessment:** Very High. DES is weak and easily compromised.
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* **Possible Cause:** Retained settings from when DES was standard.
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* **Use:** Ensuring functionality of older applications.
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* **Remediation:** Configure accounts to use stronger encryption types like AES in Group Policy.
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11. Susceptible to Kerberoasting:
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* **Explanation:** Service accounts have SPNs and weak passwords, making them vulnerable.
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* **Risk Assessment:** High. Enables offline password cracking.
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* **Possible Cause:** Lack of awareness about service account security.
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* **Use:** Service accounts needing elevated privileges.
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* **Remediation:** Implement strong password policies for service accounts, rotate passwords regularly, use Managed Service Accounts (MSA).
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12. Administrative Accounts Allowed for Delegation:
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* **Explanation:** Admin accounts configured to allow delegation.
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* **Risk Assessment:** High. Can be misused to escalate privileges.
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* **Possible Cause:** Misunderstanding or overly permissive security culture.
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* **Use:** Facilitating administrative processes.
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* **Remediation:** Restrict delegation rights, use Constrained Delegation.
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13. Passwords Will Never Expire:
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* **Explanation:** Accounts are configured to never require password changes.
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* **Risk Assessment:** Moderate to High. Increases risk of undetected breaches.
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* **Possible Cause:** Minimizing administrative burden.
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* **Use:** Reducing disruption from frequent password updates.
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* **Remediation:** Configure policies to require periodic password changes.
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14. Accounts Not Required to Have a Password:
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* **Explanation:** Accounts do not require passwords for authentication.
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* **Risk Assessment:** Extremely High. Allows unrestricted access.
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* **Possible Cause:** Configuration error or setup for automated systems.
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* **Use:** Automating processes without manual authentication.
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* **Remediation:** Enforce password requirements for all accounts.
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15. Smart Card Accounts with a Password:
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* **Explanation:** Smart card-required accounts also have passwords set.
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* **Risk Assessment:** Moderate to High. Bypasses smart card security.
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* **Possible Cause:** Hybrid authentication setup or legacy fallback.
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* **Use:** Providing a fallback in case of smart card issues.
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* **Remediation:** Require smart card for login, disable password fallback.
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