Visiting the homeserver's root path used to redirect to Element Web,
but only when Element Web was the client the playbook installed. People
running Cinny, Commet, FluffyChat, Hydrogen, SchildiChat or Sable landed
on a bare homeserver page instead.
The wiring now builds matrix_playbook_public_client_urls — the public
URLs of every playbook-managed web client which is enabled, ordered by
preference — and redirects to the first of them. Element Web stays
first, so existing setups redirect exactly where they did before.
The URL is computed once and shared by all five homeserver
implementations, which each carried their own copy of the old
Element-Web-only expression. It honours each client's own scheme,
hostname and path prefix, so a client served under a subpath now gets
linked correctly.
Supersedes https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy/pull/5513
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Commet role was the only playbook-installed web client without a
`_scheme` variable to go with its `_hostname` and `_path_prefix`, so
anything wishing to build Commet's public URL had to reach for
`matrix_playbook_ssl_enabled` itself.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Meowlnir (https://github.com/maunium/meowlnir) is a Matrix moderation
bot which speaks the same policy-list protocol as Mjolnir and Draupnir,
but runs as an appservice and can override individual policies coming
from ban lists you do not control.
Bots and their management rooms live only in Meowlnir's own database —
nothing in its configuration file can declare one — so the role
provisions them through the management API from a declarative roster
(matrix_bot_meowlnir_bots_custom), applied under the
ensure-matrix-users-created tag. Management rooms may be declared or
created for you; bots and rooms no longer declared get pruned.
Wrapper scripts for driving the management API by hand are installed
to /matrix/meowlnir/bin.
Meowlnir re-runs its configuration upgrader in memory on every start,
so a literal `generate` value yields a new secret per restart. All
secrets are therefore rendered explicitly, validation rejects
`generate`, and the configuration directory is mounted read-only.
Draupnir and Meowlnir both want synapse-http-antispam, which the
playbook wires up to a single consumer. The wiring prefers Draupnir,
and both roles fail the run when each claims it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Jitsi migrated image publishing from Docker Hub to the GitHub Container
Registry, and the new registry carries no tag history, so this also moves
Jitsi to stable-11146-1. That release makes the containers rootless and runs
them with a read-only root filesystem.
`jitsi_jvb_container_colibri_ws_host_bind_port` goes away with it. Colibri
WebSocket support was removed upstream in favour of SCTP data channels, so
the Jitsi Video Bridge no longer serves HTTP at all and needs no
reverse-proxy routing.
The `matrix_redis_` -> `redis_` check and the `redis_` -> `valkey_`
check both stored their matches in
`matrix_playbook_migration_redis_migration_vars`.
Facts persist for the whole play, so the second check was silently
overwriting the first one's value. Nothing reads these facts outside the
block that sets them, so this was harmless in practice, but it breaks as
soon as anyone reorders the checks, reads a fact later on, or disables
one of the two checks and expects the other's value to still be around.
Name the second one after its own check, like every other check here
does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four checks carried the task name of the check they were copy-pasted
from, so the redis -> valkey and keydb -> valkey checks both announced
themselves as matrix_redis ones, and both synapse OIDC label checks
announced themselves as matrix_ssl ones.
The matrix_nginx_proxy and matrix_ssl leftover messages also asked
people to rename variables, while the sentence right above them
(correctly) asks for these to be removed. The roles are gone, so there
is nothing to rename them to.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The variables holding matched deprecated variable names used to be
dictionaries (built via `vars | dict2items | ... | items2dict`), so
calling `.keys()` on them was correct.
Since a1f6ee4dc9, they are lists produced
by the `ansible.builtin.varnames` lookup, but 15 of the messages
consuming them were left calling `.keys()`.
The failing tasks are gated behind a `| length > 0` condition, so only
people who actually still carry one of these deprecated variables would
hit this. Such people were greeted by a cryptic templating error instead
of the message telling them what to rename or remove.
Fixes https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy/issues/5491
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The metrics endpoint was the only thing this bridge ever routed through
Traefik. With it gone, the container was still labeled `traefik.enable=true`
without defining any router, which makes Traefik fall back to its default
rule and produce a router pointing at nothing. It was also joining the
reverse-proxy network for no reason.
Related to https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy/issues/5487
6b4b7647e fixed this for synapse-usage-exporter only. A checkout owned by
a different user makes the git task fail from then on, either with a
permission error or with git's dubious-ownership protection, until
someone removes the directory on the host by hand. It gets into that
state when the matrix user's uid changes (a server migration or a restore
onto a differently numbered user), when an earlier clone ran as another
user, or when someone runs git as root inside the checkout.
Every other role cloning a repository onto the server was open to the
same failure, so ensure the checkout's ownership recursively before
updating it at the remaining 54 sites.
The three matrix-synapse ext clones also gain force=yes. They were the
only on-server clones without it, which left a checkout that an
interrupted run had half-written wedged, instead of repaired on the next
run.
matrix-matrixto used to clone as root into a directory that nothing ever
chowned, unlike every other role. It now becomes the matrix user too.
The Element Web and SchildiChat Web theme checkouts live on the Ansible
controller, where correcting ownership is not ours to do, so they merely
mark the checkout as a safe directory for git.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The recursive chown in front of the git task already guarantees that git
operates on a checkout owned by the user it becomes, so marking the path
as a safe.directory on top of that protects against nothing. Drop the
environment variables and condense the comment to a single line.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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